N9 3
CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN9
AN EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET WAGE
AN EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET WAGE
CIA/RR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports
FOREWORD
The recent Soviet program for the reform of wages and salaries, in progress6s described and aval ua ted in this Particular emphasis is placed on the lapact of the progran on wage rata differentials by occupation, geographic area, branch ofand conditions of work. In evaluating the wage program, special attention is given to problems of pricing labor serviceslanned economy, such a3 the establishment of wage differentials that willlabor in accordance with tha economic priorities of tha regime and tha coordination of earnings with output of consumer goods and services.
This report ls limited to the state sector of the Sovietattention is given to wage changes in induatrymining, and electric power). Wage changes forworkers ore treated in detail, but changes ln salaries,awards for white collar workers are given less attention. Theparts of this report are limited to direct laborthrough the wage funds of the various enterprises. vertime pay, production bonuses, and the likerebut other, leso direct forma of remunerationpensions,awards for socialist competition, educational stipends, andtransfer paymentsore excluded from consideration. associated program of reducing the length of the Sovietnot described in detail, but the conclusions, An Evaluationr^rir. for Reducing the Viorkweefc
lit the USSR,re incorporated in, the discussion.
coKfEirrs
Pafit;
Summary and Conclusions
I. Introduction
Setting
Structure of the Soviet Wage and Salary System
System6
II. Rationale cf the Wage
III. Course of the Wage Reform
13
Organizational
of Experimentation,
of tne Sixth Five YearO)
Early
of the Program,
for Completionours Revisions.
Nev Administrative
Timing of Transfers to the New Wage and Hours
TV. Evaluation of the Wage
A. Introduction
of the Wag*
Consolidation of Wage Rates and
Shift in Emphasis froo Progressive Piece Rates
to Time Rates and
3- Introduction of Collective Piece Bates
Elimination of Longevity Payments
New Bonuses for
Increased Use of Technically Based Output Norms .
Changes in the Composition Of
Page
for "Hot, Heavy, andork .
of Wage Fund
of the Wage
V.
Aspects
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical
Appendix B.
Appendix C. Source
Tables
Planned Time Schedule for Adjustments in the Work-
week and in Wages,
Major Wage Scales in Construction and in Selected
O-6I
Base Wage Rates of Wageworkers in Selected Branches
ofO-6I
Distribution of Wageworkers in Selected. Industries,
by System of Payment, Before and After the Wage Reform .
Proportion of Pieceworkers in Selected Industries
on Technically Based Output Rorme During the Period of
the Wage
Relative Share of Basic Wage Payments in the Total
Earnings of Wageworkers in Sovnarkhoz Industry, as of
1 August
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Effect of Changes in Wage Rates and Output Norms
on the Composition of Earnings for Selected Jobs ln the
Meat
Wage Rate Differentials Before and After the Wage
Reform in Selected Branches of
Distribution of Wageworkers, by Wage Grade, In
Selected Industries Before and After the Wage Reform
Earnings Differentials of Wageworkers, by Branch of
Industry, Selected
Planned and Actual Increases in Output and Produc-
tivity in
Distribution of Wageworkers in Industry and Con-
struction, by Wage Grade, as ofarch
Distribution of Wageworkers in Industry and Con-
struction, by System of Payment, as of1
Selectedage Sates of Wageworkers ta Indus-
try and Construction, .1
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AM EVALUATION OF THE SOVIET WAGS
Summary and Conclusions
The recent Soviet wage reform, in progress6as the most comprehensive attempt ever made by the USSR to improve the wage system. The reform sought to recover central administrativeover wages and to reduce inequities and inconsistencies in wage rateG and output norms. By these means it was hoped that thepressures of the "wage creep" would be contained, that waste and misallocation of labor would be reduced, and that individual workers would be spurred to increase output and improve job skills. As ofome of the goals of the wage reform appear to have been at least partly achieved, whereas other goal6 appear to be incapable ofby wage reform alone.
eriod of experimentation6he wageprogram was linked in8rogram for reducing the length of the workweek. The combined program progressed slowlymuchS but was accelerated in8 and By the endll workers and employees hud beencheduled lil-hour workweek compared with k& hoursnd by the endl,million workers and employeesnearly two-thirds of the totalhad been transferred to the new wage rates and scales. urther reduction in the workweekour) was not carried through ae scheduledut apparently the transfer of workers and employees to the new wagecontinued.
The wage reform accomplished Its objectives in varying degrees. The reform eliminated the large number of uncoordinated "ministerial" wage systems and establishedet of coordinated Job classification manuals;implified set of wageigher minimum wages, upubles"ubles per month;ingle schedule of regional wage differentials;onsistent set of differentials for "hot, heavy, and hazurdous" work. The widely used
* Ruble values In this report are given in old rubles, which were the rubles in use before the currency reform These old rubles may be converted to new rublesate ofo 1. lhe current official Soviet rate of exchangenew) ruble to
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but inequitable cyetem of progressive piece rates* vaa practically el lal -ated, and tbe number of workers paid according to time rates was Tbe use of higher output normabased on careful technical studywas Increased, although not enough to satisfy Soviot labor economists. Longevity pay, which had been Intended to be applied only ln priority Industries but which hod spread to all industry, vas largely eliminated, and the use of bonuses as Incentives vas increased. By raising basic wage ratesercent in many casesand simultaneously reducing the extent of supplementary pay, the basic wage rate was reestablished as the major factor in the pay structure. Finally, central financial and administrative controls were strengthened to combat the overspending of wage funds by enterprise managers.
Analysis of the changes in minimum wages and wage scales suggests that, in general, the new wage rates represent largely anof previously existing levels of pay. Changes vere made in the composition rather than in the level of earnings. Tbe nev minimum wages raised the level of earnings ofew low-paid workerschiefly custodial workers, some apprentices, and some clerical workers. The average annual money earnings of all workers and employees roseear, the period of the wage reform, not much more than the annual increaseercent tbat had prevailedhe wage reform, in effect, incorporated Into the new baalc wage rates the many provlouo, unofficial deviations in earnings that hod beenpiecemeal ln response to pressures of the "labor mnrkot." Thethus has tidied up the structure of wages for tho moment and takes account of recent technological change, but it remains to be seen whether or not the system has the flexibility to respond to future change.
Analysis of the changes in wage differentials suggests three probable deficiencies. First, the set of differentials established by branch of Industry have been retained and could perpetuate the buildup of redundant labor in high-priority industries because plant managers In thesemay continuo to use their priority positions to purchase "reserves" of underused labor as Insurance against contingencies; on the other hand, the changes In output norms are designed to reduce featherbeddlng inand the amount of redundant labor may be cut. Second, the regional differentials in the nev pay Schedules arc insufficient to move workers to remote areas because the housing and consumer goods on which to spend the extra money are not being provided by the government. Third, the new differentials for "hot, heavy, and hazardous" work, which ore based solely
* Under the system of progressive plecoorker is paidmore, the more his production exceeds the norm. For example, he might beimes the straight piece rate for production above norm up toercent overfulflUmont and two timea the straight rate for further above-norm production.
on the "physiological needs" (largely food consumption requirements) of the workers on these Jobs, are not large enough to attractnumbers of workers to these Jobs. In addition, the newwag" ruten do not reflect differences in Job requirements and working conditions thut exist among individual plants. Because the cost of changing Jobs is much lower than in the Stalin era and because managers ore now faced with abnormally smal: numbers in the new age classes entering the labor market, labor turnover at specific plants will continue toexing problem. Evidence published ln? and3 of high labor turnover in widely scattered industrial plants supports this conclusion. As for the effect on Incentives to produce, it Is difficult to conclude that the Soviet workershole have speeded up their effort because of th- wage reform.
Tbe over-all performance ln holding the line against tbe "wage creep" has been good over the last decade. By recovering central control over wages ae part of the wage reform, the Soviet leadership has perhaps an even stronger assurance that the future level of wage expenditures will stay within the general guidelines of tbe Seven and Twenty Year5 Wages ami wage expenditures are to increase slowly but at rates considerably below gains In However, because planned wage levels for any year are basod largely on the experience of the previous year at eachand because the new system of controlertain degree of administrative flexibility to meet the practical nuedfi of enterprise managers, the Soviet leadership cannot be certain that planned earnings levels will not bo exceeded. Finally, no system of wage control will substitute for Inadequate provision of more and better consumer goods cn which wages may bo spent.
I. Introduction
Setting
5 the USSR began preparations for the firetrevision, of the wage system Onravda announcedew organizationthe State Committee on Labor andod been established under the chairmanship. Kaganovich. 2/ The Committee apparently was formed to survey the changes needed ln the wage system and to provide central direction in carryingomprehensive wage adjustment program. During ther period, the Soviet wage system had developed without the coordinating influenceentral agency. Within formally designated limits, each ministry and department mads those wage rate changes that appeared to be necessary for its workers andsubject only to the pro forma approval of the Council of Ministers. During this period the Council of Ministers seldom challenged tbe power of the ministries and departments to set wages. ew basic changes were made by tbe government, but no attempt was made toa general reform of the wage system.' Despite the fewdirected changes and the many adjustments and modifications made by the various ministries and departments, the structure of the wage systemiffered little fromodel.
Structure of the Soviet Wart" and Salary Byutcm
The Soviot wage and salary system, established, wus borrowed largely from tbe work of the loader of the Scientific
aerially numbered source references, see Appendix C.
** The State Committee of the Council of Minlaters, USSR, on Questions of Labor and Wages (GoBudarstvennly Komitet Soveta Ninlstrov SSSR po Voprosamarabotnoy Platy).
Workers and orrioyecsechnical term used by the Sovles It includoi all wage and salary earners but excludes members of the armed forces and collective farters.
7 the Soviettabilised new alnlaunworkers in Industry and In rail andhe governmentpecial wage lncreaae ofercentin heavy Induatry ln the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East.lncreaae apparently was granted in an effort to reduce tbeof workers who bad been relocated during World War II. ost-of-living adjustment was announced In preparation
for the abolition of the rationing systemnd the accompanying currency und price changes. %J
Management Movement, Fredrick. W. Taylor, and his followers* and was similar to that used by other industrial nations. The systembetween blue collar and white collar workers, although this terminology is not used by Soviet economists. All blue collar workersageworkers, apprentices, and junior service personnel**are paid according to the wage scales of wageworkers, whereas white collar workersanagerB, engineering-technical workers, and clericalre paid according to separate salary schedules.
Under the first system, wageworkers' jobs are classified Into labor grades (raaryady) according to the level of skill required for the Job. The nature of the Job and the skills required are outlined in standard job classification manuals (tarifno-kvalifikatsionniye spravochnikl). Wageworkers arc then paid the appropriate wage ratefor the labor grade of their positions. Forthe following wage scale (tarifnaya setka) was introducedin the Astrakhan Fish Combine7
Labor Grades
Coefficient Daily piece rate
(rubles per day) Daily time rate
(rubles per day)
2 0
As indicated in the example above, wageworkors are paidto either piece or time rates. Time rates are used for those wage-workers whose jobs do not permit the establishment of output norms.
" iscussion of Taylor and the development of the scientific management movement, see Villers,or an appraisal of the impact of the scientific management movement on Soviet wagesee Aganbegyan and Mayer,
** Wageuorkcrrabochiyoviet statistical category which is similar to the US concept of production worker but which is somewhat more limited in coverage)
Apprenticeuchenik
Junior service personnelmladshiy obsluzhivayushchiy Managerrukovodyashchiy
Engineering-technicalcheskiy rabotnikerm in Soviet statistical compilations, that usually includes managers) Clerical workersluahashchiy
Under tbe piece rate system, uhich included aboutercent of all wage-workers in industry/ the established daily, weekly, or monthly wage rate is converted into rubles per unit of output according to an output norm (norma vyrabotki) established for the task or job. Tvo kinds of output norms have been used; experience-statistical norms (opytno-statlsticheskiye normy) and technically based norms (tekhnicheski obosno-vanniye normy). The former reflects largelyorker has done in the past, and the latter is based on his potential output as determined by technical Studies. Actual pay under the piece rate system reflects either underfulfillment or overfulfillment of the output norm.*
In addition to earning the pay specified in the wage scales, workers also may earn supplementary pay and bonuses. Supplementary pay may be earned on the basis of cither straight or progressive piece rates
(pryamaya sdel'naya or sdel'no-progresslvnaya Regular bonuses are linked to achievement of output or quality plans, and special bonuses may be paid for specified purposes from the enterprise fund or from special
state funds, such as those designated for socialist competition awards.
Managers, engineering-technical workers, and clerical workers are paid accordingeparate "official" salary system (sjstema dolahnost-nykh okladcv). Monthly salaries are set in accordance with the standard tables of organization established for all state enterprises. Insalaried workers may receive bonuses for the accomplishment oftusks on either the plant or the shop level.
Before9 the bonus system for salaried workers was based solely on fulfillment and cverfuifilloent of the monthly output plan, contingent on meeting the cost plan. Hew bonus regulations were put into effect9 in Construction, transportation,and part of industry and0 in most branches Of heavy industry and in state Tse new regulations established quarterly bonuses based on the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the cost reduction plan, contingent on fulfillment cf the output plan, the assortment plan, the labor productivity plan, and the delivery plan.
" lor example, if the monthly rateathe operator is establishedubles per month and his output normpindles per month, his piece rate (compensation per unit of product) wouldopeks). Only if he producedpindles would hie actual pay equal his established monthly wage.
** Under straight piece rates, above-aorin output would be cenpensated according to the sane pay rate per unit of output as was established for the norined work. Under progressive piece rates the pay rate per unit of output would bc increased for the above-norm work by some multiple or multiples of the straight rate, suchimes up toimes thereafter.
In industries of exceptional importance to the growth of the national economy, however, bonuses for exceeding the output plan were continued. Additional bonuses are provided for success in the implementation of new technology according to regulations adopted*
C. Wage System6
During the early ands, Soviet leaders and economists noted that the wage system was in need of adjustment. Theirapparently waa not directed toward the formal structureage scales, grades, job claasification manuals, and the likebecause the formal structure subsequently was not altered. Rather, they were dissatisfied with the ways in which the formal structure had been adapted to departmental needs and to strong economic pressuree such as the wage inflation experienced during World War II, the postwar tightening of the labor market with concurrent pressures for still higher earnings, and the effects of rapid technological change.
ach ministry or department generally was responsible for setting its own wage scales and rates within the limits of the formal structure, eubject to the approval of the Council of Ministers, and for enforcing these rates in subordinate enterprises. The alteration of wage rates and scales as the need arose in each ministry or main administration created numerous, different wage rates for workers of equal skill and Eveningle ministry or department, workers withskills and Job responsibilities often were paid very different wage ratesepending on tho plant, the type of production, and otherconsidered important by the responsible ministry in theof wages.
Other differences between ministerial wage systems createdproblems. For example, plants of the ferrous metallurgical,machine building, paper,ew other industries had nofor regional wage differentials, although other industries had numerous zones and Therefore, even if the wage raterade TV machinistoscow machine tool plant wasercent above thatrade IV machinistoscow textile plant, the opposite might be true in the Far East or Horth. Thus transfers or migrations to distant machine tool plants were discouraged, and managers of these plants were forced to find other ways of attracting qualified workers.
Closely related to the problems created by multiple wago scales were the problems created by obsolete output dorms. During World War II and the postwar period, output norms had not been revised often enough to
* iscussion of the salary and bonus system for managers, engineering-technical workers, and clerical workers may be found in.
reflect the increasing production potential of the various workers. , output norms often were being exceeded byercent, although production plans of the enterprises were barely fulfilled or even Rapid changes in technology made existing experience-statistical norms and job classification manuals obsolete, and there was no coordinated system for standardizing norming methods, job descriptions, or grades for new jobs.
Confronted by strong pressures of the labor market, managers took advantage of the lack of coordination in the system and established low output norms in order to obtain higher earnings levele to attract or hold workers, lhj Slight modifications often were made in job content to provide an opportunity for raising the grade and wage rate of the esult of both actual and fictitiousin skills and Job content,*ercent of the wage-workers in major chemical enterprises, for example, were paidtond II, which were designed generally for unskilled or low-skilledimilar absence of workers in lower wage grades existed in other industrial branches us diverse as the machine building and the fish/ Special supplements such as longevity pay and the use of fictional piece rates had to be created for time workers whose earnings otherwise would have remainedfixed compared with earnings of The wage system was being widely manipulated to raise earnings in specific Jobs closer to competitive levels, despite the formal Safeguard ofreview of proposed changes.
lhe following data show the growth of earnings of industrial wageworkers04 by various types of pay lg/:
Increase
Weaker
Percent)
earnings
pay
pay via progressive
rates
p
pay tc pieeevprBcre In
with changes in wort
b
3-5
line pay
ia accordance with daaic piecr
in accordance aith basic tiire
See also Tableelow. ** Data refer only to wageworkers under the jurisdiction of the various ministries, excluding those subordinate to local industry.
II. Rationale of the Wage Reform
A rationale for the vago reform night easily be found in the wage and norm aberrations and the managerial manipulations of tbe prerefortn period. It might be claimed, and with considerable support, that the wage reform was intended to reduce labor turnover, reduce labor costs per unit of product, raise labor productivity, or establish moreincentives. lnese considerations, however, do not explain why the adjustment was begun6 orhorough overhaul of the wagewas attempted rather than piecemeal alterations. Although the wage system needed repairsb* and some vere made, no over-all reform was hinted. The former wage and allocation system was performing some tasks reasonably well. Large numbers of workers were being supplied to key industrial and construction organizations (except perhaps to those In the aore remotend apparently the system more thanmet the needs of enterprise managers in priority areaseserve of labor to meet production goals.-*
The nature and timing of the wage reform might be traced to adisturbing situation growing outradual deemphasis of the physical allocation of laborimultaneous tightening of the labor market. After the douth of Stalinhe physical allocation of labor was deemphaoizedesult of changes that included the widespread dismantling of tho labor camps system of the Ministry of Internal Affairshe gradual reduction in the activities of tho central labor recruitment agencynd6 relaxation of legalto During this period the urban labor market wastighter under the impact of rising agricultural incomes and the trend toward more achooling for young persons. Moreover,he labor market was beginning to feel the effects of the reduction in the size of the age groups reaching labor forceesult of the low birth rates of the World War II period. Cnls tightening of the urban labor market gradually was drawing the determination of wage rates (and therefore the level of aggregate aoney earnings) outside the control of the Soviet leadership and the national planning agencies. Thein leadership must have felt growing uncertainty that the wage rates set in thia market would allocate labor to desired activities and would
Seend F,elow.
** For comments on the size of these reserves of labor, see The departure from physical allocation of labor, however, bus not been complete. Legal provisions still permit enterprise directors to transfer workers between enterprisesumber of cases, and higher and technical school students still receiveear Job assignments on graduation.
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remain within the bounds of established plans for consumption,and defense."
The Soviet leadership waa faced with two interrelated problems. The first was to set relative wages ao that earnings differentialsoccupations, types of work, and industrial and economic sectors would encourage an allocation of labor consistent with plans. The second problem was toystem of control that wouldecurrence of the situationhen average real earnings of industrial wageworkera rose faster than their averagef this latter condition were to become widespread throughout thethe leadership vould be faced either with inflationary pressures or alternatively, with the need to divert resources to consumption from other uses such as investment or military expenditures. Althoughincreases in real earnings had been planned for theprimarily througi price reductions on consumer productsthe actual rise in money earnings during this period represented in part anincrease.
The poorly conceived and sometimes inconsistent approach of the regimeo these wage problems suggests that the leaders may not have seen all of these problems. During the periodhe State Committee on Labor and Wages worked out aof specific measures for the adjustment of wage rutes and salaries, but it was nothat the leadership formulated its present position on aggregate wage levels and social consumption.
* The needhorough overhaul alsc may be ascribed to the need for more efficient use oforollaryightening labor market. The wage and salary system establishedas designed to previa, incentives for increased production with little specific regard to labor costs. The need for efficient use of labor became more pressing in the period of relatively "tight labor" beginning in the mid-lQjO'e andto the present.
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III. Course or the Wage Rcroro
A. Early Organizational Inertia
hortly after the formation ln Hay of the State Committee on Labor and. Bulganin emphasized at the Communist Party Plenum tbe need to eliminate obsolete work norms and to alter the wage system in order to provide better incentives and reduce laborf However, no activity by the State Committee was evident during the first year of Its existence- Two wage adjustments were announced during this periodone for constructionnd one for animal husbandry worKers on state farms but the State Committee was not mentioned in the original decrees or in the available information on their These two wage adjustments probabLy represent the last of the series of wage changes prepared and directed by the ministries.
The apparent inactivity of the State Committee during its first year might be accounted for by the normal tlm*-consualng initial tasks of organizing and staffing and the initial etudy of wage This explanation is partly supported by the fact that the Soviet leadership did not become firmly committed to the wage reform program until January and Februaryecond possiblefactor, however, might have been the resistance to the program by the first Chairman of tbe. Xaganovlch, as contended in the issue or Sotsialiatlcheskly trud for Although the replacement of Kaganovlch. Volkov In/ (notannounced until July) probably was connected primarily with the intra-Coomunist Party struggLe underway at that time, the charge by 5otslaUstlcheokiy trud may havealid one- hirdfactor might have been resistance to the State Committee by the ministries. An editorial in the6 issue of Sotsialiatlcheskly trud stated pointedly that the broad powers granted to the new State Committee did not usurp the traditional powera of the ministries but ratheromplement to thea- In addition, the editorial described the establishment of Inspectorates of the State Committee to work with the various ainlstrics in preparing for the adjustaant of wages in their respective
S- Period ofjj7
1. Provisions of the Sixth ?jve fear
Both the original draft of the Sixth Five Yearublished in6 and the final, draft approved by the Twentieth
-
Party Congress la6 called for the following changoa In the wage and calory
Introduction of technicallynorms,
in the proportion of base payearnings and the establishment ofrelationship among branches of theand different occupations, consideringskills and working conditions,
of the pay ofclerical workers and an elimination ofof existing systems of pay forand
in the role of bonuses intechnical Innovations, higher laborand lower production costs.
In addition, the final draft Included an amendment that provided for the traaafer of all workers and employeashour workweekhour workweek by Uie end The workweek wao to bo ahortenedours6 and then was to be reduced further on un induatry-by-industry baols. Both tlie wage program and the hours program were under the guidance of the State Committee on Labor and Wagee but wereseparately. Each program remainedreliminary stage6 and most
2. Early
Several experimental tests of tbe new wage schedules were began innd later in the year. Experiments took place during August and September atelected machine buildinguring September and Octoberonferrous metallurgical plants, )if and throughout the latter half6 in the coal mines of tho Donets and L'vov-Volynsk Basins. 3s/ Inpproval was granted by tbe State Committee for experimental triala of three new wage scales for the ferrous metallurgical Industry. 3Jj/ Inow wage schedule for medical and pharmaceutical enterprises was approved for tasting at two plants in
Tlie stream of decrees and approvals for experimental testing of new wage schedules, which began inontinued throughout the first half In January the State Committee directed those machine building cntorprisea that were not subordinate to the machine bulldine
-
ministries to bring their norms and wages into line with the Jobmanuals of the machine building ministries." niform eight-grade scaleatio between the lowest and highest basic wage rateas approved together with three separate wage rates for grade In7 the State Committee approved the testing of new wage scales for the Ministry of the River Fleet,/ as wellew eight-grade scaleatioor electric power Similar test acalea were approved, and teats were begun, among the workers of the Ministry of Motor Transport and Highways, RSFSRhe printing houses of the Ministry of Culture, USSRhe fish; and the Omsk oil refinery. 4j/ In addition, 5Te State Committee approved proposals for testing three wage scales for various parts of light industrytwo eight-grade scales with ratiosnd one seven-grade scaleatio. hk/
The Ministry of light Industry alao was instructed in March toew job classification manual by the second quarter7 and to make proposals for further experimental wage rates with thethat the resulting aggregate wage expenditures must not exceedplanned wage funds. Similarly, approval was given to the relevant ministries and inspectorates for te&te of wage scales of seven grades and eight grades, respectively, in the woodworking industry and in the salt and tobacco industries. 4jj/ The new scales representedinimum an attempt to substitute oneew wage scales for the multitude of scales used within each ministry or industry.
Soviet reporting on these early experiments ic incomplete, but several general characteristica can be seen. First, all of the major experimental wage changes except those in the coal mines of the Donets and L'vov-Volynsk Basins were undertakenimultaneous reduction in hours of work.*" Second, in contrast to the six-grade scales with ratios ranginghat finally were adopted by the endost of the experimental wage scales were comprised of seven or eight grades with ratios ranging. In addition, the experiments did not significantly alter the payment of large and growing longevity supplements, the widespread use of "fictional" and progressive piece rate systems, and the overrating of job categories.
* The existence of machine building enterprises subordinate toother than machine building wac one aspect of the trend toward ministerial autarky that waB widely criticized before the ministerial reorganization
Separate experimental changes ln hours of work, however, werein selected automobile, machine tool, ferrous metallurgy, and non-ferrous metallurgy plants.
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These early experiments were resisted widely by both workers and enterprise managers. Worker resistance to higher work norms led to protests and even to Enterprise managers were reluctant to alter work norms because of the possibility of adverse reactions on the part of workers and because of their desire to maintain flexibility in matters of wages and norms. In addition, managers vere reluctant to change norms because they were unable to predict accurately the extent to vhlch the new norms vould be met and therefore the amount ofpiecework pay.
At the experimental plants it proved to be very difficult to predict closely the share of basic wages in total earnings and tbe final level of average earnings. In some plants, large increases ln average earnings wore experienced. Particular note was taken by Sovietof those Instances in which average earnings rose faster than labor productivity. In other plants, where an attempt waa made to avoid additional wage expenditures by ahlfting workersigid aet ofbased norms, average earnings were reduced. The latter instances probably were responsible for tho considerable labor unrestprotesta and strikes observed during
In7 the State Committee on labor and Wages Instructed Its Dlvialon of Labor and Working Conditions toew Jobmanual covering oil Jobs common throughout the economy7 and Instructed "leading" ministries to do likewise. The ministerial manualsintended to provide uniform guidance for theministries, departments, and plants ln grading and paying workers vcro to bo drawn up on the basis of Job lists previously prepared by the State Committee, klj The progreaoivo abolition of the economicbeginning in7 WJ/ disrupted these and other activities connected with the wage reform. The personnel of the labor, wage, and norm departments of the economic ministries were reassigned toof labor and wages atewly established councils ofeconomyo various planning agencies, andeven to the State Committee Itself. Kost wage experimentation stopped during the second halfith the exception of that for tho river fleet of the RSFSR Ua/ and highway transportho were unaffected by the
* The adjustment of wage rates in the state trade netwurk7 represents an interesting anomaly. Although it waa undertaken moreear after Volkov's appointment as Chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages and although it appears to follow the general linesby tbe State Committee, information on thie change contains no reference to on active role by the In addition, wage rates ln state trade were later scheduled for readjustment2 under tho guidance of the State Committee,
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In7 and8 the State Committee again began to implement tha vage reform in industry, working through the new labor and wage departments of tbe
C. Acceleration of the8
During the last quarter7 and inimultaneous transfer to shorter hours and new wage schedules was begun at selected ninlng (other thanetallurgical, and chemical enterprises. This action apparently was based on previous experimentation withtransfers in coal mining. In8 the government decreed that both the wage reform and tbe reduction in hours be introducedand completed by the end& in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and lu the coal, chemical, and cement industries. gk/
The linking of the wage and hours programs had several important effects, lhe reduction of the workweek apparently quieted the resistance formerly experienced to upward adjustments in output norms and changes in methods of compensation. It also put pressure on Soviet managers to cake better use of labor and to introduce technical and organisationalin order to transfer to shorter hours and new wage rates without incurring shortfalls in the output plan or overspending tbe wage fundwhere specifically authorized.
Tne program, however, continued to lag behind Bchodule8 and much Much of the lag apparently was due to theof Bomo managers to formulate satisfactory plana to accomplish the transfer to new wages and hours without shortfalls In productivity and production or without unwarranted increase? tn the wage bill.
A new feature of the program was introduced in the Seven Year, published inhich called for minimum wages to bc raisedubles per month*ubles per monthndubles per month6 for rural and urban workers and employees, Theage rates on all wage scales established after9 accordingly were setubles or more per month. Those established before9 presumably were at least equal to the new minimum because they all Involved Industries "of national econoaic importance" in whichates were established well above the former alnlmuas. The Seven Year Plan reaffirmed the goalbour workweek by the end0
" For workers In Industrial, construction, transportation, andenterprises, the minimum wages established7ubles per month in rural and urban areas, respectively. These rates did not apply to Junior service personnel.
and further specified that an additional hour was to be cut* The plan also announcedransferhour workweek would begin4 and would be completed
D. Drive for Completion of the Wage and Hours
Administrative Procedures
Bytandard administrative procedures had been developed so that changes in houro and wages could be made with aof adverse effects on output, productivity, and wagenterprise managers, foremen, and local trade union committeemen proposed new work schedules, wage rates, and work norms consistent with guidelines provided by the State Committee and with preliminary technical plans of the enterprise for the organisation of "internal reserves" and for capital and noncapital using innovations. The expected earnings of each worker under the new conditions then were computed and aggregated to determine whether the enterprise wage fund vould be overexpended, and earningswere examined for conformity vith the over-all earningsstipulated by the planners.
*
Readiness for conversion was then reviewed by the appropriate higher organsthe sovnarkhoz, mini0try, or local executive committee, depending on the administrative subordination of the enterprise, and tbe appropriate city, oblact, kray, republic, or central trade union committee. In those cases where the transfer wmt to be madeay weekourn dolly instead of theuy weekours on weekdaysours on Saturdays, additional review and approval were needed by thedepartments of the union republic Councils of Ministers or theUSSR ministries and departments, in agreement with the Stateon Labor and Wages and the All-Unlon Central Council of Trade Unions.
of Transfers to the Kew Wage and Hours System
Onew schedule for completing the vage reform and the transfer to the shorter vorkweek vas announced (see Transfera were to be madeerritorial basis rather thanronch-of-industry basis, presumably to facilitate supervision by the sovnarkhozes and to reduce the movem'Tit of workers from plants ln which the wage and hours adjustments had not yet been made to neighboring plants already operating under the new conditions.
* To date, there has been no announcement thatour reduction planned2 was granted.
For undergrounday workweek vas to be
ollovs on
-
1
USSR: Plannedchedule for Adjustments in the Workweek and in Wages
of tbe Shorter Workveek
Introduction of Hew Wage Scales nnd Work Norma
In the Worth, the Far Bast, Siberia, the Urale, Kazakhstan, Moscov and Moscow Province, Leningrad and Leningrad Province, and Ivanovo Province In all other
fcth9 -kth0nd Uth0
6th,h0nd 4th0
and geological survey work
In the Worth, the far East, the Urals, and Kazakhstan In all other areas
Lr.C
State agriculture
Scientific research and design organizations
Trade, public catering) procurement, naterial and technical supply, educational, public health, cultural, art, and other establishment? as veil as governmental and other "nonproductive" breaches
0 tth0
i-tli9 -Utb0nd 4th0
nd 4th0
0 -thc
/
/
In those cases vhere changes ind vork norms vere not mode concurrently vith the reduction in hours, vage schedules vere adjusted arithmetically at the tine of the changeover to shorter hours in order to maintain earnings until the detailed vage changes COJld be conpleted.
-
Under "the new schedule the rate of Implementation of the program increased. By the endnlyillion workers and employees, outotal of aboutillion toad been transferred to the now wage and hours By0 million were on the shorter workweek and byeptember, Uoy0 tho transfer of all workers and employees to the shorter workweek was completed. 6l/ The completion of the wage reform was scheduled to proceed more slowly. The number of workers andoa the new wage schedules by0 probablythe planned number ofncluding almost all workers and employees in industry, most of those in construction, ond acme workers in other economic branches. By the end ofko million persons bad been transferred to the new wage Workere and employees whose wages had not been adjusted by the endrimarily those in trade and public dining and in health, government, andere scheduled to have their wages changed The few observed references to wage changes in these areas2 suggest that the planned schedule was being followed, but there haa been nothat the wage reform has been completed.
* The average number of workers and employees5 millionO0 million
-
TV. Evaluation of the Wage Reform
A. Introduction
Tho wage reform le evaluated in this section In term* of what the Soviet leadership expected the wage reform to accomplish and what itdid accomplish. The wage reform, in most general terms, wasto insure that each industrial enterprise was furnished the proper number and assortment of workers, given the productive assignment of tbe enterprise and Its priority in the Soviet scheme of things. The demand for labor froa this point of viewgiven"that Is, the level of industrial output and construction has been set Independent of wage Issues, and the task of the wage system (and other controls) is to see that the supply of labor Is distributed aaoag the productive enterprises according to this, demand. Thus the optimum distribution of labor refers to the appropriate distribution of labor among geographical areas, among industries, and among enterprises, given national economic priorities as embodied ln the national economic plan.
A second task that the wage reform was addressed to was the elimination or at least the reduction of "bad practices" within industry, especially cases of excess paytandard amount of work or atandard payeeble work effort (featherbedding). In many cases, such in-equitieo had arisen from the inability of management at all ranks to keep work norms In harmony with the rapidly changing technologicalof work. The wage structure did not respond properly when new methods of production were introduced or when new machines replaced old. In addition, it wao the hope of the Soviet ieadcrship that tbe complete overhaul of the pay structure and work norms, together with thoof aore systematic and up-to-date incentive provisions, would induce workers to increase output; improve job skills; and, ia some cases, move to Siberia.
A third task that the vage reform was expected to accomplish was to bold tbe line on over-all wage expenditures, lo avoid general rises in price, wage rates could advance onlylowaceslower than gains in productivity. Tbe Soviet leadership presumably thought that central administration of wages must replace the varyingof autonomy enjoyed by ministries, sovnorkhoses, and enterprises in the administration of wages. Despite instances ln which enterprises seemed to be inflating wage payments under various guises, it should be noted that the "wage push" was really not of alarming proportions at the time of the wage reform.
A detailed assessment of the success achieved ln meeting these objectives is given in the sections that follow.
-
B. Simplification of the Wage System
1. Consolidation of Wage Rates and Scales
A major factor contributing to tbe chaotic wage system before the wage reform was the lack of uniform job classification in the various ministries and departments. This lock was removedith the Introductionniform Job classification manualprepared by the Scientific Research Institute of Labor.* The manual covered aboutercent of all Jobs in Induatry together with equivalent positions in other economic Similar manuals wore prepared for Jobs specific to particular industries and brenchco of the economy and were coordinated with the basic manual. Thus enterprise managers werewith uniform guidance ln classifying and rating of jobs, andand planning agencies wereixed standard against which to judge managerial actions.
tep toward manageability of the wage system, theof major wage scales (in tbe form of grade coefficienta) for workers in industry and construction was reduced fromhereby uharply reducing the poesibilltiea for manipulation of wage ratea by managers. umber of tho newly established wage scales are presented inew branches of industry (such as coal and metallurgy) have unique scales, but moat of the branches use six-grade scales similar to those of the machine building industry or the consumer goods Industries (wage scale key numbers.
The wage reform also reduced the number of different wage rates for the firfit grade froa several thousand to VO. An example of thla simplification may bo found in the Soviet machine building andindustry, where more than r> million wageworkers now are paidto one wage scale witheparate rutos for the first grade. Rates for the first grade (and therefore all subsequent grades) areaccording to conditions of work and type of production.1 Thla arrangement contrasts sharply with the old system or moreage Scaleseparate rates for the first grade in the machineand metalworking Induatry.
Nauehno-l'ssledovutel'akiy Institut Truda tfoaudarstvennogo Komlteta Sovota Kinietrov SSSR po Voproaancarabotnoy PlatyScientific Research Institute of Labor of the State Committee of the Council of Ministera, USSR, on Questions of Labor and wogos. ** In addition to the major wage scale in each branch of induatry, however, unique scales for special enterprises are usedumber of branches (seeollows on
* For the applicable rates for the firstgrade in each branch of Induatry, eee Appendix A.
-
USSR; Major Wage Scales la Construction and ln Selected IndustriesContinued)
la TifM of Smde Coefficient a
MM*upWr I
ln< 0/
km Ess.
Mnenlnand xtttaluorniDg,atrolnua nnd cmrilling, and axploratIon unita,co na true--lor. wuriili eiMr than cananl and concrete product!.Hanin* pj and tlaanr, callod papar and voodvorn-
avica- a" and baxary ti aod flour ana fend atUui %l
nre uned (neeA).
1X0
tbe Donbu aad the L'ror-Voljnak; ^fUBiayta aid Mnyer citerea* for encnenloretailed OUeunalan of new vnnn ncelne ln ferrouem coajnu-lnon WU) thoee la oUiar ontloiw, iee aourca JO/.
mil eorninier foodi indueirlea nra paid according loor Ihe aacfcite building
-
Wage rates for tlie first grade arc influenced by the legal minimum wage, conditions of work, and notional economic significance of the industry or branch of the economy. In general, tlie newates were establishedubles per ronth inubles in heavyubles in important light and food industries,ubleshe newly established minimum wagesin other consumer goods In addition, within each branch ofumber ofage rates werefor differing work conditions,ifferential for pieceworkers generallyoercent above the rate paid to time-workerset of differentials for work under "hot, heavy, and hazardous" conditions generally up toercent above the rates for work under normal conditions and for vc-rk under "extremely hot, heavy, or hazardous conditions" up to Kxamples of theseage rates, by industry and type of work, are presented in
2. Shift in Fbiphasis froci Progressive Piece Rates to Time Rates and Bonuses
Before the wage reform,oercent of all wageworkers in industry were compensated according to piece rates, withoercent of all wageworkers in industry paid on progressive piece rate After the wage reform on3 percent of the wageworkers in industry were paid according to piece rates, withercent of all wageworkers in industry paid or. progressive piece
the number of pieceme workers paid bonuses for the fulfillment of plant cr shop goals.
lhe decmphasis of piece rate pay in favor of more time rates, th* elimination of nearly all progressive piece rates, and the increased use of bonuses are shown by the data in* Although
probably are representative of tlie shift that took place throughoutand construction. Isolated references, such as the report that lhe share ge workers onates declined fromoercent of theupport this view.*
Many factors apparently notivy^ediet leaders to de-emphasize the piece rate system. Under conditions of rapidly rising**
ollows onee Appendix A. ollows on
* See also Appendix A, which shows the distribution of wageworkers by system of payment in construction and in the various branches of industry as ofr Text continued on
Table 3
USSH: Bane Wage Rates of wagevorkers In Selected Branches of Industry *J
I
ane ga**
orofAppronlmntlon
Oil Induatry b/
At raftand ayntbetle placi*
undar do rani cocdltlon*
day
underri =ar=fui
day
under eepaclally bnnry
oanurul ceaditiocn
day
aera under ncranl condition*
day
under henry nad LaraTul
day
under especially beany
harmful eondli'.ona
day
nlnen
operations
day
aurfMe of alnea
day
induatry c/
ClUtl nod workers* scttleoenta
nomal working condition*
hour
hot, heavy, nnd harmful condition*
la a
hour
rural nrana
John
hour
ore ecapietef baa* Man* rate* ln Sole', iciuery, see Apwrdii
I
-
i
j
Ill jjjiU!
output due to technological improvements, piece rates and obsolete work norms resulted in excessive levels of earnings for piece workers. The problem was particularly pressing in those instances where progressive piece rates were used. Moreover, piece rates were becoming an obsolete form of pay in those instances where automated processes effectively fixed the pace of Consistent with the latter factor, therereater shift to time rates during the wage reform ln industries characterized by flow productionomogeneous product, such as chemicals and electric power, than in those characterised by batch productioneterogeneous product, such as machine building and textiles.* Soviet labor specialists have indicated the hope that piecework in industry will be reduced even more by the scheduled changes in wage rates One source notes that piecework in the chemical Industry will bc limited tooercent of all wageworkers% ?V
3. Introduction of Collective Piece Rates
In addition to reducing the proportion of workers on piece rates, the wage reformew piece rate system that of collective piece rates. 'Ihis system, which ties individual earnings to the total output of the brigade, was instituted in activities requiring or conducive to teamwork, such as on the coal faces in mines, onsites, and on assembly line operations. The specialized brigade memberuch as the blasting specialistoal mining brigade who cannot work full-time at his assigned taskthus is encouraged towork in addition to his specialty, thereby increasing the total earnings available for division among the members of the brigade. Tne share of total brigade earnings paid to each worker is proportional to his skill level and/or to other measures of his relative contribution to the product, thus siaintal ning both the desired relative wageamong brigade members and the incentives for personal ici-provfiosnts in skill levels.
Although few figures are available on the current extent of collective piece rates, the Soviet press has announced that collective piece rates have become the basic form of wages in mining, lumbering, construction, and many assembly line and complex machine groupings at particular manufacturing Collective piece rates are reported to coverercent of all underground workers in the Donbas coal mines,ercent of all workers employed in timber cutting, and on "absolute majority" of the production workers in tbe ferrous metallurgical96/
To some extent the observed shift represents the elimination of the previous use of "fictional" or meaningless piece rates, uhich weresolely to makearticular level of earnings.
U. Elimination of Longevity Payments
The longevity pay systemintended initially for theof long service ln high-priority industriesapparently vas regarded as unsuccessful largely because it gradually had spread to Industries of low priority and to other sectors of the economy andlt did not motivate young workers to remain employed In theor enterprises that had provided them with on-the-job training.
The technique used by the State Committee for the gradual elimination of longevity benefits is indicative of the conservative approach that characterized the entire wage reform. ayment of longevity bonuses was abolished for workers In central and republican governmental organizations who were earning moreubles per month. In addition, the accumulation of new longevity bonuses was stopped for most other workers, although bonuses previously accumulated continued to be paid until the affected workers wereto the new wage system. Certain workers in crucial branches of Industry such as coal, metallurgy, chemicals, petroleum, and timber work In the Far North and East continued to accumulate new bonuses These favored workers still recoive bonus payments for longevity accumulated up to that time, and underground workers still are permitted to accumulate bonuses for longevity,aximum annual payment equal to two times the monthly wage rate forr more years of longevity supplements are scheduled for review and probable elimlnotion at the next regular review of the wageresumably.
5. Hew Bonuses for Wageworkers
The wage reform sharply increased the proportion of workers eligible for bonuses, as shown in This increased emphasis on bonusesuhich arc paid to each worker when group goals are met in contrast to supplementary piece rate pay that is based onent of individual output normsreflects dissatisfaction with earlier attempts to translate final output plans for on enterprise, shop, orinto equivalent individual output norms. Many articles cite instances ln which workers under progressive or straight piece ratessupplementary pay for overfulfillment of output norms even though the output plans for the plant, shop, or department were not met.
The new bonus system for wageworkers provides for theof bonuses for fulfillment and overfulfillment of the output plan of the enterprise, shop, or department as well as for improvements in quality and for savings of raw materials. Bonuses are established for
' bove.
-
fulfillment of the monthly output plan of the enterprise, shop, orand are paid to each worker in amounts equalrercent of the monthly wage rate depending on the branch ofand the type of production. In addition, bonuses for overfulfill-ment of output plans are fixed,ercent of monthly wage rates for each percent of overfulfillment. Bonuses for theof qualitywidely used for workers in auxiliary ahops not involved directly in the production processare established In amounts up toercent of the monthly wage. Bonuses also may be paid forof raw and semifinished materials by the enterprise, shop, orbut such bonuses may not exceed UO percent of the savings. Finally, and of crucial importance to the control of the aggregate wage level, the sum of all bonuses may not exceedr Uo percent of basic monthly wage ratesepending on branch of industry and type of99/ By limiting the sum of all bonusesixed percentage of established wage ratea, the State Committee reestablished the wage rate as the controlling factor in the level of total earninga.
6. Increased Use of Technically Based Output Norms
Many of the norms used in industry before the wage reform were experience-statistical norms, which were based both on previous work experience and on work standards established on an ad hoc baeis by foremen and norm setters. One of the objectives of the wage reform was to replace these experience-statistical norms with technically based norms, which are established on the basis of comprehensive examinations of machine speeds, productive reserves, advanced methods of production, and time and motion/
Experience-statistical norms never provided an accurate foundation on which toatisfactory piece rate system, despite continued attempts to reform them. Annual revisions of these norms in January or Februarylat percentage increase in most norms, with little or no study of the specific requirements of each job. This procedure seriously affected the morale of the work force and contributed to labor turnover because many pieceworkers suffered reductions in earn-inga during the first few months of the year, even though productivity rose. Managers attempted to compensate for the effects of the nnmmi norm revision on earnings by reserving organizational and technicalspecifically for this period and by introducing new "fictional" and progressive piece rates. These actions often provided opportunities for increases in earnings in tbe latter part of the year that were greater than increases in/
The "mass" annual changeover to new norms was discontinuednd enterprise managers were ordered to determine output norms, in agreement with the appropriate trade union committees,
as an Integral part of tho annual technical, industrial, and financial plan of the enterprise. Changes in norma had to be Justified by specific organizational and technical/
The introduction of these nev technically based norms,proceeded very slowly, as shown lnroper noraing vac hampered by the lacktandard system for calculating nev norma and by the related failure to review and "correct" newly ontabliahed norms. Hew norma, therefore, often were immediately overfulfilled vith theover-expenditures of the wage fund.
Despite tho difficulty experienced ln Introducingbased output norms, they continued to be pushed by Soviet In. Volkov, Chairman of the State Committee, strongly expressed diaaatisfaction with the norm system, which he claimed still leads to overfuifillmoat of output norma (byercent in none lnstanceB) and to labor
orkers transfer to thosewhore [output] norma are lower and where workers con provide themselves therefore with higher earnings. It la necessary tohese deficienciea. Improvement of thoand payment of laborecisivefor overcoming labor turnover.
V.V. Orlshin, Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, alao called for an increase in the number of technically baaed norms at the plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions on/
7. Changes In the Composition of Earninga
Before the wage reform, basic wage rates accounted for only about one-half of total earnings, ranging from kO toercent ln the various industries. The remainder comprised supplements for above norm work, bonuses, longevity pay, and various other items. One of theof the wage reform was to raise the relative nil are of basic wage payments in tho total earnings of pieceworkera tooercent and of timevorkers tooercent. Considerable progress toward thla objective by0 was suggested by data reported for oov-narkhoz industry, as shown in" although the source did not make clear whether the data referred to oil sovnarkhoz enterprises or merely to those that had shifted to the new wage system by that date.
*ollows on* ollows on
-
Table 5
USSR: Proportion ofn Selected Industries on Technically Based Output Norms During the Period of the Wage Reform a/
f Total
of Industry
Coal ainlng c/ TerrcuB metallurgy Itonfcrrmii metallurgy Cil refining Chen!cola
Electrical and tr.emai energy Nech:ne building and rtetslvorktiut
Heivy narnme Ikiia:ng
Xacnlne tool buildings
Transport nachiuery
Motor vehicles
Inttrunent building
Construction naterials
Paper
Textiles
Saving
leather, fur, and footvear
-airy products
Fieti
Bakeries
Desenbcr
im
0
6i. 69
0
xact coverage of each inlur.tr* is unspecified ir. t':i- original sourceo., tliererore, are representative only of general trends.
b. Exact date Of earliest recorded percentage unfcnovn reported only as "before" the vage refors. Tbene data probably cover enly enterprises ln theinistries.
c- Xajcrity of enterprises probably transferred to nev wage conditions before earliest recorded percentage above.
-
Table 6
USSR: Relative Share of Basic Wage Payments in the Total Earnings of Wageworkers in Sovnarkhoz Industry a/ as0
Basic Wage Payment
ercent
Branch ofTotal Rart^wgw
All sovnarkhoz
Ferrous
Nonferrous
Electrical and thermal
Machine building and
Timber, paper, and
Construction
Light
Food
ata refer to all workers whether timcworkers or piece-workers.
Tne transfer of the meat processing industry to the new wage system provides an example of the merging of all forms of pay into the new wage rates (see- The old rates and supplements for six jobs in this industry roughly add up to the new wage rates. The higher earnings possible under the new system depend largely on meeting and overfulfilling output plans so as to qualify for bonuses. On four of the six Jobs, earnings according to the now system would be equal to or less than previous earnings if bonuses were not earned.
The hypothesis suggested by these data that the new wage rates and bonus provisions represent largely an institutionalization of existing earnings levels among wageworkers is consistent with the Soviet objective of reestablishing workable and controlled incentives in the wage system. The institutionalization of the existing level of oamings made central administration of the wage system more feasible, and the rationalization of work norms (where carried out) made incentives for fulfilling output goals more uniform and effective. Work incentives
* ollows on
Table 7
USSR: Effect of Changes in Wage Bates and Output Boras on the Composition of Earnings for Selectedn the Meat Industry a/
rut lei
sf
Job Title
'1
rulfillmat
t1
Streisnt
Additional Pay 'Jnder Progresalve Place Batca
no
Konlhly
aw
(aanunnl)
AfT-oo
JJ..S5
ejs.io
in
fat* IV)
IB)
50
srt.w
perator in fau (grada v)
Saw
10)
(na tuned)
lav
10*
' .
Saw
ioi
tafanrani]
0
M.6c
ai.w
uornere for tna evarfuimiaent of plant or aboc output plana rather than for Individual output aom.
lov ovarfulflllnent cr output mraa aaimtad in theeurea refleete eitbetan'.lal lacreaaea la output noma.
reported in tbt aource the conponeata do not end to tbtahovn.
-
under the new wage system were simplified considerably in contrast to those of the old system that had become blurred through "unjustified" additions to basic wages; longevity bonuses; and manipulation of rates, job categories, and work norms. Although previous earnings levels for most jobs were institutionalized, the relative position of some jobs was raised or lowered, as seen in tho example above of the wage changes in the meat industry. Moreover, the standardization of wage rates over broad industrial categories probably led to reductions in earnings for some workers and Increases for others. Over.the period of thehole, increases in absolute earnings considerably outnumbered decreases because average earnings were steadily increasing. Further evidence on the degree of institutionalization of the old level of wages is present below in the sections on minimum wages and skill differentials.
C. Minimum Wsces
Minimum wage levels were raised twice during the period of the wage reform. The first increase to new levelsubles per month took place at all enterprisesnd the second increase to kOOubles per month became effective ae each enterpriseto the new wage scales.
Ininimum wages were establishedubles per month, respectively, in rural areas and in cities and workers* settlements andubles per month in industry, construction, transportation, and communications (exclusive of Junior Wherever the established wage rate was below the newlyminimum wage for the relevantupplement was paid to the affected worker to raise his basic wage rate to the new level of minimum wages. In granting these supplements, no attention was given to actual levels of earnings even though most wageworkers were receiving other supplementary wages ranging fromercent of their basic monthly wage/ Thus, after7 change in minimumrade III wageworkeronthly wage rate of 2C0 rubles perepresentative rate for unskilled workers in low-paying industrialeasily couldo $kO rubles per month, inclusiveupplement ofubles to raise basic wages to the establishedwage levels.
* See Kapustin's comment on this aspect of7 increase/
** As shown in Tableelow, tbe actual and thereforegrade occupied by most unskilled workers before the wagewas grade III. After the reform,as reestablished in most branches of industry and of the economy as the appropriate grade for this category of workers.
-
When the higher minimum wagoo of hOOO rublea wore put into effect9o supplements were paid. Instead, the new "'nimmi wages become the newage rates at lov-priority enterprisea in rural and urban areas, respectively. Because mostwageworkers in the "productive" branches of the economy already hadf earnings equal to or larger than the new minimum wages, tho now mlnimums represented forhange in the form of wagebut not an increase in earninga. Tho higher minimum wages probably raised earnings for those persons employed as Junior service personnel, apprentices, and clerical workers who vere receiving only smallto their basic wages. The total number of workers who realized substantial increases ln earnings from the increase ln minimum wages, however,mall part of the total work force. In industry, for example, the total number of junior service porsonnel, apprentices, and clerical workers repreaentedercent of all industrial production personnel/ and some persons In these categories had wage rates that vere higher than the ncv mlnimums or were receiving bonuses and other wage supplements.
D. Skill Differentials
Skill differontlala as repreaented by the differences between the grades in Tableere standardizedonsiderable extent sizply by the reduction ln the number of wage scalea mentioned above. Soviet economists claim further, however, that skill differentials were sharply reducedone of the goals of the wage reform. They point out that tbe extreme ratios now arcn contrast to the previous ratios of, as ahown in' They argue that the reduction in these ratios was made possible by the growing average skill level of the work force and of the relativeln the number of Soviet skilled workers.
An American economist, Walter Galenson, has demonstrated that these Soviet comparisona axe/ No sharp reduction inactually took place, because there were almost no wageworkers in the first two grades of the earlier wage scales.
Examination of the available old and new wage scalesthe new extreme ratios in the various industries roughlytho "effective" extreme ratios of the old system. Not only"effective" extreme ratios relatively unchanged by the wagethe distribution of workers by "effective" wage grades alsoaltered significantly, as shown ioproportion of+
bove.
8 follows on
9 follows on
continued on
-
Mill
1 !?
Ill li| #
p n
!lli!
wageworkers now assigned to the first two gradefl of the new scales in each branch of induatry ie similar to the proportion of workersassigned to the third and fourth grades of the old scales. inilar relationship is evident in the higher grades. Moreover, the nujfeer of grades generally has been reduced froa eight to six.
The Soviet claim appearB valid only when viewedo the present. In examining the period between major wage"oviet economist, M. Mash inn, found that earningsamong wsgeworkera by skills had widened, although thenumber of skilled workers had increased/ Mozliina notes, however,hange to narrower differentials began duringeriod, when the growth of earnings among low-paid wage-workers exceeded that of the higher paid workers. Mozhlna'a data also show that during theears of the wagedifferentials among industrial wageworkers were reduced slightly (quartile coefficients declined8. These data suggest lhat Soviet economists oreradual reduction inn action that would reflect the Improved relativeof skilled workers in contrast to thes.
E. Industry Differentials
The newage rates vary according to the "national econoaic significance* of each economic sector or branch of industry. As noted above,age rates were set by the wage reformubles per month Inubles in heavy(exclusive of mining0 to 5U0 rubles in important light and food industries, andorubles in other consumer goods/ However, actual pay differentials by branch of Industry or by branch of tbe economyeasured in Soviet publications as the difference in average money earnings ir. the various branchesreflect other factors as well as "national economic signifi-. They include urban-rural differentials* and differences in working conditions, in tbe nix of workers' skills, in the regional distribution ofand ln the size of bonuses and other pay supplements.
Basic industrial differentials are Justified in Soviet economic Publications in terms of the ideologi-jul doctrine of the "primacy of heavy Industry." ihese wage differences are considered necessary to assure high-priority economic sectors and high-priority branches of
* ense the urban-rural differential alsoifferential which reflects "national economic significance" in that lt reflects anof the relative value to the state of work ln tie urban and rural areas and Is related to the historical treatment of the peasants or collective farcers and the rural areas generally as residual claimantse national income.
- -
industry with adequate supplies of/ Presumably thealso enable high-priority branches to recruit the best qualified and most energetic workers from each skill category. Because of the poor control of expenditures for labor, however, the special advantage in the purchase of labor cervices has contributed in the past as muchuildup of redundant labor at the various priority enterprises as to the recruitment of the best workers, as seen during the changeover to the shorter workweek9*
Some prominent Soviet economists have suggested that the basic industrial differentials should be eliminated andingle unified wage system should be established. These economists argue that all branches of industry and the economy would be supplied with adequate labor in the abseace of special industrial differentials if the various skill, regional, and other differentials are correctly set. Theseassert that movement ln this directionwithout reducing wages in the high-priority Industrieshould be madehen wages are scheduled for further/
Average pay differentials by branch of industry89 ox>ved toward relatively higher pay for heavy industry (see. These data, however, do noteasure of the effect of the wage adjustment, because only part of industry had been transferred to the new wage schedules by the end The available information on the increase ln average earnings by branch of industryj6 does notonsistent pattern of increasing ordifferentials among Industrial branches. Soviet sources state that average earnings of wageworkers increased69 hyercent in the coal industry, lh percent ln ferrous metallurgy,ercent in nonferrous metallurgy, andercent in/ and that earnings were scheduled to increase5 percent ln light industry,ercent in food,3 percent in construction0 (presumably also in comparison/ One source noted, however, that the wage adjustment increased earnings of all workers and employees in industry and construction byercent (base year unspecified) but that thefor food and light industries was relativelyercent for wagifworkers in the foodhus implying some narrowing of the gap between earnings in these industries and average
F. Regional Differentials
Tne replacement of the many und varied ministerial wage systemsingle system of regional wage differentials is one of the most
* Seeelow. ** Tableollows on-
- Kh -
Tabic lu
USSR: Earnings Differencials or Wagevorkcrs, by Branch or Indus-ry a, Selected
AllCC
Eccuit pNI f
Coal
all'trcr (Including
racfcuo b'jlldlni ud icttti tart lag rxtractliaMtal.lcrh'T.
'j and
Kudvortlot
T-itllei
Uast lnduilry
and foolvaar
BawliU
food
V
x.:
|/
J.
v
. |
1.
. A.
>..
a.; and3d fur
cO aad
(Wjarge-seal?
ol/ placta ofr, ".
-Olj.
only.
impressive accomplishments of the reform. The nev differentials are fixed in part to compensate all workersardship region uniformly for differences in the cost of consumer goods among regions; forin the clothing, heating, and food requirements of the various climatic zones; and for the relative scarcity of free or partly free housing and social services in the remote regions. The size of the adjustment in money wages for each of these factors was determined by detailed studies of price levels and of the economic and physiological needs of persons in the various/ The resulting regional differentials are expressed in the following coefficients:
Coefficient
Central, southern, and western rayons of
the Europoan
II Specific rayons of the Urals, Southwest
Siberia, Kazakhstan, and0
III Remote rayons of European Far North,
Southeast Siberia, and the0
IV Northern and remote rayons (including Murmanskaya Oblast) and the central
rayons of Siberia and the0
V Far North (excluding0
The new system of regional coefficients Is supplementedecond set of coefficients based on altitude and hardship. Regional coefficients cay be increased by up toercent at enterpriseseters above sea level, up toercent for thoseeters, and up to Uo percent for those0 feet). Regional coefficients also may be increased fromercent for enterprises located in desert or arid regions. Theincrease ln each case, however, is aez by the appropriateministry, department, or Council of Ministers of the union republic with the agreement of the State Committee on Labor and Wages.
The regional differentials are intended also to provide anfor migration ae well ae to compensate for economic and physical differences In the more remote areas.* The size of the "migrationalone cannot be determined from existing Information. Therecognition of the need for an additional inducement to migration is an Implicit recognition of the need to compensate migrants for losses
* The new regional wage differentials do not affect the system of travel grants and longevity pay for persons working in the Far North andregions, which also are intended to encourage permanent residence in these regions.
- U6 -
in the area of subjective values, including family ties, familiarand the more "Western" social atmosphere of the European
The new system of regional differentials appears to be well structured, but it is becoming increasingly apparent to Sovietthat regional differentials alone probably will not produce tho desired level of permanent settlement in remote areas. Many recent articles stress that regional labor turnover remains high. At least two Soviet economists* trace this high turnover primarily to lack of adequate housing and social/ Extra income may serve to compensate for deficiencies in housing and social services in theof short-term contract workers who are willing to undergo hardships temporarily for the sake oftake, but the same compensation is lesB meaningful for permanent workers who face the prospect of long-term deprivation of housing and social services. In addition, high incomes coupled with inadequate housing and social services may induce some persons who initially Intended to settlein the remote regions to give up their plans and return, with their money hoards, to the more "civilized" regions.
Inadequate housing and social services alsoole even in those instances where graduates of higher and secondary educational establishments and vocational-technical schools are assigned to work in remote regions. Ihe student trainee, who often leaves his initial job assignment at the end of his compulsory tour of,/ has contributed to the problem of high labor turnover.
Although the new system of regional differentials appears to consider most of the relevant factors, it is not likely to induce the desired level of permanent settlement as long us housing and social services in the reax>te regions are inadequate.
G- Differentials for "Hot. Heavy, and Hazardous" Work
Soviet economists generally note that the pay rates for "hot, heavy, and hazardous" work are fixed atercent above the pay rates for work under normal conditions and for "extremely hot, heavy, and hazardous" work at/ Actual differentials often arc less. Wage rates for pieceworkers in "hot, heavy, and hazardous" work in the machine building and metalworking industry are approximatelyercent above the rates for pieceworkers under normal work conditions,
* One of these. Perevedentsev, observes that the total outflow of persons from Siberiaxceeded the number of new arrivals in that region, including moreersons formally recruited for work in Siberia through the organized, recruitment system.
- h7 -
but the Bane comparison in the paper industryifferential ofercent; in the textile industry (Groupercent; and the sewin* industry (Groupercont. imilar difference in the size ofamong industries exists in the differentials for "extremely hot, heavy, and hazardous" work." These differences among industries may represent an attempt to reflect differences in conditions of work, un institutionalization of existing earnings differentials,attern of industrial priorities similar to the basic industrial differentials mentioned above.
Differentials for "hot, heavy, and hazardous" work,are baaed on differences in "physiological needs"requirements of persons engaged in different types These needs have been measured recently by the Instituteof the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences as part of ato establish "scientific consumption/ Theneeds have been established as
persons not employed in physical
labor, for persons not working, and for pensioners
persons employed in mechanized labor
or light physical labor (such as lathe operators, fitters, electricians, drivers, tractor operators, and
persons employed in nonmechanized
labor (such as carpenters, joiners, stokers, blacksmiths, and painters)
engaged in heavy physicalas stevedores and
If the differentials established for each branch of industry actually represent only these differences in physiological requirements, they may be too small to attract sufficient numbers of workers into such labor relative to alternative work. Little attention has been given to tne psychological as against the physiological needs of the human organism, and no obvious effort has been made to compensate for the usual distaste for "hot, heavy, and hazardous" labor.
Sec Appendix A.
- US -
One Soviet economist. Ye. Kapustin, has indicated an awareness of Uie importance of psychological factors. His remarks, however, did not refer to the present system of differentials for "hot and heavy" work but were addressed instead to the possibility that the future growth of opportunities for comparatively pleasant work on automated lines and in automated shops will require the establishment oflarger differentials for work ln casting, forging, and "hot and heavy" shops. ITO/ Althougheputy director of the Scientific Research Institute cf labor of the State Committee on labor and *agcs. Is an influential economist, his views on psychological factors are not reflected ln the current wage reform. Because the Ideology of Soviet economics rejects "subjective value"oncept ofKapustin's ideas may not be accepted for future application unless he clothes them in orthodox Marxist
H. Control of Wage Fund Expendituree
Beginning lnk and continuing through the wageeries of changes was made In the procedures for direct control of wage expenditures with tbe intent of strengthening the power of financial authorities over enterprise managers, of Increasing the costof maiiag'-'ro, and of eliminating nvcrexper.diture of tho wageecree ofugustrequired that enterprises henceforth repay wage fund averexpcnditiircseriod/ On ')nterprise managers were granted the right to draw on wage savings made In preceding quarters for the payment of wages in subsequent quarters of the same/ Thus managers were permitted to cover extraordlnaiy wage expenses in the latter part of tht* year with wage savings made during the earlier quarters. Although these twoIncreased supervision over wage funds, permitted managers to adjust to varying wage needs during the year, and presumably Improved wagecoctplalnts of overexpenditurc of wage funds persisted throughout0/
Two additional controls were introduced In9 the State Committee on labor and Wagesist of high-level people In Induatry who could not be paid bonuses for plan fulfillment if the wage fund was overexpended for tluit period. In latawar. further tightened by the decree on new bonuses for Sovietengineering-technical workers, and clerical workers in industry,
- Theof tho wage fund refers to on lncreasa in the proportion of lubor costs in the total costa of production above the plnnnod proportion. Therefore, overexpenditurcelative rather than an absolute measure. It does not refer to the overoxpendJtureixed ruble ocount.
construction, transportation, communications, and statehis decree, which made cost reduction the major criterion for theof bonusesproviding that output plans were metpecifiedthat bonuses would not be paid to managers,rwMrhrHworkers, or clerical workers for the designated time period if the wage fund during that period was overexpended at the shop or enterprise level. The regulation further stipulated that bonuses would not be paid inperiods to those managers and engineering-technical workersby the State Committee as responsible for the wage fund until the overexpenditurea of the preceding periods were/ These two additional controls seem to have taken hold onlyery small degree, for few managers have been able to qualify for bonuses under these provisions.
Thus the wage reform attempted to strengthen control of the wage fund and the aggregate wage level. Thie objective frequently is discussed by Soviet writers in terms of tho need to equalizo the wage fund and the consumption fund, the desirability of holding the growth of money wages to some specified fraction of the increase in productivity, and the need for money wages per worker to grow secularlylower rate than the growth of "free" social services per worker in order to effect the gradual shift from the socialist form of distribution"to each according to hisore Communist form ofto each according to his needs."
The object of this increased control over wage expenditures ia clear. If the growth of money earnings can be held to some fraction of the growth in productivity, the shore of the total output available for government distribution will increase, and these resources nay be used for priority national objectives Increased investment, spacemilitary expenditures, and "free" social serviceswithoutto rationing, freezing of savings, and other direct controls. Although controlling the growth of money earnings is only one of the possible ways of financing increases in the relative level of stateit currently is preferred to other procedures, such asincome taxes or sales taxes or prices of consumer goods.
Although it probably is too soon after the introduction of the new finaacial controls toull evaluation of theirSoviet publications give some preliminary evidence ofperformance. An editorial in the2 issue of Finansy SSSRumber of sovnarkhozesKcmcrovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Perm', and Karagandain which profit plans in industry had not been met for several years because of deficiencies in labor and wage planning tbat permitted average earnings to increase faster than productivity. Tne editorial called for tighter supervision over wage and productivity planning.
-
In addition, two Soviet. Orlovskiy and CP. Scrgcycva, have suggested that the planning system as presentlyworks against the long-run effectiveness of the financial controls because the wage levels actually achieved in any onehether or not consistent with wage plansbe cone the basis of tbe wage plans for the following/ Furthermore, wage and other plans can be end have been revised in the past during theplan period vhen managers can show that changes are required to fulfill production goals.*
I. Cost of the Wage Reform
The benefits received from the wage reforma more manageable wage system, more effective lneentivcG, ond the likepresumably were not without cost. Average annual money earnings of workers62 (shown below) increased slightly more than the rateercent that had prevailed
Approximate PercentageAverage Honeytlie Previous Year
3
3
2
2
3**
*
3-5
ore significant cost might be found in the foregone output implicit in the shorter workweek, if lt con be assumed that the dealred
* Bee David Granick'B diecuaaion of the relative influence ofoutput goals as against the influence of financial and coston Soviet planning and managerial/
Estimated on the basiseported increaseercent in realeported increaseercent ineighting of money earnings and social consumption In the average Income of workers and employees, and an assumed decline in tho price levelercent
changes in the wage system could not have been made without the grant or more leisure.*
Annual data on productivity, as shown in" provide some indication of the costs implicit in the wage and hours program. Planned output goals in industry were exceeded each year9ut this achievement0I was made possible only by an unusually large increase In employment, which compensated for an ucderfulflllment of productivity goals in those years. imilar underfulfillment of productivity goals occurred12 as follow*:
Productivity in Construction (Output per Personercentage Increase Above the Previous
'o
W
j
IhO/
W
3.5
Plan fulfillment reports, therefore, suggest that productivity Plans in industry and construction generally were met during the period or transfer but fell far short immediately thereafter.T An explanation in industry may be found in the timing of the reduction in hours aad ln the distribution of internal reserves.
* If it is assumed that the shorter workweek was introduced for other reasons, such as ideological, then the foregone output could be regarded onlyost of the hours reduction or, after linking of the hours and wage programs,oint cost of both programs. of ideological and other motivations for the shorter workweek are discussed in CIA/RR ERn Kvuluutinn of the Program for Re-
ducing the Workweek in the USSR.
Tableollows on Based on "construction and installation workers."
esult of the shorter workweek, output per man-hour rosefasterI than output per person. It was reported to have increased ln Induatry5 percent0 percentndercent1 and in construction0 percent0 andercent
-
Because many of the transfers to the shorter hoursthe problem plantswere not made untilhe major impact of the shorter hours on production and productivity0 would not be seen in the annual output and productivity figuresvhich are annual
Table 11
USSR: Planned and Actual Increases in Output and Productivity
in
Percentage Increase Above the Previous Year
y
per
b/
Series)
c/
d/
sJ
d/
c/
f/
e/
tl b/
h/
i/
h/
tl
J/
w
J/
k/
y
U
onpersonnel."
Rmploymcnt and wage policy before the wage reform apparently permitted the accumulation of relatively larger reserves of labor in heavy industrial plants than in the lower paying and less favored light industrial plants. hen many plants in heavy industry were being transferred to nev wages and hours, these reserves could be "mobilized" to meet or exceed output and productivity plans, whereashen light industry and problem areas of heavy industry were transferred, the relative absence of such internal reserves showed up in the failure to meet established productivity goals in0*
* Statistical evidence of low productivity growth in light Industries during the changeover period is presented in source ljjg/.
-
Tho poor productivity performance of the construction industry1 similarly reflects the practice of transferring beat enterprises first and the timing of the hours reduction. The shortfall Inin construction in12 may have been relatedailure to make full use of the available reserves in the rush tothe transfer to shorter hours before the endo theof unfinished construction vork criticised by Khrushchev, and to some intensification of the chronic supply difficulties of this sector.
The transfer to nev hours and wage rates, therefore, probably was not bo costless oa it appeared earlier,umber of optimistic Soviet ortlcloe were published9 end0 on the use of internal reserves.
The prospects for success of tbe -Soviet wage refom over the next few years may bc considered under two headings, "administrative aspects" and "aiiocative aspects."
A. Administrative Aspects
The establishment of rational and internally consistent pay schedules, the revision of vork norms to make them more consistent with present technological realities, and the reduction of the autonomy of local economic units to set wages ought to put the Soviet leadership in an even better position to control the "wage creep" and to weedertain percentage of "bad practices" in industrial enterprises. Two general considerations, however, suggest that the administration of tlie new system will present continuing problems over the next few years.
Tbe first difficulty is that the rapid pace at which newand new machinery are being introduced into Soviet industryin considerable changes in the content of individual jobsinstability in whatair output norm. of rapid change is tbe need lor uuKir.istrutive :iuh.l i" si-'parl
from the rules, 'ihe new wage reformentralcontrol and by eliminating inequities and inconsistencies in the system nay give riseituation in which managers arc hindered by red tape froa adjusting to small problems that are properly within their own (local) sphere of authority. In this connection it isthat the entire wage Structure will .iradually become untidy once more and an entirely new schedule of rates, differentials, and norms will have to be issued again eventually. The Soviet leadership iseing able to makeevision without greatlythe money earnings of manyecause the continued annuel gainercent in 'aggregate real wage expendituresthe means for changing relative wages without hurting any group
A second important difficulty Is that (sany other important changes in Soviet economicave been taking placefor instance, the bifurcation of the Party economic administrative apparatus into agricultural and ocnagricultural branches, theof the sovnarkhozesdd to kO units, and the appointmentew Supreme Council of the National Economy. The structure for administering wages and the content of tbat administration are bound to
-
be affected by these other sdminl strati ve shakeupa. In particular, the question should be asked as to whether these other administrative cbanget will increooe or decrease the administrative flexibility of the new wage system. It is not tho purpose of this report, however, to speculate on the possible effects of these developments on the wage reform.
B. Allocatlve Aspects
The wage reform, by itself, would not seem to promise important changes in the manner and efficiency with which economic resources will be allocated within the Soviet economy over the next few years. As was shown in IV, above, the schedule of differentials among industries and among grades of labor remains substantially unchanged. On the positive side, there ought to be the elimination of some (we know not how many) "bad practices" through the reduction of excess individual pay and the renovation of work norms. There shouldeduction in featherbeddlng and an increase in the rationality and effectiveness of incentive schemes Yet one may doubt that the Soviet worker is going ta bestir himself en masse much more than he has before the vage reform. And, as described in the preceding section of the report, the leadership ought not to count on the immediate elimination of redundant laborsquirreled away in priority industriesor on an immediate queuing up to fill vacancies in remote areas, or on an immediate rush to "hot, heavy, and hazardous" Jobs.
It is hard to see how the wage reform is going to reduce labor turnover over tbe next few years." More important to the problem of labor turnover are the post-Stalin reduction in government restrictions on changing Jobs and the small size of the new age classes entering the labor market.
ovict press innd3 have been devoted to the problem of high turnover ax plants in widelyparts of the/ pecial study of labo? SLCMd^ by ^Kcsaarch Institute of Labor was
-
APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLHiS
Tablesndresent Informal ion onistribution of wage-workers in industry and construction by wage grade and systems of payment. These data were taken from Vestnik statistiki, no S,/ The most recent data on these topics, which do not alter the conclusions of this report, nay be found in Vestnikno Tablewas compiledarge number Of Soviet sources, as noted ln the source references to the table.
Table 12
USSR; Distribution of Wageworkera In Industry and Construction, by Wage Grade a/
as of1
rade. {finest)
bcldiary production.
of Grade a
- of Icdtitrv or CoRatr-etlea
UM Scad*
lad^try
Metallurgy
0
extnc-lon
J
of plf Iron, itMl, relied
alloyi. aad byproducts
setaiiurgy
extraction
U
D
U
In conatruetloo tha data Includerk
-
nna tas :
| 5
33
. B|Jj
l
ia
4 Ti '43 P
^ IS JSSJ Jj53
|l|3
3
3 3 3
5
3
s
j
i
i
I
3
i
! 1
ssssisi
nl
I
5
j 3
n a
ii a
s
JSS5 JJ SS5
Its siasssst
If 33 35 SS""
3 15 p'4
lj|
1
'3
i >
3 ; 3 3
Iit S
jjl 3 1 5
BBS ii
I! Si!S5 l 1
i
Iia
i3
335
33
Table 1'.
USSR: Selected1age Bates of Wageworkers ln Industry and Conotruction
Continued)
Type of Work
building and metal-worklog (Continued)
2
local industry)
Oil industry
At refineries and synthetic plants cl
under normal conditions
Pieceworkers under normal conditions and time-workers cu hot, heavy, aad harmful jobo
Timeworkers on especially heavy and harmful Jobs and pieceworkers on hot, heavy, and bnraful jobs
Pieceworkers on especially heavy and harmful Jobs
Timevorkers under normal conditions
Pieceworkers under ooraal conditlone and tine-workers on bot, heavy, and barnful Jobs
Tlaevorkers on especially heavy and harmful Jobs aad pieceworkers on hot, heavy, and harmful Jobs
Pieceworkers cn especially heavy and harmful jobs
Pieceworkers under normal conditions
Ruble 0
hour
hour
ti
hour
hour
1
hour
hour
hour
hour
day
-
Table 1^
USSR: Selectedage Rates of Wagevorkers in Industry and Construct lor.
Continued)
age Hate
Eranch of Industry
of Work
Reported
Approximation
industry (Continued)
wider heavy and harmful conditions
under especially heavy and harmful
under nor=al conditions
under heavy and harmful conditions
ri-
under especially heavy'.rul
i
mines
operations
surface of mines
:z
glass, soft
under normal conditions
and construction
under hot, heavy, and harmful con-
Sj
and piecevorkera under normal conditions
under hot, heavy, and harmful eon-
it
cale) g/
'aider normal condition**
S
C
under hot, heavy, and harmful con-
Selectedage Rates of Wagevorfcers in Industry endContinued)
age Hata
of IndustryS6 acale)
[0
Synthetic leather h/
Timber cutting and float-la. 1/
of Work
Tioevorkar* under especially fact, heavy, and
haraful coodllions Pieceworkers under normal conaltioc* Plaeewertare under hot, heavy, and haraful eoa-
ditleaa
Pieceworker* under tapeclally hot, heavy, aad
haraful conditions Uederground worker* alclng most enesdeal* Dndarsroucd workers alnlag arsenic, apatite, and
sulfur
Tlaavorkera under normal conditions Timevorkara under haraful conditions Piaoevorkora under normal conditions Pieceworkers under harmful conditions
1 perer day
per day per day per day per day
1 par day
Rublea Ruble
Ruble
Monthly
(03
Me
aettlesantB and eeaps
mm
per hour Ruble* per hoar
Ruble* per hour
-
Table. Ik
USSR: Selectedage Rates of Wageworkers la Industry and Construction
Continued)
'ace Rate
Monthly
Branch of Industry
of Work
Reported
industry 1/
n
under normal conditions Tloeworkors under heavy and harmful conditions and pieceworkers under normal cocdltloaa Pieceworkers under heavy and harmful condition*
per hour
RuMe* per hour Ruble* per boor
5
993
I
under norral conditions
Timeworker0 under heavy and harmful conditions and
pieoaworkors under normal conditions Pieceworkers under heavy and harmful conditions
per hour
Ruble* per hour Rubloo por hour
8
#>
Induitry m/
cities and workers' eettleocnts
normal working conditions
Under hot, heavy, snd harmful condition*
par hour RUblea per tour
WO
rural areas
Job*
per hour
ml
d.overs workers ln aviation, autccotive, tool,oaringa, radio-teohnioal, machine tool, shipyard, tractor, electroaechonlcal, transport, energy, agricultural machinery, and instrument enterprises, and persons raking metallurgical,
-
Table 1*
USSR: age Rates of Wageworkers in Industry and Construction
Continued)
-.cat treating, oil drilling, illrlcalr^-ccapresfdne.clrl.jera-.Ine equipment. Sroup II coversrefining. . building and setalvorklns enterprises subordinate to aovnarafcoaes,nd departaeatB. Workers ln machine building enterprises subordinate to local Soviets are paid according to group IUercent below those of group II. Lot*/
c. Wages at refineries end synthstic plants are the saoe as those at chc-lcal plant*. At refineries under local jurisdiction (localages areercent lower.
i:
It.ates apply to oost plants; grcu? II cay beby regional councils of national ecowsry inUi-individual enterprise* ia Jtoseov and Leningrad and in Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian cities
"la consideration for vage levels alreadynd, riaaUy, special rates (other) are established Tor plants engaged In the prizaxy processing of cotton, flax, and slallar crops.
Li ates apply toplants; group IZ nay be established by regional councils of national economy In agreeaent vltri tao state coiwittoo for Individual enterprises ln Moscow aod Leningrad and in Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian cities "ir. consideration for wage levelB already achieved1'; and, finally, special rates (other) are established Tor plants engaged in tbe primary processing of cotton, flax, and similar/
Hi/
APPENDIX 3
BIBLICCRAPIir
The following bibliography represents the eajor recent Sovietconcerning the Soviet wage system:
nd. ZarabotnayoSSR {Wages in theoscow,
Kostin, Leonid. Watrca In the USSR, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing
. Rcnl'niLya aarabotaayaod"yoa materlal'nogQ blaposostoyanlyaSSH (Heal Wages and the In-crease in the Material Wellbcing of the Workers of theoscow, Publishing House of Social-Economic
Scientific-Research Institute of labor. Zarabotnayaroatysalcnaostieye sovershenstvovanlyc (Wages ln Soviet Industry and Tbeiroscow, rtbI lining House of Social-Econoaic
. Zarabotnaya Plata pri sotslaliiae (Wages Underoscow, State Publishing House of the Higher
Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Sovorshenatvovaniyc organizatsii zarabotnoy pluty (Improvement in the Organization ofblishiag House of Social-Economic Literature,
nd. Sootnoshenlye rosta proievod-itel'nostircanrafalennosti SSSRionship of tho Growth of Labor Productivity ond Wages in Sovietoscow, Publlab ing House of Social-Ecoooeic Literature,
All but one of the books listed here are available only in the Russian language. There are available in English translations that provide reasonably complete coverage of the Important Soviet newspape-and Journal articles on the subjects of wages, hours of work, output norms, methods of pay, uses of labor, migration, labor turnover,levels, and related subjects. Many of the Russian-language sources cited inay be found Ir. English translations.
-
APPENDIX C
SOURCE REFERENCE.-
Ye. "Sovcrshenstvovaniye organizatsii zarabotnoy
SSR" (laproving the Organization of Wages in theotstallaticfceskly trud..
Pravda.. 2.
So'braniyoaaporyazheniy raboche-krest'yanskogo
SR (Collected Lawa and Decrees of the Workers' and Peasants' Govemaent of thet I,ec. (For an English-language extract, see Abram JJergson. 'lhe Structure of Soviet Wages,f,U0X
Sobranlyeaspsryottheniy pravitel'stva SSSR (Collected Resolutions and Decrees of the Government of the
N.G. rude (labor Legislation),
7 (Also in Pravda,.
Raymond. The Dynamics of Industrial Management, New
fc.
nd. ZarabottiayaSR (Wages
in the.
- ulujzynyetvo, no k,U6.
Petrochonko, P. Putl uluchsheniya normirovaniya truda na prcdprlyutiyakh" (Ways of Improving Uie Norolng of Work atianovoye khszyaystvo. no. 3-
1C
remirovanii rukr-vedyashchikh, inzhenerno-tekluiicheskikr.lushashchikh" (New Bonuses fcr Managers, Engineering-Technical Workers, and Clorleulkttsiaiiutlcheskly trud,.
I/.vrstiya,ul SO, p. J.
Markov, V. rganizatsii material*nogo stlmulirovantya tekhnicheskogo progressa" (New Organization for the Material Stimulation of Technicalianovoye khozyaystvo, no.
Kapustin,. U'>-'itj. Agiuibogyaii and..
. Tarlfnaya slstcaa zarabctnoy platy rabochikh
(Tariff System of Wages forJ..
Ye. "Raapredclenlye poekotoriye voprosy uporyadoehoniyu tnrifnoy oietemy zarabotnoy platy rabochikh proer/shlennosti" (Distribution According to Work and Some Questions of the Adjustswnt of the Tariff Systea of Wages for Workers inianovoye khozyaystvo, no.
-
Mayor, V, o vervo van lye* zarabotnoyeriod razvernutogo Btroitel'atva konnnuniGBa" (Increasing and Improving Wages In the Period of the Comprehensive Development oflanovoye khozyaystvo,. kl.
Prarda.
. Real'nayo zarabotnayaod"ycc aaterial'noso blagosoetovaalya"Real Wages and the La-crease in the Material Well-Bcing of the Workers in the. Ik2.
R. "Izacneniye tarifnoyover ah-
enstvovanlyea tekhnikl" (Changes in the Tariff Syaten inwith Technicalotslallatlcheakly trud, noan 6l,-
Institute of Labor. Soverahenatvovanlye
rabot.uoy platy (lEprov^iMit.rganisation of Wagedited. Shkurko,- Rybnoyo khozyaystvo. noul 6l,.
nd Shop, M. hodc perevoda na semlchaoovoy rabochiyporyadochenll zarabotnoyashinostr-oenii" (Concerning Experience in the Transfer to the Seven-Hour Work Day and the Adjustment of Wages In Machineotslallstlcheakly trud. no
nd Zlokazov, Yu. "Strothayshye coblyudat'
gofiudaratvennuyu dlstslpllnu" (Observe State Disciplineotslallstlcheakly trud. no.nd. ZarabotnayaR (Wages In the,
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
proarynhleanor.tloye soyershenstvovanlye (Wages in Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapustin, Shkurko, and Orlovukiy,
CIA/RR, An Evaluation of tlie Program for Reducing
the Workweek in the USSR,
roan, Harold J. "Soviet Law ReformDateline"
Yolo Law Journal..
Ya. M. Voaproizvodstvq rabocheyalacs
truda (Reproduction of the Labor Force in the USSR and the Balance of.
A. ootnoshenii tcapov rosta proisvodltel'nosti
arabotnoy platy" (Concerning the Relationship in the Rates of Growth of Labor Productivity andotslallstich-esfciy trud. no. MetGdoloBicbeukly voproBy izuchenlye urovnya zhlznl trudyasheb-ikhsya (Methodological Questions in tbe Study of the Living Levels ofditedu. Pisarev,.
-
nd. Sootnuahenlyo roatit pruizvoditel'noatiarabotnoyromyshlennosti bSo'Il (Relationships of the Growth, of labor Productivity nnd Wage* in SovietV7. . adacbakh po dal'neysneau pod"yccutckhnlcheakoauluchenlyu organizatsii prolz'Ajdstva (Concerning Tasko for the Further Development of Industry, Technical Progress, and Better Organizationhap IV,.
Stroltel'naya gazeta,- 3-
Sel'skoye
nd Kontrat'ev, K. "Novyye noplatahivotnovodstvye sovkhozov" (Nev Nones and Pay of Labor on Anioal Husbandryc he skly trud, no.
"Uluchoheniye organizatsii zarabotnoy platy rabochikh sovkhozov" (Improving the Organization of the Wages of State Farmotsiaiistichcakiy trud. no Pravda.
2d. Sptelalisticheskly trud. no.
29- Vedumusti verk-iovnoeo soveta SSSR. no, {Ukazo2,
"Uluchshat*euklonno podnimat' proizvoditel'oost' truda" (To Improve the Organization and Steadily Increase Laborotslalistichaaaly trud, no Pravda,an6 SotstalletichOBkly trud, no Ob uporyadochonli zarabotnoyevetnoy metallurgii"
(Concerning the Adjustment ln Wages in NonferrouaotsiollBticheakly trud,.edcos^vakh" (Io the Ministries andSotslolistieheskiy trud.Novyy taxifno-kvaliflkataionnyy spravochnik tsvetnoy metallurgii'* (New Job Claselfication Manual in Nonferrousotsial-ictlcheskly trud.U. "Uporyadochenlye zarabotnoy platl vedeniye nokraohchennogo rah-ochegogol'noy profByshlennosti'1 (Adjustment of Wages and Introduction of the Working Day In the Coalotsialiatlcheskly trud, no "Osnovnyye napravleniya po uporyadocheniyu nonnirovoniyaurabotnayahemoy metallurgii" (Basic Trends In the Adjustment of Work Norms and Wages in FerrousotBlolistichoskiy trud,-
Med'.tsinskaya promyshlennost' SGSH, no.
Sof lallstljheakly trud. no Ibid, no
39. Jbid.
- 79
do.
avtoraobil' nogohosBeyaykh dorog" (Adjustment of the Work Norms and Wages for Motor Transport and Highway Workers) Sotstallsticheskiy trud, no.. PollRraflcheskoye prolzvodstvo. no Rybnoyc iLhozyaystvo, no U,- ks-hG,
kh. Sotslalistichcskiy trud no-. oo. lk$-lk6.
DerevcobrubatyvqyuBhchaya promyshlennost', no. Pravda,
0
Trud,
0
Nev York.. Sotslalisticheskiy trud, no.. CIA, CIA/RR, Developments in the Organization and
Planning of Soviet Industry, Aug
U9. Rechnoy transport, no- fc-5.
nd Ulitakiy, P. "Uporyadochenlye zarabotnoy platy
rabotnikov avtotransporta za shchet ispol'zovanlya vnutrennikh rezervov" (Adjustment of Wages of Workers in Motor Transport on the Basle of the Utilization of Internalotsial-iBticheBkly trud. no.
Sovetskaya torgovlya, no.
"Nad chee rabotayut otdelyarabotnoy platy sovnorkhozov"
(What do the Sovnarkhoz Departments of Labor and Wagesotslalisticheskiy trud, noOtvetstvenoyye zadaohi otdelov truda sovnarkhozov" (Responsible Tasks of the Sovnarkhoz Departments ofotslalisticheskiy trud,
D. "Sootnosheniye rosta proizvoditel'nosti truda 1
zarabotnoyeniletkc" (Relationship Between the Growth
in Labor Productivity and Wages in the Seven Year Plan Period),
Pianovoye khozyaystvo, nond Ul'yanova, A. "Velikoye soteial'noye zavoyev-
oniye" reat Socialestaiko 5,
.. Pravda,
Sovetsklye profsoyuzy,-
Sbornik zakonodate!'nykhrude (Handbook of Legislative
Acts Concerning.
Statistical Administration, USSR. Narodnoye khozyaystvo
0 godu (The National Economy of the USSR,I,.
-
Central Statistical Administration, UUG::. rmrodi;uye khozyaystvo9 RQdu (The National Economy of the USSR,.
Central Statistical Administration. USSR. 1 godu (The USSR in Figures,.
Pravda,
'lzvestiya,
Pravda,an 6l.
8
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,
Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Yedinyy tarifno-
kvallflkatslonnyy spravochnik rabochikh, skvoznyye professii (Unified Job Classification Manual for Wageworkers, Common
Institute of Labor. Spravochnyye aaterlaly
poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor and
Mayer,it. (iii,
nd. Novyye uSloviya oplaty truda v
stroltel'stve (New Conditions of Pay ia.
65. . Tarifnaya sistema zarabotnoy platy rabochikh (Tariff System of Wages for
nd. Orgar.izatstya zarabotnoy
heraoy tnetallurgii, spravoctinik (Organization of Wages in Ferrous Metallurgy,-
M. Gardner. Comparative Wage Structures ln the Steely In-
dustry of the Soviet Union and Western Countries, Reprint, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Sotsialisticheskiy trud, no.
Scientific-Research Institute cf Labor. Sovershenstvovanlye
organizatsii_ zarabotnoy platy (laprcvement in the Organization ofdited.I,.
p.
Sotsialisticheskiy trud, no.
Mcftyanoye khozyaystvo, no.otsialisticheskiy trud, no 7 .
Petukhov, op. pit..
Henizov, K. Qrganizatsiya oplaty trudaSSR (Organization of Pay for Workers in ihe-
aaterlaly, norud. no-
-
ernnlka, no BotBiallatichcskiy trud,-
c" Lonnuya
5
SotslallBtlcheskiy trud,.
Bhveynaya pronyshlennost', no.
SotBlalletlcheskly trud.U. o.
Pravda.
Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Spravochnyyc materialy
poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor and
no
. SoverahcnBtvovaalye slstem prenlrovanlyav prooiyshlennostl" (Improving the System of Bonuoee for Wageworkers inotclaJlstlchcskiy trud,. UU.
Kazanakiy and ul'yanova,,
Ncftyanoye khozyaystvo. no-otslalisticheskiy trud. no.
SotaialiBtlcheskly trud,.
Meyerzon, D. plata trudasloviyokh
sovreeeanoy tekhnikl" (Horns and Payment of Labor underof Modern.
Kazanskiy and Ul'yanova,it.,
Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Soversnenstvovanlyc organizatsii zarabotnoy platy (Improvement in the Organization ofdited. Shkurko,, and
Ye.I. "Proizvodltel'noet'arabotnaya plata"
(Labor Productivity andotsialisticheskly trud, no.
Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Spravochnyye materialy poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor andI,
Rudnltakly, M. "Tsvetnaya metallurgiya posle perekhoda na sokraahchennly rabochlyovyye ualoviya oplaty truda" (Nonferrous Metallurgy After the Transfer to the Shorterand the New PayotalallBtlcheakly tmd,-
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
proipyehiennoBticycaniyc (Wages ln Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapustin, Shkurko, and Orlovskiy,.
-
95- Volkov, A. "PoBledovatcl'no osushchcstvlyaL' prlntsip roatorial'noy zaintereeovonnosti" (To Apply ConBiotently the Principle. 2.
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
propyshlennostieye sovershenatvovaniyc (Wages tn Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapuatin, Shkurko, und Orlovokiy,
M.A. Oplata truda na predprlyatiyakhazovoy
promyshlennosti (Payment cf Labor at Enterprices of theI96I,.
Levin and Timoshpol'akiy,,.
F. yplate voznagrazhdeniya za vyslugu let" (Concern-
ing Payment of Length of Serviceotalallsticheakly
trud, no-
Institute of labor. ye naterlaly
poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor andI, p..
ekoiKtmlcheskly slovar' (Short Economic Dictionary),
edited. Kozlov. Pervushin,.
nd Mayer,. IO5-UA.
Sotsialisticbeakly trud. no.
Volkov. og., Trud. 28
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
promyshlennqstieye soverEhcnbtvovanlyc (Wages in Soviet
Industry and Theirdited by Kapuatin, Shkurko, and
Orlovskly,nd Ul'yanova,,.rLentlflc-Rcaearch Institute of Labor. Spravocnnyye materlaly
poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor and
lanovcye khozyaystvo, no. KnmauniBt, fin p. .
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
prouryBhlennostieye sovernlieiiBtvovanlyii (Wages in Soviet industry and Theirdited by Kapuatin, Shkurko, and Orlovskly,
A. erekhodennsovoy rabochiya novyys
ualoviya oplaty truda" (Concerning the Transfer to the Seven-Hour Workday and to New Conditions of laboryur.naya industriya SSSR. no
Sclentif Ic-Ri'bcarcb Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata y
proaysblenaestleye severcin-nstvovariiy* (Wages in Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapuatin, Shkurko, and Orlovakiy,
- fi3 -
cit. (l,I16.
Statistical Administration, USSR. Narodnoye khozyaystvo
0 godu (The National Economy of the USSR-
son, Walter. The Soviet Wane0 (Reprinted from
the Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting ofarca Association, Saint Louis,)
and Mayer, op. cit..
Ilk. Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
promyshlennofltleye sovershenstvovanlyc (Wages in Soriet Induatry ana Theirdited by Kapustin, Shkurko, and Orlovakly,hk. Scientific-Research Institute of Labor. Soverahenctvovaniye oraanlzatcil zarabotnoy platy [Improvement in the Organization ofdited. Shkurko,.
M. aspredelenii promyshlennykh rab-
ochikh SSSR po razmeram zarabotnoy platy" (Changes in the Wage Distribution of Industrial Wageworkero in theyulleton' nauchnoy inforoateil: arabotnaya plata,.
Pravda,
Aganbogyan and Mayer,it.-
. overshenstvovanlye zarabotnoy
eriod raxvemutogo stroitel' otva koamunlzca" and Improving the Wage System in the Period of the Comprehensive Construction ofianovoye khoa-yarstTo..
N.A. Zarabotnaya plata prl sutslollzmc (Wages-under
. kl.
V.V. cropriyatiyakh po zavert>hcaiyu perevoda T
rvi,lj^iaLihchlkh na ackrafilichenly rabocMy dnn' (Concerning Measures for the CoBpletion of Transfer0 of All Workers and Employees to the Shorter Workday)peech to the0 session of the Supreme.
and Sergeyeva,it.,bove")-
USSR. GOnudarstyennyy plan po raavitiyu narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR1 god (State Plan for Development of the National Ecccozy of tbo USSR^ k, Moscow,
Agaabcgyan and Mayer,it..
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
promychlcnnpntleye soyerahenstvovanlye (Wages in Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapustin, Shkurko, and Orlovskiy,I, p. kO.
and Mayor,cit.. Sotsialictichcukiy trud, no. J'l7.
EkonomicbeBkaya gazeta,oprosy ekonomiki, no
-
nd Orlovskly, Yu.I. Pravovoye polozhenlye llta
sovpeshchayuahchlkhroiEvoditei 'ays trudoa {Legal Position of Persons Who Are Combining Study with ProductiveeWitt, Nicholas. Education and Prof&BElonal Employment in the USSR..
Institute of Labor. Spravochnyye materlaly
59,
poarabotnoy plate (Handbook of Materials on Labor and SovetBkaya toreovlya. no
Current Digest of the Soviet Proos. vol XI,6 Sep
P. 5.
N. etodologii raschetov potreblenlya produktov
pitaniya"ethod of Calculating the Consumption of Foodyulleten' nauchncy infomatsii: arabotnaya plata, no.
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
proaynhlenaostleye soverahenBtvovanlye (Wages in Soviet Industry and Theirdited by Kapustin, Shkurko, and Orlovskly,l,.
redit. no
Partiynaya zhizn',-
Sotsialiaticheakly trud, no.
Byulleten' nauchnoy lnfornatsii: arabotnaya plata,inanay SSSR,redit, no. Sotsiallsticheekly trud,.
V.I. Planovcye regulirovanlye zarabotnoy
inzhenorno-te^rjchesklkhlu/.hashchikh (Planned Regulation of Wugos of Engineering-recbnicol WorkersI,.
Orlovskly and Sorgeyeva, op., above).
Cranick, David. "An Organizational Model of Soviet Industrial
he Journal of Political Economy,.
etodologii lnchlsleniya real'nykh
eol'noy zarabotnoy platy trudyuahchikhaya SSSR" (Concerning the Question of Methodology In the Measurement of Real Income and Real Wages of Workers ln theaucihnoy lnformatall: arabotnaya plata,
Figumov, og. cit.,.1ec 6l.
Ekonooicheskaya gazeta.ec 6l, p.estnik statistiki, no. xiii.
-
Finansy SSSR, no. 9-
Pravda,an 6l, p.O. Pravda,
6
6 Izvestlya.M- *
Pravda, ec 6l.
Veatnik atatlBtlki, no. xii.
Pravda.
326 Jan 6l.
SVocomichcakaya gazeta,ar 6l, p.J+9. Izvestlya,
Pravda.
8
6 Jan 6l.
Ekonocichcahaya gazeta,ex 6l, p.. Izvestlya,
4ravda,
ec 6l.
VestnSh. ill and vll.
Institute of Labor. Zarabotnaya plata v
l'jnnoutieye soycrahenctvovaniye (Wages in Soviet
nr. t. ry i i'.'i-'l ! . , Sld-iurko, <uid Orlovakiy,
7. 2.
Sovetsklye profsoyuzy.et 6g, p.konoqichcnkayu.. 1.
I. "Anketaoye obsledovanlye prlchin tekuchesti kadrov v
arabotnaya plata, no 4,
. Kaplan and
proayshlennostiA Questionnaire Study of the Rea-sone for the Turnover of Cadres In Sovnarkhozyull-
eten' nauchnoyp. s.
.
Kahan, Arcadiuc. "Labor Tu Labor Review,Labor Turnover In the Sovl<
rejoinder by A. Kahan, Mod
Ecofioaicheskaya gazeta,. Veatnik ntatistikl,. Pctukhov,, above).
Sotsiaiioticheskiy trud, no-
-
Katakin and Drcmin,ell., above).
SptBlallatlcncakly trud. no
Petukhov,"op. cit.T.emlEov,cit., above).
Heftyanoye khotyayatvo..
Sc^eialiaticii.-Bkiy trUd, no. lbo. Slroltej'nyye materlaly. no.
Botaialisticheakly trud. no.eramika..
QotalallBUcheakiy trud. noo.
.
LeanayaS
Ibid.
J73- SbtBiallatlcheakiy trud. Shveycsva prcgyahlennost'. no gptaiallBticheskiy trud.9 .
- -
Original document.
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