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INFORMATION REPORT
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DISSEMINATION CONTKOlS
WO FOREIGN DISSEM
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ITALY
SUBJECT SEGNl'S VIEWS OH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC (OC)ARTY SITUATION ON THE EVE Or THE DC NATIONAL CQUNCIt
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l(bfcO)LliOVJNG REPORT WAS PREPARED BY i
AN ITALIAN
WHO KNEW HIS REMARKS WOULD REACH AMERICAN OFFICIALS.
1. ON THE EVE OF THE DC NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED TO BEGINULY SEGNI HAD NOT CHANGED THE OPINION HE HAS HELD SINCE THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTYHAT ALDO MORO'S POSITION AS DC PARTY SECRETARY IS INDEED PRECARIOUS BUT NOT FATALLY THREATENED. SEGNI IS DOING ALL HE CAN TO SHORE UP MORO'S POSITION. SEGNl'S PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MORO IS FAIRLY
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DESPITE SOME HARSH EXCHANGES BETWEEN THEM DURING THE FINAL FEW DAYS OF MORO'S ATTEMPT TOOVERNMENT.
SEGNI BELIEVES THAT ON THE WHOLE MORO IS STILL THE BEST CHOICE FOR PARTY SECRETARY EVEN IF HE IS NOTICEABLY LACKING IN FIGHTING SPIRIT AND COURAGE. SEGNI HOWEVER CONTINUES TOERY LOW OPINION OF AMINTORE FANFANI, DESCRIBING HIM AS THE CANDIDATE OF THE COMMUNISTS FOR THE PREMIERSHIP. SEGNI BELIEVES THAT MOROIS AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND THAT IN HIS STRUGGLE WITH FANFANI, MORO CAN RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF THE "DOROTEI" WITH WHOM,Er.NI, MORO REMAINS ON GOOD TERMS. IF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MORO AND FANFANI WERE TO DEVELOP INTO AN OPEN FIGHT, WHICH HE THINKS UNLIKELY, SEGNI FEELS THAT MORO IS SURE TO HAVE THE MAJORITY OF THE DC PARTY WITH HIM. THIS MAJORITY WOULD BE FORMED OF MORO'S OWN "MOROTEI/ THELL FACTIONS TO THE "DOROTEl" RIGHT, THE "BASE" ANO THE "RlNNOVAMENTO" GROUPS. THE LATTER TWO GROUPS ApE NOT UNANIMOUS IN THEIR SUPPORT OF MORO BUT THEY WILL NOT FOLLOWTANFANI IN ANY STEP THAT MIGHT FURTHER THREATEN THE UNITY OF^HC' PARTY.
ACTUALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OPEN CLASH BETWEEND FANFANI IS NOT GREAT. THE PROBLEM WILL NOTACED AT THE^ATj'ONAL COUNCIL MEETING. MORO WILL RETREAT AS TACTFULLY AS HE CAN ATTACK BUT FANFANI WILL NOT PUSH THINGS TOO FAR. AFTER HE^QBfA
HE THINKSEW CONCESSIONS. FANFANI WILL LET
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THE DC CONGRESS, BUT HE WILL USE THE INTERVENING TIME TO PREPARE HIS GROUND FOR THE NEXT PUSH. MORO, MEANWHILE, IS ACCORDING TO SEGNI UNHAPPY WITH HIS PRESENT POSITION AND IF HE COULD DO SO GRACEFULLY WOULD RETIRE FROM THE SECRETARYSHIP.
U. SEGNI IS LARGELY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE "DOROTEIn WHO IN TURN ARE WORKINGROUP AGAINST FANFANI. AT THE MOMENT SEGNI ISHIS INFLUENCE PARTICULARLY THROUGH TREASURY MINISTER EMOLOMBO WHO IN TURN WILL KEEP THE "DOROTEI" BEHIND MORO AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING.
5. WHATEVER HAPPENS AT THE MEETING OR DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL
i '
MONTHS, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT SEGNI WILL EXERT HIMSELF TO THE
UTMOST TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF FANFANI AS PREMIER, RATHER THAN
DESIGNATE HIM, SEGNI HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT HE WOULD
DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT ANO CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS. IN ANY STRUGGLE WITH
FANFANI, SEGNI FEELS HE HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES. HE FIRST OF ALL IS
NOT REQUIRED CONSTITUTIONALLY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO NOMINATE
ANY PERSON IN PARTICULAR. SECONDLY HE IS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
ARMED FORCES, AND WITH THIS POWER HE IS DETERMINED TOTRONG FRONT IN THE FACE OF ANY DISTURBANCES THE ITALI AN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI)
MIGHT MOUNT TO FORCE HIM TO ACCEPT THIS POINT
OBVIOUSLY REFERS TO SEGNI'S CONVICTION THAT FANFANI IS THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE OF THE PCI FOR THE PREMIERSHIP. THISOLITICAL
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- OISSEWIW.TION CONT1CX5
HO rOMGH DlSSEM-
JUDGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT BASED ON HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE SITUATION. GIVEN HIS POSITION, WHETHER ONE ACCEPTS OR REJECTS HIS JUDGEMENT, IT WILLIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION.)
6. DESPITE THE FOREGOING, SEGNI SHOULD NOT BE LOOKED UPON AS HOLDING COMPLETELY NEGATIVE CONVICTIONS, IN FACT SEGNI WOULDORO GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH, NOW THAT PSI SECRETARY PIETRO NENNI HAS INPINION LOST CONTROL OF THE PSI, AN ACCEPTABLE CENTER LEFT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE. (SUB-SOURCE COMMENT: WITHOUT SAYING SO EXACTLY, SEGNI CLEARLY LONGSETURN TO THE CENTER GOVERNMENTORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LIBERAL PARTY (PLI) AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (PSDl).)
7. TO FURTHER EXPLAIN SEGNI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FANFANI, SEGNI IS CONVINCED THAT FANFANI IS NOT ABOVE WORKING WITH THE PCI IN HIS FIGHT AGAINST MORO. IN FACT, SEGNI IS SURE THAT FANFANI HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING THE PCI TO PUT ADDED PRESSURE ON THE PSI AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (PRI) IN ORDER TO MAKE MORE TROUBLE FOR MORO ANO THE "DOROTEI.1 SEGNI NOTES THAT FANFANI SHARES THE VIEWS OF FANFANI'S FRIEND AND ADVISOR, MAYOR GIORGIO LA PIRA OF FLORENCE, WHO IS NOW GOING AROUND SAYING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO HAVE THE COURAGE TO TALK WITH THE COMMUNISTS. FANFANI, HOWEVER, WILL NOT CARRY HIS DOUBLE DEALING WITH THEO THE EXTENT WHERE HE WOULD HAVE TO BREAK WITH THE DC.
NO FQPIION DlSSEM-
BMM
tSSIMJUATlON CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
OF THE FOREGOING RAISES THE SPECTREOPULAR FRONTFEELSERY REAL PROBLEM BUT THE OISSENSION WITHIN THEPROBABLY STOP SHORT OF FORCING THAT SITUATION ON THEREALIZES THATREAT EXTENT HE IS NOW THE TRUE KEY TO THE
DC SITUATION. NOT EVEN THE "DOROTEI" HAVE SOOLE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE POSSIBILITY IS ALWAYS IN SEGNl'S HANDS TO PREVENT THE FORMATIONOVERNMENT RELYING FOR ITS MAJORITY ON PCI SUPPORT. THE "DOROTEIHOWEVER, STILLAJOR ROLE TO PLAY AFTER THAT OF THE PRESIDENT. THEILL SUPPORT MORO IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST FANFANI AND IN THE END FORCEERIES OF COMPROMISES GRANTINGEW OF HIS POINTS BUT NOT MATERIALLY ADDING TO HIS STRENGTH. IN THIS WAY FANFANI WILL HAVE TO DESIST. HIS ESTEEM IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER FACTIONS WILL ALSO NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED. HE WILL THEN START PREPARING HIS GROUP FOR THE NEXT MAJOR BATTLE AFTER THE PSI CONGRESS.
DISSEM STATE CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL).
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