MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL GROUP (CI) ASSISTANTS
SUBJECT! National Intelligence Survey*
herewith at Mr. McCone'e ref the National Intelligence Surveys iorPeru* aad Venezuela, for your Informationectionsn Bolivia, Brar.il,Jordan, Thailand, and South Vietnam will be eent tothey are completed end published. Ultimately, you willSectionsor all countries within tha purview ofGroup (CI).
documents are being transmitted eolely for your
. information and use. They are net being disseminated fortderation by tho Special Group (CI).
t should ha noted that these docuir.cats are supplementary to the material Included In tha Internal Security Assessments for Africa, tha Near East, and South Asia which were produced this yaar.
Special Group Officer
/-ttachaicntoi As stated above
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DATE:7
NIS 86
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
venezuela
SECTIONUBVERSION
This rtviiiori oj Sections tuned under tht tfIS maintenance program. It supersedes ike originalaltdopies of which should be destroyed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, d. C.
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning ol, of the U. S. Code, as amended. IUor revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 57
Page
1
1 Venezuelan Communist
7
c
d.
t. Propaganda
r. Paramilitary
and
target
a Political
and
c Educators and
I. Civic improvement
front
a, Venezuelan Committee for Peace and
h Women's
Union of
d Society of Friends4 *
Association of Democratic
Communist front- 25
g Youth and student front
h. Labor front
6
Role of the armed forces In
Clvlhan subversive
Clandestine
Foreign non-Communist subversive
Comment on principal
1 Chart2 Table3 Map
OF FIGURES
Organization, Communist Party Electoral strength, Communist Party Distribution, electoral vote, Communist Party
Section icas prepared for the NIS by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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StateFur if amy
57. Subversion
Tht user can supplement the Information In this Section by referring to Section SO, Introduction, for an overall view of tht history, problems, and distinctive political char-aclcrtsties of the country. Tht strength and effectiveness of forces for the suppression of subversion are discussed In Sections SI. Intelligence and Security,ublic Order end Safely. The position and strengthegal Communist Party in the nationalscene are discussed Inolitical Dynamics.
General
For moreentury Venezuela was ruledmall elite of landholders and merchants who controlled the production and marketing of the few exports that provided the basis for amoney economy. Tne transfer of political power from one faction to another within the ruling elite was usually accomplished byand violence in which the armed forceson both aides. In the past quarter-cen-tury, however, the traditional pattern has been profoundly modified, although subversion remains an integral part of the political process. Theof Venezuela's enormous petroleumhasapid commercial and industrial expansion accompanied by significant changes in the social structure. While overall population has doubled since thes. the populationew o! the major cities haseven more rapidly. Caracas, for example, has quadrupled in size during thisew middleand managers of the newemerged to demand andoice In the conduct of the nation's affairs This group his provided some of the outspokenof political reform. The urban andlabor force, including many people attracted from rural areas to the cities and oilfieldsetter way of life, has becomevocal In its demand for fulfillment of Its aspirations
In response to these socio-economic changes two powerful and conflicting groups have come to the fore In the political sphere. These are the armed forces, which have demonstrated their willingness to seize and exercise political power in their own interest, and the mass-based, reformist political parties seeking to establish representsUvewith many of the trappingselfare state. Both groups have resorted lo subversion to attain political power. The armed forces moved into the politics) vacuum created by the death of the diclator Juan Vicente Gomeznd have remained the decisive political force inuntil recently. Military leaden, actively supported by propertied elements, have ruledfor IB of the more thanears since Gdmex' death, and have shared control withIn coalition governments for ani years during this period. None of the military regimes succeeded inoliticalwith mass support, however. Clvlllan-led political parties, independent of the government, came Into legal existence for the first time inhistory1 and Immediately began to compete for leadership of the new urban middle and working classes.4 the present leading political parties ofAction (AccidnSocial Christian Party (Partido SocialRepublican Democratic Union {Union Repubhcanaand the Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista dehad bem formed and legalized. (Forcomplete discussion of the origin and history of these parties, see this Chapter,nder Political By the endollowing. years of AD-aimy rule andonths ofgovernment under an AD administration, these parties were sufficiently well-established toecade of military dictatorship. They, in fact, collaborated ln the underground movement which contributed to the overthrow of theof General Marcos Perez Jimenez The four parties cooperated closely with the military-civilian forces in theJunta which ruled Venezuela from8 until Under the democratic regime headed by President Romulo Betancourt of the AD, elected In8 andonoalition of three of the parties has been maintained, but the PCV has been excluded from participation tn thegovernment, and military hegemony Inpolitics has been practically eliminated.
In Venezuela there is no recognized politicalactively opposed to the basic changes occurring In the social order. Practically allof society have come to accept thechanges that have taken place In the past
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generation, and the great majority of theendorses the broad social reform programs espoused by the four leading parlies. In thisopposition to changa has tended to focus on specific policies and details of implementation rather than on the basic program of the
There are. nevertheless, highly vocalelements at many levels In Venezuela with serious reservations about the amount of reform necessary or desirable, about the manner in which such reforms are to be carried out. and about the advisability of permitting the AD to direct the course of Venezuelan affairs. Probably the most reluctant to accept further social change and most opposed to the rising political power of the urban middle end lower classes arc the military and civilian leaders known as Andfnos (so-calledmany of them arc natives of the western Andean states that have dominated Venezuelan politics for the pastnorganized and numerically small however, the Andinos per se were maneuvered out of power in the events following the overthrow of the Perez Jimenezost active conspiratorial Irritant on the political scene since that time hu been Ihe so-called Pirez-ytmenistet, who Include not only followers of Perez Jimenez but also other reactionary conspirators. They have representedarrow cross-section of Venezuelan society, but have attempted by propagandaporadic campaign of terrorism to undermine public confidence In the succeeding regimes. However, because of their small numbers and poor organization, and because of publictoward Perez Jimenez or other potential authoritarian leaders, they have failed to attract significant support. Both the Andinot andhave denounced the AD program as being communistic and have appealed to the armed forces to seize power. Elements of both groups appear to be included In the membership of aCivic-Military Institutional! Committee iComlti InsMucionalUta CMcoMilttar-ClCM).
Potentially more dangerousorce Torare the Important urban banking,and industrial elements and rural landholders who dominate the principal economic associations of tbe country These groups usually prefer an apolitical role while seeking to Influence official economic policies through their professionalThey are not opposed to social change per se. and appear to regard democraticas more desirable than an authoritarianNevertheless, they rate the economic order above social progress and have on occasionsubversion to oust administrations that threatened their economic position. In theituation,ajority among these elements has given tacit support to thewhileoderating influence on Its financial policies.
To date, the most serious potential threat of subversion in Venezuela Is posed by the armed forces. The military establishment continues toower factor In the country andumber of circumstances would attempt to resume political control. In the current period of rapid social change, the armed forces have come to regard themselves, and to be widely regarded in conservative circles, as the custodians andof traditional Venezuelan values andShould these values and institutions, or their own professional interests andappear to be seriouslyuick move to restore authoritarian rule might beIn the event of collapse of the inter-party accord that has prevailed amongleftists since the fall of the Perez Jimenez regime, some leaders of tbe armed forces would be sorely tempted to seize power despite civilian opposition. The pressure for military Intervention in the political process would be greatly increasedlear Indication of approval by the usually apolitical civilian economic associations. Genuine concern over the threat of Communism is shared by the leaders of the armed forces, although some of them do not appear toistinctionCommunism per se and leftist reformism.
At the same time, there are many important factors that tend to discourage military subversion in Venezuela.5 the armed forces have been increasingly professionalized,umber of outspoken military leaders publicly at least have sought to impress upon their subordinates the need for an apolitical officer corps. Of moresignificance Is the fact that since the fall of Perez Jimenez the armed forces have not been united in opposition to the regime and are not prepared for coordinated action against it on short notice. The failure of incipient coups In July and8 demonstrated clearly at that time that the fournavy, air force, and nationalnot equally convinced of the desirability of politicaltate of affairs that also currently prevails. Furthermore, these incidents also served to reveal the strength of civilian opposition to the armed forces and the ability of the political parties to shut down the economy and marshal large numbers ofprofessional men, students, and workers tooup d'etat. It was made abundantly clear to the leaders of the armed forcesilitary seizure of power would be accompaniedreat deal of bloodshed androtracted civil resistance. The promptness with which the government has moved to "exile" the leaders of
kbjumky 1
abortive coups also served to discourage sub versive plotting In the armed forces. Nevertheless, plotting continues within the armed forces, and one direction It appears to be taking la toward the establishmentivilian movement to create popular demand for military Intervention.moves by the administration to secure the allegiance of the military also serve to reduce the threat of subversion by the armed forces
Venezuela's strategic location In the Caribbean and Its Importance as one of the leadingnations of the world have made It ofinterest to foreign power* In the years following World War II foreign subversiveInside Venezuela was promoted by the L'SSK. through tho Soviet Embassy in Caracas and the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute. Thesought to obtain vital Information regarding the petroleum and other industries and lent aid and comfort to the PCV. These channels foractivity were closed Inhen the Irritation of the Venezuelan Government reached the point where it broke diplomatic relations withnd banned the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute. In the same month Venezuela also severed diplomatic relations withthe only other Soviet bloc countryin Caracas.2 Venezuela has not maintained diplomatic relations with any member of the soviet bkx. Nevertheless. the Soviet Union has continued to have close contacts with the PCV. through which It has sought to promote Inlimate ol hostility toward the United States.
The social, economic, and politicalthat has been taking place in the pasthas been propitious for the development of Communism In Venezuela. The PCV, whichhas legal status, ranks among the largest Communist parties In the Western Hemisphere and may well be one ot the strongest In terms of lla participation In the political life of the country PCV members and persons sympathetic toward Communist doctrines are found primarily In the Caracas area, Maracaibo, and the oilfields, where the Party has competed effectively withleftist parties in exploiting the demands and aspirations of the working class The Party also draws support from otheramong students, educators, andmaintains that its followingroad cross-section of Venezuelan society. As an agency of international Communism, the PCV isto the policy requirement! of the Soviet Union and has faithfully adjusted IU program and tactics to reflect broad shifts In Soviet strategy Nevertheless, the Party has found It advantageous to minimize its relationship with the USSR and necessary to adapt its program to the specific needs of the Venezuelan situation.
The most Immediate and pressing objectives of the PCV are to preserve Its freedom of action and loirm base from which to exert Influence on the administrationeriod of time it seeks to swing Venezuela Into the neutralist camp in thewar" and, ultimately, to gain political control of the country. Both short- and long-term objectives Include exacerbation ofelations and the establishment cl closer tiesVenezuela and the Sino-Soviet bloc. Some Communist foreign policy goalseutralism) coincide with those entertained in manysectors, due partly to deeply ingrained. sentiment and partly to what Is believed to be national sell-interest. Tlie Communist desire for political control, however, is opposed by the larger parties. The PCV hard core is composed of dedicated. wcU-disclpllned Communists, but the bulk of the membership, acquired sinceacks thorough indoctrination and training in Party tactics. PCV leaders recognize that the Party, by itself, now has neither the capability to seize and hold political power by force nor the electoral following to take over the government by constitutional means. The PCV cooperated closely and effectively with the AD. the COPEI. and the URD in the clandestine Junta Palnddca (Patriotichich contributed to the overthrow of tha Perez Jimenez regime. Communists were excluded from key positions in the provisional government established innd none of the non-Communist parties was willing to collaborate with the PCV in an electoral coalition or subversive oper-aUon. Thenity" of the four leading parties has been effective only In countering the common dangerilitary coup. Under these circumstances, Communisthave centered largelyhree-prongedcampaign. To preserve "political unity" and thereby forestall open and bitter competition with the other parties, the Communists haveustained campaign of rumors of an Impendingcoup d'etat. At the same time they havethe other parties in attacking the United States, attributing to "US. imperialism" andby US. monopolies" responsibility for most of the social and economic grievances of the lower and middle classes. By aggravaUng andthese grievances and intensifying anti-US. feeling among the middle class and labor-both urban andCommunlsU areto build the popular following lhat wouldthem to attain power at the headorker-peasant alliance. If these tactics should prove insufficient the PCV Is also preparing aorganization designed in part to foment
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political unrestampaign oi sabotage and terrorism.
In their propaganda campaign the Communists seek to call upon the resources of front groups,and led by PCV members or sympathizers, and on professional associations and youth,and labor groups penetrated but notdominated by Party agents. While theof Communist front groups in Venezuela has not developed to the point reached in some other Latin American republics,umber arc currently primarily paper organizations, somefronts are highly effective In extending PCV influence to those social elements that are active proponents of change. The front groups fall loughly into two categories: special-Interest groups appealingimited audience, such as those of women or those made up of members of aprofession; and general-purpose fronts, which direct their appeal to all classes and sectors ofThe Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy {Comile Venezolana par laemo-cracia) is the principal example or the latter type. Extensive Communist penetration of tho press In the Caracas area and strong Influence In theJournalists'soeiaeidntie Periodi3las) has assured wide anddissemination of PCV propaganda,that directed against the United States, in most of the major newspapers of the country. The Communists have failed to gain control of the leading labor organizations, which are dominated by the non-Communist leftist parties. The same Ls true, nominally at least, of the leading student organizations. Nevertheless, PCV members occupy strategic positions In most of the youth and worker organizations. In marked contrast with their pasl history of labor strikes and violence, both theand non-Communist labor groups since8 have avoided large-scale strikes,to achieve their oblectircs by political means. Because the views of the non-Communist leftists on many exploitable Issues coincide closely with many of the PCV propaganda objectives, thesefrequently lend themselves to Communist-inspired campaigns, thus reinforcing frontin Venezuela and abroad. Some of thefronts and Communist-infiltratedare affiliated or have established liaison with international Communist front oreanizations. The travel of Venezuelan delegations to meetings of international Communist fronts abroad provides an Important means of contact and communication between the PCV and the International Communist movement. As Dirt of the campaign for closerbetween Venezuela and Communist China, Communists and fellow travelers on0 organized the Society of Friends of China
{Sodedad de Amiga* de China)ropaganda outlet. Previously, bin at ion al centers had not served an important funcUon in the Venezuelan Communist propaganda apparatus.
The PCV is at once aided and hindered by (he fact that the immediate objecuves expressed. In its program and Its appeal to the nationalisticof the Venezuelan people are almostfrom those of the three leadingparties These parties and the PCVto agree on the basic nature of Venezuelan problems and on their solutions, which Include effective democratic government with full civil rights, more equal participation for all in thewealth, and an expansion of existing state capitalism. In the Venezuelan context theseare revolutionary, but arc now acceptedubstantial majority of the populaUon asand desirable. In these circumstances the Communists are permitted full freedom to expound their views, but their appeal Is considerably dulled by the fact that they cannot effectively present themselves as the only revolutionary partyfor the welfare of the mass of the people. In fact, tbe PCV has on occasion been accused of lacking revolutionary seal, as when lt supported the moderate, Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, for the presidency against Rbmulo Betancourt, whose reputaUonevolutionary was beyond question. The Communists obviously felt that Larrazabal would be more receptive than Betancourt to PCV Influence. Nevertheless, the Communiststhat the PCV Is the "vanguard of democracy" in Venezuela and deserves the major share of the credit for the overthrow of the Perez JimenezIn their attacks on the United States, which they invariably link closely with the Perez Jimenez regime, and In their demands for thenationalization of natural resources,petroleum (which is exploited mainly by VS.he Communists hare been somewhat more vehement than the other narties. However, in their suoport for the "Buy Venezuelan" cam-palon, the malor efforts to promote Venezuelanand reduce reliance on foreign,. imoorts, the Communists have not distineulshed themselves as more nationalistic than members of the other parties.
The widespread belief that the "political unity" of all civilian forces, Including the PCV. is essential to prevent the restorationegime dominated by the armed forces has resultedigh decree of toleration for the Veneruelin Communists This tolerance also reflects ponular recotmition of tbe important role pltved by the PCV In theof the Perez Jimenez retjime. Under such circumstances the Communists have met withsuccess, particularly In labor, press, and
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student circles. In presenting the PCV as anational party which differs only In degree from the parties of the non-Communist left Tbe Communist* have also benefited directly from the conviction shared by tbe non-Communist leftists, and stoutly defended by the leaders of the major parlies, that in an open political system all parties have an Inherent right to express their views openly and to seek political office by constitutional means. Moreover, all of the parties currently predominant on the Venezuelan scene have had to operate clandestinely In the past. Their leaders are awareet! organized party can survive long periods of Illegality Besides, many of them are convincedegal Communist party is easier to keep under surveillance and is fax less troublesomelandestine one. In addition, they are frankly concerned that any antiCommunlst measures adopted by the present government might be turned against themuture udministration. The fact that some of the top PCV command are from wealthy Venezuelan families and have close social connections with prominent non-Coramu-nists undoubtedly contributes to the favorablewhich the Communistsertain amount of comradeship was built up between non-Communists and Communists who were Jointly persecuted or Jailed together by the dictatorship.
The leaders of the three major parlies are aware of the International and subversive character of the Communist movement in Venezuela. Although they have cooperated closely with the PCV tothe threatoup from the right, they have consistently rejected the demands of the PCV for participation In the government and In lnterparty agreements However, some element* ln the non-Communistthe AD youthand part of thenot firmly convinced of the Communist danger and counsel cooperation or alliances with the PCV for partisan ends. In an effort to counter this tendency, AD and COPEI leaders have publicly described the Venezuelan Communists as members of an Internationaland proponentshilosophy inconsistent with the democratic and traditional goals of Venezuela Moreover, on various occasionsBetancourt has warned the public, andthe labor force, against Communist machinations and the danger of becoming pawns In the International political strategyoreign power.
Serious concern over the danger posed byin Venezuela has been expressed by the Catholic Church, the armed forces, and those propertied elements who stand to lose tne mostrowth of Communist strength or influence The COPEI also assumed an increasingly outspoken anti-Communist position afterhr only consistent anti-Communist media of importance are the Catholic press, chiefly the Caracas daily La Reiigidn, which points up the atheistic andcharacter of Communism and the nonsec-tartan humor magazine Martin Garabato. which seeks to undermine the Communist appeal by ridicule. Both publications stress the Communist threat to traditional Venezuelan values nndThe Catholic Church Is actively engagedsocial action" program in an effort to meet changing social conditions and satisfy theaspirations of the lower classes within the framework of Christian doctrine. In thislt endorses most aspects of the social reform programs of the nonCornmunlst parties while vehemently opposing the Implications of the PCV program.
Foreign Communists are active among Spanish, Portuguese, Dominican, and Nicaraguan exile groups In Venezuela The Communist-penetrated exile organizations engage In plotting against their homo governments and occasionally lend themselves to PCV-soonsored prooagandaIn suoDOrt of International CommunistHowever, they do not appear to maintain regular and close connections with PCV and as of now do notubversive threat against the Government of Venezuela.
The Venezuelan Government has the authority under existing legislation to cope with subversive movements of any nature. Judicial action in this respect may be based upon Articlesndf3 constitution, which define the duties of Venezuelan citizens and resident aliens, and6 penal code, which defines conspiracy andas crimes and prescribes the penalties for such crimes. Articlef3 constitution stipulates that Venezuelan citizens shall defend their countryT.lrrsrv-ice. and obey the constitution and the laws and regulations enacted by the government. Articletates that aliens are to contribute to thedefense, respect the laws on the same terms ss citizens, and refrain from political activities other than the exercise of suffrage when they are entitled to that right. Citizens who fall ln their duties may be triedarge body of lawscivil and military offenses. Aliens who fall in their duties may be detained, confined, orfrom the country. In the penal codeof criminal actsature range from clandestine entry Into restricted areas, for which the guilty may be jailed forays, to conniving with foreignor external enemies against the territorial integrity or republican Institutions of the nation, for which the penalty Isears confinement.
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conspiracy and subversion with intent to depose national, state, or municipal govern' menu or to destroy republican institutions at these levels may draw penalties of from three to five years confinement ln political jail. Unlimited abuse and slander of publicavorite conspiratorial device tolimate of instability, invite penalties rangingoonthsIn some Instances the penal code alsofines. Aliens tried and found guilty ofor subversion may be deported, bul the penal code makes no provision for the exile of Venezuelan citizens. In practice, however, the Venezuelan Government has had frequent recourse to measures of exception (offahereby civilian conspirators have been exiled withouttrial. Military conspirators are moreassigned abroad for an indefinite period long-established custom condones both practices.
B. Communist activities
enezuelan Communist Party
The Communist Party of VenezueU (Partido Comunttta dewas1 during the dlcutorshlp of Juanez. It was outlawed6 byEleazar LCpez Contreras. Although stillproscribed, the Party was allowed lo engage In front activities during thes by Lopez' successor. General Isaias Medina, in return for Communist support of various social and economic reforms sponsored by the admlnUtratlon. Tlie Communist front groups eventually merged into the Venezuelan Popularnion Popularwhich was legalized in the Federal District onhe UPVdeclined in importance and for allpurposes ceased to exist The PCV Itself was legalized In the Federal District the following year. During thehe PCV largely followed the Interna.tior_al Communist wartime policy of collaboration with existing regimes in Latin America. Under the leadershln of Juan BautlsU Fuenmayor, Eduardo and OusUvo Machado. Luis Mtquelena, and Rodol'o Quintcro. the PCVmuch of iU attention upon the Itbor movement, becoming the dominant element In the trade unions. The Communist Parly wasstrong among the petroleum workers, who composed the largest single organized group In labor.5 it was estimated that the Party0 members.
A longstanding feud over tactics and doctrine precipitated an open split in the ranks of the PCV inissident group was expelled for unwillingness to accept the PCV policy ofwith the Medina regime. After anunity congress. dissidenU7 formed what eventually was called the Revolutionary Party of the Communist Proletariat (Partkto Reoolu-cionario del ProletariatIU members were later commonly referred to as the "Blacks opposed to the "Red Communists" of the PCV During the latter part of the periodB when the non-Communist leftist Democratic Action party (XccWnwas in power, the "Red CommunisU" under Gustavo Machado and Juan Bautlsta Fuenmayorolicy of alignment with the governing party. InIhe "Blackhose principal spokesmen were Luis Miquelena and Rodolfo Quintero, generallyourse of nonalign-menl. Blessed wilh the tacit endorsement of the international Communist movement, the "Red Communists" remained the stronger of the two factionsarge margin. In the congressional elections7 the "Red CommunisU"0 votes, orf the total votes cast: the "Black CommunisU"otes, or% of the total vote. There is reason to believe that during the early years oflcutorshlp the PRPcmore closely with the government than did the PCV, and in return was given considerable freedom of action. For example, the PRPc was allowed to maintain control of the Influentialof Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda. Efforts to restore unity to the Venezuelan Communist movement were not wholly successfulroup of PRPc leaders rejoined the PCV, and the PRPc for all practical purposes ceased to exist.
Duringeriod of AcctAn Democrdtlca government, the CommunisU were notablyin their efforts to expand their infiltration of the labor movement, the educational system, youth groups, and women's organisations This failure was largely due to competitive activities by the AD; the PCV-PRPc split also contributed to the Communists' difficulties. However, the military coup d'etat of6 and thebanning of the AD inffered the CommunisU opportunity for renewed activity.
Inowever, the PCV was outlawed by the military JunU, and IU petroleum federation and affiliates were dissolved; these measures, coupled with some police harassment and theof some PCV leaders, the severance ofrelations with Russia Innd action taken by the Venezuelan Government against the then existing Venezuelan-SovietInstitute and IU members contributed to the checking of overt Communist activities in
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Venezuela In thei.37 PCV membership and overt activitiessteadily, as those PCV leaders who hadeen Imprisoned either went underground or into exile abroad. However, the PCV was notas ruthlessly as other parties during the dictatorship, and the Party later emerged with its structure largely Intact.
The Communist* participated directly In the Junta PalrUHica, the clandestine movementin7 which was instrumental in the ouster of the Perez Jimenez regime inith the fall of Perez Jimenez the PCV gained de facto legal status and resumed overtactivity under the leadership of Jesus Faria, Qustavo Maehado. and Pompeyo Marquez Mlllan. Operatingree political system the Party has succeeded In pushing Its membership well above5 level, although It remains numerically weak In comparison with the three majorAD. URD. and COPEI. De jure legal status was achieved with the promulgation on8 of an electoral law which enabled Communists to run for public office. In addition to theinfluence through its Infiltration of keyIn organised labor, communications media, the teaching profession and student organizations, the PCV Is believed to have also achieved some success In its efforts to Infiltrate the government and major leftist parties
a.organization of the PCV Is comparable to that of other Communist parties throughout Latin America. It Is organ-Ized In then the federal territories of Delta Amacuro and Amazonas, and In the Federal District Because of its present legal status, the PCV is able to operate openly and has assumed many of the aspectsormal political party from an organlsaUonal standpoint. Severalhave indicatedlandestine Partyexists parallel to the overt PCV structure. Little Is known at present about the structure and composition ot tho clandestine organization. It has been reported that crypto-Communlsta areIn labor union work, and presumably PCV members are operating secretly in other areas as well. In9 the Party beganmall clandestine guerrilla force. (For aof this organization, see below, underActivities.)
In the ascending order of the hierarchy, elements of the formal Party structure are cells (area andard or local committees: regional committees; the Central Committee (including the Political Bureau [Politburo] and the Nationaland (theoretically) the National Con
""Bssafii^ gresshart of Party structure, see.
Party crf/4The basic units of the PCV are Party cells established in factories, cities and towns, and rural districts. Cells made up of Industrial or commercial workersivenare called enterprise cellseells In residential areas are called neighborhood, street, or apartment building cells (cesatoi de barrio, dee btoque).to one PCV writer, enterprise cells are favored because they are composed of factorybulwark of the Parly. Theoretically, no cell can have lessr more thanembers;membership of more thanas beenin some cells. An averaget the cell members are womon; the PCV goalemale membership. Each cell is underolitical secretary; the officers of second and third highest rank are the secretaries otand finance, respectively. These officials are circled by tha full cell membershipell conference or cell general assembly, which is, in theory, the lupreme authority of the cell. CeU meetings arc held weeklyegular site, which mayember's homeard committee headquarters In the case of residential cells, or at the place of employment in the case of enterprise cells. AccordingCV publication, the order of businessell meeting should be as follows:eview of the state of fulfillment of the tasks assigned at the previous meeting;eview of finances and of the status of dues payments:olitical discussion; report of the politicalassignment of new tasks based on the needs ascertained during the political discussion; andn educational session consisting of such thingsecture, commentseading assignment, and course work. According to the same source, the role of ihe cell Is lo I) nartlcioate in theof Party poller through the studv andof the materials prepared bv the Partv leader-shlo;orcad the Party line throueh theof propaganda, the sale of the Partv news-paoer Trlbuna Popular, and the organization of public assemblies and conferences;ecruit new members:ducate members and explain totho Partv Ideoloev;eep Partv ties with the muses and assist them In the defense ofrtehtt: andrtanrxe Its members In collective prolecta. with each member hart-i*'fic tasks and resoonslbill'iea "In the DoU'lcal birtles and effortsand poplar masses to regain what Is rieh'fullv theirs."
Ward and localare groupedInto wards Ixonas or nv*>os) in the Federal District and in some other cities, and into local areasess populous mun'ci-
Ix
ties and villages In tbeard or local area generally may contain up toells,ew In Caracas have more. Each ward or local area Is under the controlommittee (senile de radio or comlte local) The committee members art electedard or local conference attended by delegates from the member cells.
egional committee! Each state as well as the Federal Districtegion. Each region Is under the jurisdictionegional committee (cotnttihich Is electedegional conference composed of delegates chosen at ward and local conferences. In theory, theconference Is the supreme authorityegion: In practice it merely ratifies decisions of the regional committee.
The largest and most influential regionalIs that of the Federal District Accordingulletin distributed by the Regionalto lu ward committees, as of9 the Federal District Regional Committee controlledard committeesotal of 2fl7 celU. Of
8 theard committees in the Federali composed only of transportation workers' cells, another of press, radio, and television workers,re composed entirely of enterprise cells. The remaining known ward committees represent the Caracas districts of AlUgracia, Sucre, San Juan, Santa Rosalia, La Pastors, El Valle, San Augustln, El Recreo, La Vega, Antlmano, and San Jose, and the coastal Vargas department. Including the city of La Ounlra.
entral CommitteeSupremeover the PCV at the national levelested in the National Congress, composed of delegates designated by the regional conferences, which theoretically meeU every two years. The National Congress In turn designates the members of the Central Committee, which acts as thedirective body between sessions of theIn fact, however, no full-scale congress has been held since the Second National Congress,hich elected or confirmed the bulk of the present PCV leadership.hird
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Congress Is scheduled tentatively torhalfn reality, maximumall limes is vested ln the Centralis composed of fromoembersequal number of alternates. Within thiskey power restsoliticalconsisting ofentralwhich In turn is subject to thea five-member National Secretariat composedmembers. Unlike sorne otherparties in Latin America, the PVC doesextensive useational conferenceull national congress.uses mainly plenums of the CentralIts medium for countrywide discussion andof policy.
The PCVouth auxiliary called theCommunist Youth (Juventud Comuniita deItationwidewhich Is generally considered an Integral part of the PCV structure, since JCV membersin most phases of Party activity. JCV members range In age from abouto breakdown has been obtainable, however, on the distribution of JCV members by age groups.age for PCV membershipence JCV members may transfer into the Party proper at any time betweenh andt birthdays The actual time whenransition occurs, however, varies according to the status ofsefulness of the Individual to the Party, whether hetudent or has become train-fuUy employed in the labor force, and whether he is deemed ready for full Party membership. JCV President Hector Rodriquez Bauzaember of the PCV Politburo and was elected to Congresseputy in the8 elections. Theof the JCV In many ways parallels that of the PCV. the main exception being the unique structure at the Central University. At the bottom of the nonunlversity hierarchy aro cells which are under the Jurisdiction of ward or town committees; these in turn are under state regional committees. At the head of the JCV organization Is the National Executive Committee (Comisidn Eftcullva Na-clonal) composed of approximatelyfficersuxiliary secretaries It Is believed that theExecutive Committee is directly responsible to the PCV Central Committee, andlsoand elected by the resolutions of periodic JCV national conventions, the last of which was held in9 with the attendanceelegates from all over Venezuela- At the Central University, which Is one of the main centers or JCV activity,egional committee controlledniversity Bureau (Bardnder the bureau arc executiveone for each university school or faculty, and under these committees are base committeesto cells in the nonunlversity structure. The JCV university organization Is frequently referred to as the University Communist Youth iJuvtntud ComunistaThe University Bureau controls the Propaganda Secretariat, which distributes Communist literature, supervises sales of the PCV party organ. Tribuna Popular, anda newspaper.Nueva Anand indoctrlnaUon program Inaugurated by the bureau in9 provided for theof study circles, weekly courses In politics and organization, seminars to be given byprofessors, and directed reading.
b. LeadershipIt Is believed that theof the PCV Politburo and Central Committee officials remained In exile during the Perez Jimenez dictatorship. Others, Including PCV Secretary General Jesus Faria. were Imprisoned by Perezlandestine Central Committee was maintained in Venezuela during the dictatorship under the leadership of Pompeyo Marquez Mlllan. Marquez and other clandestine leaders, including Ouillermo Garcia Ponce, Eloy Torres. Klc.ii.tr Diaznd Douglas Bravo, cooperated with th* Junta Patrtdtica during the latter months of the dictatorship and worked with non-Communist parties in the planning and execution of thestrike of8 which precipitated the fall of Perez Jtaenez. This close liaison between the PCV and leaders of other parties during the revolution was largely responsible for the favorable politicalhich the Communists were able to operate after Perez' exile. After theJunta under Admiral Wolfgangassumed control of the government onirtually aU the members of the Central Committee came out of hiding, were released from prison, or returned to Venezuela from exile abroad. The Politburo emerged and assumed actlvoof the PCV. Its composition has remained constant, although two regular members of the Politburo reportedly were added to the National Secretariat inhe Nationalis now believed to consist of Jesus Faria,general; Gustavo Machado Morales;Marquez Millan; Alonso OJeda Oiaechea, agrarian secretary; and Luis Emlro Arrleta,secretary. Other members of the Politburo are Ouillermo Garcia Ponce, propaganda secretary; Pedro Ortega Diaz, secretary general of theDistrict Regional Committee. Martin Jose Ramirez Castro, finance secretary, Eloy Torres, labor secretary: Eduardo Machado Morales, press secretary; Ernesto Suvaector Rodriquez Bauia. president of the Juventud Comunlita ae Venezuela; and Eduardo Gallegos Mancera,of the Municipal Council of the Federal District
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Since thes the PCV's most prominent leader and principal spokesman hai been Oustavo Machado Morales, an able and persuasive Marxist of great personal magnetism. His long and almost legendary career, marked by paramilitaryactivities, imprisonment, frequent exile, and peregrinations throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean area and the Soviel Union, in some ways parallels that of Brazilian Communist leader Luiz Carlos Prestes (sechapter V,iographies of Keyachado. whoemberealthy and prominent Caracas familyarts University law graduate. Joined the Communist movement5eriod of Intensive Indoctrination in Communist dogma in the Soviet Union9 he staged aninsurrection against the government of Venezuela and President Juan Vicente Oomez. He then went into hiding, not to reappear until after the death of Gomezmprisoned briefly and later exiled, Machado did not appear again in Venezuelan thai year hehis willingness to adhere strictly lo the international CommunlM line by switchingfrom denunciation of President Medina and the latter't pro-Allied policies to support of both shortly after the Russo-German pact collapsed with Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union.
Although Machado remains the PCV's chief spokesman today, he has been criticized recently by other Party members for his failure loore dynamic Party policy Secretary General Jesus Faria likewise has been criticized for lack of dynamism attributable to his current poor health. In9 the National Secretariat of the Politburo reportedly was expanded from three to five members. The new members added were Luis Emiro Arricta and Alonso OJeda Olachei. It was rumored at the time of Ihe change that the purpose of the expansion might have been tothe eventual removal of Machado and Faria from tht National Secretariat.
It has also been reported that Pampero Marque: has emerged as the top PCV leader andMirquet headed the Venezuelantol Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) In Moscow duringnd spent four months visiting the USSR and Communist China. Shortly after his return to Venezuela the Central Committee heldh Plenum.hich served as an occasion for dissemination by Marques of the latest Kremlin line. The PCV leadership appears to be relatively flexible at the higher levels, and follows, the collective leadership doctrine dictated by Khrushchev ath CPSU Congress6reater extent than do most other Communist parties of Latin America
Faria, Machado, Marquez. andomewhat lesser extent, OJeda and Arrleta. have all been active In Party affairs during the past two years and, with the exception of Machado, have made numerous trips to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. None appears tourely figurehead status. It has been reported that Machado. because of his public relations value, may retain Ills prominent position In the Party hierarchy as long as the PCV's present policy of unity with the non-Communist leftist parties prevails, but that Marquez or another leader may assume overall direction of PartyIn the event the Communistsore radical course or are forced to go
c. MembershipThe PCV made striking gains in membership during the year following the ouster of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship Int is estimated that In7 the Party was composedkeleton cadre ofCV and JCV militants, by8 the enrolled membership had risenincluding JCV members) according to PCV middle-level leaders. Enrollment appears to have leveled off sinces Venezuelan press accounts reported that PCV membershiparound0 level as of9 This figure comparesrevious high0ccording to figures released by the British Empire Communist Conference In March of that year Judging by the percentage of the PCV vote attributable to the Federal District and the slate of Miranda In the8 elections. It is probable that at0 PCV membersJCV members) out of the estimated total0 are from the metropolitan Caracas area. Evidence exists that9 the PCVon organization and on the consolidation of8 membership gains.
Most Communists come from labor and youth (primarily student) groups and.esser extent numerically, from the teaching profession, and from the ranks of Journalists and Intellectuals Because of the Integral relationship between tbe PCV and the JCV. the Communists generally group members of both organizations together ln their estimates of PCV strength. Although the exact percentage of JCV members amongommunists ln Venezuela today is not known, It Is probable thatf thetomembers of the youth organization.
PCV members are most heavily concentrated in I) the Federal District area (Including tbe state of) the state of ZuUa In the west; andhe state of Anzoilegui in the east All three areas contain relatively large numbers ofand Ansoalegul by virtue of
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being Venezuela's most Important oil producing states. The party's rapid Increase ln strength during the postrcvolutionary period is largelytohe favorable politicalIn which the PCV was able to operate after;enerally favorable treatment from the Venezuelan press and othermedia; andkillfully-organized mass recruitment campaign inaugurated on8 and carried on until November of the samefew weeks before the December presidential and congressional elections. The fact that Caracas' population had doubled over the pastears gave the Communists an unusually good target in that they were able to reachinimum ofeavy concentration of poor and politically naive inhabitants.
The8 recruitment drive constituted an effort to make theartyass base capable ofignificant impact in the congressional and presidential elections which were held on Decemberuring theinimum of prerequisites were required ofParty members. Almost anyone could join, and recommendations from PCV members were not required. Mass meetings were organized to stimulate recruitment, and national, regional, and local leaders were sent around the country tothe campaign. Party units were encouraged to compete with one another in recruitmentMeetings were even held among remote Indian tribes in the interior, notably in the Amazon as Territory, and interpreters wereto translate speeches Into local dialects. Party leaders recognized the problems created by the assimilation ofreat number of new members anderies of activities to encourage and sustain the interest of the recruits and to teach them Communist theory and tactics. Much of the training took place in the Caracas area, where it was reportedchools staffedotal ofnstructors were established inlasses at these schools consisted ofhour indoctrination sessions. Inarxist school, the Inttituto Ezcqulel Zamora, was opened In Caracas. Staffed by prominent Communist leaders and intellectuals, including Gustavo and Eduardo Machado, Pompeyo Marques, Guiiiermo Garcia Ponce and Fernando Key Sanchez, the institute is open to all,of academic background.
d. FifA-vcisThe PCV relies mainly ondues and fundraJslng drives to cover its operating expenses, as it has few members orwho are able to make substantial donations to the Party. Membership dues generally arc paid monthly and levies an? based on ability to pay. The method of assessment i* usually left to the in-
dividual cell, but quotas normally are fixed for each cell by Its parent ward or local committee. In many cells each member is required to contributef his monthly salary to the Party If he earns upollvareser month; if he earns more than this amount he Is obligedf his monthly pay. Party members who are unemployed are required to make token payments rangingoents) per month. Fundralsing drives take several forms, including sales of membershipat aboutrives featuring the sale of nonredeemableales of revenue stamps for Porty membership cards, and periodic national financial campaigns during which Party cells are called upon to fulfill specific quotas by such means as extra assessments, raffles, dances, dinners, and "salaryt the latter each member Is expected to donate the equivalent of one day's salary to the Party. Proceeds from the collection of dues are generally split between the cells, the ward or local committees, thecommittees, the Central Committee and Politburo. Often the larger portion of the proceeds Is retained by the colls and ward or localto cover day-to-day administrative andexpenses. Money obtained from fundraising campaigns, on tho other hand, is often divided so that the highest percentage of the proceeds goes lo the top echelons of the PCV hierarchy. ForIt was reported that the proceedsevenue stamp sale for membership cards plannedaracas ward committee inould possibly be divided asor the wardor the regionalor the Central Committee;or theThe JCV participates In most Party fund-raising activities and is assessed quotas just as are the PCV cells.
Cell members are constantly urged to push sales of the Party newspaper Tribuna Popular. Often they are asked to purchase two subscriptions of the newspaper themselves, one for their personal use and for transmittal to friends, and another for posting in public places.
Generally, the PCV's financial campaigns have been only moderately successful, and It is apparent that In the recent past the Party has been hard pressed to finance its program of propaganda and recruitment. Furthermore. PCV members arein arrears in the payment of their dues, and Income from Tribuna Popular has fallen below that hoped for by the Party leadership. Probably the Party's largest fundralsing drive to date was the National Financial Campaign inaugurated in8 for the purpose of backing PCVin the8 elections. At the end of the campaign Party leaders said publicly
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Hie campaign had succeeded In providing the PCVollvaresf twice the original goal, but this claim Is open to question Interim results of the drive, published two weeks before Its end, showed that subscriptions In the Federal District and the atate oftwo areas of greatest PCV strength -were leuf the assigned quotas for these regions After the end of the drive, It was reported that Parly leaders in the Federal District admitted to cell members that they were disappointed in the results of the campaign.
o evidence of significant directsupport of PCV by the International Commu-nlst organization. However, the cost of theamount of travel by PCV and JCVto the Sino-Soviet bloc presumably Is financedarge extent by the USSR and Communist China. In addition, much of the writtendistributed by the PCV Is printed In the bloc, and the cost of shipping the material to Venezuela is borne for the most part by the USSR (For the rumored possibility of Soviet financialto Tribvna Popular, see below, underFacilities.)
e. PhopaoacilitiesThe PCV has at its disposal extensive facilities for theof Party news and propaganda. These include the Communist press, consistingidelyweekly tabloidozen periodicals, and the non-Communist leftist press, which employs many Communist writers and provides apace for PCV propaganda. The PCV is not known toany radio or television stations,redominant role In the Federalradio and television workers' union. Sino-Soviet bloc literature is distributed freelyVenezuela, and movies from tha Sino-Soviet bloc are shown from time to time
The principal medium for PCV propaganda la the Party's weekly tabloid newspaper Tribuna Popular, whicheported normal circulationts editor Is Oustavo Machado Morales. The newspaper has offices at PCVin Caracas. Distribution Is maintained throughout Venezuela, largely through theefforts of the Party cell members. Tribuna Popular is used to disseminate Party news andand Is required reading for all PCVAfter trying unsuccessfully forear to convert Tribuna Popularally, Ihe PCV Central Committee in9 announced again that It planned to make Tribunaally newspaper, and the Party at that timewo-month campaign to raise funds for the paper. Politburo member Eduardo Machado traveled to Havana for the announced purpose of purchasing printing equipment, spentew days there, and then flew to Mexico City, where he reportedly visited the Soviet Embassy. Subsequently plans were announced for the establishmentew printing firm. Editorial Cantaclaro. and theof presses from East Germany toally paper beginning inhe presses for Editorial Cantaclaro arrived Intep-up In publication has not as yet occurred. If Tribuna Popularaily basis in the near future, it would seem likely, Judging from the failure ot PCVfundraislng drives In the past, that financial backing will have been provided by.
Communists also publishumor magazine with claimed weekly circulationnder the direction of Gabriel Bracho Montiel. Other leading PCV magazines areonthly edited by National Secretariat member Pompeyo Marquez which concentrates onIdeology and Is designed for the intellectual; Cruz delultural and Intellectual magazine published monthly by the Crui del Sur bookstore in Caracas; Libertonthly; Tiempoi Suetoi, and Educador, an Irregularly published magazine started inith an Initial printingopies. Juventud Comunlsta de Venetvela pub Ilshes Joi>eaouth newspaper which appears Intermittently; Its circulation is reported to behe student body of Andres Bello Lyceum (Uceo Andri* Hello) in Caracas publishesro-Communist newspaper, Cuadros. Tho Spanish Communist front organization Libertad para EspaAaonthly magazine which bears the group's name. Several Spanish-language magazines edited Inare distributed freely in Venezuela. Including Union SodeHica and other periodicals devoted to sports, agriculture, ballet and theater, metallurgy, and writing andaracas firm. DU-tnbuidoramports Communist pub llcations in small lots from many countries and distributes them in Venezuela. Several Caracas bookstores deal in Communist literature, including Libreria Cruz del Sur and LibreriaZamora. and the JCV outlet Libreria Polledro. The PCV owns two Caracas printing firms,m-presora Venezolana and Imprctatnd several PCV leaders own Editorial Cantaclaro, which they hope will eventually publish Tribuna Popularaily basis. Another Caracashouse. Editora Orajot, is owned by aof the Communist Party of Spain andpublishes Spanish CommunistIniormativa Venezolana. press clipping service, is run by PCV newspaperman Servando Garcia Ponce. Two Communist-controlled outlets. Club de Dixot Cruz del Sur and Ducoi Supraphon.
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Soviet bloc phonograph records and music.
Communist propagandists have been greatly aided by the policies and attitudes ol most of the publications which comprise the non-Communist press; many of these publications employ or accept contributions from Communists andMost of the major Caracas dailies are to some extent critical of VS. foreign policy and anti-"lmperlalist" and make no consistent effort to counterbalance the propaganda which appears in the Communist press or which is contributed by Communists to the non-Communist press. Some Communists and persons sympathetic towardare employed on the editorial staffs of most of the Caracas dailies, and these papersgive editorial space to PCV and pro-Communist contributors from the outside. For example. El Universal, probably the most conservative of the major Caracasublished articles by Pompeyo Marquez of the PCV National Secretariat. Marquez now writes sporadically for El Nacional, while Jesus Faria and Gulllermo Oarcla Poncehave written articles for Laommunists Servanda Oarcla Ponce and Manuel Trujillo write daily columns for Ultimas Noticias. At leastommunist or pro-Communist writers are used by the two largest dallies of Caracas, El Nacional and Ultimas Noticias.
The Venezuelan Journalists' Association (Asoct-acfon Venetolana deis the only group of Journalists which exerts an effectiveof influence on the national scene. It Is highly sensitive to any foreign criticism of post-revolutlonary Venezuela, but is unhesitating in pointing out the faults of other countries, with the apparent exception to date of the Soviet bloc countries.ajority of theis affiliated with the AD, PCV memberstrong minority and many of them enjoy prestige and importance In their own right as political,and Journalistic figures. Communists hold positions of control on the AVP national board and the Federal District branch, which representsf AVP membership, and are Influential In the Zulia section. This has enabled Communist Journalists to limit unfavorable publicity against their Party and to keep many anti-Communists from gaining positions in the higher echelons of the association. At the AVP national convention inommunists won theof five of eight working committees and the vice-chairmanships of two others. Ana Lulsa Uovera, an avowed member of AD whoecord of Communist-front group activities, was elected president of AVP, and PCV member Servando
Garcia Ponce became executive secretary general. Subsequently. In November. PCV member Eleazar Diaz Bangel was reelected as secretary general of the Federal District branch of AVP, andhow hold three of seven positions on the executive board of this branchCV-URD-Independent slate defeated an AD-CO PFIotes
Communists and persons sympathetic toward Communism among the nonprofessional personnel of Caracas newspapers reportedly have on some occasions been able to prevent the publishing of snU-Communist material. Many of theseare members of National Press Workers" Union (Srndicalo Nacional de Trat-ijadores dewhich Is headedommunist secretary general. An example of apparentInterference of this sort was the almost complete suppression in Caracas newspapersnited Press International news storyeud between Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and the Cuban Communists In lateubsequent Investigation indicated the possibility that the story had been removed surreptitiously from newspaper wireless files.
Anti-Communismeak but growing voice in the Venezuelan press. The Catholic presshas been the Communists' strongest critic. In addition, several minor dailiesaracas weekly humor magazine. Martin Carabato, are outspokenly anti-Communist Because ofcirculation the anti-Communist press Is not generally effective In counterbalancingpropaganda In the Venezuelan pressatholic-oriented anti-Communistorganization formed Inhe National Organization of Democratic(Organisaeidn Naclonat de Periodistasor ON API'i n, wields little real power In comparison to the AVP. Beginning inrticles critical of the Communistsincreasingly apparent In some of the leading Caracas dailies. Including the Caprilcs papers (Ultimas Noticias, La Eijera, andMundo) and El Universal.
f. Paramilitary activitiesSporadic and generally ad hoc preparations for armed guerrilla action were made by the PCV8 when the Junta de Gobierno was ruling Venezuela. These plans, which were never put into effect, were aimed mainly at protecting the provisionalagainst rightist attempts to seize power and atase for clandestine PCV activity in tbe eventuccessful rightist coup. During the several crises which threatened the provisional governmentt was revealed that the
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had hidden caches of arms, Including pistols, rides, and "Molotovestined (or use against counterrevolutionaries in case nonmilitary defenses failed. The Party instructed keyhow to patrol streets at such times.
Late8 PCV leaders discussed plans toa permanent secret guerrilla force whose primary mission allegedly would be to aid in the repelling of Invasion and/or coup attempts, and whose secondary mission would be lo stand in readiness to support the Party In lis struggle for power. The organization ofuerrilla force was begunmall scale in the Caracas area inevolutionary Querrilla(Comifs Retolucicmarlo dtCRC) was set upovert subcommittee of the PCV Central Committee. Although the CRC and its subsidiary groups have no overt connection with the Parly, their membership Is composed of persons selected from PCV cells, most of whom operate under pseudonyms In the clandestineIt Is believed that overall control ot the CRC rests with Eduardo Machadoember of the Politburo. The nationalIs Douglas Bravo, who is also propaganda secretary of the Federal District Regional
Training exercises for guerrilla commandersInstruction in street fighting, sabotage,of strategic locations, weaponsprinciples of guerrilla warfare, and political theory, small-scale field maneuvers have been conducted in the hi Us surrounding Caracas. The future commanders are expected to orientgeographically with the coastal mountains between Puerto Cabello and Higuerote, whichCaracas, and with the area around Cumana. Querrilla training activities so far have for the most part been limited to the Caracas area.short courses in guerrilla tactics were given to groups ot Communist leaders from the interior of Venezuela innd similar courses were planned for later the same year; It is indicated, therefore, that the Party hopes to develop alkeletal guerrilla organization in tho outlyingof Venezuela. According to Party leaders, the specific alms of the guerrilla organization areo counterattack in the event of an amphibious Invasion of Venezuela by followers of ex-dlctator Marcos Peres Jimenez;o counterattack in the event of an attempted coup by discontentedmilitary elements;n PCV orders, to attack as guerrillas In any pari of the country, ando conduct Isolated hit-and-run attacks,In city streets, against the police or against other armed organization*
The Communist guerrilla organization cannot beotent military force at the present time, since It is still in the formative stage and emphasis has been placed on the training of leaders rather than on the recruitment of large units of rank-and-file Communists. Present size of the force reportedly is slightlyen PCV leaders contend that the primary purpose of their paramilitary organization Is to help defend the present democratically elected government agains: possible coup or invasion attempts Nevertheless, their efforts lo form the frameworkuerrilla apparatus have been expanded at the same time that they themselves have taken an Increasingly antigovemment attitude.
g. OajrCTTOs and tacticsWith respect to intermediate and long-range objectives, theCommunists seek to Impair relationstheir country and tha United Stales, lopressure on the government to adopt apolicy In the "coldnd to prepare the way for an eventual revolution by which they would come to power. Since8 the Immediate political consideration of the PCV has been tolis freedom of action andirm base from which to influence democraticIn Venezuela. In pursuit of this goal the Communists have emphasized tbe need for unity among the leading parties and have consistently attempted to portray the PCVespectable, national organization differing only in degree from the other major parties of the left.
The Communists have advocated coalitionand guaranteed minority representation tn Congress. Other features of the PCVsocial reform, expansion offacilities, reduction ot living costs, and laborclosely resembled comparable provisions In the programs of the non-Communistontinuing public campaign has been waged by the Communists against Perez Jimenez sympathizers, and the Party has promised to resist with force any coups attempted against Ihe present government.
The unity theme has prevailed In spiterowing antl-Coramunut attitude on the part of tbe government since Betancourt took office tnhe policy of the Communists In the face of this growing hostility has beengradually from moderation to propagandaagainst the government, although lt stillsupport of constitutionalthe fact that PCV leaders reportedly arethat the present AD and COPEI leaders are probably their greatest longrun enemies, andthe political groups with which the PCV would least care to align Itself If it were not com-
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to do so by circumstances. PCV leadersbelieve that the present AD policy oftoward the PCV Is engineered by the "old guard right wing" of the AD, and feel that the younger "left wing" members of the AD are more receptive to their policies and overtures; theyto fortify the latter (action whenever possible and to take advantage of any rifts between the two groups. At the same time they attempt to strengthen leftist elements in the COPEI and the URD. The Communists' current outward policy remains one of avoiding extreme disruptive tactics and other actions which may bring on repressive measures from the administration, and ofa facade of official PCV support for the government. Whileolicy tends to protect the relatively favorable status which the PCVat the present time. It also causes the Party toertain amount of potential massbecause the PCV program ostensibly differs only slightly from those of the other major political groups, the Party Isnique attraction for the poor and for other discontented elements of the population. The Party has engagedass propaganda and recruitment campaign whichdividends In the8 presidential and congressional elections. The campaign has been particularly effective among students and educators, who comprise, along with labor, the principal target groups of the PCV. Theassault has been aided by frontthe most prominent being the Venezuelan branch ot the World Peace Council, which have been influential In promoting frequent overseas travel by Venezuelans to attend Sino-Soviet bloc front activities.
The PCV has developed several policies andthemes which complement and arewith Its doctrine of national unity. Many Venezuelans who have spoken out againstinfluence in government and politics have been labeled by the PCV as Pirei)tm.eni$tabent on destroying political unity and undermining the Venezuelan revolution. This tactic serves the dual purpose of discrediting anti-Communism and demonstrating PCV patriotism and support of the revolution The PCV has Joined the other major parties in campaigning for aid for the underprivileged. It has supported literacy campaigns, slum clearance, and sanitation drives and has formed or Joined campaigns to atd labor, small farmers, and Indians. It has participated in neighborhood Improvement committees and has succeeded in gaining control of some of them. Agitationoratorium on outstanding debts and ant Speculation legislation likewise have formed part of the Communist campaign in favor of the poorer classes.
The PCV remains strong In the labor movement, but deprived of the relatively favorable position It occupied during the Perez Jimenez regime, has lost ground to AD and COPEI labor groups in some areas. In order to forestall the resurgenceentral labor organization oriented towardthe PCV has accepted the non-Communist position that Venezuelan labor at the present time should avoid affiliation with cither Western-oriented or international Communist labor organizations but maintain liaison with all of them.
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In the economic sphere the PCV hasationalist policy which has differed only slightly from those of the other major parties except on the subject of economic aid from the United States PCV leaders reportedly have said that their Party will fight with all its resources any offers ofUS. aid. For the sake of political unity the PCV has not agitated for the Immediateof the Venezuelan oil Industry, but has called for revision of existing petroleum and Iron ore agreements to provide Venezuelareater share of thetate-owned National Petroleum Corporation to compete with the foreign oil companies,tate monopoly for thehandling and marketing or refinedproducts. The PCV holds that no newor iron ore concession should be granted. It has propagandized only mildly in favor oftrade between Venezuela and the Soviet Noc. mainly because theotosition to absorb large quantities ofmain export-Beginning Inhe PCV has campaigned actively for the reestablishment of diplomaticbetween Venezuela and the USSR, and other Sino-Soviet bloc countries. (RelationsVenezuela and the USSR, werefrom5 untUhen they were severed, and the Venezuelan-Soviet Cultural Institute was closed by the Perez Jimenez government. Later in2 relations wtth Czechoslovakia were also broken; since that tune Venezuela has exchanged diplomatic missions with no blocowever, according to Hector Mujlca. prominent Communist and director of the CrMtr.ii University School of Journalism, theof diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the Soviet bloc is notrimary Issue In the eyes of the PCV and will not be pressed by that Party. Apparently the Communists do not want
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ontroversy over tbe question st the present time.
One of the PCV's foremost objectives Is theof relations between Venezuela and the United States. Its main tactics In this respect are the encouragement of nationalist sentiment among Venezuelans, use of the theme that the United States favors dictators In Latin America, andof the theory that Latin America's illsesult of American "imperialist"ecent target of PCV attacks has been the United Stales Military Missions In Venezuela, which the Party seems intent upon driving out of theFrequent articles ln Tribuna Popular demand the expulsion of the missions
h. International contactsThe PCVhas been closely attuned to the policies and directives of the Soviet Government Liaisonthe Venezuelan Communists and leaders in the Soviet Union has been particularly close sincehen Russian leaders reportedlyconcern over the lack of coordination within the Communist movement In Latin America and determined to provide more Immediateto the movement Guidance to PCV leaders and coordination have been effected for the most part by travel on an Increasing scale of Venezuelan Communists to the USSR and to other blocincluding Communist China. PCV leaders also have traveled to other Latin Americanwhere they have consulted with Sovietand with other non-Venezuelan Communists. Similar international contacts have beenby the Communists at the student level. Possible Soviet use of Latin American Communist exiles as couriers and as advisers to the PCV was revealed with the arrest of OualemalanJose Manuel Fortuny In Rio de Janeiro Infter an extended stay In the Soviet Unionour through Brazil and Uruguay, Fortuny was arrested en route to Caracas, where reportedly he was to work with the PCV in tho final phase of the electoral campaign.
eeting of Latin American delegates at the celebration In Moscow commemoratingh Anniversary of the October Revolution inrovisions were apparently made for coopera-tior. and coordination of effort between theparties of Latin America and for more frequent travel of Party leaders to the USSR The then-clandestine PCV was represented at the meeting by Oscar T. Merchant. Earlyfter the PCV had gained de facto legal status, the Party hastened to expand lis internationalIn8 PCV leader Eduardowent to Mexicoecret meeting of Middle American Communist parties. In8 PCV
Secretary General Jesus Fails and Eduardowent to Mexico, where they consulted with Mexican Communist leaders and with officials of the Soviet Embassy. The two PCV leadersto Moscow where, among other things, they reportedly conferred with Soviet leaders on the possibility of the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between Venezuela and the USSR.
Probably the most Important consultations between PCV leaders and Soviet and other foreign Communist leaders since the beginning of the PCV's postrevolutlonary expansion occurred during and aftert Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unioneld in MoscowFebruaryhe congress was attendedop-level Venezuelan delegation headed by National Secretariat member Pompeyo Marquez. Also on the delegation were Alonso Ojeda Olacchea. at lhatember of the Politburo and now alsoember of the National Secretariat; Pedro Ortegaember of the Politburo; and Pedro Gutierrez of the Central Committee. Directly following thepecial meeting of Latin Americanwas held In Moscow, presided over by two officials of the CPSU. At the meeting the necessity for greater coordination among Latin American Communist parties and between these parties and the USSR, was reiterated by the Soviet officials Other subjects stressed al the meeting were the need for Latin American CommunisU to adapt themselves to and Identify with nationalreflecting th* legitimate aspirations ol the people of Latin America, and. as an extension of the unity principle, the policy ofommon front with nationalist and anti-Imperialist move-menU.
PCV policies sincet CPSU Congress have coincided with the broad principles laid down at the special meeting for Latin AmericanIn line with Ihe call for Increasedbetween Communist parties In Latin America, Venezuelan leaders are reportedly among the chief coordinatorsast plan of Communist action In Latin America. The PCV has participated In other cooperative efforts,onference of Latin American Communist leaders ln Santiago. Chile which was designed to coincide with tne9 meeting there of American foreign ministers andeftist propaganda rallyby the Chilean Popular Action Front (Frente de Action(seehatter V,nder Domesticnity of action with non-Communisttenet oft CPSU Congressasdiscussed, long been espoused by PCV.ore extensive coverage of the PCV national
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policy, see above, under Objectives andh* PCV standsrominent example ol the successful implementation of still another recommendation at the Moscowidentification of Latm American Communist parties with national movements. The PCV has been strikingly successful in depicting Itselftrictly Venezuelan product, free of obligations to foreign (ie, Soviet) masters, which acts only ln the interests of the Venezuelan people. In its propaganda the PCV repeatedly denies that itoreign-dominated party. Typical in this respect is the following excerpt from an Indoctrination essay by Ouillermo Oarcla Ponce:
It is infamy to say that the Commu&Utn organisation al the serviceorclfn power. The CommunlM Partyationaltntntlanarly of Irut patriott. Our policies and our program tit decided byCommunists In order totha interests of Venezuela. Those who say that our party tsational party are tboa* who IM ta order to patn the good tiurtoreign power: the United States We Communists arc not Intimidated by Ul* calumniesh* servants of American policy Ln our country. Bolivar ni also accused offoreignnd It was inld that Francisco dc Miranda vas an "agent ofe Communists do not deny that we are united with the working classes of all countries, and with all the communist parties of tha world, by the bonds establishedommon Ideological fountain, by ihe science of Mind leniPtim. and by tha sacred pitaclpin cf ICe InUmaUooal se&daniy at Um proletariat. But this does not conflict with our statusationaltneiuelanarly which places the sacred wairare of our country above any other interest
rincipal (argel groups
a. Political partiesIn Its dealings with other political parties the PCV has placed great emphasis on the national unity theme, which originated with the Junta Patridtica, theorganization which directed clandestineagainst the Peres Jimenez dictatorship during the months preceding Perez" ouster. By callingpirit of cooperation betweenand the major political parties and by emphasizing its avowed rol*egitimateparty free from International encumbrances, the PCV has attempted to gain Important positions in and out of government for its members and supporters, and to Influence the policies of the non-Communist parlies. Concomitantly, lt hasarge popular electoral vote in an effort to realize its aspiration ofartyase sufficiently large to qualify ltajor factor in Venezuelan politics.8 when the Government Junta waa In power, severaland pro-Communists succeeded In gaining high positions in the government The PCV failed, however, In Its efforts to bringingle unity candidate for president supported by Itself and the three major non-Communist parties.Belancourt subsequently refused to cooperate with the Communists or include them In hisand tbe influence of the PCV In ruling circles declined markedly compared to what lt had been under the Government Junta.
During the early postrevolutionary period the CommunisU were aided In their unity drive by the fact that many Venezuelans felt the country owed IU liberty to Interparty cooperation and feared that the resurgence of factionalism would compromise the revolution. Many Influential non-Communists were willing to work with th* PCV and belittled the Communist danger because they believed that most PCV memberseculiar breed of "home-grown" CommunisU whose primaryrested with Venezuela rather than with the Soviet Union. The fact that many of the top PCV command are from wealthy families and have social and blood ties with prominent nor.-Communists undoubtedly contributed to the complete freedom to proselyte and engage in propaganda which the CommunisU enjoyed during the period of the Gov-eminent Junta.
Although no avowed PCV or known sympathizers were given cabinet posU during the period of the provisional government, several CommunisU and pro-Communists were appointed by the Junu to public offices at lower levels, especially to technical positions ln the Ministry of Education and the autonomous government institutes, such as theAgrarian Institute {Imtituto Hactonathe Agriculture and Cattle Bank (Bancohe National Institute ofWorks (fiufirvfo National de Obratthe Venezuelan Social Security Institute (fnsfirufo Venesoiano de Seguridadhe Venezuelan Children's Council (Consejo Vertc-zofano delnd the Venezuelan Development Corporation (COTjwraelonCommunisU were also represented or. th* electoral law and agrarian reform Uw drafting committees and were appointed to th* Supreme Electoral Council. While some of these CommunisU and pro-Communisw still hold their Jobs, they are slowly being weeded out by the Betancourt regime.
Unity ln the strictly political sense between the PCV and the major non-Communist parties showed signs of wearing thin toward the end6 In August Betancourt announced that the AD. the URD, and the COPEI had decided against apopular front government with Communist participation, and In October the same three parties signed the "Punto FIJo" pact by which they agreed
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run separate slates In the December elections andostelection coalition government which, by Implication, would not Include the PCV. (See this Chapter.. General, for details.)
The PCV showing in thelection did not live up to Communist expectations, The URD candidate, Larrazabal, whom the Communists finally decided to back, lost the election to Betancourt byotes, and the PCV failed to increase Its share of the total vote over what it had been in the last freeelectionSeeable, showing PCV electoral strength7) However, the Communistsood show of strength in the December legislative elections. They received nearly twice as many congressional votes as presidential votes and made the second-best showing of any party In the Federal District, where they received more votes than the AD and were topped only by the URD. Theyeats in the Senate outotaleats in the Chamber of Deputies outotal. The Senate seats were occupied by Jesus Faria and Pompeyo Marquez, PCV secretary general andsecretary, respectively. Elected to the lower chamber were Gustavo Machado Morales,Garcia Ponce, Eloy Torres, Hector Rodriguez Bauza, Joaquin Araujo Ortega. Eduardo Machado Morales, and Pedro Ortega Diaz. (Forof the Communist vote In8 elections, seeap.)
Of particular significance in the PCV voting pattern in8 elections werehe excess of the PCV's congressional votes over Itsvotes; andts show of strength in the Federal District congressional election. Among the reasons for the comparatively small PCV vote for President were the intense campaign conducted by the Catholic Church against the PCV and Betan-court's wide popular appeal. Although the larger Communist congressional vote has not been fully explolned, It Is apparent that most of the excess votes came from the fringe of new and undisciplined voters from the lower classes, who. although not PCV members, were attracted by the individual appeal of many of the politically experienced PCV candidates and by the social welfare andimprovement activities of the Communists in slum areas. The tatter factor was of particular importance in the Caracas area, whichnew" population estimated0 adult persons, mosl of them penniless, who migrated to the capital after
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The situation or the Communists was sharply altered by the Installation ol the popularly-elected AD coalition government under Betancourt. In his inaugural address onnnounced that although the civil liberties of the Communists would be respected by hisPCV members would be barred from position! In the government. The coalitionappointed by Betancourt containedfrom the AD, the CRD. and the COPEI, and some Independents, but no known Communists During the early months of the Betancourt regime the Ministry of Interior engaged in mildof the PCV, mainly by interfering with PCV rallies, and Ihere was evidenceeneral tighten-
-gninr"_
Ing of the governments policy toward Communists. In9 the regime's position against Communist participation ln the government was reiterated Some PCV leaders and other political observers reportedly felt that Betancourt and his AD and COPEI supporters, by their antl-Commu-nlst statements and actions, were deliberatelyto provoke the PCV to such an extent that it would attack the administration publicly and thus shatter its unity facade. It was not believed,that Betancourt would go so far as tothe PCV, since he had staled several times in the past that he supported the legttlmato right of that party to operate In Venesuelaegal organ and that the banning of Communist parties was
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not an effective method of combatting Communism in Latin American countries.
b. Youth amd studentsYouth and student groups appear to be one of the targets of highest priority for the CommunisU in Venezuela Under the seasoned leadership of "professional students" in their middle and late twenties, PCVs youth wing, Juvenlud Comttnitfa de Venezuela, hasone of tho most powerful and Influential young Communist groups in the WesternIn terms of both Its size relative to that of its parent organization, and Its impact onpolitics and government. Its Influence was demonstrated vividly during the visit. Vice President Richard Nixon to Caracas Inhen Communist student leaders formed the nuclei of several of the antl-Nlxon demonstrations. The principal long-term Communist alms In thefield appear to bt the preservation ofthrough cooperation of the JCV with the youth movements of the AD. the COPEI. and the URD; the formation and expansion of future PCV cadres through concentrated indoetnnailon in Marxist ideology; and the disseminationnd pro-Soviet propaganda among student and other youth groups.
In many instances the JCV tactic of cooperation with non-Communist student groups, particularly in the field of protesl demonstrations, has been more successful than have PCV unity tactics at the Party level. The JCV, together with the youth organizations of the AD. the COPEI, the URD, and two minor political groups, Republican{Integrationand theWorkers' Party 'Partido Sociallstanity pactledging, among other things, tbe maintenanceolitical trucean on political factionalism. The participation of the Communists in the youth pact was altogether at variance with the policy followed by the AD, the URD, and the COPEI parent organizations ofthe PCV from the unity pact signed earlier the same month.
Communist Influence among students is greatest In Caracas, especially at Central University.the AD apparently has developed the strongest influence among the0 students, the Communists are believed totudent following nearly equal to that of the AD. Moreover, the Communist followingettergroup. The Communists are active on the executive council of the Federation ofCenters (Pederaeidn de Centrotthe university's politicallystudent organization, and were largelylor the FCU's decision In8 to Join the
Communist-run International Union of Studentsommunist,German Lairet.ls viceof FCU. With respect to the Federations of Student Centers at the other three nationalthe Communists appear to rate second In strength at the University of Zulia (inut are weaker than the COPEI and the URD at the University of the Andes (In Merida) and the University of Carababo (Int theheld at the Central University Inor student representatives to the student-faculty electoral bodyhich in tum elects the rector, the Communistsf the popular toU; the AD receivedhe. the. and the
Communists and pro-Communists gained control of the arrangements committees of and thedelegation to the FCU-sponsorcd Third Latin American Student Congress held In Caracasttended by representatives ofatin American countries. Puerto Rico, the National Student Association of the Unitedhe mternational non-Communist studentCOSEC (Coordinating Secretariat forStudenthe Catholic International student group. Pax Romano, and the Communist IUS. Although In Itself the congress wasommunist conclave, the Communists whothe Venezuelan organizers apparently hoed to use Itommunist proDiganda forum. The credentials committee, orgsnlzlne committee, and directive board of the congress all showedto foreign Communist delegations andto ensure the recognition offactions of delegations which were arjlit. Central University FCU President Hector Perez Marcano. leftist member of the AD youthwho acted as president of the congress,the Communists at every opportunity and was Instrumental in the theft of cables sent from Colombia to the anti-Communist Colombiansupporting Its stand forajority of the delegates to the congress probably were pro-Communist, the Venezuelan CommunisU were not wholly satisfied with theof the gathering,inority of anti-Communist delegations succeeded In makingheard and disrupted many of the Uctlcs of the organizers.
The Influence of Communist thinking on theof the non -Communist youth groups UIn the public pronouncements of these organizations, which repeatedly duplicate PCV and JCV propaganda themes. For example, youthpublished by the AD and the URD In9roposed visit of Puerto Rico Governor Luis Munoz Marin to VenezueU. called for the formationront to struggle against
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"colonialism" andentioned the "dangers of turning over natural resourcesnd supported the Communist-sponsored Seventh World Festival of Democratic Youth in Vienna. While the extreme positions taken by AD and URD youth groups are to some extent the result of Communist propaganda and Infiltration, they alsoommon attitude among young Latin American ultranatlonalistic Intellectuals who mistrust and resent thepolitical and economic position of the United Sulci in the Western Hemisphere The AD Youth Bureau itself has repeatedly denied that It Is Communist-oriented. Whatever the derivations of the policies of AD and other non -Communist youth groups may be, it Is apparent that many of the objectives of these organizations coincide with tho goals of the PCV.
c. Educators and iNTELWCTUAiaInfluence among student groups Isby strong PCV representation amongand Intellectuals. At the university faculty level Communist penetration Is highest at theUniversity, the most prominent Parly member being Hector Mujica, director of the school of journalism, and Jose Vicente Scoria, dean of the college of sciences. Other Communist professors Include Fedcrico Brito Figueroa, Luis Anibal Gomez, Raul Agudo Freites, and Pedro Beroes of the Journalism school; A. D. Boelll of the biology school; J. B. Sojo and Antonio Estem of the music school; and Pedro Esteban Mejia Alarcon,anchez Mljares. Francisco Mleres. and Gladys Trujillo Moreno of the economics school; Federlco Montenegro, J. R. Niiftex Tenorio, Nicolas Curiel. and Pedro Duno of the college of humanities; Simon Munoz Armas and Rafael Angel Barreto of the school of medicine, and Luis J. Mola Polentini of the school of dentistry. The rector of Central University, Francisco de Venanzl, was elected with AD and Communist student support. De Venanzl has tolerated and often encouraged the activities of politically volatile students and has been accused of being "soft" on Communism. Elsewhere, the teaching staffs of the University of the Andes In Merlda and,esser extent, the University of Zulia ln Msracaiboumber of
At the secondary school level. Communists are active In the Venezuelan Teachers" Federation
(Pexteracion Ver.ezoiana de Macs trothereCV members ofman directorate of this organization, alongembers from therom the COPEIRD representatives At the lUceo Andres Betio, Caracas' largest lyceum.
f theeachers are reported to be Communists or pro-Communists.
d. LabonLike youth and student elements, organized labor is reported to bo one of the PCV's most important target groups. Operatingosition of strength ln the immediate postrevolu-tionary labor scene, the Communists maintained their national policy of unity In their dealings with labor elements and thereby gained respectability In spite of setbacks In some areas, the PCV hasin holding control over large segments of Venezuelan labor. The Party's labor strength Is far below that of the AD, but equals or surpasses that of the COPEI and the URD In many areas The labor organizations of the AD. the COPEI. and the URD are growing, however, and the PCV is hard-pressed to prevent inroads by these groups'
At the time of the overthrowez Jimenez the Communist leaders appeared lo beost favorable position to win control over Venezuelan labor, lhiring the Perez Jimenez regime severe repressive measures were taken against most AD arid COPEI labor unions. In contrast, theattitude toward certain Communist unions was relatively lenient; these unions were even allowed to maintain open contact with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU1 and the Con-federation of Latin American Workers (Con'edera-cidn de rrabajadores ae la AmericaCommunist International labor organizations, throughout the period of the dlcutorshlp The Perez Jimenez regime also employed "former"leaders in the governmenl-iponsored unions with whichought to replace those-which had been repressed The explanation given was that these Communists were useful InfornianU.lso notable that the regime feared the AD more than lt did Communism and was willing lo use Communist hostility toward the AD for IU own ends Notwithstanding the strong position of the PCV In the labor field at the time of the8 revolution, the return from exile of AD leaders who had Improved their skills and reputationsumber of ORIT posU abroad and who had worked closely with their clandestine AD laborin Venezuela soon led to the reesUb-lishment of AD predominance In organised labor.
Of theenezuelans ln the labor force, slightly morereMost of them now belong to unions and federations in the AD-domlnated Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (Confederacion de Trabo-tadoretwhich was reorganized and expandedrade union congressfter the congress the CTVembership,and commercial workers,workers organizeduralNine industrial federations andegional federations comprise the CTV affiliates. Of the
I
moreelegates attending the November trade unionere PCV members. This was greater than the number of delegateseither the COPEI or the%ut less than hair the number of ADwhof the total number of participants- However, the number of PCVfrom the vital Federal District area equaled that of the AD. The PCV and the AD each claimedelegates from the Federal District; the URD claimedelegates and thef the top officers elected at the congressre affiliated with theith the PCV.ach with the COPEI, and the URD. Thus, the PCV emerged from the congresstrong minority force capable ofconsiderable influence on Venezuelan labor, particularly in the event the two other minority parties should agree to cooperate with thein order to challenge the AD leadership.
Although the Communists do not exert ainfluence on the CTV, they are powerful in several influential federations and in numerous union organizations through Venezuela. Their strongest position Is In the Federation of Workers of Ihe Federal District and the State of Miranda (Federacion de Trabaiadores del Districtostado delaimed member-shiD. where theyutn the executive committee, including that of secretary general,ut ofn theexecutive council. This organization was set up9 and replaced the AD Trade Union Center of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda (Central Sindical de Trabajadores del Distritostadohe COPEI Pro-Federation Committee of Organized Workers of Venezuela (Comite Pro-Federacidn de Trabajadores Oraanieados deand the "Black" Communist Federation of Workers of the Federal District and State of Miranda (Federarioh de Trabajadores del Distritostadohe Communists are also active in the important Federation of Venezuelan Petroleum Workers (Fcdnaddn de Trabaiadores Petroleros debut have lost strength there since the fall of the Perez Jimenez regime. As of0 Communists constituted theut ofember unions of FEDEPETROL. but inf these, the Union of Petroleum Workers and Emolovees of Maracaibo (Stndicalo debreros PetrolTox dedid they command an absolute majority of the membership.
The lessening of PCV strength in the petroleum industry since the revolution stems from theof the relatively favorable positionby the PCV in petroleum workers' unions under Perez Jimenez and from theresurgence of the AD and the COPEI, which have made Inroads into areas where theformerly were dominant. Significant AD gains have been made at PCV expense among the oil workers at Cablmas, Lagunlllas, and other areas along the eastern shore of Lake Maracaibo In the state of Zulia. and among the refinery workers in the state of Falc6n. The most important COPEI gains have been made in the strategicallyrefining area on the Paraguana Peninsula In western Venezuela. The PCV,trong minority force among the petroleumIn influence only to the AD. This was evidenced by the federation's nationalinutelegates,ere either Communists or had records of Communist activities. Two PCV Central Committee members. Luis Emtro Errieta and Cesar Millan. were elected toman federation directorate assecretary and assistant organization secretary, respectively. PCV members occupy importantIn the oil workers' union in the Anaco-El Tigrc section of eastern Venezuela and are active In the Amuay refinery in the west.
Among other union groups In which thehave influence are the Graphic Arts(Federaddn de Trabaiadores de la Industriewhere they are strongf the organization'sffiliates; the Federal District automobile workers' unionan directorateommunists; the union of workers of the General Motors' plant In the Caracas area; and the metal workers',workers', and radio and televisionunions in the Caracas area.
e. RuralIn outlying districts the PCV is active in Ugai campeslnas (rural leagues) which have been set up throughout Venezuela to deal with rural problems at the local level. The Party attempts to infiltrate those leagues already In operation and encourages and takes part In the establishment of leagues where they do not exist. The PCV has had little success in this field, but lt Is known that the Partyew of the ligas campesinas. The great majority of the leagues, however, are controlled by the AD and,esser extent, by the URD.
Communist propaganda in these rural organiza-lions centers around agrarian reform. Aoutlet for PCV demands for an extensive agrarian reform law was provided at the First Venezuelan Farmers' Congress (Primer Congreso Campesino de Venezuela) In late May and early Junelthough the congress wasby the AD, Communists were active during the proceedings, and PCV National Secretariat member Alonso Ojeda Oleacheather Com-
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munist were elected loman executiveof the Farmers' Federation of Venezuela (Federacion Competing defter the government-sponsored agrarian reform bill was published int was criticized by theand their sympathisers as being too mild and favoring the propertied classes.
f. Cmc improvemivt committezsta. have succeeded in gaining control of some civic Improvement committees, particularly In the Caracas area, and have thus been able tn these cases to take credit Tor the efforts of thesein the fields of slum clearance, sanitation, and neighborhood improvement. The committees generally are called pro-Improvement, pro-defense, or pro-development Juntas (juntas pro^nejoras,hey are often grouped Into loose federations. Although many of theare dominated by Communists and active sympathizers with the Party, most of them remain under the control of the AD and the other two ma)or non-Communist parties. The PCV attempts to infiltrate these nan-Communis! groups wherever possible. According to one PCV leader, thecommittees constitute one of the Party's most useful tools in Its attempts to become the vanguard of the masses Participation byin neighborhood activities lends credence, in the eyes of many, to PCV claims that the Party Is genuinely interested In the welfare of thepeople, and Is on the side of theclasses. Widespread Communistin civic improvement committees In the Caracas slum areas Is believed to have beenresponsible for the large PCV congressional vote in the Caracas area in the8 elections
rincipal front groups
Communist front groups In Venezuelaeace committeeomen's auxiliary, some rural organizations and civic improvement(see above, under Principal Targetomen's groups, and exile groups from theRepublic, Portugal, and Spain. In general, however, these groups are relatively undeveloped in nature and lack the sophistication ofand operational pattern found In the front groups of some other Latin American countries and of the countries of western Europe. Three of the groups discussed below have been in existenceear or less, and definitive information in depth Is either spotty or unavailable on all. In addition, the PCV Is attempting to form single youth and labor fronts. Although lo date lt has been unsuccessful In this endeavor, it has been able to penetrate existing student and labor organi-
zations to such an extent that they often follow Ihe Communist line and participate In Soviet bloc front activities overseas.
a.ommitteePeace and DemocracyThis organization {ComlU Vene-solano por la Paz yIs affiliated with the World Peace CouncilnCommunist front, and participates in the activities of the parent organization. It was forced to curtail Its activities during the last few years of the Perez Jimenez regime, but expanded Itsconsiderably after thehe president of the committee Is Gen Jose Rafael Galbadon, an elderly eccentric. Although Galbaddn himself Is not an avowedmany of the mosl active leaders of the committee, including well-known Intellectual Carlos Augusto Leon and Dr. Jose Maria Sanchez Mljares, are PCV members. Galbaddn and Leon became full members of the WPC Inhe Peace Committee generally parrots the Soviet propaganda line on such subjects as atomic test suspension, disarmament, and coexistence, and sometimes also adopts causes which, although not closely aligned wiih Soviet foreign policy objectives, are attractive to many Idealists and liberalOne of the committee's main propaganda objeclives Is the transformation of Latin Americapeace zone" which, in Communistmeans an area whicholicy ot neutrality or nonalignmcnt between East and West. The "peace zone" theme reportedlyopic of conversation between Galbadon and Soviet Premier Khrushchev Innd was the subjectamphlet issued by Galbadon In9 entitled -Latin America Peacemong the essays contained In the pamphlet were articles entitled "Peace. Freedom.To Defend Truth is to Work forBerlin. Road tond "Recalling Nixon."
The committee has found It convenient to carry out part of Its program through the use otIn professional societies and women's and students' groups who promote participation in peace front activities by their organizations. The majority ofmembcr Venezuelan delegation lo the WPC-sponsored International Disarmament Congress in Stcckhclm8 wasof members of professional societies rather than ef the Peace Committee itself. Represented on the delegation, besides committee members Oalbadftn, Leon, and Sanchez, were members of the College of Teachers (Cofepio dehe Federal District Medical College iColegio Medico del Distritoaracas Radio and Television Workers' Professional Union (Stndieato Prolesional de Trabajadores de laowthe University Front (Prentt UntversUario)
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the University of Santa Maria In Caracas, the Union of Venezuelan Women (Union de Mujeresthe Venezuelan Teachers' Federation (Federaeioh Venszoionahe Municipal Council of Ouarlco (state ofnd the Venezuelan Society ofMembersupport committee for the congress Included former Coitalo d> Profesorcs president Felipe Masstanl. Central University law professor Dr. Humberlo Cucnca, URD supreme council member Dr. Manuel Lopez Rlvas, composer Antonio Estevez, and writer Juan Llscano Velutlni. ln some cases the WPC has used the propaganda tactic of listing as supporters of Its activitiesIntellectuals and public figures who actually have no connection with the organization. Other recent international aetlvites of the PeaceInclude attendance by Carlos Augusto Leoneeting of the Bureau of the WPC In Moscownd the attendanceenezuelan delegation at the WPC TenthMeeting in Stockholmata have been unavailable to date on the scope and finances of the committee.
movementThe Women'sfor National Liberation and the Fight(Moptmtenfo Fementno de Liberationy ae Lucha par la Pat) Is an auxiliary ofCommittee for Peace andconceived early9 and formallyJunehis group does not enjoyand appears to have littleGeneral Oabaldon Is honoraryMargot de BrlceAo Is president, andde Guevara Is vice president. Margotwas on the PCV Central Committeebut Is currently not an acknowledgedthe Party.
union or womwThisNocional at Mujerestt theprincipal women's frontas successors of the ailing FeminineGroup (Agrupacidn Culturalwhich had developedhere were formed theVenezuelan Girls (Union de Muchachat1 and the UNMwhich were Communist fronts. The UMVof existence3 and many of itsthe UNM, which becamel was partially revived clandestinelywith representatives of the URD and theamong Its members. Followingof the Perez Jimenez regime, thereorganized, chiefly through PCV efforts,limited collaboration from the URDAD. The UNM president Is Belch San Juan.
a PCV sympathizer. Leading Communists active In this organization are Argelia Lhaya de Martinez, Carmen Qulntero, Trina Urbina. Esperania Vera de Fuenles, and Lucinda Montero de Bravo. The UNM has sent delegations to Internationalwomen's conferences and to other front meetings In Venezuela and abroad. It is affiliated with the International Communist front Women's International Democratic Federationhe UNM Is particularly active In the poorof the Federal District. There are UNM affiliates ln the El Sltio, El Ciprcs, and Los Euca-llptos sections of Caracas, There are also chapters In some of the states. The group agitates against atomic tests and for world peace, democraticfor women, and better living conditions for women and children. Data on size and finances are unavailable.
or friends or chinaThis(Sociedad de Amigos deabout In9ommitteeand fellow travellers, most ofvisited Communist China during themonths, was appointed toocietypolitical, cultural, and economic tiesChina. The formation of thedesigned to coincide with the celebration10th anniversary of the Chinese People'showever. Interest was lacking and theof SAC did not take placehe executive committee elected alconsisted of Dr. Roberto Gabalddnsuspected crypto-Communist who Is theon the board of directors of theAgrarian Institute; Ana Luisa Llovera,newspaperwomen who Is president of thehas been associated with CommunUtthe past; Jose A. Medina Sanchez, URDU also associated with peace frontHumberto Cuenca, of the AD left wing,of the Caracas Bar Association, presidentVenezuelan Committee to Defendell-known apologUt forChina; and Dr. Carlos Augusto Leona member of the peace front and of theCommittee. Details are as yet unclearthe size of the organization, IUrecruitment, IU finances, and IU methodsIts members appear to be mainlyfellow travellers, and Venezuelansvisited Communist China.
association orThis ctrganization of lawyersVenttotana de Juris tas Democraticosis affiliated with the principalfront organization for the legalthe International Association of Democralic
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ased In Brussels, was originally formeduring the next six years Ita number of non-Communist members. AVJD participated in Latin American lawyers'in Brazil and Ouatemala in thes but became largely inactivenommittee consisting of leftist Independent Humbcrlo Bello Lozano andlawyers Ada Ramos and Jose M. Sanchez Mi-jares was established for the purpose of reviving the organization. In view of Its recent revival, little is known about AVJD's size, recruitmentkey figures, finances, aims and methods of operation, or its potential degree of influence.
f. Foreign Communist front cuoursAt least two, and possibly five, groups composed of foreign exiles in Venezuela are Communist fronts. These are the Ltbertad para EspaAa (Liberty ofn organization made up of Spanish exiles: the Dominican Patriotic Union of Caracas (Union Patri6tica Domlnicana deof exiles from the Dominican Republic and affiliated with the Caracas-based andDominican Liberation Movement (Movl-miento de Liberacidnheaded by Dr. Carlos Larrazaba! Blanco, Dr. Francisco Castellanos, Cecilio, and Alfonso Canto, who are also members of UPD; the Portuguese Patriotic Junta (Jimfo Pofridticohich has been permitted to use PCV radio and press facilities for Its propaganda: and thePatriotic Union (Union Patrhfticawhich is infiltrated byone of whom is Armando Amador Flores, the husband of Ana Lulsa Llovera, president of the AVP. These groups generally refrain frominto Venezuelan politics, but occasionallyin Venezuelan front group activities. For example, in9 representatives of thepara Espaiia, the UPD, and the Portuguese Patriotic Junta spokeally of the Women's Movement for National Liberation and the Fight for Peace.
Probably the largest of the exile front groups Is Ihe Libertad para EspaRa which was formed instensibly to serveolitical complement for the non-Communist Exileof the Spanish Republic (ComiU de ExHados de la Republicaheulletin and leaflets which deal mainly wiih the anti-Franco movement. The unity theme is apparent in these publications: their authors defend the union of all antldiclatorial forces. The organization agitates for the abolition. bases In Spain and the suspension of nuclear tests In order to prevent the "annihilation" of Madrid. Among the founders ol the Libertad para
Espana group are Eduardoyear-old brother of the late Spanish philosopher Joseasset; Franciscopanish Communist; Jose Antonio Rial Vasquez. aemployed by Caracas daily El Universal; Teodoro Isarria. also of El Universal; Antonioommunist, Angel Palaclo, awho servedaptain under Colonel Enriqueommander of Communist troops during the Spanish Civil War. Alberto deheater and film director suspected ofommunist; Antonio Granado Valdes. Centralart professorocialist; Paseualelt ran, Communist writer; Felipe Luis deainter suspected ofommunist; and Elfldio Alonso. The organization draws on theembers of the Communist Party of Spain living in Caracas
g. Youth axd stuocht raosT groutsPCV efforts to promote the formation of single youth and student fronts under Communist control have not been successful to date. In the absence of any significant organization capable ofstudent organizations throughout Venezuela, the dominant power among students rests with the Federation of University Centers (FCUJ of the Central University In Caracas, and thisnominally at least, Is controlled by the AD youth organization (See above, under Principal Target Groups.)
Venezuelan student attendance at Communist front activities abroad has been heavy since the8 revolution made such travel possibleargearge percentage of thewho have participated In such activities have not been avowed Communists; many, how ever, have been pro-Communists and/or members of the left wing of the AD youth organization Inive-man Venezuelan delegationHermanlose associate of several known Communists, attended the Constitutive Assembly meeting In Stockholm of thePreparatory Committee for the Seventh World Youth Festival. Four Venezuelans, none of them avowed Communists, attended the Fifth World Congress of IUS in Pelplnghe leader of the delegation, Jesus Ramon Carmona (then Inas at the time theof the student body organization (FCU) of Central University. Another Venezuelan student delegation attended an IUS Executive Committee meeting in Lodz. Poland.arge delegationttended the Seventh World Youth Festival in Vienna
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h. Labor front groufsCommunists and their sympathizers In the labor movementcontacts with the World Federation of Trade Unionshe principal internationallabor front, and with Its Latin American subsidiary, the Latin American Confederation of Workers (Con/ederadon d> Trabajadores de la AmericaVenezuelanwere active in discussions in Mexico aimed at implementing the decision taken att CPSU Congress to strive for labor unity through the establishmentew movement, lessCommunist than the CTAL, organized along trade union lines with departments similar to the WFTU International trade departments. It such an organization Is established in the future, Venezuelan Communists can be expected to press for affiliation with It by labor groups in their country. During the past two years delegations of Venezuelan labor leaders, Including, in some cases, members of non-Communht political parties such as the AD, the URD, and the COPEI, have participated In WFTU-sponsored activities abroad, including the First World Congress of Young Workers in Prague Inhe Second World Conference of the WFTU Trade Union(TUI) of Agricultural Workers In Bucharest inhe Third World Congress of Chemical Workers In Petroleum and RelatedTUI In Leipzig innd the WFTU Firs! Conference of the International Commercial Workers TUI In Prague In
C. Non-Communist subversion
Non-Communist subversive activity to seizeof government has beenonstant factor In Venezuelan politics Sinco the death of longtime dictator Juan Vicente. there have been successful coups d'etatevolutionnd many unsuccessful attempts at coups before and8 Theof political Instability5 has been associated with the rise of militarism andpublic anxietyeriod of rapid change in the social structure. At present,neither civilian nor military conspiratorsto possess the capability to overturn theregime. The major target areas for seizureoup d'etat would be the crucial Caracas-Maracay-La Oualra region, In which much ol the military force and most of the national economic and political leadership are concentrated, and the important oil areas In Zulia and Anzoa-tegul slates, whose economic activities are so vital io the revenue of tho government.
During the period of the recent8 to. the chief source of danger to the government was conspirators In the armed forces. Between the end of January and the beginning of8 theservices were primarily engaged In Internal adjustments In leadership and In easing Inter-service hostility aroused by conflicting roles of the several services during the long January crisis which ended In the overthrow ol Perez Jimenez Under the provisional government there were three major crises in relations between the government and the armed forces- The first one was associated with the anger of the armed forces at the Ineffective government arrangements for security during Vice President Nixon's8 visit to Caracas (see below, under Role of the Armed Forces inThe second crisis reflected growingin high military circles with antlmillury propaganda in the press and the -full freedom for all political elements" milieu. At that time. Air Brigadier General Jesus Maria Castro Leon. Ihe Minister of Defense,abinet meeting onestated Ihe changes In government policy deemed necessary by the armed forceseated debate Oeneral Castro thanirtual ultimatum. Kt did not receive any gen era! support from the armed forces, however, and the ultimatum merely resulted In his removal and departure abroad on special mission forhe third major crisis took the formtillborn coup d'elat8 by officers of the military police school under the leadership of officers on active duty as well as several exiled officers who had secretly returned Civilian unity and the coalition agreement among the three major non-Communist parlies have been major factors in politicalinasmuch as they represent' civiliannever again lo experience such evils of absolutism and ot the police state as prevailedthe Gdmez and Perez Jimenez regimes
Since Betancourt has become President,new difficulties have appeared Information on nearly all aspects of non-Communist subversion in Venezuela has been both nebulous andbut obviously there continue to beamong both civilian and military group* who persist In preparingoup d'etat.their activities seem to be related to concurrent efforts supported by exiles formerly with Ihe Perez Jimenez government Theseactivities are favorably viewed by theof the Dominican Republic, which Is also fomenting unrest and the climate of conspiracy in Venezuela. The chief subversive methodsIn use are the clandestine radio, leaflets, rumor on the grand scale, Introduction of weapons
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contraband trade, and secret agents (seeunder Civilian Subversive Activities andClandestinereat deal of moneyew individuals, who may Include Perez Jimenez, the industrialists Antonio Raima and Jorge Pccaterra, who have recently beenand possibly Dominicanrujlub Molina, is the putative source of financing. These difficulties have been associated both with the activities of Perezjimeajsfo groups and the clandestine Civic-Military Institu-tionallst Committee (ComiU Inttituaonalata
Nonelheleu, by selling groups of individuals from time to lime and deporting many of them, the authorities have prevented any serious threat lo the government. Resort lo terroristshootings9 and January IBGO have Indicated failure of thegroups to obtain support by propagandistsell-publicized appeal in9 by General Castro Leon to both the armed forces and civilians In Venezuela to abandon the Betancourt administration has been viewedonfession of failure to win either civilian or armed forces support General Castro was, moreover, court mar Lla led In absentia and retired with loss of all retirementumber of important barriersuccessful coup exist Acctcn Dtmo-crdrlca Is the majority party strongly based In the popular vote and organizedswith considerable success to equate itself with national Meals and aspirations and In so doing has developed its ties with the business community (protectednd it is repairing itswith the armed forces. Coalitionis working, despite Inevitable interpaityso that no party is known lo be lending itself to conspiracy. Civilian democratic representative government Is an ideal fervently supported to the point of active common defonse by all the political parties, labor organizations, student groups, and economic and professional associations. Negative factors operating against the possibiltiyoup d'etat are the lack of organized demand by any significant element of the population for recourse to an armed-forces-based government and theof an emotionally charged issue which would deprive the ad of its majority support and enable conspirators to Justify the overturn of President Rdmulodministration. To these civilian-oriented elements of stability should be added therientation being given the armed forces by their newumber ofof the military high command have beento their subordinates and to newlygraduates of service schools the proper function of the armed forces as an apolitical arm for the defense of the nation and its legallyinstitutions Moreover, since3 revolution the navy and air force have improved their positionsis the previously dominant ground forces and are now less likely to be ready toovementilitary takeover at the risk of again becoming subordinated to the larger and traditionally more powerful army.
1 Hole of the armed forces in subversion
Despite the current trend toward an apolitical military force, however. Venezuelans areto seeing the armed forcesecisivein the change of governments. Upon this basis, the general public believes in the possibilityoup d'elal which would necessarily Involve the support of all or part of the armed forces. Popular belief in the possibilityiolentof government is accompanied by constant rumor and reinforced by politicians playing upon fearsoup d'etat In the interests of civilian political unity. Non-Communist politicians blame ex-Junta President Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larra-zabal. now on diplomatic assignment abroad, and even occasionally President Betancourt, for failing to purge the government o( all Perezjtmenistas and the "residual machinery of the dictatorship The Communut Party exists, or at least professes to exist,tate ofwellVenezuela will bringolpt (coupelivered by the military, fathered by PiretjtmenUtat. and sponsored by the United States Military Missions Unsubstantiated reports are rife reflecting on the activities and intentions of some high-ranking leader* of the armed forces, including those publicly active on behalf of an apolitical role for the military (see below, under Clandestine Organizations)
Top-ranking military leaders have publiclyto the foregoing by stressing the loyalty of the armed forces to the regime and their devotion to an apolitical professional role. Congress In turn responded to the rumor campaign in the last days of9 session by adopting resolutions (in the nature of advice to the Executive) designed tothe subversive potential of the armed forces. One resolution called for the "purification" of the armed forces to bring Ihem Into harmony with the democratic character of the new Venezuela.sought to abolish the military training courses and faculties at the two coeducational military luctei In order lo make them comparable to other lyctet so that all Venezuelan lyceemay be molded in the same democratic ideals The jealous concern of Congress ever the training of the armed forces even ledesolution that the military mission agreements with the United
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States be revised to include the assimilation ofmission personnel to the status ofsubject to Venezuelan taxation andSuch intervention ln military affairsto the slate of military opinion prior to8 coup d'etat, which the armed farcesin part as defense of their Institution
Events since the orerthrcr* of the Peres Jimenez administration8 have been marked by the gradual removal of military leaders who sought to continue active participation by the armed forces In the formation of government policies andand In the offices of government. Some of these men have been sent abroad as ambassadors and attaches or In performance of so-called special missions. Many are exiles because of participation In unsuccessful coups d'etat, because they had been bested in Intraservice rivalries, or foreputation of being violentlyshake-out" offficers was largelybyut theery limited scale. In9 andumber of officers suspected of plotting and those who were too openly critical of the administration were subjected to disciplinary action
Directly related to the outflow and transfer of military figures has been the progressiveol the militaryolitical force. Theperiod in mlHtary-clvlllan rivalry forin the nation Is currently viewed as having occurred from8 in the aftermath of the Nixon incident, when United Suites officials In Caracas refused to acquiesce in Venezuelanaction against the provisional government, through the ouster of Castro Leon and many of his collaborators In8 The steadyof the military Into the poliUca] background has been roarked by the crises of July8 (seend by acceptance of the election and inauguration of Presidentan event considered highly improbable as late ashis development has been accompanied, apparently, by growing accordPresident Betancourt and his majority party and the armed forces, the result of attention to the needs of the services and acquiescence in theirautonomy. The trend towardfrom the AD of the radical leftwing splinter group under the leadership of Domingo Alberto Rangel should also contribute to more mutualbetween the armed forces and the AD. On9 Betancourt asserted that theof the armed forces Is resolute and sincere, because their leaders are men of professional and Institutional dedication and because the armed forces did not benefit from the dictatorial regime."
Under these circumstances the military conspirator at the present time Is sharply limited in his ability to win support.
Nonetheless, the potential for IncitementOn9ivilian PeVeiJime-nlifas were deported to Curacao forhermy garrisonspurious letter purporting to be from President Betancourt to Lt. Col Hugo Trcjo, whose ambitious democratic politicking had led to bis "exile" as ambassador to Costa Rica in8 The gist of this document Indicated intention on the part of the civilian regime to Impose completeupon the military.9 reports also began to appear that lower-ranking navywere discontented with lop-ranklng navybecause of the Utters* poor relations with thcir counler parts In the ground forces Dissatisfaction wilh the general Venezuelan attuatlon and with Communist growth is also reported among some younger officers In the ground forces,f whom were transfererd to interior garrisons in9unitive measure. Continued crises in confidence in the national economy during the latter half9 andugmented by the government's lack of finesse in attempted remedial action, have slightly Increased thevery limited military supportolpe The evils of the Perez Jimenez regime wereto dim before the dally reminder of visible massive public works of that administration, and the remembered aura of prosperity, as theadministration struggled to pay inherited debts, to reshape the socio-economic pattern ol society and to establishemocraticprocess.
ivilian subversive activities
Expression of civilian discontent throughto overturn the government is closelyto the role of the military in society, since civilian groups under present circumstances must subvert the armed forces to accomplish their ends Dr. Rafael Caldera, chief of the Social Christian Copei Party and president of the Chamber of Deputiestatedpeech of9 that:
Venezuelans are so accustomed to seems the armyally factor in their lives, aoto make the army the arbiter of their political contests. that at each moment tne mosttroops for thadissimilar en*ato larch* the amy In pew adtenturaianic our political reality.
Thus, civilian conspiracy directly foments anpolitical role for the armed forces, and civilian reliance on the armed forces for domestic power plays constitutes civilian mlliurism. In Vene-
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zuela civilian conspirators are round in veryan tire form circles and among those who strongly supported Perez Jimenez because they profited by his dictatorship. Many Venezuelans in exile, Including both civilian and militaryare conspiring to return to home and position. On the whole, probably more civilians than military have been exiled, and exceptery limited number of officers, they tend to be wealthier.of conspiracy are reported to exist in Colombia, the Dominican Republic. Italy, Spain, New York City, Miami, and Curacao. The latter locale is alleged to be the major center for jointRepublic collaboration. Each conspiracyand each period of crisis have resulted in deportation of Venezuelan civilians for conspiracy. One political party, the Venezuelan Federal(Oroaniaicidtt Federal Venetolana) was discredited and disappeared because its dominant figure and secretary general, Dr. J. M. Romero dc Pascuall, was Involved In the0 crisis. He has subsequently been charged with continued Perezjimenista activities and has spenttime under arrest. When strong suspicion exists without adequate documentation to assure convictions in the courts, measures of exception (alto policja) have been invoked consistently by the executive power to decree the detention or exile of civilian conspirators without judiciala practice accepted by the people as necessary to terminate resistance to democratic republicanwhile Venezuela remains in the shadow of military political influence and forceful overthrow of democratic government.
As has been noted, the inauguration of President Betancourtime ended the series of purely military difficulties which had troubled thegovernment. While military conspirators apparently made no attemptshe arrest. Investigation, and exiling of eight officers ln January and0 showed that the danger of an attempted military coup was not over. Perhaps noajor element in conspiracies, the military, nevertheless, still remain an object for subversion. For the most part, only civilians have been arrested for distribution of antigovern-ment leaflets, have undergone trial for conspiracy, or have been unceremoniously dumped abroad. Seizure Of clandestine radios broadcastingdesigned to subvert the armed forces and to excite Interparty conflict has led only to the arrest of civilians. Again, civilians are the main figures In contraband arms trade, and only civilians have been identified as terrorists. All evidence points to the fact that some civilian conspirators exist in most sections of the nation and In most sectors of society.
The propaganda themes of civilian conspiratorial groups allege Incapacity and immobility ofgrowth ot social anarchy, and the danger of Communism. All of these themes have formed part o* the non-Communist subversives' rumor campaign Coalition government is attacked by reviving old enmities, atimulaung interparty rivalry for government jobs, and arousing fears of eventual AD repression of rival parlies as itincreasingly predominant Testimony given9 by members of Perez Jimenez's NationalPolice during piepartlon of Iheir indictment was damaging to prominent figures, and appears to have been In part an effort by the Peresftmenistas to end the determined silence maintained by the new regime about past collaboration with Perez Jimenez of many people still in Important official and semiofficial posts
landestine organiiationi
9 saw the Initial identification of the Chnc-MlliUry InstltuUonahst Committee" CICM's major activities to date have been theof subversive leaflet* in the majorcities by the hundreds of thousands; the mountingontinuous rumor campaign, which reportedly achieved its highest level innd the possible sponsorship of theradios which broadcast antl-BetancourtSome commentators claimreat deal to the rumor campaign In order to keep alive the support for national unity which protects all political parties from repression
CICM appears to bt making an effort to attain the sophisticated level of clandestine activity of the parties under the Peres Jimenez regime. Its leaders reportedly want toefinite ideology and program to that any new government Installed by CICM actionirm basis on which to operate. Previously, and because of the lackirm basis of political guidance, military members of the CICM have noted, civilian politicians have taken captive new governments established by effort of the military. To date, however, details have been wholly lacking with respect to suchand program planning.
* Recently the name Civic Military Rerolutlor.tr> Movement <fcfot*"ilenio avioiurtgna/ij-hu appeared InvorvtnB many orames associated with the CICM. the MR CM appears toiter phase ol the CICM: however, thebetween the two Is not elear.
Fragmentary Information Indicates that the CICM organization is still Incomplete. It appears to consist of foreign and domestic divisions headedeneral council The domestic division is divided Into regional branches with the greatest activity being carried out in the Federal District
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Caracas and the westernmost state of Zulla.tn other states have been reported on ascale. Regional branches have separatelycivilian and military elements The civilian sector apparently handles propaganda, terrorism, economic support, and political organization; the military sectorpparently primarily concerned with subverting military unit commanders who in turn would order their troops and materiel into the field against the government and its supporters during an effort to seize control of government (see below).
Leading figures of CICM have been alleged to be such high-ranking officers asarco Aurelio Moros Angulo (former Commanding General of the Army andf the Joint Armed Forcesolonel Vicente Antonio MarchelU Padron. exiled Ln0f the Joint Armed Forcesavy Captain Gduardo Morales Luengo. also exiled in0 (former head of the plush armed forces club Circiito Militar and former Chief off the Start of the Joint Armed Forcesational Guard Major Luis Alipio Marquez (designated assistant military attache, Italy. In. and Lt Col.Sanchez Olivareaf Army and now commander of the Artilleryl the above listed officers, Colonel MarchelU and Captain Morales were arrested for conspiracy in0 and retired from the armed forces (seen addition. Brig. Gen. Jesus Maria Castro Leon (ex-Minister of Defense and now retired from the air force) and Colonel Oscar Tamayo Suarez (ex-National Guard Commander) have reportedly been linked with CICM from abroad. It has also been alleged that the effective head ot CICM is the Venezuelan Military Attache in Rome. Col. Jesus Manuel Perez Morales, "exiled'1 from Venezuela inf all these names, only lhat of Colonel Moros has appeared consistently in reports of conspiratorial activities Both Colonel Moros and Brig. Gen. Antonio Ignaclo Brlcefto Linares, who commands the Venezuelan Air Force, are (without confirmation) reported to have been membersroup which allegedly gave President Betancourt an ultimatum at the end of9 requiring complete autonomy for the armed forces and prohibiting the reported return to Venezuela or Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal and Lt. Col. Hugo Trejo from their diplomatic posts. Both the latter are in disfavor with the armed forces. Trejo is regarded asere political opportunist, and Larrazlba! Is disliked for hisand activities in the field of civilian politics and for his past support In these endeavors by the Communist Party. Counterbalancing all thesehowever, is the fact that one of the most frequently alleged leaders of CICM, Colonel Moros.
has managed lo survive, apparently unscathed, several "shakeouts" and has been consistentlyin publicizing and encouraging the growth of support by the armed forces for the new regim?.
ew civilian leaders have been reported for CICM and their Importance has not beenIn the9 terroristumber of men were Identified and detained or shipped out of the country. Of these the most Important figures appear to be Antonio Reyes Andrade, Luis Eduardo Chatalng, Hernan Escarra Quintans,omero de Pascuall, and two prominentGen (ret) Nestor Prato and Carlosaldonado. Identified as CICM propagandists are Antonio Daza Morro. Marcos Reyes Andrade. and Julio Plrela Almost all of these men were closely connected with the Perez Jimenez regime. As has been noted, the majority of CICM activities appear to be carried out only by civilians, the role of the military sectorbeing confined to the fostering of subversion In the armed forces. In this connection, theof non-Communist subversion In Venezuela continues both nebulous and contradictory. One view Is that CICM policy Is to conserve and protect its military elements, and to commit Ihem toonlyoup d'etat should be attempted Another view Is that CICM isivilian organization engaged in the dual effort ot creating an unstable situation in Venezuela throughand terrorism and of subverting the military It is also alleged that CICM has attracted theof civiliansajor section or private financial power. In Novemberowever, the financial Interests whichare supporting CICM were engaged in public endorsement of the Betancourtin an effort to resolve favorably the crisis in economic confidence.
9 activities ot CICM occurred in the days immediately preceding May I, the perioduneo Julyndhese periods of tension have excited one or more or the following reactions: resolutions against coups d'etat and of support of the government by such organizations as state assemblies, labor unions, and chambers of commerce; abundant editorializing; review of the machinery forof civilian organizations; pronouncements by politicalddresses to the nation by President Betancourt; and threats of general strike in support of the government.
CICM0ew terroristwhich led to vigorous reaction on Ihc part of Congress, political parties, and organizedminute general strike was organizedo demonstrate Labor's solidarity wiih the government. Tension was added to the concern
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aroused by terrorist actions by arrest of fugitive rancher Rafael Enrique Jaramlllo, who may have been linked with the terrorism and conspiracyThe situation was further aggravatedanuaryiot caused by hoodlums andwho tookemonstration of some unemployed workers. Among the many arrested were found members of the URD and PCV parties. The government promptlyo work camps ln the Interior ando reform schools. It followed this vigorous action by capturing on Januaryarlos Savelli Maldonado, along with much information which has compromised the security of CICM. Twenty officers andivilians were subsequently arrested. It is believed that the identity of some other top military members ot CICM has beenilitary board of Inquiry Investigated the arrested officers andesult navy Captain Eduardo Morales Luengo and army Colonel Vicente Marchelll Padr6n. were retired; along with Colonel Carlos Camacho Pan. Major Luis Rafael Cardler Rodriguez, and Captain Carlos Gustavo Angola Gonzalez. Major Gonzalo Suarez Romero. Lieutenant Gonzalo Abreu Molina, and Captain Ruben Apento Bolivar were subjected to disciplinary action.
Public concern has been intensified byfriction over coalition government problems in the states, whichigh point Inandnd over apportionment of offices In such unity organizations as theRural Workers' Federation {PederaciQn Campcsinaffectiveness of the rumor campaign has been augmented by Its duration and by the PCV's public dally gloom over dangeroup d'etat. On the other hand, the rumor campaign has had the effect of Impressing theparties with the necessity to bridle their rivalry In order to maintain sufficient concord and unity to guarantee stability of constitutional government.
Similar to CICM,egment of lt,roup called Pro National Armed Forces (Pro Fuerzaslias Pro Nationalist Activist Front (Pro Prenfe Acttvistats existence was reported ints regulations were revealed in El Nacional of Caracas on Julyt the end of the8 crisis; and iterious blow in the failure of the abortive coup onRO-FAN claims tolandestine Internalwith foreign branches. Its members allegedly belong to the armed forces, the professions, and the business community. The only individual still openly identified with PROFAN Is Dr. Nestor Moratlnos, now resident In tho DominicanNeither CICM nor PROFAN appear toezjimenista organizations ss such, butrepresent discontented military and civil-ian elements in general.
oreign non-Communist subversive activities
Among foreign countries and groups only the dictatorial government of the Dominicanhas been engaged In fomenting discontent tn Venezuela, although the Communist Party ofadds the United States to this category, and others blame much of the Venezuelan economic unaVrrdevelco*nent on the United States as aforce for discontent. Some allegations that the Spanish Government also has been Involved ln ant!-Betancourt conspiracies have appearedLongstanding personal enmity between Betancourt and Oenerallsslmo Trujillo of theRepublic as wellistory of stormy relations during periods of democraticin Venezuela, forms the background for the present Impasse between the two countries.deterioratedver theof Dominican exiles ln Venezuela andpress commentary.5evolutionary Junta headed by ROmulo(see this Chapter. Sectionnder Political Parties)rive to form an antl-dictator bloc in Middle America, the Caribbean, and northern South America. Venezuela refused to acceptby the Dominican Oovtrnment5 and relations were not restored until the military seized control in Venezuela8 (for full details, see this Chapter,estoraUoo ofgovernment In Venezuelahe strong anti-dictator bias of Venezuelan foreign policy.
Dominican use of tho diplomatic pouch tosubversive propaganda Into Venezuela, the introduction of subversive literature at Dominican ports Into vessels and airplanes going toand the arrest and Identification ofworking in Venezuela as agents of theGovernment contributedeverence ofbetween the two countries on. Since that time the Dominican radio stations have continued to beam antl-Betancourt broadcasts to the Venezuelan populace and to report Invasion or Imminent invasion of Venezuelan territory by lib-ertion forces. Venezuelan armed forces are alert to possible Invasion by armed subversive forces.
At the tame lime, the Dominican Government has employed us firms for Its anti-Venezuelan propaganda and seeks to Influence US. attitudes and policy toward Venezuela The Venezuelan press has reported the training of frogmen In Ciudad Trujillo to sink the Venezuelan Navy or to sabotage oil Installations In Lake Maracaibo, and it has labelled as Dominican agents the large
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of Dominican women employed a* cabaret singers, dancers, and prostitutes In the Caracas area.
Official Venezuelan sources In the Netherlands Antilles consistently report the presence andof Venezuelan exiles and Dominican agents in the Islands. The Venezuelan press has made similar sensational reports. There Isrowing body of evidence of direct collaboration between the Dominican dictator and theexiles most closely linked with Perezchiefly through the former Venezuelanin the Dominican Republic, Luis Ctia-fardet Urblna. The Dominican Government also countenances subversive planning and propaganda by Venezuelan exiles resident In the Dominican Republic. Both Dominicans and Venezuelansassume that the other country Is "eager" for direct hostile action. Venezuelan statements aboul the Dominican Republic, the quest by th*of Venezuela for inter-American sanctions against dictatorial governments, and the scant limitations Imposed on Dominican exiles incontribute to the difficult situation involving the relations between the two countriesinvolvement in the9 and0 unrest and terrorism In Venezuela appears to be documented and the Venezuelan Government Is reportedly preparing an official publicationwith Dominican efforts to subvert Venezuelan society and Its government.
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1). Comments on principal sources
Tlie Information In this Section was drawnfrom. sources and thepress. Press comment on conspiracy and possible coups d'etat greatly assisted in theof the Subsection on non-CommunistArticles from the Venezuelan Communist press, particularly Qui ei el Partido Comuntsta de
Venezuela (What is the Venezuelan Communist Party)CV indoctrination essay, Curso "A"
(Courseublished In Tribuna Popular, were especially useful sources of data on the Venezuelan Communist Party organization and principles
In general, the Information on PCV organization, finances, propaganda facilities, and electoral and paramilitary activities In the Caracas andareas is considered to be adequate. There Is. however, an overall tack of precise data on PCV and Communist youth organization. Including the composition of the youth organization by age groups; data are almost wholly lacking on theclandestine organization of the PCV.on the sources and distribution of PCV finances, on the size, composition, and distribution of PCV membership, and on the relations between the PCV and the USSR, was Incomplete. Specific deficiencies also include the statutes of the PCV and of the Venezuelan Communist Youththe extent of Communist penetration of neighborhood improvement societies and rural leagues (Ugaihe drgrcc ofpenetration among teachers and students in the school systemhole. Including primary school, secondary school, and universityomprehensive analysis of Communist influence in organized labor, the size, organization, andof the Venezuelan Committee for Peace and Democracy; the size and finances of the National Union of Women; the size, character oftechniques of recruitment, finances, and methods of operation of the Society of Friends of China; the size, techniques of recruitment, key figures, finances, alms, methods of operation, and degree of influence or potential influence of the Venezuelan affiliate of the Internationalof Democratic Lawyers; and the key figures of the Dominican Patriotic Union and the Portuguese Patriotic Union. Details are similarly lacking on the size, key figures, and finances, and on anydifferences or rivalries among theof the following Communist-dominatedthe Venezuelan Journalists'the Federation of Workers of the Federal District and the State of Miranda, and theWorkers' Union of Maracaibo. Although the gaps in details concerning Communist subversive activities in Venezuela are numerous, suchas has been adduced In the Section is deemed to be essentially accurate.
Information on non-Communist subversion in Venezuela is at the present time nebulous and contradictory. Definitive detail Is lacking onorganization, leadership, financingbetween groups, and the full scope of clandestine planning and activities pursuant to such planning.
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