y
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASERSANITIZED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons
SubmnW by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE
Concu/fcd la by lha UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD Al3
?
ff*
ntelligence oryaniiatiom partiapaleti in lhe preparation of *hn estimatei
The Control Intelligence Agtncy ond theroon^ationi of tKe Ofporrii.Tid of Slole. Dclerua. lha Army, ihe Navy, lha Ai' Forte. AEC, ond NSA
Concurring:
oi Imeibflcnta andl Stateefame Inteiligenio Agency
AiMitant Chief O* Slafi (or. Department ofy
AuiUoni Chief oF Novol Operotiofiieportment of the Nervy
A.ii.looi Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF
tho Director, Atomic Energy CommiiMon
Director of the National Security Agency
Abilainingi
Director,ha tub|ecl being ou'wrf* of hitiidictiO<i.
APPROVES FOR RELEASE CWHISTOWCAl-REVIEWPROfiRJIM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear Weapons
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PKOBLEU 1
CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 4
I INTRODUCTION 4
II. SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
4
Available Booster
Warhead Yields and Effects
Other Characteristics
Cost
8
Current
Potential Advantages and Disadvantages 9
Near-Term Intentions 11
TO SPECIFIC UN AND US COURSES OF ACTION .SOVIET
Technical Consideration* 14
Considerations of Cost and17
TABLE I. WARHEAD WEIGHTS AND YIELDS OF POSSIBLENUCLEAR-ARMED 9
APPROVED FOR RELEASE CW HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS TO ORBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THE PROBLEM
To examine Soviet capabilities and intentions to orbit nuclear weapons, probable Free World reactions toevelopment, and Soviet reactions to various US responses.1
CONCLUSIONS
have thus far acquired no evidence that thetouclear-armed satellite in Uie near term, orprogram to establish an orbital bombardment capability isseriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership.the USSR does have the capability of orbiting one orfew nuclear-armed satellites at any time, and atcost. )
limitations of existing hardware and facilities arethe nuclear weapons which the Soviets could orbitwould not add significantly to their militaryCurrently operational Soviet ICBMs would bedelivering comparable payloads with
'In Uils estimate, wc concentrate primarily on midtiorbithose designed to complete one or more revolutions ol the earth prior to beine detonated. Wc also have included, though at much abbreviated length, consideration of fractional orbit system, ic. those designed to make less than one revoluUon ot thc earth before detonation. Although they do notallistic trajectory, fractional orbit systems are employedanner more closely related lo that of an ICBM, and are therefore not germane to most aspects of the problem.
ariety of political motives, such as the desire to restore thc image of the USSR as the preeminent world military power, might nevertheless impel the Soviets touclear weapon in the near term for demonstrative purposes.ove would be more likely if the Soviets were already committed to theestablishment of an orbital bombardment force, or ifthat the US was so committed. However, In seeking to impress world opinion, they would alsoariety of adverse reactions. Awe and alarm would be accompanied by resentment and dismay, and it would be charged in many quarters that the Soviets had extended the nuclear arms raceew, more dangerous area. The SovieU would have to consider whether it would serve their interests to risk strong US counter-moves, including an ambitious US military space program,eneral intensification of the cold war. )
balance, it appears to us that the disadvantagesthe advantages, and we therefore believe thatless than an even chance that the USSR will orbit ain the near term. Nevertheless, the Soviets maybalance differently than we do, and it remains possiblewill exercise their technical capability ut any time.
thc USSR shoulduclear weapon forpurposes, it would almost certainly anticipate some formreaction. The Soviets would have to consider thea US attempt to destroy their satellite, and if the USdo so, they would probably threaten retaliation against They would be wary, however, of the risksdirect retaliation,ossible "open war" on alland the accompanying dangers of escalation. Officialopinion in most states allied with the US wouldsupport US measures to counter the Soviet action. the nonaligned states would favor some form of UNSoviets themselves might use the UN in an effort tocounlermoves and to delay or forestall any USin space. )
iCCRCf-
ProspecU
solely on considerations of cost andwe now understand them, it would appear unlikely thatwill during this decade deploy advanced orbitalsystems of military significance We recognize,thc Soviets might reach different conclusions as to costor that other factors might be more weighty.considering the pace of developments in the weaponsgeneral, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Sovieta period many years ahead. For theseirmas to whether the Soviets will deploy an advancedsystem withineriod cannot bethis time. )
tho Soviets do proceed with an advanced orbitalbelieve that they are more likely tomall forceery large and sophisticated one.mall force could be maintained continually incould be held on standby on the ground for deploymentIn any case, developmental testing of an orbitalsystem should be observable to us atearprior lo attainment of an accurate, reliable
SLC.Uf
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Wc have no direct evidence ot any Soviet plan to orbit asatellite. However, we believe that the Sovietsresent and nearapability to launch one orew such nuclear-armed satellites by employing existing hardware. With respect to thc longernde are convinced that the Soviet leadership will, if it has not already, authorize feasibility studies and perhaps research and development tests on an orbital bombardment system.
Because of thc lack of direct evidence, this estimate relies heavily on what Is known of the Soviet and US slates-of-the-art In theof advanced missiles, space systems, and nuclear weapons. In employing this approach, we recognize thai great uncertainties are involved, especially in thc longer term. Knowledge of what is feasible and useful in the field of space weapons may change significantly as additional research and development work Is performed In both countries. At present, however, the factors wc can set forth wtth respect to Soviet capabilities for orbiting nuclear weapons Include: (a) the known and theoretical capabilities of Soviet space and missile boosters If adapted to this purpose; (b) the estimated yields and effects of nuclear warheads detonated at various altitudes; (c) the techniques the Soviets might employ for orbiting and detonating such weapons; and (d) thc likely accuracy, reliability, and costs of alternative techniques.
In considering the problem of this estimate, particularly withto the near term, we have sought to distinguish between the known performance characteristics and the theoretical possibilities of existing Soviet hardware and related equipment- We have, inconsidered certain trade-offs the Soviets might also weigh, such as maximizing warhead payloads for higher yield detonations in orbit at the expense of lower altitude detonations with their greater ground effects. For the longer term, we have assutned continued Sovietof large boosleri and appropriate subsystems which could be employedariety of missile and space purposes. Including an orbital bombardment system.
II. SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO ORBIT NUCLEAR
Available Booster Syi'erm
A. The USSR could use any one of several launch vehicle systems lt now possesses louclear weapon. Thc system considered most
SECRCT
sultable tor thc launching ofeapon on the basis of known performance characteristics is theCBM booster, withunikcnlk upper stage. Another launch system thc Soviets conceivably could utilize is theCBM We have not yet been able to determine whether thes relatively small or veryf thes very large, il could be used in conjunctionenlk uppercombination not tested toprovide the Soviets with their greatest present payload capabilityuclear-armed satellite.
Warhead Yields and Effect*
Currently available evidence shows that the Soviets arc interested in individual weapons of large mcgatonnagc yields, for deterrence and intimidation as well as for actual military employment. The weight and thus the yielduclear warhead which could be orbitediven launch system would be dependent on the altitude at which the satellite was to be orbited, on whether or not thc satellite was to be deorblted prior to detonation, and on otherhe highest yields could be achieved If the warhead were detonated while in orbit, because the satellite would need to have little on-board equipment other than the warhead. Using thecnlk upper stage, the Soviets could achieve aa weapon designed lor orbiting and detonationn. altitude. If thes large and was employed with the same upper stage, they might be able to attain nder the same conditions.
Our knowledge of the effects of high-yield warheads detonated at very high or orbital altitudes is subject U) much uncertainty. We are
confident, however, lhatdetonated at alti-
tudes as highhey would produce negligible blast, shock
and fallout effects on thc ground. Available data suggest thatP"
^Jat this altitude would create heat over large areas, provided that the atmosphere was clear, but this heat would not be of sufficient Intensity to start fires or to cause second degree burns to
iscussion of possible performance characteristics o( theCDM. seeM, "Soviet Mililnry Capabilities and Policies,atedarchOP SECRET, paragraphsSfl and Annex B, Table 1.
'abular summary of the estimated ytHds attainable with possible Soviet launch systems under various eondlUom ine* Tabic 1.
5
sccBcr
exposed human skin. Such detonations might cause temporary blackout of communications and radar over thousands of miles, but we havadata at present to measure such possible effects reliably and we Lhink tl unlikely that the Soviets themselvesuch daU.
n order to produce effects on the ground, therefore, aorbited with existing hardware would have to be designedIts warhead.atellite designed to be orbitedthen to de-orbit and detonate its weapon at an altitudeeet, theenik upper stage couldwarhead capableThel large, and employed
enlk upper stage^however, could still theoretically deliverthese conditions. In clear weather,
such bursts aT this altitude would cause severe damage to cities and other soft targetsairly large area, primarily by means of fire, although blast effect could be significant against some soft targets.
etonation at even lower altitudes would bo required toor hard targets by means of blast, shock and nuclearform of delivery would require heat-shielding and otherwhich would further reduce the size of the nuclearby using theenik, the Soviets could still orbit atand bring down to several thousand feet for detonation, aa yieldIf tne requirement were Imposed
that the nuclear weapon be recoverable, this possible yieldf large, and employed with a
Venlk upper stage,'ow altitude detonation, or
1^the weapon was recoverable. However, as great or greater yields could be obtained with these launch systems if employed as ICBMs; accuracy and reliability would also be better.
Olher Characteristics
Inystem, the Soviets would also have to consider other tradeoffs between its characteristics and thc nuclear payload which could be orbitediven launch system. In the examples given above, we assumed that the Soviets would employ minimalnd shallow dc-orblting paths in order to maximize nuclear payload. Orbital altitudes higher. would resultonger orbital lifetime, but at the expense of payload. There would alsorade-oil between accuracy and payload. Steep de-orbiting paths would result in greater delivery accuracy, but the vehicle would require more propellant for retrorockets and thus have reduced weapon yield.
While wc believe the Soviets are now capable ofuclear-armed satellite without prior testing, they could not have muchIn its reliability and accuracyelivery system. The deduc-
6*
Hons we have made Irom Soviet missile and space technology pointechnical capability olEP on the order. with warheads, of thc yields mentioned above, de-orbited on shallow re-entryoviet recoverable earth satellites have contributed somein accurate de-orbiting of space vehicles, but the greaterrequired for weapon delivery would call for developmental tests with new components. To develop such accuracy and to establish the reliability of nuclear-armed satellites would probablyeries of testseriod of atear after an Initial launching.
he effective orbital lifetime of nuclear-armed satellites the USSR could launch in the near term. circular orbits Isto rangeeek or so at the lower altitude to several months at the higher. The do-orbit propulsion system probably would be equally reliable at either altitude, although the longer storage period In space might have adverse effects on this system. Further, the Soviets must recognise that loss of ground control would result in eventual decay at an unpredictable point along the orbit. Therefore, they would almost certainly take precautions to build Into the satellite safety devicesto deactivate or destroy the warhead system If control of the vehicle was lost.
Existing Soviet facilities probably are adequate to control the operationingleew nuclear-armed satellites. These facilities could readily be employed toarhead over Soviet territory or the open ocean for demonstrative purposes. The Soviets wouldfew difficulties Inuclear warheadorth to south pass over the US, since all the retrorocket Ignition points fall within line-of-sight of the USSR. This would not be so onorthatisfactory system could probably be developed byimer, set while the satellite was over the USSR.
Based on the foregoing considerations, we Judge that the USSR could orbit anduclear-armed satellite ul any time. Because of uncertainties as to lis performance, thc Soviets would presumably consider it no moreramatic demonstration of technicalIf,eries of test launchings began in the near future, thereossibility that by the end4 thc Soviets couldmall force of0 nuclear-armed satellites with predictable reliability and accuracies on the order. CKP. In addition to the necessary boosters, satellites and warheads,orce would probably require at least some additional ground facilities, which could be constructed concurrently.
' As indicatedoasewhal better accuracy could theoretically be achieved by employing sleeper re-entry paths and sacrinclne some payload weight, but we think this very unlikely in theeriod.
scener
7
Cost Consideration! *
Soviets could put one or more nuclear-armed satelliteswith present hardware, ortandby capability to do so,cost on the orderillion per satellite. Assuming anin orbit of several months, one such satellite could beorbit at all timesost on thc order0 million or moreEven with existing types of hardware, however, it wouldmore to develop weapons with predictable reliability andand toorce0 such weapons In orbit at allaccomplish this, the Soviets would have to expend on the orderbillion for test firings, hardware production, ground facilities,initial investment. Maintenance costs would probably bebillion per year thereafter. For purposes of comparison,expenditures on long range attack forces of all typesmissiles, and missile submarines) are onj billion per year, excluding research and development costs.
III. LIKELIHOODurrent Evidence
Indicated above, we have thus far acquired no directthat the USSR Intends touclear weapon ln theTo date, no test firings have been observed which can bewith the development ofeapon. Wc have,positive evidencerogram to establish an orbitalis at present seriously contemplated by the SovietThere have, however,umber of public referencesranking Soviet officials in the past two years with regard touses of space. In these statements, they have frequentlyto "global rockets" andew occasions to their abilityrockets from orbiting satellites. Moreover, the Sovietsbecome increasingly critical of US space activities,comments on an alleged US intention to exploit space for military
Potentiol Advantage! and Diiadvanlogo*
f only because of Its high cost and limited effectiveness weit unlikely that the Soviets will deploy in thc near term an orbital force which would maintain as many as five to ten nuclear weapons in orbit. They could launch oneew such satellites atsmall cost, but these would havi: negligible military value. Thus,
'We have no information on the rublo cost* of Soviet ICBM or space systems. All cost figures presented in this cstlmau- represent calculations of what such weapons mlcht cost if produced In the US
weoviet decision tn orbit nuclear weapons during the next two years or so would be based in the mum on political andconsiderations. The Soviets might conceive ofoveramatic demonstration of technical and military prowess, oneessentially lo bolster their international prestige. We have pointed out elsewhere that thc Cuban crisis had thc effect of altering to the disadvantage of the USSR the view generally held of theof military power and that the Sovietstrong Incentive to restore plausibility to their claims of military superiority. They would hope that the consequent enhancement of the USSR's imagereat power could be used Lo persuade or intimidate other states into making concessions. 1
If. for primarily military reasons, the Soviets decide over the course of the next year or so toajor space weapons program for later deployment they might use an initial developmental vehicle for demonstrative purposes, hoping in this way to achieve immediate political capital. (They acted in much this way in thes when claimsignificant ICBM capability followed the decision to develop an ICBM force but preceded thc deployment ofurther, whether or not tho Soviets are now committedpace weapons program, they might seek to demonstrate their own prowess first If convinced that the US was committed torogram. They might even seek to forestall or delay the US effort by launching their own weapon in on attempt to arouse world pressure, particularly In the UN. against the militarization of space. They could planto offer to withdraw their weapon in exchange for US adherencean on space weapons.
Reactions in the Free World to the USSR's launching of an orbital weapon would vary with time and place, and much would depend on the extent and promptness of the US response. Reactions would also depend in part on the nature of the Soviet demonstration, on thc claims advanced by Moscow concerning weapons capabilities and potential use. and on the credibility of these claims. We think It highly unlikely that the Soviets would assert that they had launched an orbital weapon without actually having done so. Their claims would have the greatest credibility if tho Soviets actuallyeapon, but they could probably be made persuasive even In the absence of a est ban would presumablyetonation.)
hc orbitinguclear weapon might provide the SovieUotent psychologicalsword of Damocles" which seemed to hang over everyone's headay which, logic and militaryaside. ICBMs do not. The feat would stimulate reaped for
Soviet scientificscarcely of post-Sputnik Iof Soviet power, and fear of Soviet intentions. If theoffered to remove their weapon in exchange for Western con
l UllCICU VII
sions, many individuals andew Free World governments would view the offer with relief and might urge the West to meet Soviet
in seeking to gauge popular and official reactions in the Free World, thc Soviets would also have to consider possible unfavorableThough the Soviets would almost certainly characterize their moveecessarymeasure, much world opinion would view itew source of International tension andurther obstacle to disarmament. It would be charged in many quarters that the USSR had extended the nuclear arms raceew and more dangerous area, and in doing so, moreover, had placed all countries, not merely its potential enemies, in peril. In Western Europe, where thchas long lived under the Soviet threat, many would probably be receptive in time to official assertions that thc orbital weapon added little or nothing to existing Soviet capabilities.
On balance, we do not believeoviet demonstration would generate any massivo or enduring shift of public sentiment. Despite the probable creation of considerable initial alarm, particularly if the Soviet move occurrederiod of high tension, pre-existingwould for the most part be likely io govern both popular and governmental reactions. Among elements in the West favoring aapproach to Soviet pressures, for example, fear and concern would probably lead to mounting demands for official concessions, and resentment at the Soviet "violation" of space might be channeled more against the arms race and the cold war in general than directly against the USSR. Conversely, among those whoore belligerent postureis the USSR, militancy would be heightened and would be accompanied by demands for some form of direct action lo counter what would be regardedew Soviet threat.
inally, in assessing thc consequences of an orbital weaponsthc Soviets would have to weigh the possibility that their act mightateful turn in world affairs. They would have to consider very carefully whether it would serve Iheir Internal andinterests to risk possible strong USeneral intensification of the cold war, and an acceleration of the arms race. Specifically, if as yet uncertain as to US plans, the Soviets would bethat the launching of an orbital weapon for essentially political purposes might spark an ambitious US military program In space.
10
Ncar-Term Intentions
hus. Lhe specific factors likely to be involvedoviet decision touclear weapon tend either to conflict with one or another or to rest on such imponderables as the Soviet estimate as to3 military program In space. Further, they depend in part on the overall US posture, the international climatehole, and the tactical line of Soviet policy at any given time. Thus, we cannot assess with confidence the likelihood of the USSR'suclear-armed satellite. On balance, It seems to us that thc disadvantages would outweigh the advantages, und we therefore believe that the chances are less than even that the USSR will makeove.the Soviets may weigh the balance differently from thc way we do, and It remains possible that they will exercise their technical capability at any time.
IV. REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC UN AND US COURSES OF ACTION
f the Soviets do in fact orbit oneew nuclear weapons, they would probably expect some form nf UNN resolutionthe Soviet action and calling for the removal of the weapons would probably be strongly supported by all Western European and most Latin Americanajority of the Afro-Asian States would also probably support their removal, though many might be reluctant tolear-cut condemnation of thc USSR. Theif willing to entertain the idea of removing their weapons, could be expected to Insist on some form of quid pro quo from the US. In this event, they could probably count on support from many nonaligned states. The outcome would, of course, rest In part on US policy at the time and thc USSR's tactics in regard not only to the Issue at hand but also Its foreign policies in general We believe, however, that the chances are better than even that the UN would eventually pass some form of resolution which criticised lhc Soviel move and called for aban on weapons In space. It might also appeal to other powers, most notably the US, to negotiate with the USSR tn an effort to secure the removal of the Soviet weapons.
oscow would probably expect an appeul for tne removal of its weapon The USSR might agree Lo remove its weapon from orbit If the UNesolution condemning any military use of space. It Is more likely, however, that the USSR would counterroaderdealing with other dlsarmamcnl and cold war issues, maintaining that it could not be deprivediliiary advantage without somefrom the West. Or. it might offer to withdraw Its weapon ln exchange for US agreement to retrain from orbiting observation
SfKf>CT
1 I
OCCRCT-
The Soviets would also probably allowirect US response. In additionigorous protest, which they would almost certainly reject, they might expect tbe US toomparablein the minimum time possible. Moscow probably would not seek toS weapon deployed under these circumstances. An ofler from the US to withdraw its weapon in exchange for similar Soviet action would probably receive considerable support from world opinion and from the UN. The Soviets might be receptive to such an exchange if it appeared at that time that their political objectives had already been well served.
The Soviets would have to consider the possibilityS attempt to destroy their satellite, and if they did, there are various ways in which they could seek to avoidS action. They need not reveal the nature of their satellite until after detonating it. If they did reveal the nature of the satellite while In orbit, they might detonate It afterew orbits, perhaps before It passed over US territory, thusboth US reaction time and an ti-satellite capabilities. The Soviets might also seek to deter US action by statements threatening some form of retaliation, such as thc destruction of US satellites.
Whether the Soviets would in fact seek to destroy US satellites in the event that the US destroyed thc Soviet weapon would dependumber of circumstances, including the general US stance and the international climate. Thc USSR's response would also depend upon Soviet estimates as to the consequences of Inaction in terms of itsprestige in general, and its possible plans for future spacein particular. If thc US haduclear weapon, the Soviets would probably seek to destroy it In retaliation. If thc US had nota weapon, the Soviets might view the US move as providing an opportunity to frustrate any future US military activities in space; at the very least, they could cite the US actionsrecedent and threaten to destroy any future US orbital weapons. Indeed, Moscow mightthe US actionood pretext for the destruction of US observation satellites. The Soviets, however, would be wary of the risks involved in direct retaliation,ossible "open war" on all satellites and the accompanying dangers of escalation.
Both governmental and public opinion in most allied states wouldigorous US responseoviet deployment of orbital weapons. While there might be some preference for at least an attempt to secure UN action, US measures to counter the Soviet action would in general receive firm support; indeed, US failure to act (particularly after an unsuccessful attempt to deal through the UN) wouldlead to considerable dismay. Opinion in thc nonaligned states would probably be most sympathetic to efforts to achieve voluntary
SCCRCT
grounding ol thc weapon by Moscow. US action lo destroy the Soviet weapon would probably stimulate concern as to the consequences lor world peacea possible crisis hadlew would view the US move as anything otheregitimate reply to Soviet provocation. If, instead, the US launched its own nuclear weapons, the nonaligned states would probably see In the US response merely an inevitable countermove. Pressures on the US and the USSR to desist from extending the arms race into space would be strong, at leastime.
V. SOVIET
Soviets will be able to improve their capabilities insatellites throughout the present decade even If they employlaunch vehicles available today. Advances in Soviet nuclearwould Increase the yields of the warheads which couldFor example, assuming continued nuclear testing, bytheenik combination could probablyeapon of
m- orblt for detonation at about
eet, as comparedWc also expect ad-
vances In the techniques of guidance and controlm thc normal course of continued Soviet ICBM and space development. Even with these improvements, however, oneew such weapons would continue to have negligible military value.
Any orbital bombardment system of real military significance would require satellite vehicles ln some number, and would accordingly be extremely complex and expensive. Important developmentaltowardystem within the decade wouldajor Soviet effort to perfect hardware und to develop advanced techniques. In considering whether to authorize such an effort, the Sovietwould examine the likely military value of orbital bombardment systems in relation to the mix of forces for long range attack they would hope to have in thend beyond, and the costs of the alternatives open to them. Further, considerations relating toreactions, the risk of intensifying the arms competition, and other similar factors discussed above would become even more complex and weighty tn connection with such an effort.
Although we haveeneral idea of thc probableof Soviet long range striking forces some years hence, our present information supports an estimate of several broad trends In the future development of these forces. It appears quite likely that present Soviet schedules call for the acquisition of some hundreds of ICUM launchers lor missiles with multimegaton yield warheads. Efforts to improve readiness and reaction times arc evidently being carried out to increase the effectiveness of strategic attack forces for pre-emptive or retaliatory
SECRET
strikes. The hardeningortion ol the land-based missile forces and the development of advanced submarine-launched missile systems point to Soviet concern to have protected retaliatory capabilities. All these developments, together with the trend toward higher megaton yields which has been evident in the nuclear testing program, arcto enhance both thc deterrent value and military capability of the Soviet striking forces.
of the recent trends in the Soviet strike forces suggest,that the USSR presently contemplates forces capable ofUS strike forces in an Initial blow, nor do Sovietdesigned to match the US In numbers ot delivery vehicles.the Sovicls appear to be counting on continued deployment ofand reliable missiles and on thc added threat provided byof very high yield weapons to attain credibility for theirWe think, therefore, that they would be likely to viewof orbital bombardment systems primarilyeanstheir existing types of forces in this role rathersuch weapons as replacement or substitute systems.probably also consider them ns one way uf Introducinginto US defense planning. Finally, they wouldthemualitative advance In weapon technology whichSoviet claims to parity or even superiority In total
Technical Considerations
Thereide range of delivery techniques and types of orbital forces which might be sought by thc Soviets, with considerable difference In developmental requirements, costs, and effectiveness. Because we have no direct evidence of Soviet objectives in the field of orbitalsystems, we can examine Soviet capabilities only in terms of the broad alternative types of forces thc USSR might consider as supplementary strike systems. In all cases, wc have assumed lhat the Soviets' evident interest in very high yield systems would lead them to consider orbital vehicles capable of carrying warheads with yields of at leastegatons, andegatons or more.
For employment in the periodhe Soviets could consider several broad types of multlorbitai bombardment force, each of them capable ofontinuous and visible threat of attack on US and other Weslern targets. Tohreat of retaliation against population centers, they mightelatively small force with limited effectiveness sufficient. Fororce, hardenedand control facilities would be required, but near-simultaneity of weapon delivery would not be essential, nor would precise accuracy be needed with very high yield warheads. For pre-emptive employment
14
against smaller or harder military targets,ophisticated force with high accuracy, short times lo target, and near-simultaneity of weapon delivery would be necessary.
ome possible characteristics of representative forces of these two broad types, and estimated Soviet capabilities lo achieve them arcin the following paragraphs. In general, however, because of present uncertainties as to thc effects of nuclear weapons detonated at altitudes above the denseesirable feature of any orbital system under present consideration (otheroken force) wouldapability to detonate weapons at whatever altitude was later found to be most effective. In addition, the orbiting vehicles would need to be long-lived and reliable, and lo be protected against countermeasures. Finally, factors of safety and cost would probably dictate theof techniques to recover warheads within Soviet territory.
orce of limited effectiveness might be designed lomall number of weapons in orbit, which, while they would notcontinuous target coverage would be capable of detonation on specified targetseriod of hours as their orbits passed near.epresentative force of this type might be programmed eventually to maintaineapons in orbit at altitudes of several hundred miles, able to attack targetsew hundred miles of their orbital planes. Thc Soviels would probably consider CEPsor this purpose. To carry warheadsT or more which could be detonated at any altitude or recovered, the system wouldadvanced spacecraft weighing on the order ofons. To orbit such vehicles, the Soviets would need loew, large boosterhrust2 million pounds.' Ifooster becomesfor flight testing as earlynd Is adapted to an orbitalsystem, it is possible that weapons of this size and weight could be orbilcd inC7 period. Further testingeriodear or two after the initial launching would be required toaccuracy and reliability.
orce could be deployed and maintained in orbit with relatively few launching facilities, and It might even utilize facilities constructed for other purposes, although some additional oontrolprobably would be required. If the Soviets pursuedand deployment ofimited force, wo think they could have it fully operational
A very sophisticated force, on the other hand, might be designed toarge number of weapons in carefully spaced orbits, with guidance and control capable of programming weaponspc-
'iscuuion of Soviet larre booster development, tee
ol NIKhe Soviet SpaceecemberECRET.
SECRET
15
clflecl target system within minutesecision to attack. Aforce of this type might eventually be programmed tosomeweapons in orbit at all times so as to he able to attackargets in the UST warheadseriod of an hour or two.orce would need to employ very advancedwith precise on-board attitude control and retrorocket systems, and with side-ranging capabilities to attack targets several hundred miles from their orbital planes with CEPs approaching. Decoys and other measures to reduce vulnerability and mask the size andof the force would be highly desirable.
The attainmentorce of this sort would require major Soviet advances in technology as wellarge-scale program to produceand construct ground facilities. It is possible that the required spacecraft could be developed and proved out withineriod. In addition,ophisticated force of this type would need to have numerous launchingery complex computation and control facility,ubstantial number of tracking and command stations spaced symmetrically across the USSR at the highest possible latitudes. Although the establishment oforce could be in progress beginning as earlyt seems highly unlikely, in view of the enormous complexities involved, that it could be fully operational until
Alternative systemsariety of types might be developed. Foromewhat smaller booster system could be employed to orbit spacecraft with advanced performance but weighing less than therequired toT weapons. If theooster is large, and development of an advanced spacecraft is already underway, an initial developmental launching ofcould probably occur
It is also possibleultiorbit bombardment force could be designedtandby force, with some reduction in total vehiclebelow thoseorce of weapons in orbit at all times.orce would have Its weapons stored at ground complexes, ready for launching at any time.tandby force was intended solely forduring periods of international tension, hardening of ground facilities would not be necessary. On the other hand,etaliatory role was also assignedtandby force, hardening of most if not all facilities probably would bemall standby force,eapons available for launching, might appeal to the Soviets as an alternativemall multiorbit force which maintained the same number of equivalent weapons in orbit.ractical matter, one launcher probably would be needed forlandby weapons, so lhat launching of the entire force could be accomplishederiodewarge standby force of sophisticated weapons would
notracticable alternativeimilar force maintained in orbit, primarily because of the exorbitant requirement for launch facilities.
inally, we estimate that the Soviets are also capable ofa fractional orbit' bombardment system withinimeystem of this type would be designed lo launch weapons at the Initiation of hostilitiesanner comparable lo Lhat of ICHM systems, but on near-global trajectories in an efTorl lo avoid USsystems. Fractional orbit weapons with yields ranging fromr more megatons could be developed with hardware comparable to that of multiorblt systems. Development time for the spacecraft could be somewhat shorter because on-board systems would be less complex. However,ystem would need very extensive and complex ground facilities, which could take at least as long to construct as thoseery sophisticated multiorblt force.
Coniiderahons of Coil ond EfleCrvcncss
II is impossible to make any confident estimate about what sort of orbital bombardmcnl system the Soviets are likely lo develop, or even whether they will commit major resources to develop any such system. Indeed, it seems likely that they have not yet proceeded beyond the point of feasibility studies on advanced orbital bombardment systems, and of weighing the possible costs and effectiveness of such systems against those of other delivery systems capable of performing comparable missions.
Thc costs of orbital systems would depend on their size nnd sophistication, but ln all cases they would be quite large when compared wiih ICBM costs. Rough calculations based on US experience suggests that thc very sophisticated orbital system which we have described wouldxpenditures on the order ofillions. Toandorce of0 vehicles in orbit at all times wouldillions for Initial Inveslmenl and an equal amount annually thereafter for the life of the program, oven assuming Hint lhc vehicles had an average orbital lifetimeear. The force of ltmllcd effectiveness, witheapons continually in orbit, would probablyxpenditures of someillions, an initial investment on the orderIVi billion and an equal amountthereafter. This smaller force, however, even ilosts were minimal, wouldive-year period cost more than five times Lhe amount required to deploy and maintain for thc same period an equal number of large, hardened ICBMsT warheads.
ractional orbit system Is one which ts deaiened to maka less than on*of the earU) before detonation, but which does notallUUe
trajectory.
17
A small, unhardened force, maintainedtandby bnsls, would be much less expensiveorce maintained In orbit. After an Initial Investment on the orderillion, operating costs could be as littleillion dollarsortion of which would be expended to conduct one or two reliability and confidenceEven so,orce would be more costly than an equivalent ICBM force It seems likely that the Soviet leadership would have to be well convinced of the value of an orbital system berorc makingarge commitment.
For accomplishing military missions, we think that duringeriod, orbital bombardment systems will not comparewith ICBMs In terms of reaction time, average life, reliability,accuracy, or targeting flexibility. In addition to being less effective militarily, an orbital bombardment system will be considerably more costly than an equivalent delivery capability with ICBMs. Based solely on considerations of cost and effectiveness as wc now understand them, therefore. It would appear unlikely that the Soviets will during this decade deploy advanced orbital bombardment systems of military significance.
We recognize, however, that thc Soviets might reach differentas to cost and effectiveness, or that other factors might In their view be more weighty. It is possible that the Soviet leaders would be strongly attracted by what an orbital bombardment system might do to reverse the Impression that they are now inferior in strategicMoreover, considering the pace of developments in thc weapons Geld in general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisionseriod many years ahead; it is possible that the rapid progress of space technology could result in weapons developments whose feasibility is not now manifest. It is also possible lhat the Soviets arcecision while awaiting more Information on their own technicalas well as on US capabilities and intensions with respect to military space programs. For theseirm estimate as to whether the Soviets will deploy an advanced orbital bombardment syslem withineriod cannot be made at this time.
II thc Soviets do proceed with on advanced orbital system, wethat they are more likely tomall force of limitedthanvery large and sophisticated one. The weaponsmall force could be maintained continually in orbit or could be held on standby on lhe ground for deployment as required In any case,testing of an orbital bombardment system should beto us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.
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