THE SITUATION IN HAITI
ELEASE MIL IICIII)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3
THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Sumoary
Haitian dictator Duvaller presently istronger position than ever, largely because of the collapse of organized opposition to him following the critical period last April and Hay. He has been successful in remaining in power beyond his legal presidential term mainly through hisand exploitation of the weaknesses and eccentricities of the Haitian people. Ae has been careful to shift or remove regime officials before they could build up personal followlngs against hio, and most of the small number of top officials who have retained their posts throughout hisare extreme opportunists, including some and pro-Comounists. It is from this group of personsuccessor to Duvaller would be nost likely to emerge as matters now stand. The chancesloodbatheneral breakdown of central authority would result from Duvalier's removal from the presidency are considered high.
The Haitian Army, traditionally the kingmaker In local politics, has been transformed by repeated purges from the most likely agent of DuvaIter's downfall into one of three armed groups supporting him and responsive to bis dictates. Theecret policecreated by Duvaller originally to counter the power of thethe roster of the forces maintaining him In power. Army efficiency and capabilities have declined as US-trained officers have been removed or have fled into exile, while the discipline and degree of training of the militia appear to have increased. Some form of unification of the two forces may be carried out in the future.
The Communist threat in Haiti, heretoforenegligible because of comiunlam's lack of appeal among the country's politically inert masses, is increasing. Haiti's Communists presently lack militancy but are permitted to operate relatively unchecked by the regime and consequently aretheir strength. The dangereizure of powermall, determined Cocurunlst elite group in tbo event of Duvalier's removal is clearly mounting.
'SECRET
Onother band, tbe threat posed by Haiti'sties vltb the bloc appear* to be minor compared wltb the interna) threat at this time. Haiti has few contacts with the bloc or wltb Castro's Cuba, and there appears to be little evidence of political or subversive Interest in Haiti on the part of-controlIrC countries.
Haiti's economic deterioration probably baa been accelerated under Duvaller. An economic however, does not appear imminent,umper coffee crop later this year ls expected to alleviate tne country's present foreign exchange shortage. randioes "economic development plan" announced by Duvaller onay appears, elf-development" program, to have been devised for internal political reasons. It holds little promise of accomplishing anytbing, but may be used by the regime to attempt to coax and extort additional funds from domestic and foreign sources.
*nnex Ai basic Facts On Haiti
Annex B: Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings
Haitian opposition to Duvaller is characterized at present by the despair and inactivity of theopponents within Haiti and by the weakness and fragmentation of exile groups. The death of Clement Barbot onuly virtually ends organized resistance to Duvaller within Haiti, and Haitian exile groups now active in tbe Dominican Republic appear to be dissipating most of their energies in attempting to discredit each other rather thanstrength against Duvaller. Exile din Integral ion is being accelerated by Dominican President Boscb's sudden decision to refuse permission for the us*erritory by the exiles for training and staging purposes.
IHI riii ii iiTnii mi niTTFiwiriF
Political Situation
Haitian dictator Duvaller has emerged fromturbulent period of April and Haytronger position than ever. There appears to be nogroup within tbe country or abroad that is now in ato attack bin, let alone topple his regime. Thesmall segment of tha population In Haiti which la eufflctsBtly active politically to carry any weight in opposing him has been cowed andby the failure of this spring's attempts against hie and by the regime's subsequent imposition of even tighter measures of control and
The impetus behind the drive to oust Duvaller on orate his legal term of officehas been entirely dissipated. There are no prospects forpsychologically propitious periodrive against his regime for some time to come. He claims tbat tbe term to which be was "re-elected" In 1M1 ls to run for six years, but several domestic groups already have urged "spontaneously" that be be "president for life." In this situation, the most likely possibilities for his removal appear to have narrowed down to two: fals death fromor from natural causes (tbe SS-year-olo Duvalier's bealtb is and baa beenoup staged by one or more of his trusted associates.
Duvaller bao managed to maintain bis regime largely by buildingody of loyal henchmen to act as tbeof bis policy of terror-lam and repression, and by effectively playing off and neutralizing those Individuals wbo might at some time oppose him. He bee lnatltuted aeffective Informant system to apprise him of plots well before they can materialize Beyond this, he has perhaps succeeded in prolonging hie term of office where other Baitlan presidents have failed because he thoroughly under-standa and has cunningly used the weaknesses nnd eccentricities
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the Haitian temperament to his own advantage. To the apol1tleal. superstitious masses, he is "Papahe virtual personificationoodoo god; to the country's overwhelmingly Negro population, he has shown himself to be anti-mulattoevotee of black supremacy, which he calls "negritude"; to all Haitians, be posesaitian frequently invoking past glories and tho nawes of famous national heroes such as Emperor Dessallnes.
One aspect of hisof nationalism has been
seen ln his use of thecapegoat for virtually all the Ills that beset the country. He has consistently charged that American alserllness, not Haitian mismanagement and is the basic reason for Haiti's continuing economic and social deterioration. In recant weeks, antl-USby regis* leaders have takenifferent tone; they have asserted that the US vas responsible for the recent critical period and for the abortive attempts against Duval which then took place. Theso charges appear to haveleast for the present--ln the ousting of the OS naval and air force missions and the refusal of the Haitian Government to allow USThurston to return to Haiti. Ouvaller has been careful not to press his attacks on the US too far; he may still hope to regain sow sort of OS economic aid commitment, and he may
believe that the risks attendantompleto break with the US are too great to be taken.
Few regime officials are permitted by Duvalier toreal power, and those who do are largely of the saw* stripe as the dictator himself. Host top officials are sporadically reshuffled or removed ln order to prevont their buildingersonal following which might some day challenge Ouvaller. Several of tbe -en who bava occupied cabinet-level positions longest under Duvaller are Com-sunlsta or pro-Comreunlats. Pro-Communist Minister of Finance Horve Boyer allegedlyormer member of the French Communist Party. The samehaa been received on Jules Blanchet, who is currentlyas Haiti's aabassador to the European Common Market. Minister of Commerce Clovla Desinor Is frequently reported to be at lean! pro-Communist, although Move reports classify him as an extreme opportunist. Others fitting into the latter category are Minister of Public Works Luckner Caabronne and Jacques Fourcand, the director of the social security institute. Both the latter are top Ouvaller aides and confidants. Adrlen Raymond, who holds the number two position Id the Foreign Ministry, Is another Individual who evidently has Duvaller's confidence and whose authority appeared to increase during the recent crisis. He and his brother, Colonel Claude lUymondgeneral of tbe Haitiantough, trusted
Hies of tbe dictator, but both ara said to have strong personal ambitions to rule Haiti If Duvaller were to fall.
Any of these officials ls ambitious enough to attemptor in collusion with others to assume control of tbe government. All are solinked with the present regime thatotential successor to Duvaller, each would be nearly as objectionable to all concerned as Duvaller himself, moat of tbe officials listed above have been reported at one time or another to be plotting to removeariant on this theme haa been the reportlan whereby Duvaller would resign and leave tbe country after arranging for several of his close advlsars to assume power. None of these reports so far has beenreliable, but of tbe two alternatives described, tbe former course would appear in tho light of Haitian history to be more likely to materialize than the latter. At any rate. It is from the small clique now surrounding Duvalleruccessor, in the event of the dictator's removal, would most likely be drawn. Thesuccessor to thels tbe president of tbe country's highest court; the present Incumbent of tbls office, Adrlen Douyon,uvaller devotee who, like all other regime officials, Is asupporter of Duvaller. He is believed not to be strong enough to survive on his own.
Duvalier's suddeo removal from office could bringloodbath which might quickly lead to general chaos andunless strong outside forces were brought In. There have been several reports that Duvaller has prepared lists of persons to be slaughtered, and has Instructed bis followers to loot and burn In tho event of an attempt on his life. If such an attempt wereontrolled slaughter could rapidly get out of hand as word spread of the dictator's demise. The longer Duvaller retains powor, tho greater will.be the populace's list of grievances against bis henchmen and th*
sharper their desire to exact revenge.
The Haitian Armed forces
Tbe failureilitary-led coup attempt on3 and the consequenceshave virtually destroyed the capability of the Haitian armed forces (PAd'H) to overthrow Duvaller. The Haitian Army In particular has been transformed from the moat likely agent for accomplishing Duvalier's ouster Into one of three armed groups protecting him In his efforts to perpetuate himself in power.
Traditionally the PAd'H has made and unmade Haitian presidents. Duvaller, however. In order to counter this threat against him,has virtuallymodeled the PAd'H in his own image. Whereas nuvaller in the past has looked on the PAd'H
T
the most likely source of an attempt to overthrow him, he now considers It one of the groups which solidly supports his He has been able to achieve this complete about-face by systematicallyall officers whom he regarded as not completelyto him. Since bis inaugurationuvaller bas cashieredercent of the officerhe last purge of aboutfficers having taken place in thepril period.
Tbe officers purged from the PAd'H have been the older, more experienced and stable elements of the armed forces. For tbe most part they were US-trained, pro-US and competent. In their place, Duvaller haa placed political appointees (cany former enlisted men) who offer little In militarybut are politically acceptable and loyal to bis The effectiveness of tbe armed forces has been reduced to the point tbat It has minimal value as an organized military force.
The Ton Ton macoutes (Duvalier's secret police) were established in7 by Clement Burbot, who later turned against the regime and recently headed, until bis deatb onuly, the sole knownopposing Duvaller within Haiti. The TTMsoosely organized mixture of military, paramilitary and civiliansupporters of the regime.
Their mission is to keep Duvaller and Haiti's blacksabsolute power as long as Ostensibly abodyguard, they are Duvalier's confidential agents, dealing la terrorism and Composed mostly of thugs and other undesirables, the TTKs number, are expert in brutality and tbe techniques of political repression, and serve the regime while serving themselves.
The civil militiaart-time paramilitary force. Even though It bas been In existencet was not legalized until2 when it was officially designated tbe "National Security Volunteer Corps"he VSNolitically mobilized and ideologically oriented force which keeps thein line. Formed,to Duvaller, forsecurity aod to ensure against an external invasion, it was actually established to offset tbe strength of tbe PAd'H. Tbe VSN has the potential to Identify and report clandestine opposition to Duvaller anywhere In Haiti; it has been used successfully to turn out the vote for Duvaller and tominor political There are0 militiamen, of which only aboutercent are equipped with firearms. ilitia-pen are concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area alone. Tbe VSN operates as an adjunct of the Ton Ton Hacoutes and ls used to implement TTM orders
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ook pert lo tbeay parade celebrating tbe second anniversary of Duvaller'slnauguratlon." On tbe basis of Its Impressive appearance at this tine, s believed to have received considerable training during tbe past year.
The US military Missions Inuntil theirby Ouvaller this spring maintained close relations with th* officers of the PAd'Hr-were feared by Ouvaller. Be claimed that tbe missions "interfered" with the absolute personal loyalty which be denanded of hla officers. As of now thefor sucb "interference" have been greatly reduced; FAd'H officers and men have beenbarred froa the slightest contact wltb those OS MAAGstill remaining; in the country. Duvaller continues, however, to give evidence of his fear of such contacts by hampering any and all efforts by the MAAG group to accomplish itsunctional.
The chancesilitary coup occurring In tbefuture appear quite small. It Is more likely that thewill becoaie bettertrained and equipped as the army's capabilities and standards continue to deteriorate. An eventual merger of tbe two groups could occur when Duvaller considers that his present drive to convert the armed forces Into
a more useful tool of hisas been accomplished. orce probably would not be worthy of consideration as aorganization by non-Haitian standards, but would be powerful enough to suppress quickly any internal move against Duvaller that might develop.
Tbe Communist Threat
Tbe threat of communism in Haiti has traditionally beenas small, largely because the Haitian populace Is generally apathetic, illiterate, and Also, tbe pressures for land reform which have beento sucb advantage by Communists ln other Latincountries are largelyIn Haiti; tbe Haitian peasants have owned their own tiny plots of land for Haiti's abject poverty, its appalling social conditions, and its political bankruptcy, however, doituation which readily lends itself to Communist exploitation. While tbe docile, lethargic nature of tbe population probably would preclude tbe possibilityommunist takeoverass uprising. It would the control of tbe countrymall, dedicated Communist elite group if it were to seize power.
The evidence now available Indicates thatedicated,Communist organisation is being built up wltbln Haiti. While th* effectiveness and militancy of local Communists are believed to be rather low
at this tins, their potential is clearly Increasing. Tbis results in no saall degree froa Duvalier's policy ofor his own devious political purposes--the existence ofwo Coaaunlst parties, both of which are peraitted to function alaost unhindered despite tbelr clandestine status. These organizations are the People's Unity Partyhich Isto haveembers, and tbe People'sLiberation Partyith an estlaated membership of upersona. The PEP has well-establishedCoaaunlst connections and ia recognized as tbe official Communist party by theCommunist apparatus. It is concentrating on building well-trained and disciplined cadres; tbe PPLN ia leso tightly knit and ls moreass party. The PPLHmall periodical pamphlet whichIrregularly entitled Haiti Deoa tn (Haiti Tomorrow).
Both tbe PEP aad tbe PPLN are steadily gaining newuvalier's removal could lead to an acceleratled growtb ew government were formed by those elements of the pro-Communist or opportunist stripe who now surround tbe dictator. If Duvalier'swere to result in chaosreakdown in national authority, only tbe Communists, who are the only organized opposition forces in Haiti, would beosition to gain Influence and power.
External Coaaunlstto Haiti appears to be of
alnor importance compared wltb the potential threat posed by domestic force* at this tlae. Poland Is tbe bloc nation aoat active In Haiti and Is the only on* maintaining diplomatic ties with the Duvaller regime. olish commercial attache bas resided in Port-au-Prince since Warsaw's newto Mexico, who ls resident there but accredited as minister to several Middle Americanpresented his ministerial credentials to Haitian officials laot month. Recent informationrowing PolishInterest in Haiti and Indicates tbat Duvaller probably la encouraging atlll more Interest
on Poland's part. Several Polish
trade officials have vlalted
Haiti since April, and aa of
olish-Haitian com- lalblnmsyrtos
being eatablltHieTririPort-aij-
Prlnce to promote barter deals
between tbe two countries. The
first barter contract set up by
the flra is said to envisage an
exchange of Haitian coffee and
other product*0 tons
of Polish cement andotal value of
Czechoslovakia also baa evinced commercial lntereat in Haiti, but evidentlyeaser extent. ix-man Czech trade delegation visited Haiti In early March of thla year and met Informally with Haitian buslness-nen. There was no indication that the delegation met with any Haitian officials, and no le-
portent deal, for1MSI
UI
rs
ICl
weapons have con* into Haiti, but non* have been
Firmer Indications of the extent of bloc Interest in Haiti may develop shortly. aitian cabinet-level delegation l* tentatively scheduled to leave for Western Europe ln September to seek economic aid commitments fromest Germany, and Italy. If these stteapts to acquire Western econoaic aid shouldpreliminaryare that only minor aid offers vill be mad* at this timereportedly will seek Czech and Polish help.
Duvaller has threatenedumber of occasions over tbe past several yearn to turn to the bloc for economic assistance if be could not obtain more aid from the US. For tb* most part, tbeselatest of which was implied in Duvaller'say that Haiti might be forced to turn to "other systems" if satisfactory economic support were not forthcoming from within the free enterprisebeen implied rather than explicit and bave not been followedenuous feelers by Duvaller toward the bloc
Ithat fornipr Haitian Tor-elgn minister Raymond Uoyse beaded a small delegation sent to Moscowuest of Soviet aid during the summeruch overtures as may have been made evidently hav* met with little response from the bloc. There also have been few other indications of any bloc interest
in Haiti; bloc propaganda media bave rarely mentioned Haiti, and except for tbe unfavorable commrnts on Duvaller made by Moscow and the Soviet delegation at the UN during tbe Haitian-Dominican crisis, blocon Haiti has been largely noncommittal,
several communist andmembers ofwer* plotting tofrom power and subsequentlyEQHaiti toI
the several weeks preceding the
of Duvaller's legal_tersj of offlc* onay;
reason to believe that thesewere deliberately planted by Duvaller so that they might reach OS Government officials. Nevertheless, ifourae of action were ever implemented, the chancea otuccessor government eliciting bloc or Cuban support would appeargroater than are the prospects of tbe present Even in this case,, th* bloc's initial reaction to an appsal forprobably would be cautious until tbe situation wasand the nature and extent of US reaction had become Also, tbe bloc might b* cautious unless th*Dominicanmora attractive and moretarget for eventual blocwon over Mr-it .
There is no evidence of moreerfunctory Interest
rS
Haiti on tha part of the Castro regime at this llai. Cuban-Haitian relations were broken In9 following an abortive "Invasion" atteaipt against Haitiandful of Castro's followers, and contacts between the two nations have been minimal ever since. Haitian Communistslive In Cuba, and one of them, Rene Depestre, ls said to have beenob by Castro at tbe Cuban Government printing office In navana. Radio Havana devotes an hour each day toroadcast In tbe Creole language to Haiti; the broadcast was initiated late last December followingmonth lapse in Cuba'sbroadcasts to Haiti. Aside from tbio, there la little evidence of Cuban interest.
Ln early May, Cuban
7oreign Minister Raul Roathat Cuba bad its own troubles and waa interested neither in Duvaller nor in Dominican President Juan Bosch, who were described aa "equally dlstaateful" to the Cuban Government.
There have been several reports recently that Castro ls training thousands ofand French-speaking Africans to be used ln aof Haiti and that some of these forces have already been infiltrated Into Haiti, neither aapect of these reports can be confirmed.
there are0 Haitians living ln Cuba, most of them having emigrated there as cane-cutters In the pro-Castro
obfafebammmmmmmmmml 0 mall percentage of these per- toI29bl suns arc Castro supporters and bHl)>ISVrS jwjommmmmmmmmmmm1
Africans being trained to go to
nom>
.answho nao gone to Cuba found living condltioos there superior to those they had left behind, which would Incline moat of them to remain. Sourcea famllar with the Haitian people point out tbat clandestine entry into tiie country, even for native Haitians, would be no easy task; such persons would quickly be spotted by local authorities, who tend to be suspicious of any "strangers." There la notbat such incidents have occurred.
The State of tbe Haitian Eco
Haiti resalns anand Impoverished country where tbe levels of production, income, health, and literacy are probably the lowest in theHemisphere and among the lowest ln tbe world. The major problems facing the economy arc those which bavs plagued the country for generations: natural resources, low agriculturalack of diversificationack of any systematic economic development program and trained personnel to Implement economic reforms. Agricultural productIon--the country's main economic activityretarded by the prevalence
ol subsistence faming on smell family plots and by the owners' failure to observe even tho moat elementary principles of land and soil conservation. Haiti's major exports are coffee, sugar, and sisal. Coffee, the mostcrop* grows wild anda minimum of processing from the peasants who collect it. Continued heavy dependence on coffee, with alternating high and low crop years and continuous price fluctuations, results ln periodic strains on the countrys economic stability.
Under Duvaller. theover-all economic has continued unchecked. Revenues ostensibly raised for developmental purposes have been diverted for Duvaller's personal use and that of his top officials and armed retainers. Taxes have been increased as much as the traffic will bear, and foreign businesses ln Haiti arcasked to "contribute" to the regime's coffers. The level of business activity has declined and during tbe last six months business has been especially poor due to the effectsongshoremen's strike in the US, the political situation in Haiti, and tbe virtual cessation of tbe touristHaiti's second-largest source of foreign exchange.
Many observers who have been struck by the poverty and economic stagnation so evident in tbe country have asiumed that an economic collapse is Imminent.ollapse now appearsunlikely. since thegrows enough food to satisfy the regime's needs and sinco the coffee crop to be harvested during this October and November is expected toood one. This will bring the regime much-needed foreign exchange andtemporarily much of the economic pressure built up over the past year. Also Haitifiscally sound ln the technical sens*. The economy, iow*ver dreary it may be in other respects, hasotably good record In fiscal-monetaryever since the end of the US occupation of the country.
In his speech ofay. President Duvaller announced the initiation of an elaborate new economic and social development plan for tn* country whichbe "Plan ofasically the "plan" callsoO-milllon investment annually for two years, in order to put the nation's economy on the road to progress. The announced goal of the planlvo-percent increase ln the nation's per capita GNP, to be achieved at the rateercent per annua. After tbe first two years ot operation, th* plan calls for an annual investmentillion, theillion going toward meeting tbe costs of maintenance and replacement.
Typically, however, the plan contains no specific provision for financing, aside from vague references to "national effort" andather blustering assertion that foreign aid with strings attached will
not be accepted. Tho plan evidently assures that the means will somehow and somewhere be found;from this, Duvaller referred to the program as "aa alliance with ourselves for progress." Tb* economy clearly cannot produce tbe fundatorogram of this magnitude, and it isthat ln It* prosent state the Haitian economy could absorb an investmentillion, even If it became available. The scheme appears similar ln purpose to Duvaller's earlier "National Renovationn economic development project of smaller scope wbich has served Duvaller'* domestic propaganda purposes and whose majorhas been the partial constructionow-cost workers' residential communityuva1lervl1le" ln an area where there is little need of It. for these reasons the plan has not been taken very seriously in Port-au-Prince except for its implied threat of Increased taxation.
Duvaller's Opposition
The strength of Duvaller's position today comes not only from his own clever manipulation of the forces which bava the potential to overthrow him, but also from the extreme disarray and despair of those Haitians who oppose blm. Tbe Haitianhas longply fragmented, but only recently bave tho antl-Duvallerparticularly those remaining withinhope ofthe dictatorship.
With the passing of theay anniversary celebrations of Duvaller's "relnauguratlon" the antl-Duvaller momentum built up during the preceding two months evsporated. and despondency supplanted optimism ln opposition circles.
Recent reports froa within Haiti Indicate that silent, opposition to Duvaller among politically conscious sectors of theigh level and probably has increased. They also aaka it clear that the populace has been cowed by tbe regime's repressive power and by it* often-demonstrated brutality against known or *us-pected dissidents. Most of those Haitians who bave exhibited courage or capability ln the struggle against Duvaller bave either been killed or lnprlaoned by the regime, or have taken asylum In foreign embassies and have fled to other countries. Only Clementdeath was announced by tbe regimeis handful of followers actively opposed Ouvaller froa within Haiti ln recent months. Barbot's death may well leave Duvaller virtually unopposed at home at this time; the capabilities of the aurvlvlog remnants of bis group are believed to be quite limited.
Sucb Internal opposition to the regime asainly in the small Haitian mulatto elcn.ent, which has been especially persecuted by Duvaller since he took power. He has been largely successful ln destroying
the political power of the mulattoes, who traditionally bave controlled most of the country's key posts other than the presidency. Further, Duvaller has sharpenedracial antagonisms between them and the country's Negrolatterfor approximatelyercent of the population, There Are reports that in the event of an attack on his regime, Duvalier's henchmen haveorders to launch an all-out attack on the mulattoes. Many members of this group already have been liquidated or have fled into exile, but those whoand professionals who bave not been harmed because of tbeir economic importance to thebitterly opposed to Duvaller.
The exile picture is one of fragmentation and confusion. ultitude of small, personallstic exile groups exist, but most of tbem tend to focus more onto discredit rival groups and personalities than on efforts against the Duvaller roglme. (Seerief description of some of tbe exile organizations most frequently reported on.) Host of the groups bave advanced dubious claims of substantial support within Haiti, and few bave come up with detailed plansuture government. Many are limited in their appeal to other Haitians because their leadership ls composed of Haitian politicans of the old-school type who. If they were to achieve power, would probably ape the
present roglme ln most of its authoritarian and corrupt Few are believed to have much financial support or military resources available at this time.
Concentrations ofDuvaller exiles are located lo the Dominican Republic; in Now York and Miami in the US; and ln Cuba, Venezuela, and the Bahamas. There are lesser numbers ln other areas. The center of Haitian exile activity is the Dominican Republic. To Haitian exiles hoping to build up strength for an eventual conquest of their homeland, the Dominican Republic lsatural and an Important staging area. Given their present lack of financial and military the Haitian exiles would be bard pressed to mount any kind of an attack on Duvaller without active Dominican support.
Dominican President Juan Bosch's recent loudof bis opposition to Duvaller have historical: Haitian-Dominican relations have beenby tension and strife ever 7 tbe two countries nearly went to war after thousands of Haitian canecutters who bad crossed the border to work in Dominican canefields were slaughtered by the Trujillo dictatorship. Now difficulties between the two countries have been revived largely because of the natures of their ember of tbe
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achool of tholeft, like Coata Rlcan ex-president Jose Figueres and Venezuelan President Bctancourt. opposes everything which Duvaller stands for and has said that their two governments cannot exist for long on tho same one will have to fall. The Haitian-Dominican crisis which erupted ln late Aprileflection of this sentlaent. It was largely manufactured by Bosch, who used the crisis to rally the Dominican people to an Old bannor ln order to divert their attention from domestic political and economic problems.
Host of the larger Haitian exile organizations have vied, with some success until recently.
for Dominican supportove against Duvaller, Booch now opposes providing military equipment and training sites to any of the exiles, although several groups did receive such aid earlier. Hla about-face In this matter may have sprung from bis fear ofcensure and froa bis unfavorable impressions of the Haitian exiles he has met. Bis decision, however, has served to accelerate the confusion and disintegration of the Haitian exile forces. Th* Dominican Government Is nevertheless continuing to wolcome Haitian exiles into tho country, and hundreds of refugees and exiles have crossed the border into the Dominican Republic in recent
eonttts . "
ANNEX A
Basic Facta on Haiti
Capital City: Area
Population
Rural to Urban Ratio;
Illiteracy:
Budget
Percentage of Budget for Military: Total Value of Exports: Total Value of Imports; Chief:
US Investment er Capita QKP: Armed Forces (PAd'H):
Civil Militiaon Ton Macoutes:
US Aid to Haiti since Vorld Vnr II: US Aid to Haiti under Duvaller Regime:
Port-au-prlnce Pop.
quareest.)
1 Octo
st.)
st.)
est.)
oastviation
at.)
st.)
Haitian Exile Organizations and Groupings*
(Listed alphabetically)
1. Corvington military grouping:
Ex-colonel Paul Corvington, former director of Haiti'sacademy who left the country as an asylee this spring and who is distinguished by his capable silitary leadership as well as by his distrust of Haitian exile politicians, is attempting to build an organisation of other former silitary officers and sen for an eventual attack on Duvaller. Active salnly in tbe Domini can Republic, Corvingtonew associates have negotiated wltb Dominican President Bosch and elements of the military leadership there for their support, but the Corvington group Is not believed to be receiving sucb assistance at this tins. aitian priest. Father Jean Baptiste Georges, currently appears to be working closely with Corvington.
2. Dojole-Fignole Haitian "Government-in-Sxlle:"
Two former rivals for tbe Haitian presidency ln7 elections, LouisDejole and Daniel Fignole, announced onay their joint leadershipman provisional "government-in-exlle." Their organization appears never to have gone beyond the planning stage and the two leaders have split up, according to recent reports. ealthy mulatto of conservativetendencies, has attempted several times7 to oust Duvaller, andarge number of supporters within Haiti. Fignole, who actually was president of Haiti forays inpellbinding Negro orator and demagogue who is believed toonsiderable following among Port-au-Prince's slum dwellers. Doth Dejole and Fignole are presumably continuing their attempts to build their own organizations.
*Ni"th"in tho Haitian exile concentrations, slliancesgroups and their leaders shift constantly and rap-Idly as tbe key figures jockey for increased prestige nnd support. For this reason, certain generalizations as to the makeup of the groups and their alliances with other organizations listed herein may very quickly become less than accurate.
(United Revolutionary Force):
Tbe proninence of tbe FRU bas declined rapidly since Bid-Hay, when tho organization's military training camp Just across the Haitian border in the Dominican Republic was closed down by the Bosch government. The group, estimated in May totrength of abouten, was set up by Haitian exile brothers Jacques and Raymond Cassagnol and was indirectly financed by Haitian ex-Presl-dent Paul Maglolre. Tbe FRU camp vas disbanded and its equipment seized by tbe Dominican Government apparently only hours before it was to launch an invasion effort against Duvaller. Other exile groups within the Dominican Republic reportedly have been vying for the allegiance of the FRU members, but no one group seems to havo absorbed them.
(Young Haiti Movement):
This well-organized and active group is ledaitian Catholic priest, Father Gerard Stssaintne, who is of leftist His group reportedly includes elements both of theleft and of the extreme left. Father Bissainthe claims that MJH groups bave been organized In several Haitian exile centers, including Now York, Caracas, and Puerto Rico, and asserts that the organization basembers within Haiti. Host or the group's current efforts are centered ln the Dominican Republic. Tbe MJH formerly received its military guidance from Andre*elf-proclaimed French guerrilla warfare expert who recently was ousted from the group.
5- MPH (Haitian Patriotic Movement):
Foundedhe MPH is led by Clement Benolt and isln. Benoit bas put forward greatly exaggerated claims as to the strength of his organization, which is believed small and probably has little financial or any other support. Benoit bicself is generally regardedather minor figure on the Haitian exile scene who is trying to build up his own importance.
6. PNH (National Haitian Party):
Tbe political vehicle established by the late Clement Jumelle (an unsuccessful presidential candidate who competed against Duvaller in7he PNH today is politically quiet and is nominally led by Clement's brother, Gaston Jumelle. Thehas maintained its original philosophy, which is of theleft, and its present headquarters Is believed to be in Now York. Some of Haiti's most progressive, enlightened, and
2
professional people maintain loose ties with the PNH, but these people--one group of whom is referred to as the Latortue group, ateamIng froa tbe naao of one Its Members, Francoishandicapped in their political efforts by the lack or any real organization. The PHH and the Latortue aroup are believed toconsiderable support among intellectuals in Haiti.
7. UPS (National Democratic Union):
Tbe ODN is tbo older of the two amalgamations of several Haitian exile groups, tbe other being the Dejole-Flgnolo It was formed2traditional" Haitian politician, Pierre Bigaod, wbo beads the group's main concentration lo the Dominican Republic. The UDN is also represented ln New York,and Caracas. It contains groups of various politicaland includes representatives of at least two of tho groups listed above (PON and NPH). Its military leader at presentis General Leonompetent, pro-US former Haitian army chief of staff. Tbe group may have greater numerical strength than any of the others. (SECRET HQ PSltBION-PloouM)
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Original document.
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