THE POSSIBILITY OF A GVN DEAL WITH NORTH VIETNAM

Created: 9/14/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

TOJUrlGS DISSEM

No.

3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The PossibilityVN Deal with North Vietnam

1. We haveumber of recent reports which raise the possibilityVN deal of sosie kind with North Vietnam:

a. Polish ICC Commissioner Hanclllo Chi Mlnh proposal to Nhue facto cease-fire by the Viet Cong; Nbu is allogedly studying this proposal, that it night become relevant in three to four mor.thu.

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Amoansaoor *odge inai nnu has atways thought ofwith the North and believes himself clever enough to bring it off.

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warned American official]aigon or Haneiii-Nhu conversationsa possible deal with North Vlotnam.

has adaiitted to our Chief ofthat he has talked with Manelll,he (Nhu) has been In contact for someViet Cong agents in South Vlotnam.,that his purpose is not to explore atho North but to wean senior Vietin tbe South away froai the Communist cause.

be aF^TCTs^prepare^To^seTvo^nrT^ne is not

already doinga Nhu-Ho communication link.

de Gaulle's recontVietnam reiterates long standing

SEPRPf^

J^LJ*3ffEIGN DISSEM

GN DISSEM

French interestossible "neutralized" solution there.

we do not feel that there isof an imminent GVN arrangement of somethe North, we do believe that there isa possibility ofeal, at some time infuture, to warrant special OS watchfulness In our view, the problem is not oneor Nhu's "going over" to Ho or wittinglytheir country to Communistthe dangers lie in tbe fact that Diemconsider their own interests to be thosecountry, and might feel that they couldmanipulate political dealings withthey might at some juncture seek to work out

a modus vlvendi with the North, out of beliefeal with kindred peoples was better thanto foreign (US) pressures.

chances that Diem and Nhu mightto seek some negotiated solution withwould probably rise if they felt that USbad become so intense that they werea corner. If they felt their only otherto be either the end of their ownhumiliating acceptanceuch greater USthe political direction of South Vietnam,opt for an "opening to the North." Theirin effectingeal would in largedepend on their method and timing. If itknown that Diem and Nhu seriously intendedan accommodation with the North, oup attempt by certainmilitary leaders. However, if Diemwere able to make it appear that theirthe North were intended to serve, and notSouth Vietnamese interests, they might In any event, there might beacquiescenceorth-South "solution"event that the nilitary and politicaldeclined sharply from present levels.

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