APPROVED FOB4 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
TITLE: Aspects Of Counteringurgency Intelligence AUTHOR: William M. Hartness
A eoitcclion ol articles on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and ttieoreiical aspects ol intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an snick's factual statements and interpretations.
The military intelligence officer reaches into other fields in anti-guerrilla operations.
ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE
may behased processonstituted government, beginning withinsidious and then gradually more massive subversive activity, which lays the groundworkhase of guerrilla warfare and may finally lead to full civil war short ofbelligerency. In CfcrnmunisMnsplred insurgency the first phase can take many, many years, and it is during this period that the Insurgency could be contained and eliminated with relative ease;itched battle must be fought to put it. Intelligence thusig Job to do long before the advent of guerrillaInstabilities In the society, detecting the subversive activity, tracing It to its Communist leadership, and methodically collecting thethat will be needed. counterinsurgency forces are committed to assist those of the country in question. Buthall concentrate on its later tasks when theforces have been called in.
Basic, Estimative, and Operational Studies
Steps in the counterinsurgency Intelligence process asat the Army Intelligence School at Fort Botablrd, In coordination with the Special Warfare Agency at Fort Bragg, begin with an Areahorough basic survey of the country In question from allsocio-cul-tural, political, economic, and military. Ideally,tudy Is begun long before insurgence becomes active; In any case It Is essential for counterinsurgency planning. This Isand particularized, when. commander has reached the scene, by an Area Assessment, which servesroad base for operational and logistical planning.
onntertnsurgency Intelligence Estimate Is prepared addressed to the specific objectives of. forces. This usually requires the designation and collectionroup of essential elements of Information. The estimate Is moreand sophisticated than the ordinary military Intelligence estimate, Involving subtle considerations and non-military factorsolitical, social, and economic nature. It describes the strengths and^eatacsses ol the Insurgent forces and exploitable features of the situation It clearly distinguishes between fact and any conjecture or opinion it may offer.
On the basis of this estimate the commander chooses his course of action. Inarticular action he has to consider not just Its primary and secondary results but Itsconsequences. The complications were brought home to me byaw last year while flying over the delta area ofvillages cut off from vehicular travel by blown road approaches. The Viet Cong, whothese villages, had blown the approaches tourprise mechanized attack in spite of the fact that It thereby betrayed Its presence.
Hereilemma for the counterinsurgency commander. If hearatroop attack the enemy would evacuate along booby-trapped paths Into the dense rain forests. If heudden air attack, it would probably Injure and kill many innocent civilians, virtual captives In their ownSince winning the support of the people Is one of the main goals In any counterinsurgency program, he would have to put great weight on the side effects of such an action. He would also have to weigh the effect of his military actions on other operations, say civic or psychological, which might have been mounted to regain the village.
ourse of action has been chosen, an Intelligence Annex to the operational plan la developed. Thisplan addresses itself to the individual objectives to be achieved and the immediate and ultimate results of actions. It requires an intimate knowledge of the arena of conflict The measures envisaged In the operational plan may beinto fourreactive, aggressive, and remedial.
Preventive measures are Intended to forestall theof insurgency in the area of operations. They include the application of standard operating procedures with respect to the following: the security, discipline, training, andof the forces; public information programs; the maintenance of public order; population and movementcontrol over sources of material support for guerrilla operations; surveillance or control ofarshalling areas, rendezvous points', and areas suitable for bivouacs;or control of access to possible points of contactthe civilian population and the insurgent force. These may be regarded as passive measures to Impede the enemy.
Reactive measures, those taken to counter Insurgentwhen It threatens the mission or the security of the command, are characteristically Intense and sometimesactions to suppress and eradicate subversion and reestablish the situation. Examples are investigations. Intercept-seizure-search operations, and coordinated police and military action. Theyesponse to specific insurgent activity.
Aggressive measures are those designed to strike at the core of the Insurgent organization or the subversive apparatus which controls it, destroying enemy morale and leadership. They generally require great sophistication in conception and hi execution. Typical are clandestine penetration, deception,and psychological operations.
Remedial measures, finally, are designed to change thethat fostered the development of insurgency In the first place and so go deeply into economic, social, and political matters. They may be the proclamationew regime or new objectives, agrarian reform, other economic or political reforms, new systems of public order, or educational programs, especially concerning the subversive Ideology. Intelligence Is less intimately concerned with these than with the others, but the civil affairs staff, which has predominantwould be greatly handicapped without Intelligence upon which to base sound civic action programs.
I'd like to illustrate these concepts from personal In the fallas assigned to organize, train.
and tacticallyative counterguerrilla force to com bat enemy activity Inorps area In Korea. My orders read. "You are hereby authorized to capture or destroy as the situation warrants, hostile armed enemy agents inorps (Group)as both Intelligence and Opera, tions for this mission.
My first step was to get hold of an area study and area_,Though these were sketchy, they acquainted me with the general situation. Small groups of North Korean guerrillas, accompanied by spies and saboteurs and assisted by local sympathizers and collaborators, were moving into and out of South Korea almost at wilL They had been Instructed to gather military, economic, and political intelligence,Informants and collaborators, prepare the gTound for widespread sabotage to be carried out on order, and subvert the population.ideline, they occasionally attackedborder outposts, killing and kidnapping South Korean personnel.
With this and other background information at hand, we drewist ofEIasis for the Intelligence estimate. These were carefully prepared to develop aknowledge of the enemy and his activities. Little was actually known except that he was there: villagers had seen armed bands In the mountains and there had been sporadic skirmishes with ROK forces and national police. But which hostile agencies had sent him? How was he trained? What were his methods of operation? His travel routes? We bad to have answers to these and many other questions before we could Intelligentlylan for counteraction
Both US and ROK agencies had manifested acute interest In these clandestine activities, but no one had methodically gathered information about themhole. Evenoperated Joint Interrogation Center had not preparedand comparative studies. ROK security files held many reports, but they dealt mostly with separate IndividualExcellent interrogation reports lay in the files olagencies, but no one had assembled and evaluated the Information they held.
We gathered from the ROK and VS. agencies this mass of unsortcd and uncollated reports and examined, analysed, and
carded the Information. Four Korean interpreter/transls-ton were assigned eacharticular aspect of thebackground data, travel routes and methods, modus operandi, and mission. It was three months before most of our EQ bad been satisfied, but then we had for our intelligenceairly complete picture of the enemy and his activities, including his relations with the peo-plejn our area. Wejoadcery few'enangeaegan formal operations.
The nature of the mission and my double assignment served to merge the intelligence and operational plans Into one. Its concept was to avoid reactingay-to-day basis to enemy activity, letting him call the shots; we thought that we bad enough sound information lo predict what he was going to do Without tipping our hand, if possible, we planned to wrench the Initiative from him by responding correctly on the first move and suddenly inflicting failure where he had scoredafter success for years. Itot of detailed staff work to build the Intelligence/operational plan, which called for measures in all of the four categories, preventive, reactive, aggressive, and remedial. One example from each type will show how each contributed to the success of the operation.
A pTerenfwe measure was lo deny the enemy access to ourince we had what we considered reliable Information about his travel routes, one of the first steps planned was to set up ambush points from which our people could detect or stop him. But thereatch: our Information Indicated that the infiltrators had developed an uncanny acuity of sight, hearing, and smell, auch that they had foiled pastby sensing and by-passing the ambush positions under cover of darkness. We needed some sort of interceptionto prevent these esc*pea. We couldn't use fixed or lethal devices such as anti-personnel mines: the villagers, though they stayed away from the mountains at night, carried on some activity there during the daytime. We neededwe could set up everyenemy was known to travel only at night-and deactivate in the morning,portable, fairly simple to operate, and available mquantity.
We decided to testrip flare. Easy to rig and de-rig this flare produces0 candle power, enough light toan easily visibleadiusards, it proved to be the solution to the problem.eek of the time it was Issued two enemy agents were capturedirect result of its use, and more than hah* ol all laterand kills were credited to It.
Our reactive measures were'"cohdltioned by the "enemy's practice of heading back to his sanctuary In North Koreaaftertrike. Since we couldn't follow him acrossh parallel, we had to react quickly. We knew his travel routes (he used only mountain ridges, avoiding valleys and populatednd we computed his speed at an average of three miles an hour. Under pressure he could push this up to fouralf miles for the first hour, butour-hour period of night travel he would average only three. We worked out interdict formulas and enlisted the aid of. and ROK military units in setting up immediate-response forces. As soon as we got an Initial report of enemy action, our control office calculated the maximum distance the enemy could have travelled and phoned all the units through whose areas he might pass. The immediate-response force in each of these units moved to Its prearrangedand waited for him to walk In.
With respect to aggressive measures one of the problems was the enemy's resistance to interrogation. This was stressed, we bad learned, In his training program,resistance under physical coercion. So Important was this subject and so realistic the training that some enemyhad been disfigured for life when subjected byto brutality to test their resistance.
A typical situation requiring rapid and productive mterroga-tlon was the captureubversive agent before hiswith the guerrilla escorts who were to take him back to North Korea on completion of his mission. If we could learn the time and place of the planned rendezvous we could bag the escort too. We decided to try the polygraph. We wouldaptured agentarge map of the area,into quadrants. When be was oriented to the map, we asked in which quadrant the rendezvous was to take
place. When one quadrant would provoke an emotionalon the polygraph, wearge map of thatinto quadrants and questioned him again. This would be repeated until we had learned tbe exact location of the meeting place. In oneecall, in which the rendezvous was to take placeemote village, we showed the prisoner enlarged aerial photos of the village, and after properhis polygraph response betrayed the very hut to bee hadn'tord during the whole examinationust have been pleased with himself for having withheld, ashe thought, the information we needed to neutralize his escort force. The polygraph% effective in the more thanases in which it was thus used.
The use of remedial measures can be illustrated in ourorientation program. The program contributed to our reactive and aggressive measures, but It was essentiallyNo consistent effort had previously been made to use propaganda or other means to acquaint the villagers with the danger the enemy presented to their country and themselves. No one had tried to cultivate their friendship systematically or get their help ln detecting and neutralizing the enemy. There seemed toide gap between the rice-roots elements of the population and their official agencies. Though there were rewards for Information leading to the capture orof an enemy agent, few villagers in the remoteknew of them. Their reporting was sporadic andseveral daysighting, too late to be of any value.
Under our program both military Intelligence and national police personnel from the counter guerrilla force made liaison visits to all villages. They told the people that not only wasatriotic duty to report strangers In their areabut It would also bring liberal rewards If it led to the arrest or elirnlnation of an enemy agent They told them what to report and where and how to report it, and they stressed the Importance of doing it promptly. We also passedillion leaflets with the same message, carrying the guarantee of reward italicized in red ink.
Finally, we set up In the village centers large signsthe national danger of enemy subversive activities, and we held contests in the schools, giving prizes to the children
who made up the best countersubversive slogans and posters. The response was good: In the first three months alter the program began, villagers were responsible lor theofOK civilians trying to defect to Northorth Koreans defecting to South Korea,ctual enemy agents.
Application tnVitanga' -
In the Korea case some aspects of the Intelligence role may not stand out clearly because of being merged withLet us takeore complex counter-insurgency mission and examine separately and in detail the process of collecting Informationarticular tacticalIt undertakes. You are the. militaryto the commanding general of the Indigenous 1stDivision ofypothetical country. Special Action Forces are helping to combat activein its guerrilla stage. The division commander is contemplating military counteractionecent buildup of guerrilla forces In Nam Binh province, which had beenquiet before.
You recognize that command responsibility for the proposed operation is vested exclusively In the division commander. Nevertheless your responsibilities to your own superiors are great: you must insure that the operation is soundly planned and executed, and you must do this by such devices asrecommendation, influence, and demonstration and by drawing on the capabilities of the. advisory setup. You have in factelationship of mutual confidence with the division commander and his staff such that the planning of the operation Is truly bilateral.
The intelligence officer on your staff, together with hiscounterpart, has maintained an area assessment of the province. Its original basis was an Area Study prepared five years ago by the American Embassy in Vltangaville, the capital, which supplied the following facts:
Nam Blnh province Is equally divided into Dinh and Hoc district* The western border. constituted by tbe ridge lines ofhtfihrange said to be Impassable, adjoins the country o(hich at this time was an independent,oaimiinlrtDinh district on the west Is mountainous and covered
Jangle vegrUtloo: tbe Dlnhj arc an Independent-spirited,tribal non-VItangan people but bad neverhreat to the central government. Hoc district, extending east to tbe Ortten Eca, la flat country deroLed to the large-scale eulUvaUon of rubber trees run by two foreign companies Tba population la Vllanaan (referred to by the Dinh* ashey wort the plantations. The climate la sub-tropical, with monsoon rains from April lo September. There were nooe^DollU- V' cat dimculOea in' the prortnee and ncTauUtary forces wereTtauoned (here; Internal sacurlty was maintained byaUonal police cancers. Dirt roads seree moat of the area. This study bas been updated by later reports from us military and civilian agencies In vitar. ga:
n 1W0 the King of Ualavla was forced to abdicateroup of openly Marxist Uatavtan army officersoup and renamed Use country the DeraocraUc Republic of Mslavla. Vltanga then severed diplomatic relations with it
ine* January IMS guerrilla bands hare ambushed police patrols along tba Dinh-Moc district boundary and have entered Isolated Tillages to deliver propaganda lectures urging revolt against tbe TIC -dominated" andltanga government TfteM guerrillas usually murder soma of the wealthier villagers and take their money "lo finance Use revolution."
he 1st Infantry Division, activated In Nam Blnh Ins the government's only military force ln Use province The 1st and 2nd regiments are stationed In the provincial capital, Bo Kan. The 3d, alongS. Army Special Forces Detachment. IsIn the northern sector of Dtnb district. No contact bas been made with the guerrillas.
i Vltanga officials believe that theho are armed with modern rifles and submachine guns of unknown origin, are receiving from both the Dlnbs and the plantaUon workerssupport ln the form of food, shelter, and Information on the movements of the security forces.
The area assessment thus formulated provides generalbut lacks the detailed data which must be considered by the division commander In determining his course ofAn Intelligence estimate of the situation Is required, and tbls requires the development of essential elements ofby tbe division G2 and your Intelligence officer. Some of the EEI can be satisfied by the division itself; others are forwarded to higher intelligence echelons In both the indigenous
and. structure, follows:
A small sampling ol them reads as
will be the effect of the monsoon nuns on the liability of the dirt roads and on helicopter operations la the tdtnuflrd guerrilla operational areas? Are relief maps and aerial photos of these areas available or can they be procured?
What civilian commonlcaUona faeiUUes In the province can be used ln tbej&mduct of the militaryj-
What specific economic. political, "or social wants are being exploited by the guerrillas to elicit popular support?
Evaluate the reliability ot the Vltangan police forces In the province.
What Is the nature and extent of foreign assistance glren the guerrilla*? How does It reach them?
Identify Internal groups and personalities sympathetic to the
The division G2 channels the EEI through Corps G2 to the J2 of the Vitanga Joint General Staff, and your intelligence officer similarly sends them through Corps level to the J2 of. command. The coordination of US. and Indigenous collection action is achieved by effective liaison.
On. side, your EEI are screened againstsholdings and the information found here returned to you Immediately. Because Nam Blnh province had notbeen of priority interest,umber of the EEI cannot be filled in this way. The J2 then focuses the capabilitiesast collection machine on theseof yoursollection plan listing the unfulfilled EEI and designating the collection agencies on which they are to be levied. Heide range of sources on which to draw.
On his own staff he has representatives of UjS. ArmyCollection, Order of Battle, Technicaland the Army Security Agency, as well as the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and the Office of Naval Intelligence. He has access to the assets of the other staff sections of the Joint command. He can call on the individual service components of the theater command and of the MAAG advisory system and on the MAAG J2 and Provost Marshal. The local facilities of USIS and AID and theregistries of the CIA are available to him. In theare the security officer, the personnel office, the pollti-
cal office, the economic office, and the military attaches of each service. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the FBI. the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics may be operating locally. US. non-government agencies can also be most helpful in providing area information. And through the advisory system and liaison, both official and unofficial, the jhas access to many lucrative Vltangan sources.
From this network of sources the J2 responds to your EE,
In summary as follows:
Detailed map stud* in the J? shop Indicated that the Vlluga. Matavla border mountains appeared passable In two areas. Bub-sequent aerial phologrsptiy of these revealed trails and poslUva Indications of recent border crossings at twopoints.
aaO. declared that during the monsoon wascn all raads except those la the Immediate vicinity of the provincial capital. Bo Nan. became Impassable. Helicopter operations would remain possible throughout the pro vine* but would be Impeded by overcast and poor pound condiuona.
ThaSA Detachment reported unusual radio traffic originating from three locations along the Dinh-Moc district boundary andtation loeaUd approalmaUly IS miles vtUUn Matsvia. Tbe codes used were typically Mi la viae
f the Special Forces Detachment In Dinh district.eport enUUed -Internal Security Nam Dinhuoted Dinhfriendly U> Special Forces aa saying that other Dinh were smuggling ammunition and weapons Into the district from Matavla for delivery to three Dinh led guerrilla bands operaUng along the DLnhWoe district boundary. These bands, numbering spproii.one hundred fifty men each, were composed of dissident Dinh and Vltangan "Loalander" elements who bad gone to Matavla0 for guerrilla training. They used code names and their true IdenUtlea could not be ascertained.
The US. CollecUon Detachment, operating JoinUy with the Vltangan Collection Company, dltoovered that the Matavian army waauerrilla training school not far west of the VlUmga border for Dlnha androm Nam Blah After training they were infiltrated back la to organise guerrilla bands. Tbe school trained approximately twenty students per month.
The Technical Intelligenceeported that a
of ammunition foundave located near the Dinh-Moc district boundary had been examined aad idenUfied as MatavUn ordnance
The Order of Battle Section, n. bad no Information on guerrilla units in Nam Blnh. However, It reported on the mUvTogaUonrisoner of war captured only two weeks before In an adjoiningam Blnh native, the prisoner hadedium-
level twin ol the Vltanga Liberation Front assigned to aunit He waa pleased at hli capture; be aald guerrilla lit* tu very bard and be bad recently been trylni to find tto tor render hlmsell Aa evidence ol food lallh be volunteered for National Army duty. Be ttated tbat Mont Hal. the provincial cnJrt of Police, bad aided the guerrilla cause by providing aa-inc notice of police raid* and searches.
Tbe CI and Security Branch.throughperaUonal arm
eturltjr, and economic, political, andfactora:
WflB reported Incrcaalng difficulty In attracting Mam Blnh audi-encea to field programs designed to explain Ui> assistance to Vltaoga; It was believed people were staying in; because of guerriUa threat* Areas where this atUUide teemed prevalent coincided with previously suspect locations reported by ASA.
Tbe Public Safety Division ol tba US. Operations Mixtion, which haa advisors with the provlncie] police, reported thatesultack of initiative on the part of Quel Mong Hal. the police were no longer capable of coping with the Increased insurgent activity in the province. Harsh working condiaou on the pUnUUons were causing severe worker unrest, and along Hal supported the plantation owners by Jailing and beating workers who complained. The foreign owners, fearing naUonalisauon ol theere seeking maximum abort-range profits and disregarding worker welfare.
The Chief of tbe DBOM Communications Division revealed that the Mission bad considerably developed Nam Birth's radio network by Inilalllni ljtioadios in tbe province. The provincial network waa Ued In with division headquarters at Bo Nan ao that Information on guerrilla activities could be relayed Instantly to the headquarters concerned and appropriate counteractions ordered.
CIA reported many recent manifestations of Matavtan-lnsplred subversive activity and Dinh unrest In the province The Dinh were upset at the arrest by the Vltangan government ol their district chief. Dong, who had been critical of the government, blaming it lor the poor living standards ol the Dinh and alleged dlacrimlnatlon against them. Chief Mong Hal of tha provincial police had urged the arrest, but the Province Chief, considering Dong basically loyal to the government, was arguing for his release to quiet the unrest
Tbe Foreign Broadcast InformaUon Service reported thatbroadcasts by the Nam Blnh Liberation Front repeatedly blamed poor working conditions in the rubber plantations on American pressure lor cheap rubber for military vehicle tires Tbehich claimed to originate in Nam Blnh. actually came from Matavla. Although an the Vltangan rubber was being
in domestic manufacture. Uie InformaUon Bervice of tie Vltangan government made no effort lo counter this propaganda.
Finally, the Vltangan Central Intelligenceummary of the internal security situation of theBased on InformaUon obtained by penetration agent^of the Ka-Uonal Police and the Military Security Service It showed that soldiers' families residing In areas under guerrilla control were being coerced to bring pressure on the soldiers to desert the regular ISSStheSillulThc guerrillas weremilitary personnel directly to threaten reprisals against tneir families If they did not cooperate by performing espionage and sabotage missions. CIO estimated thatf the 1st Infantry Division had been brought under guerrilla influence by these measures. The Vitanga situation, although hypothetical, closelyconditions which. Special Action Forces face today and which we may expect them to encounter for many years to come. It shows how the American Intelligence advisor at division level, working with thean supply through carefully formulated specific EEI the information needed for division operations. It points up the Importance of his ready access, through theultiplicate and vigorous collection network. More broadly. It Illustrates the essential role of Intelligence innowledge of significant and many times obscure factors to bear on the de-terrnlnationest course of action.
The Communist-sponsored insurgency environment hasew context. forces abroad, one in which conventional military intelUgence requirements must be greatly expanded to include some matters formerly regarded as nonmilitary and others unique to counterinsurgency. both now of critical importance for military operations. The VS Special Action Forces require concentrated, tailoredand counterintelligence support. They requirelike that illustrated above for the operationalof committed forces, but also broader InformaUon as the basis for pre-cornmitment planning and long-rangeon insurgency potential These requirements cover all aspectsotentially insurgent country and its society and early recognition of incipient Insurgency.Original document.