Created: 9/24/1963

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Iho strength of Chinese Ccmcainlet military forces In tbe SIdo-Indian herder area is apparently unchanged since tbe fighting in the fallhough road Improvement andprobably have Improved their offensive capabilities. While our knowledge of tbe disposition of Chinese forces within this area ls limited, tbey remain capable of launching strong attacks at various sectors of the frontier with little or no warning.

We still believo, ao ve statedIEPossibilities of Greater Militancy by tbe Chineseatedhat for Banc time to come Pelplng is unlikely to undertake major military operations against India, though It might carry out email-scale border probes. Last year's attacks wereonsiderableeaction to India's efforts to push Its units forward into disputed territory during the sunner




nd no such Indian activity has occurred this summer. Moreover, the Chinese will probably be deterred by tbe change In International alignments affecting India. They now knew that if India were attacked, it wouldUK material support, and at least political support from the USSR.

?. nevertheless, the approaching anniversary of lasttogether with arrival of favorable weather foralong the eastern sector of tbe Slno-IndianIncrease Indian concern nbcut renewed fighting. Ifshould decide to make newhey vould be ablea substantial amount of Indian territory. Indianthe Ladakh area have been improved, but Indian forcescould at best make Chinese advances slow anddefenses have also been strengthened in thearea, and nov consist of three divisions. In tbeAgencyowever, tbe Chinese could advancerapidly than they didtbe area has been left

almost completely undefended.

The shock of seelog their army humiliated and their country open to invasion until tbe Chinese announced theirend withdrawal caused Indian leaders toasic shift

In their defense strategy for BETA. Whereas2 India was attempting to occupy every part of Indian-claimed territory It could garrison, present military plans call for moving Into HEPA only gradually and only into positions that can clearly be defended. New iJolhl has given the three divisionsplus Independent smaller unitst haa south of SETA the primary mission of defending Assam, (in addition, India has an armored divisionarachute brigadeobile reserve; thaoe could bo moved to the areaeek.) India's present strategy takes account of the sharp increase In logistical problems tbe Chinese would experience as their forces penetrated more deeply into Indian territory. This strategy, combined with Indianto use air power against the Chinese In the eventajor attack, make it likely that In any new conflict Indian forces would be less likely to be overrun.

5- However, if Chinese forces should reoccupyort of NEFA, Hew Delhi vould beifficult and embarrassing position. If India failed to secure the withdrawal of Chinese forces by other means. Hew Delhi would be under heavy political pressure to expel tbe Chinese despite poor prospects of success. FOR TBE BOARD OF NATIONAL


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