ives general guidance requested RKrTEL.
We have following additional general thoughts which have been diaeuesed with President. While vw do not wish to stimulate coup, ve also do not vish to leave inpresslor.. vouldhange ol* governaent or deny eeonoale and military assistanceew regice if it appeared capable of increaBlng effectiveness of nilitary effort, ensuring popular support to wir. war and improving working relations. We vould like to be informed on what is being contemplated but ve should avoid being drawn into reviewing or advising on operational plans or any other act which might tend to. too closely with change In We would, however, volcano iriToraetion which would help ud aaaeas character of any alternate looeVimhip.
reference to opoalfroblem of General Mitih youconsider having contact take position that in presentknowledge he is unable present Minn's case to responsiblewith any degree of seriousness. In order to geteven to consider Minn's problem, contact would have toJnfomatioa clearly indicating that Minn's plans off or aof success. At present contact sees no such proepect in tho
You should also consider
vould be desirable In order toierrT'^TTlity inilnlll)veil as sin liar approaches to others whether appropriate arrangements
could be cede for follov-up contacts by individuals brought in especially froa outside Vietnaa. As ve indicated ine are most concerned about security problem and wo are confining knowledge these sensitive matters in Woshlngton to extremely limited group, high officials in White House, State, Defense and CIA
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE.Original document.