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3
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Sumoary
Haitian dictator Duvaller presently istronger position than ever, largely because of tbe collapse of organized opposition to hiro following the critical period last April and Hay. He has been successful in remaining in power beyond his legal presidential term mainly through hisand exploitation of the weaknesses and eccentricities of the Haitian people. Ae has been careful to shift or remove regime officials before they could build up personal followlogs against hie, and most of the small number of top officials who have retained their posts throughout hisare extreme opportunists, including some and pro-Comeunists. It is from this group of personsuccessor to Duvaller would be most likely to emerge as matters no* stand. The chancesloodbatheneral breakdown of central authority would result froa Duvalier's removal from the presidency are considered high.
The Haitian Army, traditionally the kingmaker in local politics, has been transformed by repeated purges from the most likely agent of Duvalier's downfall into one of three armed groups supporting him and responsive to bis dictates. The civil mill-tinecret policecreated by Duvaller originally to counter the power of thethe roster of the forces maintaining him in power. Army efficiency and capabilities have declined as US-trained officers have been removed or have fled into exile, while the discipline and degree of training of the militia appear to have increased. Some form of unification of the two forces may be carried out in the future.
The Communist threat in Haiti, heretoforenegligible because of copmunlan's lack of appeal among the country's politically inert masses, is increasing. Haiti's Communists presently lack militancy but are permitted to operate relatively unchecked by the regime and consequently aretheir strength. The dangereizure of powermall, determined Communist elite group in tbe event of Duvalier's removal is clearly mounting.
On the other band, the threat posed by Haiti**ties with the bloc appeam to be minor compared with the interna' threat at this time. Haiti has few contacts with the bloc or with Castro's Cuba, and there appears to be little evidence of political or subversive Interest in Haiti on the part of Com-nunist-controlled countries.
Haiti's economic deterioration probably has been accelerated under Duvaller. An economic however, does not appear imminent,umper coffee crop later this year is expected to alleviate tbe country's present foreign exchange shortage. randiose "economic development plan" announced by Duvaller onlay appears, elf-development" program, to have been devieed for Internal political reasons. It holds little promlee of accomplishing anything, but say be used by the regime to attempt to coax and extort additional funds from docestlc and foreign sources.
Haitian opposition to Duvaller is characterized at present by the despair and inactivity of theopponents within Haiti and by the weakness and fragmentation of exile groups. The death of Clement Barbot onuly virtually ends organized resistance to Duvaller within Haiti, ind Haitian exile groups now active in tbe Dominican Republic appear to ba dlsaipatlng moat of their energies in attempting to discredit each other rather thanstrength against Duvaller. Exile disintegration ie being accelerated by Dominican President Bosch's sudden decision to refuse permission for the use of Dominican territory by the exiles for training and staging purposes.
-,nnex Ai tnsic Facts On Haiti
Annex B: Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings
SECRET
Political Situation
HaitiaD dictator Duvallar baa emerged from tba turbulaot period of April and Haytronger position than ever. There appears to behin tbe country or abroad that is now in ato attack bio. let alone topple hia regime. Theaoall segment of tbe population In Haiti vhlch ia sufficiently active politically to carry any weight In oppoelng him haa been cowed and demoral-lEod by the failure of thia sprlng'a attempts agalnat hia and by tha regiae's subsequent Imposition of even tighter measurea of control and re-preaalon.
The lepetua behind the drive to ouat Duvaller on orate bla legal tero of officehas been entirely dissipated. There are no prospects forpsychologically propitious periodrive against hia regime for eome time to coso. He clalos tbat tbe tero to vhlch be vaa "re-elected" in 1M1 is to run for six years, but eeveral domeatlc groups already have urged "spontaneously" that be be "president for life." In this situation, the most likely possibilities for hia reooval appear to have narrowed down to two: his death fron aasaaslna-tloo or fron natural cauaee (tbeear-old Duvaller'a health la and has beenoup stsged by one or bore of his trusted associates.
Duvalier baa managed to maintain bis regie* largely by buildingody of loyal henchmen to act aa tbeof his policy ofsnd repression, aad by effectively playing off and neutralizing those individuals who night at some tioe oppose bin. He haser-vaalve, effective Informant system to apprlae bio of plots well before they ceo materialize Beyond this, he has perhaps succeeded in prolonging his tero of office where other Bait lea presidents have failed because he thoroughlyand haa cunningly used the weaknesses and eccentricities
S EG RET
the Haitian temperament to his own advantage. To the apolitical, superstitious masses, he is "Papahe virtual personificationoodoo god; to the country's overwhelmingly Negro population, he has shown himself to be anti-mulattoevotee of black supremacy, which he calls "negrltude"; to all Haitians, be posesaitian frequently Invoking past glories and tho names of famous national heroes such as Emperor Dessallnes.
One aspect of hisof nationalism has been
seen in hie use of thecapegoat for virtually all the ills that beset the country. He has consistently charged that American miserliness, not Haitian mismanagement and is the basic reason for Haiti's continuing economic and social deterioration. In recant weeks, antl-USby regime leaders have takenifferent tone; they have asserted that the US was responsible for the recent critical period and for the abortive attempts against Duvaller which then took place. These charges appear to haveleast for thethe ousting of the US naval and air force missions and the refusal of the Haitian Government to allow USThurston to return to Haiti. Duval1er has been careful not to press his attacks on the US too far; be may still hope to regain some sort of US economic aid commitment, and he may
believe that the risks attendantomplete break with the US are too great to be taken.
Few regime officials are permitted by Duvaller toreal power, and those who do are largely of the same stripe as1 titer himself. Host top officials are sporadically reshuffled or removed in order to prevent their buildingersonal following which might some day challenge Duvaller. Several of tbe men who bave occupied cabinet-level positions longest under Duvaller are Com-sunista or pro-Communists. Pro-Communist Minister of Finance Herve Boyer allegedlyormer member of the French Communist Party. The samehae been received on Jules Blanchet. who is currentlyas Haiti's ambassador to the European Common Market. Minister of Commerce Clovls Desinor Is frequently reported to be at least pro-Communist, although Home reports classify him as an extreme opportunist. Others fitting into the latter category are Minister of Public Works Luckner Caabronne and Jacques Fourcand, the director of the social security institute. Both the latter are top Duvaller aides and confidants. Adrlen Raymond, who holds the number two position in the Foreign Ministry, is another Individual who evidently has Duvalier's confidence and whose authority appeared to increase during the recent crisis. He and his brother, Colonel Claude lUynondgeneral of the Haitiantough, trusted
Hies of the dictator, but both ire said to have strong personal ambitions to rule Haiti if Duvaller were to fall.
Any of these officials is ambitious enough to attemptor in collusion with others to assume control of tbe government. All are solinked with the present regime thatotential successor to Duvaller, each would be nearly as objectionable to all concerned as Duvaller himself. Host of tbe officials listed above have been reported at one time or another to be plotting to removeariant on this theme has been tbe reportlan whereby Duvaller would resign and leave tbe country after arranging for several of his close advisers to assume power. None of tbese reports so far has beenreliable, but of tbe two alternatives described, tbe former course would appear in tho light of Haitian history to be more Likely to materialize than the latter. At any rate, it is from the small clique now surrounding Duvalleruccessor. In the event of the dictator's removal, would most likely be drawn. Thesuccessor to theIs tbe president of tbe country's highest court; the present Incumbent of this office, Adrlen Douyon,uvaller devotee who, like all other regime officials, is asupporter of Duvaller. He is believed not to be strong enough to survive on his own.
Duvalier's sudden removsl from office could bringloodbath which might quickly lead to general chaos andunless strong outside forces were brought in. There have been several reports that Duvaller has prepared lists of persons to be slaughtered, and bas Instructed bis followers to loot and burn In tho event of an attempt on his life. If such an attempt wereontrolled slaughter could rapidly get out of hand as word spread of the dictator's demise. The longer Duvaller retains powor, tho greater will.be the populace's list of grievances against bis henchmen and the
sharper their desire to exact revenge.
The Haitian Armed forces
The failureilitary-led coup attempt on3 and the consequenceshave virtually destroyed the capability of the Haitian armed forces (PAd'H) to overthrow Duvaller. The Haitian Army in particular has been transformed from the most likely agent for accomplishing Duvalier's ouster into one of three armed groups protecting him In his efforts to perpetuate himself In power.
Traditionally the PAd'H ban made and unmade Haitian presidents. Duvaller. however, in order to counter this threat against him,has virtuallymodeled the FAd'H In his own image. Whereas Duvaller In the past has looked on the FAd'H
as the most likely source of an attempt to overthrow hla, he now considers It one of the croups which solidly supports bis re-else. Be has been able to acbleva this complete about-face by ayatematlcally ellol-aatlag all officers who* be regarded as not completelyto him. Since his Inaugurationuvaller bas caahleredercent of tbe officerbe last purge of aboutfficers having taken place in thepril period.
Tbe officers purged froa the FAd'H have been the older, mora experienced and stable elements of the armed forces. For the most part they were US-trained, pro-US and competent. In their place, Duvaller hae placed political appointees (many former enlisted men) who offer little In militarybut are politically acceptable and loyal to bis The effectiveness of tbe armed forces bas been reduced to the point that it has minimal value as an organized military force.
The Ton Ton Hacoutes (Duvalier's secret police) were established in7 by Clement Barbot, who later turned against the regime aad recently beaded, until bis death onuly, the sole lenowaopposing Duvaller within Haiti. Tbe TTMSoosely organized mixture of military, paramilitary and civiliansupporters of the regime.
Their mission is to keep Duvaller and Haiti's blacks in absoluto power aa long as Ostensibly abodyguard, tbey are Duvalier's confidential agents, dealing in terrorism and Composed mostly of thugs and other undesirables, the TTOs number, are expert la brutality and the tecbnlquee of political repression, and serve tbe regime while serving themselves.
Tbe civil sllltlaart-time paramilitary force. Even tbough It baa been in existence it was not legalized until2 when it was officially dealgnated tbe "National Security Volunteer Corps"be VSNolitically mobilized and ideologically oriented force which keeps theIn line. Formed,to Duvaller, forsecurity and to ensure against an external invasion,
it was actually established to offset tbe strength of the rAd'H, Tbe VSN bas tbe potential to Identify and report clandestine opposition to Duvaller anywhere in Haiti; It has been used successfully to turn out the vote for Duvaller and tominor political There are0 militiamen, of which only aboutercent are equipped with firearms. are concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area alone. The VSN operates as an adjunct of
the Ton Ton Hacoutes and is used to Implement TTH orders
rs
the cumber of menfairly large.
in Kort-au-'rlnre,embers of tbe VSN took part in theay parade celebrating the second anniversary of Duvaller'a "re-lnauguratloo." On the baala of its Impressive appearance at this time, the VSN la believed to have received considerable training during the past year.
The US military misalona inuntil tbelrby Duvalter this spring maintained close relations with the officers of the PAd'hV-were feared by Duvaller. He claimed that the missions "interfered" with the absolute personal loyalty which be denanded of his officers. As of now thefor such "interference" have been greatly reduced; PAd'H officers and men have been vlr-turally barred froo the slightest contact with thoae US HAAO per-aonnel still remaining In the country. Duvaller continuea, however, to give evidence of his fear of such contacts by hampering any and all efforta by the KAAG group to acconplleh lta normal functions.
The chancesilitary coup occurring in tbe foreeee-able future appear quite small. It la more likely that the nllltla will become bettertrained and equipped as the army's capabilities and standards continue to deteriorate. An eventual merger of the tvo groups could occur when Duvaller considers tbat his present drive to convert tbe armed forces Into
a more useful tool of his regime has been accomplished. orce probably would not be worthy of considerationilitary organization by non-Haitian atandards, but would be powerful enough to suppreae quickly any internal novo against Duvaller that might develop.
Tbe Communist Threat
Tbe threat of communism in
Haiti bas traditionally beenaa aaall, largely because the Haitian populace la generally apathetic, illiterate, and Also, tbe pressures for land reform which have beento such advantage by Communlate in other Latincountries are largelyIn Haiti; tbe Haitian peasanta have owned their own tiny plota of land for Baltl's abject poverty, its appalling social conditions, and its political bankruptcy, however, doituation which readily lends ltaelf to Communist exploitation. While tbe docile, lethargic nature of tbe population probably would preclude tbe possibilityommunlet takeoverass uprlalng, it would the control of tbe countrymail, dedicated Communist elite group If It were to seize power.
The evidence now available lndlcatee tbatedicated, bard-core Communist organization is being built up wltbln Haiti. While the offectiveneee and militancy of local Communlata are believed to be rather low
at this tlaa, their potential is clearly increasing. Tbls results In no snail degree froa Duvalier's policy ofor bis own devious political purposes--the existence of Haltls two Cosaunlst parties, both of which are permitted to function almost unhindered despite tbelr clandestine status. Those organizations are the People's Unity Partyhich is estimated to haveeabers, and tbe People'sLiberation Partyith an estimated membership of upersons. Tbe PEP has well-establishedCommunist connections and is recognized as tbe official Communist party by theCommunist apparatus. It is concentrating on building well-trained and disciplined cadres; tbe PPLK la less tightly knit and la moreass party. Tbe PPLNmall psrlodical pamphlet wblcbirregularly entitled Haiti Perns in (Haiti Tomorrow).
Both tbe PEP and tbe PPLK are steadily gaining new members. Duvalier's removal could lead to an acceleratled growth ew government were formed by those elements of the pro-Communist or opportunist stripe who now surround tbe dictator. If Duvalier'swere to result In chaosreakdown in national authority, only tbe Communists, who are the only organized opposition forces In Haiti, would beosition to gain Influence and power.
External Communistto Haiti appears to be of
minor Importance compared with tbe potential threat posed by domestic forces at tbls time. Poland is tbe bloc nation most active in Haiti and Is the only one maintaining diplomatic ties with the Duvaller regime. olish commercial attache has resided In Port-au-Prince since Warsaw's newto Mexico, who is resident there but accredited as minister to several Middle American presented bis ministerial credentials to Haitian officials last month. Recent informationrowing Polishinterest la Haiti and indicates that Duvaller probably Is encouraging atlll more interest on Poland's part. Several Polish trade officials have visited Haiti since April, and as ofolish-Haitianfira reportedly waa being established in Port-au-Prlnco to promote barter deals between tbe two countries, The first barter contract set up by tbe firm is said to envisage an exchange of Haitian coffee and other products0 tons of Polish cement and other prod-ucts, otal value
Czechoslovakia also haa evinced commercial lntereet in Haiti, but evidentlyeaser extent. ix-man Czech trade delegation visited Haiti in early Marcb of this year and met informally with Haitian There was no Indication that the delegation met with sny Haitian officials, and no im-portant deals for cash or barter were made. There have been several reports since
SECRET
that Czech weapons have come Into Haiti, but none have been confirmed.
Firmer indications of the extent of bloc interest in Haiti may develop abortly. aitian cabinet-level delegation is tentatively acheduled to leave for Western Europe In September to seek economic aid commitments from Prance, lest Germany, and Italy. If these attempts to acquire Western economic aid shouldpreliminaryare that only minor aid offers will be made at thia timereportedly will seek Czech and Polish help.
Duvaller bas threatenedumber of occasions over tbe past several yearn to turn to tbe bloc for economic aaalstance if he could not obtain more aid from the US. For the moat part, theselatest of whlcb was implied In Duvaller'aaythat Haiti might be forced to turn to "other systems" If satisfactory economic support were not forthcoming from within the free enterprisebeen implied rather than explicit and have not been followedew tenuous feelers by Duvaller toward tbe bloc have been reported, however, such as the unconfirmed reports tbat former Haitianminister Raymond Hoyse beaded a small delegation sent touest of Soviet aid during the summeruch overtures as may have been made evidently have met with little response from the bloc. There also have been few other Indications of any bloc interest
In Haiti; bloc propaganda media have rarely mentioned Haiti, and except for tbe unfavorable comments on Duvaller made by Moscow and the Soviet delegation at the UN during the Haitian-Doolnlcan crisis, blocon Haiti has been largely noncommittal.
It haa been reported that aeveral Communist andmembers of Duvaller's coterie were plotting to remove him from power and subsequently declare Haiti to be arepublic." aah of such reports were received during tbe aeveral weeks preceding the end of Duvaller's legal tero of office on IS May; none have come in alnce then, and there is some reason to believe that thesewere deliberately planted by Duvaller so that tbay sight reach US Government offlclala. Nevertbeleas, ifourse of action were ever Implemented, the chancee ofucceeaor government eliciting bloc or Cuban support would appeargroater than are tbe prospects of tbe present Kven in this case, however, the bloc's initial reaction to an appeal forprobably would be cautious until tbe situation wasand the nature and extent of US reaction had become Also, the bloc might be cautious unless theDominicanmore attractive and moretarget for eventual blocwon over first.
There is no evidence of moreerfunctory interest
tlKU>2iVnYrs IS)
Haiti on tho part of the Castro regime at this time. Cuban-Haitian relations were broken in9 following en abortive "invasion" attempt agalnat Haitiandful of Castro's followers, and contacts between the two nations have been minimal ever since. Haitian Communistslive in Cuba, and one of them, Rene Depestre, is said to have beenob by Castro at the Cuban Government printing office In Havana. Radio Havana devotes an hour each day toroadcast in the Creole language to Haiti; the broadcast was initiated late last December followingmonth lapse in Cuba'sbroadcasts to Haiti. Aside from this, there lo little evidence of Oihaninter**
. Ln early may, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roathat Cuba had its own troubles and was Interested neither in Duvaller nor in Dominican President Juan Bosch, who were described as "equally distasteful" to the Cuban Government.
There have been several reports recently that Castro Is trailing thousands ofand French-speaking Africans to be used ln aof Haiti and that some of these forces have already been infiltrated into Haiti, neither aspect of these reports can be confirmed. Tbe former Haitian consul general ln Santiago de Cuba, who returned to hislast month, estimated that
tiom>
there are0 Haitians living in Cuba, most of them having emigrated there as cane-cutters in the pre-Castro period. He stated thatmall percentage of theseare Castro supporters and that be found no evidence of Africans being trained to go to Haiti. He also made the point that tbe Haitians who had gone to Cuba found living conditions there superior to those they had left behind, which would incline most of them to remain. Sources familar with the Haitian people point out that clandestine entry Into the country, even for native Haitians, would bo no easy task; such persons would quickly be spotted by local authorities, who tend to bu suspicious of any "strangers." Tbere is nothat such incidents have occurred.
The State of tbe Haitian Eco
Haiti resalns anand impoverished country where tbe levels of production, income, health, and literacy are probably the lowest ln theHemisphere and among the lowest ln tbe world. The major problems facing the economy are those which have plagued the country for generations: natural resources, low agriculturalack of diversificationack of any systematic economic development program and trained personnel to implement economic reforms. Agricultural production--the country's main economic activityretarded by the prevalence
ol subsistence farming on smll family plots and by the owners' failure to observe even the most elementary principles of land and soil conservation. Haiti's major exports are coffee, sugar, and sisal. Coffee, the mostcrop, grows wild ands mloimum of processing from tbe peasants who collect It. Continued heavy dependence on coffee, with alternating high and low crop years and continuous price fluctuations, results In periodic stralna on the country* economic stability.
Under Duvaller, theover-all economic has continued unchecked. Revenues ostensibly ralaed for developmental purposes have been diverted for Duvaller's personal use and that of his top officials and armed retainers. Taxes have been increased aa ouch as tbe traffic will bear, and foreign bualnesses in Haiti areasked to "contribute" to the regime's coffers. The level of buslneas activity haa declined and during tbe last six months business has been especially poor duo to tbe effectsongshoremen's atrtke In the US, the political situation in Haiti, and tbe virtual cessation of the touristHaiti's second-largest source of foreign exchange.
Many observers who have been struck by the poverty and economic stagnation so evident in the country have assumed that an economic collapse Is Imminent.ollapse now appearsunlikely, since thegrows enough food to satisfy the regime's needs and since the coffee crop to be harvested during this October and November la oxpected toood one. Thia will bring the regime much-needed foreign exchange andtemporarily much of the
economic pressure built up over tbe past year. Also Haitifiscally sound in tbe technical sense. The economy, lowever dreary it may be in other respects, hasotably good record in fiscal-monetaryever since the end of the US occupation of the country
In hia speech ofay, President Duvaller announced the Initiation of an elaborate new economic and social development plan for tbe country which be titled tbe "Plan ofasically the "plan" callsSO-million investment annually for two years. In order to put the nation's economy on tbe road to progress. The announced goal of the plan lvo-perccnt Increase In the nation's per capita GNP, to be achieved at the rateercent per annuo. After tbe first two years of operation, the plan calls for an annual Investmentillion, theillion going toward meeting tbe costs of maintenance and replacement.
Typically, however, the plan contains no apoclfic provision for financing, aside from vague references to "national effort" andather bluaterlng assertion that foreign aid with strings attached will
not be accepted. The plan evidently assumes that the means will somehow and somewhere be found; sold* from this, Duvaller referred to the program as "an alllanco with ourselves for progress." Tbe economy clearly cannot produce tbe fundatorogram of this magnitude, and it Isthat In Its prosont state the Haitian economy could absorb an lnveatmentillion, even If It became available. The scheme appears similar in purpoae to Duvaller's earlier "National Renovationn economic development project of smaller scope which has served Duvaller'a domestic propaganda purposes and whose majorhas been the partial constructionow-cost workera' realdentlal coomunlty named "Duvallervllle" in an area where there Is little need of it. For these reaaona the plan has not been taken very seriously In Port-au-Prince except for Its implied threat of lncreaaed taxation.
Duvaller's Opposition
The strength of Duvaller's position today comes not only from his own clever manipulation of the forces which have the potential to overthrow him, but also from the extreme disarray and despair of those Haitians who oppose bla. The Haitianhas long been deeply fragmented, but only recently have tho antl-Duvallerparticularly those remaining withinhope ofthe dictatorship.
With the passing of theay anniversary celebrations of Duvaller's "relnauguratlon" the antl-Duvaller momentum built up during tbe preceding two months evaporated, and despondency supplanted optimism In opposition circles.
Recent reports from within Haiti indicate that allent, opposition to Duvaller among politically conscious sectors of theigh level and probably has Increased. They also make It clear that the populace has been cowed by tbe regime'e repressive power and by its often-demonstrated brutality against known or aua-pected dlaaidents. Host of those Haitians vbo bave exhibited courage or capability in the struggle against Duvaller bave either been killed or iaprlaoned by the regime, or have taken asylum in foreign embassies and have fled to other countries. Only Clementdeath was announced by tbe regis*is handful of followera actively opposed Duvaller from within Haiti In recent months. Barbot's death may well leave Duvaller virtually unopposed at borne at this time; the capabilities of the survlvlog reananta of bis group are believed to be quite limited.
Such Internal opposition to the regime as exists ismainly in tbe small Haitian mulatto elca.ent, vhlch has been especially persecuted by Duvaller since he took power. He has been largely successful in destroying
the political power of the Dulattoes, who traditionally bave controlled most of the country's key posts other than tbe presidency. Further, Duvaller has sharpenedracial antagonists between then and the country's Negrolatterfor approximatelyercent of tbe population, There Are reports that in the event of an attack on his regime, Duvaller's henchmen haveorders to launch an all-out attack on the mulattoes. Many members of this group already have been liquidated or have fled into exile, but those whoand professionals who bave not been harmed because of tbeir economic importance to thebitterly opposed to Duvaller.
The exile picture is one of fragmentation and confusion. ultitude of small, personallstic exile groups exist, but most of tbem tend to focus more onto discredit rival groups and personalities than on efforts against the Duvaller roglme. (Seerief description of some of tbe exile organizations most frequently reported on.) Host of the groups have advanced dubious claims of substantial support within Haiti, and few have come up with detailed plansuture government. Many are limited in their appeal to other Haitians because their leadership is composed of Haitian politicans of the old-school type who. if they were to achieve power, would probably ape the
present regime In most of its authoritarian and corrupt Few are believed to have much financial support or nilitary resources available at this time.
Concentrations of antl-Duvaller exiles are located lo the Dominican Republic; in New York and Miami in the US; and In Cuba, Venezuela, and the Bahamas. There are lesser numbers in other areas. The center of Haitian exile activity is the Dominican Republic. To Haitian exiles hoping to build up strength for an eventual conquest of their homeland, the Dominican Republic Isatural and an important staging area. Given their present lack of financial and military tbe Haitian exiles would be bard pressed to mount any kind of an attack on Duvaller without active Dominican support.
Dominican President Juan Bosch's recent loudof bis opposition to Duvaller have historical: Haitian-Dominican relations have beenby tension and strife ever 7 tbe two countries nearly went to war after thousands of Haitian canecutters who bad crossed the border to work in Dominican caneflelds were slaughtered by the Trujlllo dictatorship. Now difficulties between tbe two countries have been revived largely because of the natures of their ember of the
political school of tholaft, like Coata Rlcan ex-president Jose Flgueree and Venezuelan President Betancourt, opposes everything which Duvaller Stands for and has said that their two governments cannot exist for long on tho same one will have to fall. The Haitian-Dominican crisis which erupted In late Aprileflection of this sentiment. It was largely manufactured by Bosch, who used the crista to rally the Dominican people to an Old bannor in order to divert their attention from domestic political and economic problems.
Hoat of the larger Haitian exile organizations have vied, with some success until recently.
for Dominican supportove against Duvaller. Bosch now opposos providing military equipment and training sites to any of the exiles, although several groups did receive such aid earlier. Hia about-race in this matter may have sprung from his fear ofcensure and from bis unfavorable impressions of tbe Haitian exiles he has met. His decision, however, has served to accelerate the confusion and disintegration of the Haitian exile forces. The Dominican Government is nevertheless continuing to welcome Haitian exiles Into the country, and hundreds of retugeea and exiles have crossed the border Into the Dominican Republic in recent months. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
A
Facta on Haiti
Capital City: Area
Population
Rural to Urban Ratio:
Illiteracy:
Budget
Percentage of Budget for Military: Total Value of Carports: Total Value of Iaports; Chief:
US Investment er Capita QKP: Armed Forces (FAd'H):
Civil Militiaon Ton Hacoutee:
us Aid to Haiti since world War II: US Aid to Haiti under Duvaller Regime:
Port-au-prlnce Pop.
quareest.)
1 Octo
st.)
st.)
est.)
oastviation
at.)
st.)
SEjCRET
ANNEX 8
Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings* (Listed alphabetically)
nilitary grouping:
Ex-colonel Paul Corvirtgton, forcer director of Haiti's mili-tary academy who left the country as an asylee this spring and who is distinguished by bis capable Military leadership as well as by his distrust of Haitian exile politicians, is attempting to build an organisation of other former military officers and sen for an eventual attack on Duvallor. Active mainly In tbeRepublic, Corvlngtonew associates have negotiated wltb Dominican President Bosch and elements of tbe military leadership there for their support, but the Corvington group is not believed to be receiving such assistance at this time. aitian priest. Father Jean Baptlste Georges, currently appears to be working closely with Corvlngton.
Haitian "Government-in-Sxile:"
Two former rivals for tbe Haitian presidency In7 elections, LouisDejole and Daniel Fignole, announced onay their joint leadershipman provisional "government-in-exlle." Their organization appears never to have gone beyond the planning stage and the two leaders have split up, according to recent reports. ealthy mulatto of conservativetendencies, has attempted several times7 to oust Duvaller, andarge number of supporters within Haiti. Fignole, who actually was president of Haiti forays inpellbinding Negro orator and demagogue who is believed toonsiderable following among Port-au-Prince's slum dwellers. Doth Dejole and Fignole are presumably continuing their attempts to build their own organizations.
tn"in tho Haitian exile concentrations, alliancesgroups and their leaders shift constantly and rap-Idly as tho key figures jockey for increased prestige and support. For this reason, certain generalizations as to the makeup of the groups and their alliances with other organizations listed herein may very quickly become less than accurate.
SEGRET
(United Revolutionary Force):
Tbe prominence of tbe FRU has declined rapidly since mid-May, when tho organization's military training camp Just across the Haitian border In the Dominican Republic was closed down by the Bosch government. Tho group, estimated in May totrength of abouten, was set up by Haitian exile brothers Jacques and Raymond Cassagnol and was Indirectly financed by HaitianPaul Magloire. Tbe FRU camp was disbanded and its equipment seized by the Dominican Government apparently only hours before it was to launch an Invasion effort against Duvaller. Other exile groups within the Dominican Republic reportedly have been vying for the allegiance of the FRU meobors, but no one group seems to have absorbed them.
(Young Haiti Movement):
This well-organized and active group la ledaitian Catholic priest, Father Gerard Stssaintbe, who is of leftist His group reportedly includes elements both of theleft and of the extreme left. Father Bissainthe claims that MJH groups bave been organized In several Haitian exile centers, inclufilni- Now York, Caracaa, and Puerto Rico, and asserts that the organization hasembers within Haiti. Host of the group's current efforts are centered in the Dominican Republic. Tbe MJH formerly received its military guidance from Andfdelf-proclaimed French guerrilla warfare expert who recently was ousted from the group.
5- MPH (Haitian Patriotic Movement):
Foundedhe MPH is led by Clement Benolt and isin. Benoit has put forward greatly exaggerated claims as to the strength of his organization, which is believed small and probably has little financial or any other support. Benoit bieself is generally regardedather minor figure on the Haitian exile scene who is trying to build up his own Importance.
6. PHH (National Haitian Party):
Tbe political vehicle established by tbe late Clement Jumelle (an unsuccessful presidential candidate who competed against Duvalter in7he PNH today is politically quiet and is nominally led by Clement's brother, Oaaton Jumelle. Thehas maintained its original philosophy, which is of theleft, and its present headquarters is believed to be in Now York. Some of Haiti's most progressive, enlightened, and
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professional peoplo maintain loose ties with the PNH, but these people--one group of whon is referred to as the Latortue group, steooing froa tbe nnso of one its Members, Francoishandicapped in their political efforts by the lack of any real organization. The PNH and the Latortue group are believed toconsiderable support among intellectuals in Haiti.
7. UDN (Rational Democratic Union):
Tbe UDN is tho older of the two amalgamations of aeveral Haitian exile groups, tbe other being the Dejole-Flgnolo It was formed2traditional" Haitian politician, Pierre Rlgaud, who heads the group's main concentration in the Dominican Republic. The UDN is also represented in New York.and Caracas. It contains groups of various politicaland includes representatives of at least two of tho groups listed above (PHN and KPH). Its military leader at presentIs General Leonompetent, pro-US former Haitian army chief of staff. The group may have greater numerical strength than any of the others.
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