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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIOEN
LIBRARY MANDATORY CASE #NLK
DOCUMENT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MEMORANDUM:
SUMMARY
Whether oromplete Sino-Soviet break occurs,between the USSR and Communist China will almost certainly remain seriously ruptured (or the foreseeable future. The most important implication of this rupture is its potential for complicating and perhaps significantly changing world politics over the long term. Meanwhile it will also create orumber of difficulties for Moscow andfor the US as welLthe same time, however, the Sino-Soviet rupture will offer theumber of new opportunities.
These opportunities may arise principally from acoincidence of US and Soviet interests, especially with respect to concernuclear-armed China.
The chancesenuine Soviet approach to the US at China's expense are not great, but they do seem sufficient at least to Justify US planning now for meeting the new hazards and opportunitiesuture contingency might entail.
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Implications of the Sino-Soviet Rupture For fie US
1. For nost practical purposes, there now ls an open split in Sino-Soviet relations. Theof the present confrontation, the directness of the most recent Insults and accusations atand the theological certainty of bothreflect new dimensions of antagonism tooto be bridged. Similarly, present Chinese Communist pretensions, and the increasing use of the Sino-Soviet dispute by. European Communist par-ties and factionsevSr for promoting their grievances against Moscow, constitute new challenges which must almost certainly be Impelling Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to question whether the forbearance they have shown in the past underprovocations might bring unacceptable harm to the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet state.whatever the immediate results ofSino-Soviet confrontation, the USSR and China will almost certainly not be able to restore mutual confidence or to achieve any genuine or lasting Although efforts may be made from time io tire tooro cordial relationship, especially^,by new Soviethinese leadersTa-v* IBIHp^BHSlno-Sovict relations will almostremain seriously ruptured for thefuture, whatever the case with respectomplete break.
2. Probably the most important Implication of the Sino-Soviet rupture is its potential forthe strategic setting of international politics. It will contribute to the displacing of two distinct and hostile power groupsore pluralistic world. The force of Ideology will probably decline. Ths major states will probably re-examine some of thoir attitudes and ro-evaluate their various interests in the light of tbe slowly changing strategicwith consequent effect upon their policies toward the USSR, Communist China, the US, and the Western Alliance. Of greatest import to the US,will probably be the conclusions the USSR itself
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draws from tbe changing situation. The Sovietshave to decide whether to inclinewith China in hostility to the US, orconsider somewhat more likely, towardlogic of their "peaceful coexistence" linefor new ways to demonstrate itsDS will in any eventuch moroworld of new opportunities andls to these opportunities and problemsthe Sino-Soviet rupture that this memorandum
A. Implications of Rupture for Communist Chioa and the Soviet Union.*
3. We can expect Increased national antagonism between the Soviet and Chinese states. The present rupture signifies that Communist ideology'has not only failed to overcome nationalism within the bloc, but has indeed aggravated such sentiment. The USSB of necessity places Its ownit identifies with blocthose of China. Peiping, believing that such Soviet behavior imperils China's ambitions, at home and abroad, insists in turn that only its interpretation of Leninist doctrine can save the CommunistChina'sdreadful harm. Because these basic positions seem unlikely to change under successor leaderships, because tbey involve as well acompetition for authority, and because they will probably be intensified to the degree that Communist China emergesreat world power, the prospect is probably not just for rupture but for increased levels of tension between these two giant neighbor states. They may remain nominal allies for some time, but even so this tension will almost certainly be reflected in increased meddling ln each other's internal affairs, more attempted subversion of the other's party andleaders, and more regard for border defenses and troop dispositions against the other.
He will consequentlyrowing incompati-
the questions which cause the USSR to be concerned chiefly with its own nationalrelations with the US, nuclear war, Germany, and the difficulties of resource allocation amid the
increasing costs of military and spacewill almost certainly result in less coincidence of Soviet and Chinese interests. Also, the gulf which separates Chinese and Sovietwill probably widen, the one remaining much more austere and revolutionary far some years to come, the otber looking forward increasingly tothe fruits of domestic gains won.
5. Wo can alson acceleratedof two competing and hostile Communist world centers, with accompanying disruption of world Communism. The collapse of unitary authority within world Communismevelopment of major Tho appearance of'Chinaecond centor of Communist authority has already Impaired Soviet prestige in the movement and made it more difficult for tbe DSSR to contain impulses toward autonomy In tbe other parties. In Eastern Europe, this has been an important catalytic factor in stimulating Rumania to resist Soviet economic dictation, and otber Eastern European parties will probably be emboldened from time to time to Insist on national Interests, although none will probably wish tothe Albanian breakaway, world-wide, Communism will come toeast of more variegatedpectrum of parties, some in power, some not,with all kinds of dissident groups and The Sino-Soviet rupture will probably not In the near future seriously impair the ability of the world movement to injure non-Coamuclstand Interests. The rupture will, however, dampen morale and even basic belief among It will complicate CP efforts to palm off Communism on uncommitted audiences as "scientific" truth guaranteed to yield amazing new brotherhood and progress dividends. And it will markedlytbe ability of Moscow to continue enlisting other CPs in support of the USSR's diplomatic and other interests.
6. There will be an increase in tbe Chinese presence and in Chinese-sponsored racialism and radicalism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Such Chinese activity has been harming Sovietin these areas for some time. The rupture will further stimulate Peiping to these ends, in the belief that the situation in the underdeveloped countries givesumber of advantages over the-Soviets: economic and revolutionary situations
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much more akin to those of China than of the Soviet Union, antlwhlte sentiments, histories M against the colonial powers,mostproclivity for irresponsible action which Peiping can encourage much more than can Moscow. Although we can expect some increased susceptibility to these Chinese efforts among extremist movements in the underdeveloped world, such emphasis will in many cases work to Peiping's detriment, and demand of the Chinese the isost varied.and subtle tactical touch.
There will probablyecrease of Chinese confidence in the deterrent effect of the Sino-Soviet Alliance on US forcen the Far East. China's failure thus far to seek to gain its foreign policy objectives by the exercise of all-out force, Peiping's brave oratory to the contrary, has of course chiefly been tbe result of respect for the overwhelming military power the US has appeared ready to bring to bear against it. This has been in part the product of Chinese uncertainty with respect to Soviet support. The most recent deterioration inrelations has almost certainly, reinforced Soviet concern lest Chinese rashness involve the USSR in annuclear war not of its own choosing, and caused Peiping to suspect that the USSR would let China absorb US punishment so long as vitalinterests were not endangered.
China's economic and military programs will continue to suffer greatly from the denial of Soviet support, although China will probably increasinglythe possibilities of obtaining needed industrial supplies from nonbloc .sources. The depth of Chinese ill-feeling toward the USSR is perhaps illustrated best by the known costs China has accepted in defying Moscow. The decline of Soviet deliveries andassistance0 has already caused enormous harm to China's economy and military establishment. China's leaders have thus succeeded ln cutting off China from both bloc and nonbloc aid for berdevelopment and military programs. Moscow has one remainingof the Pf>l. currently supplied toChina has already inquired about obtaining POL from nonbloc sources, whether or not Khrushchev applies this sanction, China willto expand its trading relations with nonbloc countries. It will probably succeed, particularly with respect to Japan, Western Kurope, and Southeast Asia. This expansion will probably not, however, make up the losses suffered from the decline of Soviet
support--either in over-all trade level, orin the unique nexus of patterns,and technical assistance whichew years ago in Sino-Soviet economic relations. Moreover, Peiping's interest in greater trade with Japan and tbe UK, for example, mayore restraining effect on its foreign and military in Asia than might otherwise be the case.
B. Problems for the US %>
Sino-Soviet rupture will probablyeither Moscow or Peipjng' suddenly andto change its basic objectives orthe US in the near future: the morninga complete break, Communist China and thewould still be sworn to our destruction,yet critically weakened in thecould bring to bear against us. Therupture will probably not remove orsubstantial Far East problems facing theChinese Communist advanced weaponsbelligerency and encouragement ofin Southeast Asia: continuing fearin Asia, and uncertainty concerning USand the possibility that the Chinesewill some day undertake such rashin the Taiwan Strait or Southeast Asia,initiate larger hostilities in the FarPeiping will in time almost certainlyworld support for UN entry, evenand Indian advocacy of its cause willlessen.
rupture will create unique newfor the US. ompleteoccurs or not, thehineseequation will be changed significantly. will continue to probe US intentions withto Communist China, and will seek tothat there are benefits to be gained byUSSR's peaceful and honorable professionsvalue.* China will meanwhile probablymore important that it has been inand Hoscow and Washington may well find
it more difficult to read Chinese intentions, in times of acute crisis, than one another's.
*See paras. below.
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Tbo Stno-Sovlet rupture will createnew problems affecting the policies of third states. Soviet "peaceful" stances will almostbe interpreted somewhat liberally by many US allies, and will further complicate US efforts to maintain firm lines against Soviet pressures and caiolery. In West Germany, particularly aftersteps aside, added pressures may develop forew modus vivendl with the USSR. President de Gaulle may tend to oe confirmed in his view that the Chinese "yellow peril" demands of tbe West that Idoscow not bo alienated. In the case of Japan, the Inducements the USSR has at its disposal, especially its abilityturn certain of the southernmost Kurile Islands to the Japanese, might cause Tokyo loaders to consider using theestrangement as an entering wedge forbargaining. Also, the USSR's lesseningpresumably,respect to Peiping may cause Increased fears of China among ito neighbors in Asia.
Although China's potential for expanding foreign trade ls limited, some attractive commercial opportunities are likely to arise, especially for Japan and Western Europe, as China looks to the West for capital goods and raw materials it once purchased from the USSR. The commercial ties that mightcould run counter to US policies toward Peiping and complicate our relations with our allies.
In their struggle with Moscow the Chinese will doubtless continue to try to capitalize on the division of the world into white and non-white, developed and undeveloped countries. The Chinese will be careful to mute racialism in those Instances where tbey will be seeking greater support from "white" parties elgium, and New Zealand). The net effect, however, will probably be to stimulate racialist sensitivities. The Chinese will probably encourage radicalism in those areas where they can make the Soviets appear timid without committing China to overt physical support of radical actions. For its part, Moscow
may on occasion undertake more dangerous courses than might bo the case ln the absence of Chinese pressures; indeed, this wasactor ln tbe USSR's Cuban missile-base venture. In some cases, such as in Italy, Moscow's waning control over the local CP may have the effect of enhancing
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cast and respectability of the
which in turn could Increase its political
In more backward settings, on the other
the weakening of Moscow's control may at
lead some CP's to increased radicalism.
C Opportunities for the US.
a greater degree than we feel 1b
g .orally appreciated, the Sino-Soviet rupturen the by-product of US policy. The natureommunist system, and Soviet dominance of that system, have from theended to dictate that-Communistnot 'indebted to the USSR for its revolutionary victory, andorldeventually defy Moscow. even though the developing rupture of the past seven years or so has been caused primarily by Soviet and Chinese actions, it has probably come more quickly and perhaps more profoundly because of US actions. US firmness and nuclear power have presented the USSR with enormous problems of national defense*all other Sovietthat of regard for the Chinese ally. US firmness has denied Khrushchev foreign policy gains anything like those ho has so long predicted as justifying, for Communist audiences, the risks and costs of his "peacefulcourse. The US has kept Mao from achieving his heart's desire of "completing the Chineseby acquiring Taiwan; indeed, we have not even let him take the offshore Quemoys and Matsus.
pressures and these frustrationsand Chinese Communist ambitions representof basic US containment policy.
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16. Without suggesting that there be the least reduction in US firmness or vigilance with respect to Soviet objectives andasm?that thereew questions where US and Soviet interest! may coincide;
17. The principal such question may be that of delaying the emergenceuclear-armedChina. Nuclear proliferation will certainly benefit neither the US nor the USSR, particularly so ln the case of an ambitious, hostile, andChina. This coincidence of interests will of course have increasing relevance for US-Sovietd testing negotiations.
18. Such partial coincidence of interests might also make less risky the buildup of US striking powor against China in the Western Pacific and the Far East, by making clear to Moscow--by the type of US weapons and theirthis US power was not directed principally against the USSR. of US and Soviet interest may also develop situations where added Soviet assistance to India, say, might not be wholly detrimental to US interest in fashioning counterweights to China in Asia. In sum, tho Sino-Soviet rupture may well facilitate USln any future US confrontation with Communist China, should the need arise, by somewhat lessening the likelihood of extreme Sovietof course that US actions did not appear to the Soviet! to endanger tbe basic Communist position in East Asia or otherwise to threaten vital socurlty interests of the
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19. As Eastern European parties move cautiously to promote their economic interests, acquire national prestige, andreater voice in the formulation of Soviet bloc policies, opportunities for closer Westorn contactsreater exerciso of US influence will tend to increase. Many parties in theworld will be more vulnerable to splitting activities and harassment which should, in^^ne, lessen their in natii-in.il politics
20. Finally, the Sino-Soviet rupture mayMoscow to alter its traditional view thatlsipolar struggleto Communist world victory. Thiscan explain individual renogades fromwe doubt that it can be sustained in tho facedefection of the scale of China and its retinueCommunist confederates. The rupture withthus support that tendency ln Sovietappears to be seeing the world ln termsgreys rather than dogmatic blacks andin turn may cause the USSR toeedWest M
21. Wo should note that whether Soviet concern over China will rise sharply over the long run may in part depend on China's growth of power: the more such power, the more pressure on the USSR seriously to court the US. If China begins clearly to boom, the USSR may in time decide that it must modify certain of its basic objectives in order to gain Western supportearsomein the event there should continue toisparity ln Soviet and Chinese technical-military power. The chances of such an eventual genuine Soviet demarche are not now great, but they do seem sufficient at least to justify US and Western planning now for meeting the strange new hazards and opportunitiesontingency might entail.
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Original document.
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