SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK (NIE 11-8-63)

Created: 10/18/1963

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CIA HISTORICALELEASE AS SANITIZED

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

(Supercede! NIEnd the Men.oror.den. lo Holden rheroof)

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack

c

b, Ihe DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred hi by Ih* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Aj indicated overleaf3

SCCRCT

menu olefense, theho Navy, lhe *Foice. AEC. ond NSA. Concurring:

DirectorIbrseaifi. Deoorii-enr of Stole

Director. DelenieAgency

Altitlanl Chlel o' SWF for Intelligence. Deportment of tho Army

Aiiislant Chief ol Novo! Operatiomepoltnent ol lha Navy

Aisblanl Chid o* Staf.g once, USAF

Tho Atomic Energy Commissiona USlft

Diracor ot tha NoSoooJ Security Ao*oc>

Abstaining!

Ihe Aiikloni Direclor, Fede*ol Bureoo of, iKe MibjeO being outside

THE DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTEIUGENCE Washington is, o. c.

R RELEASE CIAPROGfWM

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of

Extreme Sensitivity of,

"Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Aiiack'

In accordance with thc wishes of the President, dissemination ofas been rarefully limited because of the extreme sensitivity of the information therein.

In thisish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Estimate, and that noof its existence be made to unauthorized persons.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . .

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC ATTACK

II. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

A Deployed ICBM Complexes. Sites, and Launchers . 11

SystemsII

Force Levels Through 12

Characteristics ofI9C5 Force 14

IU MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTICFORCES.15

and Deployment 15

Characteristics of 16

17

IS 20

IV. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE

in Ballistic Missile Forces

in Cruise Missile Forces

Force Levels Through

Capabilities

V LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCES.

Levels and

Capabilities 22

VI. SPACE WEAPONS

VII. MAJOR SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

and 24

Range 25

Warfare and Countcrnivasures

VIII. TRENDS IN STRATEGIC ATTACK6

Ballistic Missile

and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Forces

Missile Forces

Range Bomber

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ANNEX B: MAPS OP DEPLOYMENT AND RANGE CAPABILITIES

Weapons

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

THElaiaSffl PRO

To estimate probable trends in thef Soviet weapon systems .uilato toearsTbl'itleS iUChoS

SUAAMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

m Strategic Attack Forces to

he Soviet leaders look upon long range strike forcesajor clement of theirposition, intended to support theirobjectives, lo deter the West from resortilitary action, and toar should one occur. The available evidence supports the view that they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives rather than forces with which ihey couldeliberate attack on the West and count on reducing retaliation to levels lhat would be In any sense tolerable

urrent Soviet military doctrine holdseneral war could begin with little or no warning, stresses the critical importance of thc initial period in determining itsand asserts that enormous advantages accrue to the side striking the first blow. However, the official doctrine also holds thai Che initial nuclear exchange might not deter-

The weapon systems ronsidered arc Ground-launched missiles with rangesautical miles or more, submarine-launched missiles, heavy and medium bombers, air-to-surfacc missiles, anddelivery and supporting systems such as orbital and suborbital vehicles.

mine the outcome, and that in any event large dealer forces are necessary toeneral war successfully. These views, when related to the strategic capabilities nowand programmed by thc West,gti and complex requirements upon themilitary establishment. Among the chief constraints in meeting these requirements art-cost and skilled manpower. The Sovietposture has also been heavily influenced *Va concentration on the Eurasian theater and by an apparent lag in miliLary thinking on the implications of advanced weapons Soviet military policy and doctrine have been considerably modified in recent years, and the process of change is continuing. However, for the immediate future, Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized byagainst Eurasia far exceeding those against North America. )

CBM Forces. Evidence acquired during the past year has led us to modify our esti-

Tr^Jf SlM andof the Soviet ICBM force in the near term. The most important single development was the Interruption of the deployment programtne summer and fallhereasons for this Interruption appear to have been technical,robable

modification to thc second generationCBM system and persisting difficulties inof thehatever the reason, however, it is clear2ear oi reappraisal, in which Soviet plannersmade important new decisions withto llicir ICBM program, Some ol thaw, (or example curtailment ofeployment, are already evident For lhe near term, tlie resultomewhat smaller force thanestimated (Paragraphs

We have nowotal ofCBM complexes, all of which were1 The complexes nowotal ofaunchers in various stages of construction. We estimateCBM launchers, including aboutard silos, were operational asn additionalaunchers were prob-ably operatlona) at Tyuratam.

Of the three Soviet ICBM systems now in the field, theas been the mostin development and is thc most widelyDeployment of the large, first genera-lionas limited to four launchers at one complex Deployment of theadto four complexes before the program was Interrupted. However.eploymenl lias now been curtailed, and It Is believed thai expansion of the ICBM force over the next year or so will be primarily ln terms of the SS-7

We estimate the number of Soviet ICBM launchers operational in. and intheseaunchers athe force in this period will consist almostof second-generationew new type ICBMs could be operational by about

The assistant Ciller ol Stall Intelligence. USAF. estimates that Hl-IM ICBM launchers were opera uonal as See his footnote on pace IS at

'Tlie Assistant Chief of StaH Intelligence. USAF.perational ICHM launchers hy mid-low,y inld-ISOD. Sec

e now believe that lhewe previously considered mlghL beUrge missile. Is comparable to thepay loadt present, bolhICBMs probably eanyTdeploymentJ warheadsICBMs couldfare developed, improved secondmissiles armed with higherctykc

and thc few SS^oS in the field could be rclto-nUedUieHiryQ

hus, it Is probable that lhe great bulk of Ihe Soviet ICBM force throughill carry warheads inT range. Byhe accuracy of the bulk ol thc force can probably be Improved to. CEP; If new guidance systems aresome portion could achieve CEP's.

The Soviet ICBM force represents anuclear delivery capability,onstant readiness stateits US counterpart, and Issinceercent of the present force is in soft sites. Successive modifications of soft sites have probably brought someln reaction time, but procedures are still relatively slow, cumbersome, andWe estimate that bybout one-lhird of the ICBMs will be In hard silos, enhancing both the survivability and the reaction time of thc force.

URRM/IRBM Forces. We have now identifiedaunch positions for.HBMs.ums, of whichre soft and the remainder are deployed in hard silos.

'The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and thc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence USAF, be-Hereonndeiit setecUon between possibleelivery capabibUe* cannot be maO at this time. In their opuuon. available evidence anddo not permit excludlnc thc possibility lhat theayosecone0 lbsittle more. Q

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growth of decisions taken in thes tn developairly extensive butcapability. The USSR now has aboutallistic missile submarines,1 of thelass; ali are equipped with short0 nm) missiles equable of delivering warheads cf ^

3 The mission originally envisaged for these submarines probably Includedin Initial strategic attacks. However, Ihey have now evidently been assigned lo second-strike roles, partly because of the growth In numbers ol ground-launchedbut probably also because of Sovietof their limitations. Although this force represents a considerable potential threat, its operational effectiveness is limited by the small number of missUes per submarinehe short range of the missiles, tbc uced to surface before launching, thelimitations of the dkscl-powcred units, and the unreliability of some nuclear powered units. These shortcomings probably account lor the continued absence of essentialtraining cruises to likely combat areas.)

here Is evidence that the Sovietsthese deficiencies and that improvedand submarines will become operational in the near future. Development Lt. ballistic missUefor submerged launching. Thiswill almost certainly be incorporated in any new class of ballistic missUe submarine which appears in the near future; it could possibly be retrofitted into existing types as well. While we have no direct evidence, it seems probable lhat ol least one newclass (either nuclear or dlescl-powertd) is under development to employ the newand that the first units could enter service in the near future. It is Ukely lhat newwill incorporate more than the three missile tubes carried by the older classes. We estimate that byhe Soviet force of ballistic missile submarines will have grownotal, Includinguclear-powered submarines. 1

In addition to ballistic missilethe USSR now has operational someubmarines capable of surface. cruise missiles. Six of these are nuclear poweredclass, each equipped with six launchers; the lest axe diesei-powered units equipped wiih two or four launchers each. This system was designed primarily for low0 feet) attack on ships at sea, but it can also be employed against land targets. We believe that the Soviels may now be placing additional emphasis on lhe cruise missile submarine program. Wethat byhis force will have grownubmarines,uclear-powered. )

Thus, we believe that in the near future the Soviets will bring Into service submarine weapon systems better suited to attacks on Eurasian and North American land targets as well as Western naval forces at sea. Further, we continue to believe that by the mld-WoO's at least some Soviet missile submarines will be engaging in routine patrols In open ocean areas )

Long Range Bomber Forces. Continued investment in Improving Long Rangeindicates that thc USSR plans tosizable bomber forces for at least the near term Improvements over the past few years include introductionew medium bomber. Introduction of air-to-surfaceand improved aerial refuelingMaritime reconnaissanceecondary role ol Long Range Aviation, and the use of bolh heavy anil medium bombers in this role hai been increasing.

e estimate that Long Range Avialion compriseseavy bombers and tankersedium bombers and tankers. The heavy bomber force5 BISON Jet bombers0 BEAR lurbo prop bombers. Of therc BLINDER, withdash eapubility, and the remainder are BADGERs. There arc anADGERsLINDERS in Naval Aviation. BLINDER is the only bomber

known lo lie in current production, bul there arc indications, lhat there may be some new production ofddition toAlthough research and development on heavy aircraft is under way. no replacement for BEAR or BISON is In sight, and we con-sidcr it highly unlikelyew heavy bomber cou Id enter inventorye estimate that inng Rangewilleavy bombers und tankersedium bombers and tankers.'

Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of Its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than lor intercontinental attack. Theof the BISON and BADGER aircraft which make up thc bulk of the force areby their limited range The emphasis on aerial refueling and Arctic training of thc past several years reflect Soviet efforts to overcome this limitation on capabilities forattack.

In view of the training patterns ofyears, the capacity of lhe principal Arctic staging bases, and the range capabilities of Soviet bombers, we believe that an aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively Considering the requirements for Arcticand refueling, and allowing forattrition, we estimate that, by commltling Iheir entire heavy bomber force to thisthe Soviets could putf theseover the US on two-way missions. The scale of an initial Intercontinental attack could be increased by the use of refueled BADGERs on two-way missions.all operational factors, we estimate that

AwisUnt Chief ol Staff Intelligence, USAF. ealimalei tlie medium bomber/lan Her lorce level (or nild.lOOS otlrcralt. He considers tho heavy bomber/tanker force will remain at appioxlucn-.fl although the BEAR/BISON .nix may vary somewhat. InUoducUonongeralicraft based on the BEAR could befin In Uie IW oree his footnote tof the Discussion.

Ihr Soviets could put upf Umm medium bombers over target areas inCanada, Alaska and portions ofUS. Initial attacks would probably be mounted in successive waves and extendonsiderable number ot hours'

trategic Attack

o well-defined strategic conceptto have governed the long range strike forces which the Soviets have deployed to date,umber of characteristics can be discerned In thc building of these lorces.and development progrums have been vigorous. In contrast, the scale and pace of deploymenl programs have been uneven. This behavior has reflected, in part, technical problems and economic constraints, but It also suggests thai the USSR is willing toa condition of limited intercontinentaland considerable vulnerabilityong period of lime. )

erhaps the most consistent patterns apparent in Soviet policy toward long range strike forces over the past several years are to be found in the increased allocation ofto this mission, the numericaloi these forces, thc improvement ofweapon systems for long range attack, emphasis on high yield weapons, andinterest in diversified capabilities.this period, emphasis has shifted from weapon systems best suited for Eurasian use lo intercontinental systems. Our estimates (or the next two years suggest, in thcontinuation of these broad trends. The

Thr Assistant Chief of Staff InUlutence, USAK. considers this paragraph seriously underesUmales thc manned aircraft throat to the conUnenUI United Slates. In the event war ihould eventuate and the USSR attacks the United Slates withweapons, he believes this will be an allout effort aimed alaximum number of weapons on US targets He would therefore eiU. male that thc number of aircraft. Including BADCKRS on one-way missions, could. Suv his footnote tof the Discussion.

forces which we projocl forre stronger, both numerically and qualitatively, but they represent no substantial change in the overall strategic posture of the USSR vna vim the West. )

The prospects ror therc lar less clear. We believe lhal the desire for an effective deterrent will remain one of the primary concerns of Soviet policy. None of the evidence available to us suggests,that the USSR contemplates forcesLo neutralize US strike forces in ablow, nor do the Soviets appear lo beto match thc US In numbers of delivery vehicles. Other programs, particularlydefense and space, will continue towith strategic attack programs, not only for resources but for scarce skills and quality materials. In general, we believe thai thc USSR would have great economic difficulty inolicy which called lor antimissile defenses of major cities, competition with the US tn space, and the higher sides of ourfor long range strike forces whichbelow. )

Soviet long-range strike forces could also be heavily affected by political factors. In the present and prospective strategicwhich confronts the USSR, there is much which arguesolicy ofnational security through some fairly moderate level of military strength or even, more radically, through internationallo limit or reverse the arms race. Moreover, Khrushchev's advocacy of higher priority for certain civilian economicappears to be growing stronger These political and military considerations suggest, not that the Soviets will cut back on their strategic programs, but rather that they are unlikely to undertake large-scale programsrush basis. Indeed, current trends inand deployment indicate that Ln the absence of an arms limitation agreement, thc Soviets will coniinue improving theirbulodcrale pace. In iram-ing the estimates which follow, we haveto take into consideration the vari-

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cconomk. military,and technical -which could influence thc size and composition of Soviet long range strike forces deployed by

hc ICBM Force. Our analysis ofprogramming to dale, and of the possible impact of new systems as well as other factors, indicates that byhe USSKwill haveorce ofperational TCBM operational systems will still make up the largest part of the force, but It willalso include significant numbers ofor improved ICBMs. In general, any new ICBM systems lo be deployed in quantity durings would need to be underalready or lo begin development shortly. )

e believe that thc Soviets are mostengaged in both improvement ofICBM systems and development of new systems, as well asontinuing space effort However, the available evidence does notthe specific nature of plannedto existing ICBMs or of follow-onOur views on the Soviet need to correct current deficiencies, on tendencies tn Soviet missile design, and on Soviet technicalheavily affect our Judgments about likely new and improved systems.

a. Very Large ICBMs. We continue tolhat the Soviets arcarge vehicleillion or more pounds ofhich could be usedpace

' The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations <Department of the Nary, believes the force level is likely to be toward the lowf the Ciilimjilf! pniented here. See his footnote to.f lhe Discussion.

' The Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence. USAP. considers the Soviet ICBM force bycould ranse from GOO to as highperaUonal ICBM launchers, depending onew. small, easily.deployed system Is introduced In the6 period See his footnote lo the Table on pacef the Discussion.

booster,global" rocket, orarrier for warheads yielding upT. If test firings begin within the next few months,arge vehicle could probably have an initial operational capability as an ICBM in the periodonitialsites would probably be soft, bul thc Soviets tmghl findeasible to incorporate hardening at some stage in the program)

b. Standard-Size Follow-on ICBMs. Wothe Soviels would consider the primary qualitative improvements needed in the bulk of the ICBM force to be Increasedshorter reaction time, higher accuracy, and decreased logistic and personnel support. These requirements can probably be metas well, and at much lower cost, byto thesollow-onin its general weight class. Improved SS-7's may be deployed ln newpossibly Including semi-hard or slnglc-sllo hard Sites. )

c Smaller Follow on ICBMs. Soviel of an ICBM system similar to the US Minutenmn would run counter to trends thus far discernible in Soviet long rangesystems, and Soviet technology necessary for large grain solid propellants Is weak. However, some of the operational attributes of the Minulcman concept would reduce the main deficiency in thc Sovietits vulnerability to USmight also reduce maintenance requirements ew missile somewhat smaller than nd using improved propellants could reachstatus during lhe period. We believe it likely thatew smaller missile would beard sites. We believe lhat test firings ofew smaller missile would not start forear and that operational launchers would not exist atsitesG7. Should theelect toew missile in soft or semihard sites, test firings could begin in the near future, with an initinl operational

Hrr-

occurring In about)

e believe lhatperational missiles in soft launch sites will rca.se by the. Tbc low side of our estimate0 launchers)lhat, in addition to deploymentew very large ICBMs which begin to enter operational inventory inhewill at about thc same time Introduceew, somewhat smaller ICBM or an improvedossibly in single-lnuneher liardoderate buildup of this sort, with emphasis on hardening, would in our view be consistentoviet effort toand improve the credibility of itsThe reasons why lhe Soviet force might develop In this manner include such economic considerations as the need to devote moreto the civilian economy or toand space programs as well as political factors. )

he high side of our estimate for0akes into account the possibility that the deployment ol soft launchers, perhaps Including some semi-hardened sites, is carried somewhat further thun in the preceding alternative,ery large system is introduced somewhat earliernd thataunchersew type -an improvedew,smaller hard syslem, possibly in single silo sites- -are deployed.uildup might reflect noioviet concern forbut also an effort to put the USSRomewhat belter position toreemptive attackestern strikeImminent and

lthough thc force levels indicated by the upper and lower limits of the range are derived from technical and strategicother force compositions and force levels wilhin this general range arc equally possible. Tlie Soviets would recognise thaL

forces within this range fell far short of those requiredreemptive attack which might reduce devastation of the USSR to anlevel, but in any case, the force wouldrotected component capable of devastating retaliatory blows if it survived.)

28 MRUU and IRBM Forces. We believe that Soviet MRBM/IRBM force levels willfairly constant Ineriod ataunchers. Thewhich we can foresee in Western forces are not likely to add to potential Soviet MRBM/IRBM targetsajor way,we do not exclude the possibilityeneral strengthening of NATO forces would result in some incremental expansion. in Soviet MRBM/IRBMIn this period arc more likely to bethan quantitative. Thc Soviets may beew MRBM, and il Is possible lhat they alsoew IRBM. If two separate systems arc developed, tho IRBM would probably phaseear or so after then It is also possible that the Soviets have elected to work ingle follow-on system which could cover all MRBM and IRBM ranges. In either event, follow-on systems are likely to feature hard or possibly mobile deployment. II, as we estimate, the size of the force remains fairly stable, improvedwill be deployed to supersede present systems, and may have largely replacedoperational MRBMs

ubmarine Missile Forces. We think that the Soviets will continue to considersubmarines an important adjunct to Iheir ground-launched missile capabilities, and we expect the requirement for capabilities tosurface naval formations to continue. Thus we estimate continued construction of both ballistic missile and cruise missileIn this period. Although wc have no

specific evidence, we believe lhat longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile syxterns could become operational in aboutC7 period. We do not anticipate significant technical changes In the cruise missileforce. )

he size of Soviet missile submarine forces will dependumber of factors including the availability of militarilybut less expensive delivery systems (especially hardened onstruction capabilities, and allocation of nuclearto other naval missions. all factors, including estimatedprograms and the possibilities forsystems, we believe that9 the Soviets willallistic missileoperational, ofill be nuclear-powered. At that time, wcruise missile submarine forcefill be)

ii'j Range Bomberi. We estimate that9 Long Range Aviation will have gradually declined in total strength to aboutheavy bombers and tankersedium bombers and tankers- We believe that it will still consist of aircraft types now in service: BISONs. BEARs, BADOERs. and BMNDERs, with the last of these comprising about half of the medium bomber force.the types and quantities of missile delivery systems they arc likely to have, as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think itlhal the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber to operational service In the period of this estimate. However, the Soviets have the technical capability of developing and producing new, high-performanceaircraft of intercontinental range foruse iueriod, should they come to consider this necessary or In thehey wouldemploy bomber forces in follow-on, rather

Ihan initial attacks, and lor increasinglyrntsdOBl.* )

pace Weapons. On the basis ofpresently available, we are unable to determine lhe existence of SovicL plans or progrums for thc military use of space. we believe that the USSR almostis investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support und offensive and defensive weapons. For accomplishingmissions, we think thai duringriod. orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of cost and effectiveness. Based on these considerations as we now understand them, it would appear unlikely lhal the Soviets will during thisdeploy orbital bombardment systems of military significance. Moreover, we believe that Ihe USSR would probably recogniseoviet deployment of nuclear weapons in space would produce an unfavorable reaction in other countries and strong US Further.he Soviets enterormal obligation to refrain from orbitingweapons, this will constitute still another factor inhibiting such deployment. )

e recognize, however, that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and in some future phase of East-West relations, political inhibitions might lose their effectiveness. Moreover,thc pare of developments in the weapons field in general, it is extremely haz-

The Assistant Chiel ol Stall Inielligence, USAF,ith this paragraph since he thinks that thewill continue to consider mannedaircraft an important adjunct to their grojnd launched mlsaile capabUiUe* He esUmales that the USSR willollow-on heavy bomber. He further estimates the heavy bomber foice will remain atr somewhat larger, depending on the liming of an expected follow-on bomber, and that by9 Ihe medium bomber/tanker force probably still will include aboul WW aircraft. See his footnote to the Tabic on pagend to101

-TOP-StKRfrl -

DISCUSSION

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

he Soviet leaders look upon long range strike lorcesajor element of theirposition, intended lo support theirobjectives, to deter thc West from resort to military action, and toar should one occur. The available evidence supports the view thai Ihey are attempting lo build forces which they regard as appropriate tu these objectives, rather than aiming at forces which they couldeliberate attack on the West and count on reducingto levels that would be In any sense

oviet policy toward long range strike forces is heavily affected by the Soviet view of the character of future war. This Soviet view has become Increasingly complicated in the last several years as thc result of adebate over the implications ofweaponry for military doctrine. This debate persists, and may lead to furtherchanges, but at the present state It has produced several ofllclal conclusions which bear on long range capabilities:

General war might beginariety of ways, including circumstances whichvery short warning times.

The initial period is of criticaland might determine Uie outcome

Enormous advantages accrue lo the side striking the Arst blow.

But the initial nuclear exchange might not determine lhe outcome, and in any event large ground campaigns would follow.

hese propositions, when related to the strategic capabilities now deployed andammed by thc West, impose high andrequirements upon Soviet long range strike forces. Among the chief constraints

In meeting these requirements are cost and skilled manpower, which pose distinctto Soviet decision-makers. One of these problems is thc proper balance of expenditure among military m'cds. thc spucc program, and the civil economy. Another Is thc properof military funds among the various force components. This problem is madeacute by the insistence of theleadership that all arms of service,large theater forces, are necessary toeneral war successfully and to provide the USSR with flexibilityariety of possible circumstances.

wo other main factors have beenin the past decisions which havepresent Soviet capabilities for long range attack. Oneoncentration on the Eurasian theater, which is traceable loSoviet preoccupation with this area as well as to thc higher costs and greatercomplexity of intercontinental weapon systems The other Is an apparent lag in military thinking, which seems to have been relatively slow In working out some of the more sophisticated implications of advanced weapons. Both these factors are nowbut for the immediate future Soviet forces for long range attack will be characterized by capabilities agoinst Eurasia far exceeding those against North America, and by adeficiency in certain performancesurvivability and reactionlo corresponding US forces.

ontinuing Soviet emphasis on high yield weapons for long range striking forces was Indicated byuclear test series. The USSR's nuclear testing program fias provided Itide variety offor strategic delivery, with yields upT As new weapons enter the inventory they will progressively improve the totaldelivery capabilities of the strategic striking forces.

II. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE

hc Soviet ICBM program continues to be marked by change, innovation, and shift in emphasis. New aspects of tne Soviet ICBM program include: (a) an interruption of the Soviet launcher construction program during the summer and fallb) further evi-dence Unitas approximately the same delivery capability as thec) apparent curtailment ofeployment;tarts of soft sitesontinued low-ratio of hard to soft sites.

at the Tyuratam test rangeto believe that new or modified systemsunder development and could reachstage in the near future.operational launch sitesewcould begin even before the firstas was the case In other Sovietbut it Is unlikely that more thanmissiles of new types could

A. Deployed ICBM Complexes, Sitei, and Launchers

have nowotal ofcomplexes, al) of which weree doubt that therecomplexes, although we do notthe possibility that one or twocomplexes may exist. Anywhich do exist probably haveto the point of having morefew additional launchers as yet.1

heomplexes nowotal ofdentified launchers in various stages of construction, of which about MS are soft and uboutrc hard. We cannotany "typical" number of launchers which each complex will ultimately contain.

' For Lhc view of Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF,footnote to Table at5

' We have Identifiedard sites, each containing al least two and probably three launch silos.

bellevo thatfICBM launchers, includingin hard silos were operational on 1

It. ICBM Syllcim Deployed '

ICBM development andhasigh degree ofbetween system testing at theconstruction of operational sites In Thc USSR has in the past fivethree different ICBMs of thetype, together with the groundfor each. At least somehas been undertaken for all three,of deployment facilitiesfairly early Inhase. Itthat2 there were slippagesin thc deployment programof tbe second generation ICBMgrowth of operational forces hasdelayed once again, though not asas was thc case8 when thewas cut back. Thus concurrentpracticed successfully by in some other missile programs,mooth and uninterruptedin ICBM capabilities.

rogram

he first generationas deployed only In Limitedbout four launchers. In addition there are two at Tyuratam. Tlies believed to be equipped jAurheads at present.'

rogram

hes the most successful Soviet ICBM in development, and It Is the most widely deployed. Thirty-six of the lastest firings of this missile have been generally successful. Although thes much smaller than thet is comparable to the

' For details of estimated ciurmctensOcs andsec Annex A, Table 4.

1 For the estimated maximum yield* of Soviet lone ranrit delivery systems, see Annex A, Table 6.

SECtcef-

Cftrr-

Titan in size and nrobably carries a'operational Soviet force consistsotThesnd hard (probably Silo-type)We believe that the rate of SSsite initiation, and hence olhas been uneven, and lhatoccurred

llhough some uncertainty remains, we row believe lhat each of the hardites probably contains three launch silos, rather than two as previously estimated. We cannot definitely determine lhe degree of hardening, buL on the basis of present evidence and analysis we believe these sites can probably withstand overpressures upsi. We estimate conslruclion lime for liard silesonths.

e believe the SS-7's maximum nuclear payload willprobably be increased^

"[with initial deployment of the higher yieidwarhcad beginning

indicate that even if large, theould cany to ICBMosecone of Only0 lbs. or somewhat more C

ooster would increase Soviet space payload capabilities only moderately, if at all, as compared with theooster.

Considering all the technical andevidence now available, we estimate lhal thcelatively smallne with about the same payload capacity as theapable ofoseconebs.arhead^

Renewed firings of the

Jlea3 us to believe that an initial operating capability could have occurred in aboute judge that the Soviets have decided to curtail deployment of thend that, if any new sites are started in the future, they will probably be in limited numbers at existing complexes.

Program '

n earlier estimates we were unable to determine whether theery large missileelatively small one. Among the reasons for believing that theight be very large was our judgment that thcwouldissile delivery vehicleegaton warheadew space booster. The caseery largeas been weakened by the continued failure of the Soviets to use theooster in the space program. Although there are still insufficient data to definitely determine the size of theosecone, the data available

'Tbe Assistant Chief of Staff, Inielligence, USAF does noi concur In the analysis containede considers lhal the evidence can also be interpreted lo show that thes relatively large, capable ofosecone within the probable weight limits00 pounds lo ICBM ranges. He believes that although strong arguments can be made forargemall missile, thc available evidence is soand subject to Interpretationirm judgmenL Is not possible at this time.

C. Estimoted Force Levels Through

Our eslimato of the number and type of operational ICBM launchers throughakes accountariety of factorsthe apparent trends ln composition of the force, and the probable timing ofof follow-on systems. The estimatea range of uncertainty regarding the scale and pace of deployment activity, and consequently regarding the Soviet strength in operational launchers, which increases as we project inlo the future.

Soft Launchers.eployment is complete, and theoft site program has probably been curtailed. Thus, expansion of lhe ICBM force for the nexl year or so will be primarily In terms of lhc SS-7. The high

"The Director. Defense Intelligenceonfident selection between possibleelivery capabilities cannot be made at this time: available evidence and analysis do not permit excluding lhe possibility that thcay0 lbs.ittle more.

side of Uie estimate assumes that soft sites will be initialedast pace throughnd that there will be no delays orin their construction 'Hie low side of thc estimate assumes that almost all of the soft launchers programmed for secondmissiles arc already under construction.

ard Launchers. We believe that hard launchers now constitute onlyf the operational launchers in the Held

but that they comprise nearly half of the launchers now under construction. Since hard launch sites requireoonths for completion, launchers to be operational inust have already been under con-struct ion byhe estimate is based on the probability that each hard sitethree, rather than two launch silos

he table below summarizes ourof Soviet ICBM force to

BSTIMATtD SOVIET OPERATIONAL ICDM LAUNCHERS -Mill bl lo MlD4i

Soil Uiur.chers

1st Generation

2nd Generation Hard Launcheri

TOTAL DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS (rounded)

Tyuratam Test Rancc

Soft

GRAND TOTAL (rounded!

4

SO

3

4

4J

IQ> i:

4

4

5

4

S-90

J5 3io-JSC

new ICBM, perhaps capable of carrying rrrj hlfh field warheads, could begin to enterid.IMS, and the force mayew Improved second eenermUon missiles In semi hardened sites.

Thc Assistant Chief of staff, Intelllec-nce, USAF considers thc estimate of current ICDM strength unreallsucally low for two reasons:

The majority eaUmatc makes insufficient allowance for tbe existence of of unldcnUfled launchers. How larje We factor for "unMentlfled- launcherse Is debatable, but in view of the deficiencies tn available lnttUleence. the Assistant Chief of staff. intelligence. USAF considers that the absolute minimum nrure for such launchers should beercent. Sinceaunchers have been Identified, of whichre judged to beinimum of li operaUonal launchers should be added to this total to compensate for unidentified launchers. Thc actual number of such launchers may well prove lo be several Umcs thin many.

The majoniy estimate does not consider that some launchersull operaUonal status would have an emergency combat capability and could support missile flnnes if the need arose. The ACS/I. USAF believes someaunchers fall into- .

Both of lhc above comment, excluderobable launchers estimated lo be operational at TTMTR. On thc basis of thc foregoing, the Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence, USAF believes Urn minimum number of launchers which should be estimated as operational3. and he would project this as follows:

-

D. Operational Charade risties of5

bout SOercent ofoviel ICBM force is in soft sites.characteristics anil operationalat thrse sites makelow reaction force. Soviet soft site deployment concepts adversely uffect both reliability and reaction time because of horizontal storage andwith subsequent movement to launchers. Wc estimate that roughly one-third of the ICBMs will be in hard silos byoth survivability and reaction time.

eaction Time. At the greatof ICBM soft sites, an alert can be maintained indefinitely with thc missiles and nosccones mated in the ready buildings near the launchers, propcllants and groundequipment at hand, and duty crews nearby. This is readinessnd it appears to be the most likely normal state of readiness capable of being maintained by the force Prom this state of readiness, the bulk of the force would require three or four hours to fire. From the highest state ol readiness, with missiles erected and fueled,oinutes would probably befor launch. This state of readiness can be maintainedumber of hours,on weather conditions and other At the hard sites, readinesss most likely normal,eaction tunc of about half an hour. In general,the Strategic Rocket Troops arc notto be able toonstantstate approaching US systems, but there is evidence of Soviet concern for this Some improvement in reducingtimes for initial firings haa probably been achieved by thc successive modification ofoft sites.

imultaneity. It appearsissile from each launcher at an Individual site could

'For delailrtd estimates of ICBM characteristics and performance, see Annex A. Table 1.

'For descriptions or Soviet missUe readinesssee Annex A. Glossary of Missile Terms.

be fired0 minutes. Theoretically, the entire force could be launched within aboutinutes. We believe, however, that even under the most favorable conditionsime lo fire given sufficiently insuch portion of the deployed missile force as the Soviets could bring to Readinessrobably could be launchedilvo extending someoinutes from launch of the first missile. Lack of direct evidence as to the reliability of Sovietmissiles makes it impossible towith confidence what portion of the total deployed force actually could participate in this salvo.

efire. One additional missile Isassigned to each soft ICBM launcher,efire capability in aboutours fornd aboutours fort is unlikely that hard launchersefire

eliability ami accuracy. SovietndCBM systems have apparently had excellent reliability and accuracy records under lest range conditions. However, the effects of Soviet operational concepts and troop training standards arc at least asas technical characteristics inof system reliability, and we have no reliable basis for estimating these effects. We believe lhat the reliability of Soviel ICBMs would be considerably reduced underconditions- Operational accuracies can probably be improved so lhat byhe bulk of the force could achievef. tandard productprogram; assuming improved guidance systems are introduced, some portion of thc force could probably achieven. range at that lime. Wc believe lhat Ihcre wouldonsiderable lime lag before these improvements could be incorporated into existing deployed sites.

arheads. The bulk of the Soviet ICBM force throughill carryinT range. he

SS7 andight be modified tocapable of delivering significantlypossibly with warhead yieldsSuch an increasedcoufu be achieved bymissiles at somewhats capable of being equippedfor delivery lo ranges of

m. We believe lhat the Soviets would first have lo lest fire appropriately modified nosecones for any of Ihese missiles

III MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BAlllSTIC MISSILEaunch positions.RBMs.RBMs have now been identified. Of these,re soft positions deployed fourite. We estimate that there are aboutard silos, deployed twoite, but there is some evidence to raise thc possibility that there arc three launch silos per hardirtually all of the solt sites and most of the hard sites are operational at present.

A. Development and Deployment

he massive capability for attack: on Eurasian targets which present Soviet MRBM and IRBM forces represent has been developed by the USSR In several overlapping stages:

(a) Beginning.RBM was probably deployed in modestInitiallyield-typewithout fixed sites. This systemalso occupied some early fixed sites

^it has probably been phased out of the operational Inventory In lavor of the SS-4.

' For differing views as lo the warhead delivery capability of the SSee lhe footnotes ot thu Dl-rector. Defense Intelligence Agency, and of the Assislant Chief Ol Staft. Intelligence. USAF.

' If MRBM and IRBM hard sites In fact contain three launch silos, there are aboutore hard launchers.

(Ii) The construction of fixed, soft sites for.as undertaken at an intensive pace from8 lo abouthenaunch positions were available. Since then this deployment lias proceeded more slowly and has beenby the construction ol hardilos, which now comprise slightly less thanercent of thc total ofBM launch positions. Very few MIIBM sites have been started since the spring

(c)ess extensive program lo de-play IRBMs In bolh soft and hard positions was undertaken. In this program, greater emphasis was placed on hardening, and aboutercent of the nearlydentified IRBM launch positions are hard silos Thisloo. is evldenUy now slackening.of hard silo slowed and may have ceased early this year.

ore thanercent of the MRBM and IRBM force is deployedroad belt in western USSR, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Other sites provide the USSR with potential coverage of other targets of particular importance in Europe, North Africa, and Middle and Par Eastern areas, and isolated sites can attack key installations in Greenland and Alaska.

e continue lo have difficulty lnthe Soviet rationale for buildingdelivery capabilities of this magnitude againsi European targel areas. One (actor influencing Soviet decisions was undoubtedly their strategic emphasis upon Europe, evident from the size of the medium bomber program and thc theater forces, and reflected in many Soviet military writings. Tlie concept ofEurope hostage while Soviet capabilities against the US were small probablyari Tne apparent Soviet Intentionin classified documents) toide variety of targets may also have exerted an upward pressure on the size of thc force,If the USSR planned to equip mosl of these missiles with kiioton warheads.

Finally, contributing military factors may have included attaifung survivability through numbers and meeting requirements forof theater forces as well as for strategic attack.

onsidering the largolcoverage anddisposition of the present MHBM ami IRBM forces, together with the evidence of slowdown or cessation in new sitewe now believe with greater assurance than tn our last estimate that the USSR has about completed the expansion of itsndorces for employment against Western targets. We anticipate no important further increase In primary soft launchalthough we expect toew additional sites with the passage of time All hard sites that we know about will be operational byc think, however, that from time to time the Soviets maypositions in additional locations to cover new targets or to supplement existing coverage.

e estimate as follows the number of operational launch positions forndissiles in the USSR through

nm. SS-4

Silo*

50

50

nm. BS 6

B0

Silo'

m;

SOFT

620

j

HARD*

100

Mil

HAND TOTA1,

750

esUmaUs assume two launch illo* per hard site.

n addition to the foregoing systems, the Soviets began in2 to testew missile to ranges of. at Kapustin Yar. The pace of the testing program has been slow, with only aboul five firings to date. Wc know little about lhe new missile, except that It has unusual propulsion characteristics which

could indicateiquidolid-fueled system The new vehicle may form partollowon development program lor either MRBMs. IRBMs or both It may be for ground or submarine launching, or both.

Oil.ormal development cycle iswith goodollow-on syslem of MRBM range could probably bein small numbers byystem might be designed to have better accuracy than existing MRBM.-IRBM sys terns (perhapsnew system, the Soviets are also likely to be seeking simplified rnaintcnanrc. reduced manning requirements, survivability, and fast reaction lime An improved liquid-fueled system might be designed for long serviceigh readiness condition In hard silos, or lor greater flexibility and securityobileolid fueled system would be well suited to silo or submarine deployment, but its weighl might make It impractical for road-mobile use In the USSR and East Europe. In any event, we think it likelyollow-on systemservice in5 would begin tothc olderather than adding to the gross size ol the MRBM/IRBM force.

B. Operational Characternlics oforce*

Documentary evidence on the original Soviel concept for deployment of MRBMslhat thc USSR onceystem of alternate sites to increaseThis concept apparently was notextensively, and we believe lhat virtually all MRBM and IRBM launch position*.those of soft sites, are primarymanned and equipped to participate in an initial salvo.

There are probably exceptions to the general rule that solt sites are fully equipped These sites would resemble thosein Cuba nnd fit the description of altcr-

* For detailed estimates of characteristics andsee Annex A, Table 1.

natc MRBM launch positions in classifieddocumentsUhichthat MH-BM "nits were to move to such sites lor protection under certain conditions, usually afterirst salvo trom the pri-maiy Site. It seems likely that some such sites will be constructed by the Soviets to improve the chances of survival of the MRBM force

iring procedures appear to be largely manual. We believe lhat even under the most favorable conditions andime to fire given sufficiently in advance, the bulk of the force could probably be launchedalvo extendingeriod of some0 minutes from the time the first missile is launched. Reaction limes are long, but arc probably belter for hard silos than for soft positions. We cannot definitely determine the degree of hardening at hard MRBM/IRBM sites, but on the basis of present evidence and analysis we believe these sites can probably withstand overpressures upsi.

here has been much evidence that lhe Soviets intend toubstantialcapability for their MRBM/IRBM loice. Based in part on information from classified Soviet documents, wc believe that the soft sites are intended to be supplied with twofor each launcher. It is highly unlikely that hard silos are intended toefire capability. Wc now have fairly good evidence on Soviet production of MRBMs and IRBMs, which leads us to believeull second salvo is probably available to all IRBM soft positions, but not yet to all MRBM softThis evidence also indicates thatis continuing despite the. cutback in deployment of new sites, and wc believe that byach sofl MRBM position couldecond-salvo missile available to it.

IV. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE

urrent Soviet submarine-launchedforces arc the outgrowth of decisions taken ino developairly extensive but unsophisticated capability.

The USSR nowonsiderableol diesel-powcrcd submarinesuch smaller forceclnai-powered submarines equipped with missiles. The majority of these arr designed to cany ballistic missilesfor employment against land targets; the remainder arc equipped with cruisewhich were evidently designed primarily for use against surface ships but can also be employed against land targets.

oth public and classified Sovietindicate that the initial mission of lhc ballistic missile submarines was "to carry out strikes deep in enemy territory and to suppori ground forcehe advent Of ground-launched systems in operationallynumbers, together with limitations In the capabilities of the submarine systems, evidently led the Soviets in thcs to reconsider the role of the submarine missile force. Information from Soviet classifiedwritings as well as the operationalof the force indicates that it is probably not now assigned the mission ol participating in initial strategic attacks. Evidence indicates that both ballistic and cruise missile subs are to disperse and protect themselves in the event ol war, and then to participate to the extent feasible In attacking Western targets. At about the time this concept was defined for thc existing forces, however, the Soviets also initialed lhe development of moremissile submarine systems. Wethat in the near future these programs willew dimension to Soviet missile submarine forces, by bringing Into service weapon systems better suited lo attacks on Eurasian and North American land targets and Western naval forces at sea.

A. Developments in Ballislic Missile Forcei

s ofhe USSR possesses aboutperational submarines capable of. liquid-fueledallistic missiles. This force includeslassicsel-

lass submarines, each ofprobably capable Of launching itsof three missiles withinafter surfacing. Anotherlass submarines were convertedand launch two suchissiles of this force canpres-

ent, and wethat maximum yields of "Jcould be introduced within The next year or SO. Although this forcea considerable potential threat, its operational effectiveness is limited by aof factors: (a) the small number ofper submarine; (b) the short range of the missiles and the need to surface before(c) the operaUonal limitations of thc diesel-powered units, which comprise the bulk of the total force; (d> the unreliability of thc propulsion systems oi some nuclear-powered units; and (c) the continued absence ofoperational training cruises to likely combat areas.

Development is far advancedew ballistic missile designed for submerged launching. Our evidence on this system (now designatedemains veryand there are critical uncertainties as to its size and the submarine class or classes for which it is designed. However, we estimate thatange.

Becauselasses ofwere designed init isthat both were designed to employ.urface-launched missile. The unusual height of their sails suggests that these subs carry their missiles in tubes which do not penetrate down into the pressure hull of the ships, but we do not know that this is the case. If.s about the same diameter as. missile, it would probably need to be longer in order toayload in the megaton range. Even greater tube length would probably beto accommodate ejection gear forlaunching If this gear were attached to the missile at its base.

Wc arc unaware of any submarinewhich we can point toandidateew class designed to employ ihe) missile. We continue lo believe that there are probably one or more new submarine classes al sonic stage Of development.that development schedules have paralleled lhat of thcn initialoperating capability with this weapon system (in either nuclear or diesel-powcreU subs or boih) could exist in the near future.

The SARK was displayed in Moscow parades in2 andnd thc Soviets described ilubmerged-launch missile. We cannot determine whether theissileeet in length andequipped with ejection gear at its base. Is. submerged launchSome calculations suggest that aof SARK's size and configuration couldange ofa.

Wc have again examined theof. submerged-launch missiles intolass submarines. If the SARK is. missile, retrofitting would require suchmodification lo Ihesc submarines as to make it seem quite impractical. Theof any missile longer than theould require changing the basic design of thc submarines if their tubes do not extend into thc pressure hull, and this would be an expensive and difficult change. However, there is enough uncertainty In the evidence regarding tube configurations and the size of. missile to raise the possibility lhat at leasl some submarines oflasses will be retrofitted with the new missile. As between the two, we think this possibility is somewhat greater forlass because it is larger and nuclear powered.

B. Developments in Cruise Missile Forces

addition to ballistic missilethe USSR now has operational somecapable of the surface-launching

.ruise missiles. Of Ihese,rc convertedlassabout half of them equipped to carry .'our mi;.iilcs each and thc remainder two each. The other six arclass submarines, which carry six such

A new diesel powered submarine was sighted recently and hus been designatedlass Analysis of available evidencelhat it isruise missileand may carry two pairs of missile tubes similar to those carried bylass.

The Soviet policy decision toruise missile submarine force was made8 or before. These systems were designed primarily to attack carrier task forces and other surface nuval vessels, but can also be employed against land targets. Their low altitude flight0 feel) andpeed would complicate defensive problems. However, for attacking targets at ranges beyondadar horizon theof the system is limited byorward observer, such as an aircraft, ship, or submarine, to providedata to the launching submarine.

he Soviets could add flexibility to theystem by programming the missile for high altitude (light, thereby extending its range touch awould provide greater diversification in the system's capability to attack both land and sea targets There isossibility thai the Soviets willerrain-clearance guidance system to permit flighteet altitude over rugged terrain.apability could be incorporated Intosystems within the next year or so. and could enable Soviet cruise missile submarines to direct either high or low altitude attacks at inland targets.

C. Estimated force levels Through

hc USSK will continue to expand its missile submarine forces, and improved mis-

siles and submarines will probably become operaUonal in the near future, but there is much uncertainty as lo Ihe scope andof the Soviel missile submarine programs at present. We believe that constructionlass subs endedut it is possible lhal there will be additional constructionodified versionuccessorballistic missile Class. By thu means the Soviets could increase the size ol their force of ballistic missile submarines even if there arc continued limitation'- on theirof submarines with nuclear power.

hipyard deliveries of nuclearhave been relatively constant atnits per yearut we believe that this rate can be increased to scener more per year. The Soviets have divided this output among ballistic missile, cruise missile, and torpedo attack classes, and we believe they will desire additional units Of all three types In order to meet their varied operational requirements. It seems probable that,ew nuclear powered ballistic missile class has iu facl been developed lo employm submerged-launch missile,lass construction program is giving way to it.

ith respect lo cruise missile classes, we estimate continued construcuon of thclass, and we believe that the appearance of thelass means that additional diesei-powered units will utso be built. We expect construction to be at least at the rates previously observed for building submarines of these general types, and It is possible that the Soviets may now be placing additional emphasis on the cruise missilebecause of the capability of this weapon system for attacking both land and sea targets.

n the table below, lhe ranges arise not only from our uncertainty as lo the scale and pace of introduction of additional missllabut also from uncertainty as to whether new classes of ballistic missile subs

are in (act under construction to. submerged-launch ballistic missiles, we have no basis for estimating the exactof missiles which new classes of ballistic missile submarines will carry, but we think it likely that such designs would incorporate more than the three missile tubes carried by thc older classes. It is also possible that there will be some retrofittinglass subs. missile over thc next year or so. We estimate as follows the size and composition of Soviet missile submarine forces

ESTIMATEOVIET OPERATIONAL MISSILE

1 OCT MID- 4 5

Ballistic Nuclear

It-class' and/or*r 11

Diesel

Z-class I'i r more

tube:;l

TOTAL

Nuclear, Eclair.ubes)

lass tzubes) 12 12 <4

TOTALM

'lass units possibly will)n submerged-launch missiles, c; class, if retrofitted, may have two launch tubes.

* Successor classes (would be equipped. submersed launch missiles.

D. Operafionol Capabilities

he pattern o( submarine deployment indicates assignment of the bulk of themissile lorcc to operations in theand assignment of the preponderance of the cruise missile force to the Pacific area. At present, somef theperational missile submarines are part of the

Northern Fleet, while the remainder areto the Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, most of the cruise missile submarines (Including all thc nuclear-powered unils) are wiih thc Pacific Fleet.

Whereas tlie diesei-powered ballistic missileould perform patrols ofl! coasts ol LhcUS, theonversion cruise missile submarines would requirereplenishment at sea in order to perform extended anti-shipping patrols. All thesubs possess adequate range for any operation, but engineeringhave plaguedlass since itsinto the fleet. On at least fivein the past four years (the mosl recent known j> us isropulsion plant failures aboard nuclear submarines Havetheir being towed back Lo base. The propulsion system aboard thelass is very noisy, and the normal operating depth limit ol thc submarine Is estimated to be onlyeet, whereas the depthoflass is estimated ateet.

A key missing ingredient in theof operational capabilities continues to be the conduct of realistic patrols to potential launch areas. We know of no routine patrols off the US or even off Western Europe.routine patrols to these areas could begin al any time. We believe lhal by thes at least some Soviet missile submarines will be engaging in routine patrols in open ocean areas.

According to Soviet classifiedthe main mission of cruise missile submarine forces is to aid in countering Western naval nuclear strike forces,US carrier task forces. It isapability exists to attack land targets, and recent missile Improvements are enhancing this capability. We still do not understand lhe exact method of employment

of these cruise milsS- Soviel- documentsthat ilaircraft willto locate ship targets. Homingagainst such targets is probablyactive radar aboard the missile,by passive techniques. Weknow how the missile would beany particular unitarge task (orce.

V. LONG RANGE BOMBER

ontinued Investment in improving Long Range Avialion (LHA) indicates lhal the USSR plans lo maintain sizable bomber forces for at least lhe nenr term.over the past few yearsew medium bomber,of air-to-surface missiles, and improved aerial refueling capability.econdary role of LRA. and maritime activity Involving both heavy and medium bombers of LHA has Increasedthe past year or so.

A. Force Lovcii and Equipment

oviet LRA, by reason of ita equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than forattack. The bulk of the force isin the Western USSR, the Ukraine, and the southern portion of lhc Soviel Far East. BLINDER Is the only bomber known to be In production, but thereindications that there may be some new producUon of BEAR bi addition to modification- The evidence alsoelatively stable number of medium bombers in inventory over the past two years or so. As ofRA is estimated lo compriseeavyedium bombers and tankers. The heavy bomber force includes5 BISON jet bombers0 BEAR turbo-props. Of lhe medium bombers,re BLINDER, with supersonic dashand tho remainder are BADGER. There

areADGERsLINDERS in Naval AviatWn.

ecent trends point to little change In lhe aircraft ivnglhtA over thc nexl Lwo years. While wc cannoi exclude thethat Khrushchev will Institute areduction In thc numbers of BADGERs in LRA. we believe hase out in BADGER strength is more likely and lhat It will be compensated in part by the further introduction of BLINDERs." This aircraft has appeared In two configurations: the BLINDERomb carrier, and thc BLINDERissile carrier. Although only the BLINDER "B" has been observedefuelingefuelingcould be developed for BLINDER "A" at any time. Thc small-scale deployment of BLINDER and relatively low rate oflead us to beheveodest force will be deployed in the next two years

lthough research and development on heavy aircraft is under way. nofor BEAR or BISON is in sight.Khrushchev's recent assertion Lhat thc USSR has no strategic bombers in production and continued indications ofemphasis on missiles lor strategic attack, there is considerable evidence to supportSoviet research on large mannedalthough no follow-on bomber program can be identified. arge,bomber design of medium range, isbeing usedest bed and wc doubt that il will enter inventory as anbomber. In any event, the lack oftesting or production evidence leads us lo consider it unlikelyew heavy bomber could enter the ope rationalof Long Range Aviation beforeurther modiflcaUon andeavy bomber types is possible, andeven some new production of BEARs.

lfferinc. view sec Assistant Chlel of SUff. intelligence. USAF footnote lo Table alaragraph 98

TOP SECRET-

estimate as follows theof LRA through

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF

I Oct

ankers Heavy

BISON 5

ft BAH . 0

TOTAL

Medium

BADGER

BLINDER . ..

TOTAL

The Assistant Chief or Staft, Intelligence. USAF sees no reason lo expect reduction of the BADGFR force Ineriod. He believes the medium bomber force will be quite stable in size, and might expand somewhat as the BADGER units attritomewhat slower rate than BLINDERS areinlo the force.rogram would retain an established capability while re-equipmentwith newractice which has been noted before in Soviet aviation. The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAP estimates the near-term medium bomber strengUi of the USSR as follows:

13 0 5

TOTAL 0 5

He further believes thc heavy bomber force will remain alombers In this period, although the BEAR/BISON mix may chanceIntroductionunger-endurance aircraft based on the BEAR could4 or

Soviets have providedtandoff capabilityintroduction of thc Kangaroosupersonic cruise missile with aagainst land targetswas probably designed for usetargets, but may have limitedagainst naval formations, withaccuracy andajorprogram has been under wayto equip BEARs for delivery of the AS-3,

*malcri characteristics and performance of these and other Soviet air to surface missiles, see Annex A. Table 4.

SO BEARs have been so modified to date.

We believe that all LRA mediumequipped with anti-shipping ASMs have been transferred to Naval Aviation. Both BISON and BEAR heavy bombers havereconnaissance over OS carrier task forces, and some ol these aircraft wereequipped for the reconnaissance role. This use of long range bombers was advocated In classified Soviet military writings, in which naval officers urged the use of these aircraft, parlicularly the BEAR, for maritimeIn view of the navalmissions performed by BEAR aircraft we cannol exclude the possibility that some BEARs will be transferred to Naval Aviation. However, we believe that atlock on landremains the primary mission of most BEAR aircraft, and have made no allowance for transfers in our estimate of the future composition of Long Range Aviation.

A new supersonic ASM. the KITCHENs being developed for thc BUNDERvidence on this missile is limited. II isoost glideustained cruise missile. IL was probably developed for use against land targets but some evidencenaval use as well. It could beby

B. Operational Capobililies 11

major obstacle to thecapabilities fur intercontinental attackhas heen the limiled range of the BISON

'For detailed csUmates of thc characteristics and performance of Soviet medium and heavy bomber weapon systems, see Annex A, Tablennex B, maps.

'The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF differs in part from Uie argument In. He believe* altcnUon should be focused on how many bombers could reach targets In the Untied Stales if. as could be expected In wartime, the USSR made an all-out effort to augment its still-small ICDM capability with Strategic bombers. Suchl-out effort would appear particularly likely In view of Soviet concern over the Importance of the inlUal nuclear exchange.

(Fnnlnole cunt, on

-ff>P

and BADGER aircraft which make up thc bulk of the force. The emphasis on aerial refueling and Arctic training of the pastyears reflect Soviet efforts to overcome this limitation. The USSR has not developed an aircraft specifically for useanker, instead, UISONs andrefor use as tankers with their bomber counterparts BLINDERS could possibly also refuel from these tankers, but because of their shorter range probably would not be used against the continental US, except Alaska.

Some BEAHs are now being modified for in-flight refueling. This modification was probably undertaken because of the range penalty involved in carrying the AS-3and possibly to increase enduranceeconnaissance mission. AboutEARs have been modified for probe and drogue refueling, and wc believe lhat additional UKARs will be so modified. BEAR is probably refueledISON tanker.

Even with aerial refueling, the capa bUIUes of LRA for intercontinental attack remain limited. Refueled BADGERs would be able lo reach targets in the extremeportion of the continental US on two-way missions from Arctic bases, but they would have little flexibility of routing and tactics. However. BADGERs on two-waycould provide coverage of many targets in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. Anmanual for thc BADGER indicates that thc range ol this aircraft is less than wc have estimated. These data are presently under

Considering all factors except combat attriUott. the Assistant Chief of Slaff. intelligence. USAFthe USSR could put moreombers over North American UiE"Ui on two-way missions and still leave several hundred medium bombers in attack targets In Eurasia

Since the BADGER canombield four limes as large as that of the warhead of anissile, the Soviets might uUllse BADOKRS on one-way missions an part ot the Initial attacks, &nd In this case the number of bombers reaching the Onlted States could.

intensive study The BISON would require both Arctic staging and inlhght refueling to cover the bulk of US targets on two wayUnrefueled BEARs could reach manyn northeastern US direclly from their home bases, but would probably stage through the Arctic when equipped withr bomb loads0 lbs or more, in order to gain extensive coverage of US targets. Refueled BEAHs carryingould reach many US largets direclly from their home bases

raining patterns and rangeof Soviet bombers indicate that aircraft attack against thc US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively. We have previously estimated that thc Soviets would commit their entire heavy bomber force lo this mission as weapons carriers andConsidering the requirements lor Arctic staging, refueling, and non-combat attrition factors, the Sovicls could5 heavy bombers over target areas in the United States on two-way missions. However, theuse of Soviet heavy bombers in maritime reconnaissance roles leads us to believeew such aircraft might be diverted to this mission

IM. The scale of the initial bomber attack could be increased should thc Soviets choose to commit BADGER medium bombers to two-way Intercontinental missions. Considering the probably use of less suitable Arcticas staging bases, refueling, and non-combat attrition factors, we believe that upedium bombers could arrive over North American target areas on two-wayThese bombers could attack Oreenland. Canada, and Alaska, and portions ofUnited States.

he SovieU could further increase the number of bombers arriving over Northshould they resort to one-way unrefueled attacks with medium bombors. In order to conduct such attacks Ihey would need to use BADGER crews which had not participated in Arctic training. Wiih the growing Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces this use

--top

of thc medium bomber force becomes increas ingly unlikely.

c consider it probable that initial attacks would be mounted in successive waves and extendonsiderable number of hours.

VI. SPACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

oxamined in* theeconomic, andoviet decision on thenuclear-armed satellites. At that time Itto ua that, for the near term, theto thc USSK would outweigh theand we estimated that thethe Soviets woulduclearthe next two years or so were lessThe course of subsequent events,the USSR's acceptance of alest ban and its cultivation of anof relaxed internationalstrengthened this view. Oromyko'sbefore the UN inhat the USSR may be willing toa declaratory agreement with thewhich both sides undertake not toweapons in space. Even If nois reached, we think Itthe Soviets will decide loG5.

thc Soviets neverthelessplace nuclear weapons in orbit duringtwo years, we estimate that, usingbooster with suitable upper staging,assemble andractionalnuclear-armed satellite atwithout prior testing Thepredictable reliability and accuracy,woulderies of testsatear after an Initialsuch lesluig, thc USSR probably could

Soviet Capabilities and Intentions to Orbit Nuclear5ECRET. RD. This estimate contains an examination of Soviel technical capabilities for orbitalsystems ond the characteristics of various systems which the USSR might deploy in various time periods.

mall number of bombardmentwllh CEP's on the ordernd orbital lifetimes ranging up to several months. The nuclear payload could

ombination of thcCBMenik upper stage were used for launching.

we think that lhe Sovietslouclear weapon in lheyears, we believe that they willinvestigate the feasibility of orbitalsystems, weighing the possibleeffectiveness of such systemsof alternative delivery systems. Weno test activity or otherthe Soviets are working along thesewe would not necessarily detect andsuch work prior to an initialEven without any special efforts,In this field will improve incourse of continued developmenttechnology, ICBMs, and space

VII. MAJOR SUPPORTING ELEMENTS A. Command and Control

During the past two or three years the Soviet military high command structure has apparently been modified to speed thc process of initiating or responding to strategicattack. The growth of nuclear andforces on both sides has almost certainly persuaded the Soviels to establish theand control channels necessary for thc swift initiation of military operations upon the decision of lhc political leadership. Our Information does notirmol lhe flexibility of response andconirol which the Sovlot highcould exercise over long range striking forces during the course of combat operations, but the general picture is one of lessand precision than in comparable US forces.

Khrushchev's position in the military command structure corresponds roughly to lhat of tlie rresident oi thc US. We have information, some of it from classified docu-

merits and some from public statements, aboutupreme Military Council and aHigh Command; Khrushchev isoi thc Council and Supreme High Com mnnder. Theody ol high-level parly, government and military officials, lias existed since before World War II toorum for discussion and decision on major issues of military policy. The Supreme High Command directed military operations during World War II with Stalin at its head, but was disbanded thereafter. Such information as we have suggests that steps Imve been taken in recent years to designate membership in the Supreme High Command and to develop procedures to permit the quick assumption by this body of top level control of militaryunder Khrushchev should events so dictate.

IM. At the present lime, there is not. ao far as weingle, unified military command for all elements of thc Soviet long range striking forces Coordination ofamong the three long range striking forces is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, whose General StafT Is responsible for planning and probably targeting for the entire military establishment Long Range Aviationajor nir command, missile-launching submarines and some medium bombers are assigned lo Soviet fleets, and the missile forces have been designated amain component of the armed forces. Documentary Information indicate that low-echelon units of missile forces, bombers, and submarines can be operationally controlledfrom Moscow.

c have no reason to suppose that there are any major weaknesses In theand control of long-rnngeor of Soviet missile submarines. Long Range Aviation has exUtedeparatethroughout the post-war period, and missile submarines have been assigned lo fleets for about five years Thus, bothand missile submarines are attached to older commands which haveumber

ears to develop and refine theirand control arrangements. On the other hand, the Strategic Rocket Forces have new and pressing requirements in this Held which are shared by neither bombers nor sub marines. Classified Soviet documents liave indicated thai as recentlyhesewere not being met, and that serious shortcomings existed incontrol, and data-processing within the Strategic Rocket Forces. These shortcomings probably stemmed both from the newness of the organization (announcednd the novelty of its command and control They were probably aggravated by the relatively rapid pace of missile deploymentnd evidently by shortages of data-handling equipment at unit level. At that time the Soviets were dissatisfied withand control procedures as they afTected the reaction time of missile units, and they have been attempting lo speed them up through automation. Wc believe that these deficiencies have been largely overcome.

B. Long Range Reconnahiance

c believe that the USSR has devoted considerable effort U> pinpointing potential targets for strategic atiack in the US and elsewhere. Thc Sovicls are probably able to achieve satisfactory target location data employing overhead reconnaissance High competence in geodetic mappingthe USSR with an excellent base; we currently estimate that the Soviet geodetic error in location of US missile launch sites is on the ordereet. Bythe wealth of open source material in the US and adding refinements through clandestine operalions, the USSR can probably locate Mlnuteman silos,eneral rangeeet. Considering thc combination ofgeodetic ond targel-locatlon errors, we estimate that, In general, the USSR is able to locate US targetsotal error or less lhanile.

tonwn-

and up to-date information on the location and movement of keyforcesigh priority SovietIn peacetime, this requirement ismet in large part by the extensive Soviet direction-finding effort, which permitsOf Western communications circuits and the units employing them. The Sovieteffort couldigh degree of effectiveness under wartime or alertin the absence of strict Westernsecurity measures and electronic emission control. The USSR supplements this efiort by such means as the exploitation of open sources, clandestine observation, and signal interceptariety of meanstrawlers.

Reconnaissance in support of Soviet long range striking forces could be further improved by the use of satellites employing electronic, optical and Infrared sensors. We believe that in the past year the Soviets have employed the "Cosmos" satellites launched from Tyuratam on photographic missions. We cannot estimate detailed characteristics for this system, but the payload capability of these satellites0onsiderable potential for experimentation and growth.

In conducting any long range attack, thc Soviets would desire to learn as rapidly as possible which targets had survived their initial strikes. We have no direct evidence on the Soviet approach to this problem. In theory, existing high-frequency back-scatter antennas located within the USSR could rapidly determine the general areas and yields of large nuclear explosions in the US. However, thc Soviets could probably not be sure in advance whether this remotetechnique would be able lo distinguish the exact locations and yieldsargeof nuclear warheads detonating over the UShort period of time. In any event, the information obtained wouldnot be precise enough to be used for retargeting ICBMs. It might assist in pro-

gramming post-attack reconnaissance more effectively.

more precise post-attackthe USSR would probablyaircraft which would have theof being able to seek out andtargets missed In lhe first phase, oruncertain location, without having toto other attackSoviets have developed aaircraft (MANDRAKK),to, whieh has an operatingfor use against Eurasianaddition, some of Iheir presentbe employedeconnaissancereconnaissance of targetsmight be performed byaerodynamic vehicles. Suchbecome operational within the nexlMore comprehensive damagecould be achieved by employingsatellites.

C. Electronic Warfare and Countermeasures

capabilities to disruptand tactical communicationsThe Soviets have developedrange of active and passive ECMincluding improved chaff, radar,jammers and variousdevices lo counter Westernsystems, such asdefense radar, and navigation aids.present capabilily covers all thefrequencies used by the West,frequencies up0ndhigher. Existing Sovietarc not likely to be effectiveof thc more advanced USsystems, such as thoseand troposphcric scalier.are continuing to enhance thisand equipment lhat will probablyavailable in the future willimprovements as greater powersophistication.

SCCRCi

irborne Systems The Soviets would probably employ some bombers in an ECM role All units of Long Range Aviation are probably equipped and trained in thc use of both mechanical and electronic ECM. Al! Soviel bombers con be equipped to carry chaff, and they have demonstrated capabilities for its employmentide variety ofconditions. Air-to*surface missiles designed to home on radar transmitters, air-launched decoys to simulate bomber radar returns, and infrared decoy flares to counter heat-seeking air-to-air missiles could also be made available provided the Soviets see a for them. Soviet aircraft are equipped with electronic jammers and have used them repeatedly in exercises- Future Improvements could Include broader band jammers, higher powered and more automatic equipment, and increased use of deception techniques.

ouniermeasuret for Naval Uft. Inyears, the Soviets have given increased emphasis to development of shipboard ECM equipment, but such equipment is of only limited value to the long range striking forces. Because of the risk of detection, wc doubt that Soviet submarines would employ active jamming, but passive Intercept gear would be used lo provide warning of Western radar and sonar search activity.

issile and Satellite Application. The Sovieis probably are continuing research on the reduction of radar cross-sections ofnosccones. and may achieve significant results within the nexl five years. They have probably Investigated various techniques for confusing radar, such as tankage vectoring and decoys to simulate missile nosccones They may also develop active ECM, multiple warheads,or inclusion In ballisticreentry systems.

VIII. TRENDS IN STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES,

. General Comiderations

rom the preceding analysis we canumber of characteristics which have

the building ol long range strike forces in the USSH:

The USSR's research and development programs, as reflected in thc expansion of test ranges and the development of successive weapon systems, have been vigorous

In contrast, the scale and pace ofprograms have been uneven. Some systems, particularly those suited forEurasia, have been deployed steadily and in large numbers. Others, such as Individual types of heavy bombers. ICBMS. and missile submarines, have often been produced and deployed In relatively small numbers.

This behavior has reflected, in part, technical problems and economic constraints But it also suggests lhat the USSR ls willing toondition of limitedcapabilities and considerableover long periods of time.

Both doctrinal discussions and some reatures of weapons design, such asand relatively slow reaction times,that Soviet thinking aboul theproblems of long range attack has been loss sophisticated than that of thc US.

well-defined strategic conceptto have governed the forcesdate. Thc present composition of thenot suggcsl that It was designedfor either preemption or retaliation.

resent deployment and developmental efforts indicate that the USSR, despite thepublic stress on surface-to-surfacehas retained diversified forces

12C. In NIE, we examined the ways In which thc Soviets might employ their long range attack forces in lime of war. Wein that estimate that the Soviet target concept is very broad and that, whilenuclear delivery capabilities top the list, the USSR plans lo strike at olher military targets and at centers of communication,and Industry, making no special effort to minimize civilian casualties.

We estimated that,reemptiveduring the near term, the USSR would probably direct ICBMs and bombers against North America and MRBM/lRBMs. medium bombers, and missile submarines against Eurasian targets. We drew attention to the special difficulties of achieving simultaneity, locating US forces at sea, and attacking hard targets We concluded that the Soviet long range strike forces would be inadequate to permit the USSR to launch Initial attacks without expecting to receive devastating blows in return. In the same estimate, we noted the limitations on the USSR's ability toits long range strike forces againstWe pointed out, however, that byof hardening ln the land-based missile force and improvements In the missileforce, the Soviets were reducing the vulnerabilityortion of the force tn order to provide it with some prospect of survival and retaliation.

Tn the succeedingonths, the USSR has expanded its forces and has made Improvements in the performanceof various systems. There Is evidence that questions of the character of general nuclear war and strategies for its conduct continue to be discussed. In none of these areas have changes appeared whichalter our appraisal of the USSR's near-term capabilities or indicate radically newto questions of strategy. But If thc outlook for the next two years is relatively unchanged, the prospects for therc far lessariety of factors could influence the numerical size, the mix of various systems, and the characteristics of individual weapon systems in the total force which will be deployed by

Technical Factors. Much will depend upon the specific successes achieved among the numerous RAD projects which now may be going forward. If. for example, thewere io succeed inew ICBM which could be dispersed and main-

tained al much less expense than currenl systems, ihey would probably concentrate on it In their deployment program. If not, pres. ent and improved versions of theystem would prolxibly represent the bulk of ICBM capabilities added duringG9Wc know that thc USSR isubmerged launch submarine system of MRBM range, but because of uncertainties about such (actors as the time of availability and the operational effectiveness of thcand its missile, we cannot predict how heavily the USSR will invest inystem

.ffrateoic Concepts. We are confident that the desire for an effective deterrent is one of ihc primary concerns in Soviet policy toward long range striking forces. Wcthis concern to be reflected in anemphasis on survivability through hardening of ground-based missiles,of thc submarine force, and perhaps the adventobile MRBM. We believe that the Soviets alsoigh deterrent value to very-hlgh-yicld warheads calculated toopponents by threatening cities,ihey probably also see some military utility in these weapons for such purposes as attacks on key hardened installations. We believe that the concept of deterrence isadvocated by those who, for more general reasons as well, wish to aim at fairly moderate-sized forces. We have no basis for estimating the force levels which might be associated In the Soviet mind with adeterrent posture.

Various classified and publicsuggest that, as Soviet military leaders have begun to comprehend the giganticolax in which the West strikes first, they havere emptive strategy upon the politicalThe military requirementsully effective preemptive strategy are themselves gigantic, although we are not certain that Soviet mllllury thought fully appreciates these requirements yet Arguments derived from

29

concept or preemption may imparl to Soviet programming during this period an upward pressure beyond levels which Soviet planners might ussociatn with the concept of deterrence. On thc other hand, evidence ol current military programs and generaland economic trends in the USSRus that Soviet policy in the latter half ol lhc decade will not be governed by an all-out eflort to achieve extensive capabilities for preemption against programmed Western strike forces.1

Economic Constraints. Expenditures on forces for strategic attack, plus those for strategic defense, have been the most active elements in Soviet miliiary spendingising bySespectively while total militaryIncreased by aboutercent. These increases have greatly improved Sovietcapabilities, but they have been among the important causes of the general economic slowdown of recent years, and this slowdown hashiei concern of the Soviel

While forces best suited for Eurasian use accounted for the bulk of spending on the long range attack missionon Intercontinental systems have shown more rapid growth and consumed well over half of2 outlays on long range attack. With the MRBM/IRBM forceoff and BLINDERS being producedelatively moderate rate. RirD and investment

' The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF would reword the last two sentences as follows:

"Our evidence ol current miliiary thinking, even in view of ecncral poliUcal and economic trends In the USSR, suggests that Soviet military policy In the latter half or the decade may be shapedonsiderable extent by further efforts topre-emptive attack capabilities. In any event, arguments derived from thc concepl of prc-cmpUon probably will Impart lo Soviet programming during this period an upward pressure beyond levels which Soviel planners might associate with the concept of deterrence."

In weapon systems designed for the Eurasian theaters will decrease substantially in the luture, although opernling expenditures will remain high. Thus, Uie USSR has some new flexibility in the current period which will enable It to increase expenditures onelements and systems forattack, or reduce spending on total long range strike force, or choose somesoluUon. We believe that because of other demands, boUi military and non-military. Uie Soviets probably will notincreasing total spending for long range attack atate, which averaged aboutercent annually. We expect some continued although more gradual rise in these allocations.'

ffects of Other Programs. Othercompete with strategic attack forces, not only for resources in the broad sense, but also for scarce skills ond quality materials necessary to all technologically advancedStrategic defenseajor claimant in this competition. We believepending on antimissile defense will conUnueigh rate during Uie period of thiswhatever decisions are taken about ABM deployment. The economic demands of Uie Soviet space program are also substantial and draw on the same resources. Ine believe that Uie USSR would have greatdifficulty Inolicy which called for antimissile defenses of major cities, competition with Uie space program which the US has scheduled for this period, and the higherIn numbers andour estimates for long range strike forces which appear In succeeding paragraphs.

'The Assistant Chief of SUff. Intelligence. USAF considers It more likely lhat thc rate of expenditure Tor strategic systems will continue to rise at leasi i> rapidly In thc coming years as it has. since these expenditures probably will Include mill, taiy space systems as well as follow-on missile and manned systems.

jCCRLI

-TGf-StOfT-

present Soviel view of thc likely character of future war also Imposes on thc USSR lhc requirement to maintain largeforces. Expenditures on this mission, while Ihey have declined somewhat In receni years, are still very large;, according to our estimates, they equalled about two-thirds of the combined expenditures onattack and strategic defense. If the Soviets mamlain theater lorces at theirsize and pursue the attempt to provide them with Improved equipment and adequate supporting elements, these expendituresbe substantially reduced, although they can probably be held at about the present levels. We believe that the proper level of manpower and expenditures In the theater forces is likely loubject of continuing contention in the coming period, and it is possible lhat at some point substantial cuts will be made, thereby easing economicsomewhat.

Political Factors. In the present and prospective strategic situation confronting the USSR, there is much which arguesolicy of safeguarding national security through some fairly moderate level of military strength or even, more radically, through International agreements to limit or reverse thc arms race. The experience of the past five years should show the Soviet leaders that their chief opponent is well able to match and overmatch them in numbers of long range delivery vehicles and Is no less able than they to develop improved systems withperformance characteristics Similarly. Khrushchev has had occasion,cries of crises, to observe the limits on lhc roleong range strike force can play inSoviet political objectives. At the same time, his advocacyigher priority for certain civilian economic programs appears to be growing stronger.

Our survey of current evidence on both development and deployment of systems for strategic attack suggests no radical change responsive to these considerations, but ralher

a general Soviet intention to continuetheir capabilities The possibiUticsore substantial change in Soviet policy hinge in large part upon more generalchanges, suchew sense of thc Soviet position in world affairs urlsing out of the Slno-Sovlet conflict,ew Soviet Judgment about the value of strategic attack forces In supporting the USSR's political objectives

IM In framing the estimates whichwe have attempted to take intoall these factors, along with the spr cine evidence available concerning the various categories of long range weapon systems. These estimates are necessarily imprecise and are expressed in ranges meant to indicate the upper and lower limits outside which, in thc absence of an arms control agreement, actual strength in therobably will not fall.

B. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces

here is now available to us abody of evidence from many sources, both on lhe general patterns of Sovietpolicy and programs and on theand deployment of long-range striking forces in recent years, from which it is possible lo identify several broad trends likely to apply to the future growth of ICBM and otherforces. It appears quite likely that present Soviet programming calls for thc acquisition of some hundreds of ICBM launchers for missiles with multiroegatonthough the specific site andof the force in thes could vary considerably within this general range.lo improve survivability and readiness arc evidently under way; the hardeningortion of the land-based missile forces and the development of advanced submarinesystems point lo Soviet concern to have protected retaliatory capabilities

MO. None of the evidence available to us suggests, however, that the USSRforces designed to neutralize US strike

TOP SECRET

in an initial blow, nor do thc Soviets appear to be seeking to match the US hi numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles. Soviet strategic attack programs place great emphasis on ICBMs, bul these weapons are sharing available resources with olher land-based and submarine systems, and we believe the USSR is investigating the feasibility of space weapons systems Moreover, past Soviet investment in air defense and the vigor of ABM research suggest that the USSR may see its security best servedombination of antimissile defenses and enormouslythough still numerically inferior,strike forces. Our evidence thus leads us to believe lhat the Soviets seeachievementsariety offields, including ICBMs, as the best way of improving thc USSR's strategic positionto that of the US.

rogram lead times and the general character of present Soviet missile andweapon technology will significantly affect lhc size and composition of the ICBM force foreriod. The major Soviet long-range missile programs which have been observed to date have required someto 3vi years from thc initiation ofof research and development launch facilities to achievement of an IOC, and at least two years more loignificant force level,perational launchers. It is doubtful that the lower limit of these lead time ranges can be appreciably reduced. In general, therefore, any new ICBM systems to be deployed in quantity durings would need to be under development already or to begin development shortly.

Evidence of RAD Activities

esearch and development activities at the Tyuratam missile test range, indicate that tho Soviets will conLlnue to improve and expand their ICBM force In thc periodurrent activity at Tyuratam almost certainly includes preparation for further space ventures and product improvement on

existing ICHM systems as well as development on new weapons systems.

the available evidence isconcerning the specific natureimprovements lo existing ICBMssystems, wi> have based ouron these matters in large pari onneed to correct deficiencies in theforce, tendencies in Soviet missileSoviet technical capabilities.

Improved and Fotiowon Systems

Large ICBMs. We continuethat the Soviets areillion or more poundswhich could be used asglobalr as awarheads yielding upT.that test firings begin within themonths,ehicle couldan initial operaUonal capabililyof such aIs employee as an ICBM. thesites would probably be soft. Tothe vulnerability ofystemmaximize its contribution to strategicthe Soviets would probably wishhardening at some stage inbut there are high costs andobstacles which might limit thehardness practicable, or perhapsentirely.

FoUoa-Ort ICBMs.that the Soviets would considerqualitative improvements neededbulk of the ICBM force to beshorter reaction time, bolterand decreased logistic andA Soviet decision lo developa basically new ICBM in the SS-7would depend largely on their viewpossibilities of meeting theirthrough productcurrent systems. These requirementsbe met almosi as well and atcost by product improvements tosystem asollow-on system ofgeneral type and weight.

TOP uLOcf-f

ew ICBM system or product improvement lo theould probablynew launch site configurationsforce survivability and decreasing support requirements. New configurations maysemi-hard sites, or new single launcherard sites providing for much greater dispersal. Deployment sites of improvedcould be under construction iu the near future and become operational fn the periodo

Soviet development of an ICBMas small as the US Mlnuteman would run counter to trends thus far discernible in Soviet long range missile systems and weapons designs. The Soviet chemical industry,those elements which have toto the development of large grain solid propellants, is one of the basic weaknesses of Soviet technology. Further, at present we have very little evidence on recent Sovietond development to supportolid or exotic fueled ICBM as small as Minuteman could become operational inime period. Nevertheless, some of the operational attributes of theconcept would reduce the mainin the SovietItsto US attack. The Soviets might findew system could go considerably further towards remedying this weakness than would an improvedndystem might also reduce thc highrequirements associated with their present systems.

A new missile somewhat smaller thansing improved propellants could reach operational status in the period. We believe it likely thatew smaller missile would be deployed in hard sites. We believeew, silo-launched, smaller missile would not start test firings forear and IOC would not occur. Should the Soviets elect toew missile in soft or semi-hard sites, test firing could begin in the near future with an IOC in about

Composition and Size ol the ICtlM

hether through productintroduction of new missile systems, or both, the Soviets will Increase theof their ICBM force significantlythe period. Inasmuch as Uie USSR has concentrated primarily on liquid propulsion in the post-war period, while emphasizingof efficient large nuclear warheads. Uie bulk of the Soviet long range attack forces operaUonal prior to9 will consist of liquid-fueled missiles capable of delivering warheads fromoT. Wcthai iot.il deliverable megatonnage will be increased by Increased load carrying char-octcristics of standard sized missiles andby introductionery large ICBM. Tic accuracy of missiles added lo theforce during the period may be. CEP. Decoys, other penetration aids, and warhead shielding could boat any time,acrifice in pay-load, should the Soviets consider that they arc required. Although there Is evidence of Soviet Interest in decoys, there ls no known Soviet program to develop them.

Wc estimate thai the deployment of currently operational missiles In soft launch sites will cease by Uies. The con struct ton of sites foray continue through Uie period, and may Includehard or perhaps semi-hardA smaller system could becomeineriod and could be deployedapid rate. Very large ICBMs with warheads yielding upT could enter inventory, and would probably be deployed in rclaUvely smallto supplement the force.

The low side of our estimate0 launchers) assumes that, in addition lo deploymentew very large ICBMs which

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAK disagrees In part with the analysis contained inec his footnote to Table on page 3Q.

begin lo enter operational inventory inne SovieU will at about the same time introduceew, somewhat smaller IcnM or an improvedossibly In singlc-Uunchsr hard sites. It further assumes that when the number of hard silosevel ofabouthe SovieU will consider the resultant force, in conjunction with other strategic weapon systems, andeterrent. The reasons why thc Soviet force might develop In this manner include such economic considerations as the need to devote more resources to thc civilian economy or lo anti-missile and space programs as well as political factors.

he high side of our estimate for0akes into account the possibility that the deployment of soft launchers, perhaps including some semi-hardened sites, ls carried somewhat further than in the preceding alternative;ery large system is introduced somewhat earliernd thataunchersewImprovedew,smaller hard system, possibly in single silodeployed. Construction oforce might reflect notoviet concern for deterrence, but also an effort to put the USSRomewhat better position toa preemptive attackestern strike appeared imminent and unavoidable.

lthough the force levels indicated by the upper and lower limiu of the range are derived from technical and strategicother force compositions and force levels within this general range are equally possible. Considering the probability ofin development and deploymentfor estimated new and improved ICBMs, we consider it unlikely that the operational force9 willaunchersthe extent of present deployment activity and the Soviel requirement toa credible deterrent, we doubt that the force will level off with feweraunchers. In both cases, the SovieU would recognize lhat the force fell far short

of lhal requiredreemptive attack which might reduce devastation of the USoR to an accepUble level, but In either case, the force wouldrotected component capable of devastating retaliatory blows if it survived.'

C. Medium ond Intermediate Range Ballijtic Mivtilc Forcei

s indicated in our near-termwe believe that thend SS-5programs have about run their course.he operational force will probably have levelled off ataunchers (someercent of themull refire capability for soft launchers will probably be available, and an Improved MRBM may have begun lo enter the force. Beyond this point, the course of the program willnot only on the general factors described in preceding paragraphs, but also on Soviet technical possibilities in the MRBM/IRBM field and on trends in Western forces on the Eurasian periphery.

mong the technical possibUitles, the most important is the Soviet option towith developmentew IRBM having advantages over then accuracy,reacUon time, maintenance, and sophistication of warhead design. If twosystems are developed, the IRBM would probably phaseear or so after the MRBM, Le, in. It is also possible that the SovieU have elected lo workingle lollow-on system which, by about the same lime period, could cover all MRBM and IRBM ranges. In either event, follow-onare likely to feature hard or possiblydeployment.

Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsl>epartraent of the Navy believes the force level is likely to be toward the lowf thc estimate presented here. In addtuon to the reason me set forth innd the last sentence of. he would addorce level. while adding appreciably lo the cost of the program, would neither increase the Soviet deterrent posture commensuralcly nor even approach an ac-ccptlble capability for preemptive attack.

frPf-

ESTIMATED SOVIET OPERATIONAL ICBM

CONFIG URATION

Launchers

and 2nd Generation'

250

Large ICBM .

Launchers

Generation (three silos}

(single launcher)

new smaller ICBMs

ew-25

:o:

(rounded}

iii

Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF believes the lower side of the ICBM-spread In this Table ls unrealisUcally low. and he considers that If the Soviets elect to focusew, small, more easily deployed system, the high side of the Table Ls too low.

slsLant Chief ol Staff. Intelligence. USaP forecasts two alternative Soviet ICBM force structures and considers that while tlie lower of these appears to be Uie more likely as of the present, thc higher alternative could well be Indl-eated by developments within the next two years.

. whichorceCBMs bys based on projection of present evidence or site construction and launcher activation rates. It Is quite similar ln composition to the high side of the spreads shown in ihe Table above.

Alternative II starts from the same base ins does Alternative I. but Alternative IImall, highly reliable ICBM, deployed in semihard or hard sites, which byould represent about hall of the entire ICBM forces.

Thc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF estimates the size of the Soviet ICBM force under these alternatives as follows-

0

Alternative II .. 0

' May Include some iemLhardencd sites. 'May Include some hardening

Assuming that the target systemessentially unchanged and thc newarc more effective, we believe the Soviets would feel under no pressure to expand their total MRBM/IRBM forceystems will probably supersedesystems, and may have largely replaced at least thehen that system will have been in operational service for nearlyears. Thus the proportion of hard sites (and of mobile launchers if introduced) will probably increase as the period advances. The re-use of existing deployment andareas by new missile systems is likely, but some redeployment can be expected as time passes.

he developments which we canin Western forces within range are not likely to add to potential Soviet MRBM/IBBM targetsajorexample,Polaris forces and possible mobile or seaborne MRBMs in NATO will be essentially untargetable by ballistic missiles. Webelieve it likely that Soviet MRBM/IRBM force levels will remain fairly constant, but we do not excludeeneral strengthening of NATO forces would generate enough concern in the USSR to result in some incrementalAssuming no arms control measures involving nuclear-free zones in Europe, it is possible lhat political and military develop-

menla in NATO and the Warsaw Fact will at some point lend the Sovicis to move some MRBIfl into Iho Salcllitcs, but we believe thc Soviets are highly unlikely to turn any over lo Satellite control. The Soviets will continue to retain their capability, exercised ino deploy Ihese systems rapidly to remote areas

have also considered thethe Soviets will come to view thea threat requiring, them lo allocate aof their MRBM/IRBM capability toemployment against China. Thca nuclear capability in the hands ofintransigent Chinese regimebring this about, inwe think lhatong period would beto influence Soviet ground forceLn areas near China, and perhapsthe Soviets to retain moreas BADGERs, capable of employingas well as nuclear weapons

D. Submarine-Launched AAissllo Forces

combined ballistic missile forceis likely lo beof whichillortion may. submerged-launchnumber of missiles carried by thiswill be at, and it maygreater if new classes ofhave more than three tubes each.will probably be engaged Inpatrols in open oceans, includingmissile range of US targets. Thethus add an important element oflo Soviet strategic attack

e think thc Soviets will continue to consider missile submarines an important adjunct to their ground-launched missileand we expect the requirement for capabilities to attack surface naval formations to continue. On the other hand, the growth of the force may be affected by the availa-

bility in the USSR of increasing quantities of militarily competitive but less expensiveilyeyond these generalisations, our estimateepends in considerableon the technical possibilities for stillimprovement in submarine missile

onger range missiles would haveover present systems, especially by allowing submarines to operate in broader ocean areas while remaining within range of potential targets. Although there is noindicating its ultimate use. if the new ballistic missile now being tested at Kapustin Yarange of. Is intended for submarine use, it could probably beIn limited numbers of submarinesr perhaps even slightly earlier, if an even longer range missile Is developed, It would probablyew submarine class designed specifically for it. andeapon system could becomeater in tlie period. In general, we think the the chances ofevelopment would be greater If the Soviets can develop at some reasonableystemargerof missiles per submarine. We have no evidence of work on now submarine projects beyond those about to become operational, but limitations in our ability lo acquire such evidence are such that new projects cancrational status without confirmation of their existence.

onsidering all factors, includingconstruction capabilities and programs and thc possibilities for Improved systems, wo believe that the number of additional nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines added to the forceould range fromo IS. This range is duo In part to ourabout future Soviet allocations ofsubmarines to the missions of torpedo attack and anti-submarine warfare Wethat construction of diesei-poweredmissile submarines will probably beby thes. Existing unils, with

-fep- see-ftef-

16

possible exception ol thelaw conversions, arc likely to remain in service throughout the decade.

Wc do nut anticipate significantchanges in the cruise missile submnrlne forceew missile withrange could be developed but this would increase thc problems of coordinating targeting and guidance Conversion ofnumbers oflass submarines seems unlikely. Some of thelass submarines, which are diesel powered but of significantly greater range, could be converted to theole in order to further enhance Soviet naval capabilities against Weslern naval surface forces and sea lines of communications. The number ofunits to be added to the forcesay be in the range

On the basis of these considerations, we estimate as follows the trends in Soviet missile submarine forces.

ESTIMATED SOVIKT OPERATION AL9

31

35

W

Loog-Rangc Bomber Forces"

ith the growth and improvement of missile capabilities, the Soviets wouldplan in thes to employ bomber forces in the follow-on attacks after Initial missile strikes had been delivered, or tothc retaliatory blow if the USSH were attacked first. Aircraft equipped withaids and nuclear weapons wouldbe used for increasingly specialized mis

The Assistant Chief of SUIT. Intelligent. UflAF, disagrees in part with Uie analysis presented inor his views see footnote following Table on

slorts. such as armed reconnaissancemaritime) and attacks on selected hard targets, as well as on targets of uncertain

location.

We believe that if thc USSR activelyork and commits funds for production and deployment, new military aircraft capable of intercontinental ranges could be brought to operational use Ineriod. The Soviets are technically capable of developing either long endurance aircraft (for reconnaissance and/or kmpenetration) or high altitude aircraft with maximum speeds of abouln this time period. Considering tbe types and quantities of missile delivery systems Ihey are likely lo have. as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think It unlikely lhat the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber to operational service during lheof this estimate The Soviets willto advance their state-of-the-art in large and high speed aircraft, and their work on advanced transports will provide aand production base which they could shift to military purposes should they come lo consider this necessary or worthwhile. If this occurs. US Intelligence is likely to obtain Indications of development and production atear or so prior to the entryollow on bomber into operational units.

Barring this possibility, the increasing age oi the BISON and BEAR, and continued phase i'of BADGER, will produce aIn both the heavy and medium bomber components of Long Range Aviation. The output of BLINDERS will probably continue lo be shared between Long Range and Nnvul Aviation. BLINDER production maythrough at least the. It is possible that the further development ofmissile capabilities, coupled with renewed lorcc reductions, willharperIn the strength ol Long Range Aviation. However, on thc basis of present trends, and

37

it:;

follows the strength of Long Range AviationG9:

ESTIMATED STRKNUTH Ot'SOVIHT LONG RANGE

Bombers and

The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAK. disagrees In part with the discussion Innd with this Table since he considers they represent an underestimation of the Importance thc SovieU will continue to give to manned strategic aircraft as an Important adjunct to their ground launcher missile bilities.

He estimates that the Introductionollow-on heavy bomber, the contlnuaUon of both BEAR and BISON In service at or near present strengths, the continued producUon of BLINDERnd the retention of sizeable numbers Ofrcralt will result In composition of Long Range Aviation as follows;

Bombers and

10

Ci

While the evidence to date li not sufficient lo enable identifies Uon of the specific type of follow-on heavy bomber on which the Soviets willihc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. considers lhat the follow on bomber couldong endurance aircraft developed from the BEAR which could be Introducedupersonic-dash bomber using technology from the BOUNDER and introduced.uclear powered bomber introducedhese uncertaln-Ues are redn the spread in the tabulation above.

f. Space Weapon* Syilam*

On the basis of evidence presently available, wc arc unable to determine whether the Soviets now have plans or programs for the military use of space Thc limitations of this evidence, however, are such that our chances of identifying such programs are poor. We believe that the USSR almostis Investigating tlie feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensiveSoviet decisions to develop military space systems will depend on their expected cost and effectiveness as compared with alternative systems, and on thc USSR's estimate of thc reaction of otherIn this connection, the Soviets would probably recognize that any deployment of an orbital bombardment system would be an act of major international import which would greatly Intensify East-West hostility, prejudice the option of detente tactics, andtrong new stimulus to Westernprograms.

Any orbital bombing system of real military significance would require satellite vehicles in some number, and wouldbe extremely complex and expensive, important developmental progress towardystem within the decade woulda major Soviel effort to perfectand to develop advanced techniques. In considering whether lo pursue such an effort, the Soviet leadership would examine the likely political military nspects of orbitalsystems in relation to the mix of forces for long range atiack they would hope to have in thend beyond, and the cost effectiveness of the alternative systems open to them. We think that they would be likely to consider orbital bombing systems primarilyeans of supplementing their existing types of forces rather thansuch weapons as replacement orsystems They would probably alsothem as one way of introducingcomplications into US defense Finally, they would probably consider

17m-

.18

ualitative advance in weniKiii technology which could support Soviet claimsarity or even superiority in totalcapabilities

Thereide range of delivery techniques and types of orbital forces which might be sought by thc Soviets, withdifference in developmentalcosts, and effectiveness. Tohreat of retaliation against populationthey mighlelatively small force of limited effectiveness sufficient. Foremployment against smaller or harder military targets,argeforce with short tunes to target, near-simultaneity of delivery, and anapproaching that of ICDMs, would be necessary.

For accomplishing military missions, we think that duringeriod, orbital bombardment systems will notfavorably with ICBMs in terms oflime, average life, reliability,accuracy, or targeting flexibility. Into being less eflective militarily, anbombardment system will bemore cosily that an equivalent delivery capability with ICBMs. Based onof cost and effectiveness as we now

understand them, therefore, It would appear unlikely that the Soviets will duringecade deploy orbital bombardment systems of military significance. Further, if theenterormal obligation to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons, this willa factor inhibiting such deployment.

e recogniie. however, that themight reach different conclusions as to cost and effectiveness, and in some future phase of East-West relations, politicalmighl lose their effectiveness.considering the pace of developments in the weapons field In general, it is extremely hazardous to estimate Soviet decisionseriod of many years ahead For Ihesea firm estimate as to whclher the Soviels will deploy an orbital bombardment system withineriod cannot be made at this lime.

f the Soviets do proceed with ansystem, we believe that they arc more likely tomall force of limited eifcc-tivenessery large and sophisticated one. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should beto us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.

ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS

Operational Capabililythe first operational unit is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.

Maximum Operational Range

ange under operational conditions with war head weight indicated. For long-range bal listlc missiles, the maximum range figuresthc effect of the earth's rotation. In general, ballistic missiles can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one third tlie maximum operational range withoutIncrease In CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

Atr-tc-Surfacerangelaunching aircraft and target al theof missile launch.

Circular AVror Probableadiusircle In which, statistically, one-half of the Impacts will occur. Inherent missileare somewhat better than thespecified In the tables, which take into consideration average operaUonalFor naval systems firing on coastal targets, an accurate determination of the launching ship's position is necessary to acldevc CEP's of the order indicated in the tables.

Warheadweight of the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism.

Ready Missileready missile is an In-coinmlaslon missile with warhead mated, mounted on an in-commission launcherrained unit which is considered ready to be committed to launch. Ready missile rate Is

the percentage of missiles on launcher which are "ready missiles.*'

Reliability, onpercentage of ready missiles which will successfullycountdowns and leave Iheir launchers at scheduled times orinutes thereafter.

ReliabtMly, inpercentage oflaunched which detonate as planned in the target areaithin three CEP's of the aiming point).

Readinessfollowingof readiness apply to all ground launched ballisUc missiles having ranges greater.

Conditionaunch crews not on alerl. Nosecone and missile checked bul not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted fartarget and missile not erected or fueled.

Conditionaunch crews in launch area and on alert. Missile and nosecone mated and checked, but In prelaunch storage

Conditionaunch crews on stationwith nosecone erected on launch pad. Propellant facfliUes in position, attached, and ready to start propellant loading. Guidance system set.

Conditionaunch crew on station,propellant loading completed. Guidance rechecked.

Reactionrequired lo proceedeadiness condiUon to firing.

Refirerequired to retire from the same pad or launcher.

TAIII.K

gUVIhT m I mi.YSTKMS INTIMATED

CHARACTERISTICSPERFORMANCE

Alt ACTBItlSriCA AMI!

rimoiiuiMi

Amirtoy fCUP*

Wsfhead WdcM llba.l

P.*oil *

Hroa

Rrliabrlil* Io FagM Nrariion Time..

OO

th active terminal

eiih terminal homing*airuimaodHE or nvelrarl

M%

Sb%

6 mini

oesmn .mil

-

inrn bal- Sabratrgrd-laaaek sal tmic

"CO

N.A.

N.A.

I!

m

* (nueleail

liquid

MT.

Unl

ttllatnllly rafri may b* nigh, mom Ik-pf,,lanl al UcAn.tol cheratteriMit* tfcfrriaiaafioNlem >fl,oba,lB. and u* Anne no idtabfr hut* for

Aii improvement of thea lup^Urf toie hear future.1 prohabW incorporategjbc. cruise alUrude. IheraOJ iuoraUng range capaUhty ton. Itbe iiroparaled la eu'-ent cram mMfoUe or no modification of Ihe luborarine.

fur taer.t ha. been laaachedxraxda-gea ufOOand there aren tdemetrr Ikat it employ* liquid propeil.nU The reaction time HlWh nil be locoparable wita Uial of they%trm.

kftariB operational5iwllr of Iraser range.

topr r

to" six sr.

Sill

S SSSS85

ssssgsss

IO . -

UT ^>

1

1

kT- *

is

Mi

tiffil

I

Hill

Is

fit

t

V.

i

3

13

a

i-

oa oj <h A a

3

O j*

c

_ i.

= (3 S

< jf

ZZ 1

s

X 6

8^

S3

26

3

Hi

8 5

If

i*

6

R 8

iff;

z

z 5o|

o

-reP- SECftLT-

TABLE I

SOVIET AlK-TOvSURFACK MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATE" CHARACTERISTICS AND I'Klll'OIlMANCK

KITCHEN Aft-4

Agiinil "I'll ilflini'dland

Accuracy (CEPal Mil, Rang")

Agairol Ships

land target

Warhwd

Trpe

(ltd.)

Spral (MACH No )

n Launcher"

RrlUbUiiv id Flight.

>i 'i

ircraft

Number id misillm,

3S0 In.rllal

421

L' nil nan n

ima mm-7 hiiiioo

U*amemi* active homing

Uid

Ual wllh active radar terminal homing

uir

only

fed

Icn

ii re

m

a.

um.

ii

a

Or notteai

r

1

5)

0

altiu

anti

anti

r H

could be

could Iw

lai

againsi

againat

target*

to rev It

n-

It C

D

1)

11

Ta HU-;

SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY UOMltEU WEAPON HVaTliMS EarJniatal IVrfocninmi' UndW au Optimum Mteiot. IV-lik CCUoiAttcs.with USA Spec exceptuelan,aiimun.niiuiV* loiter nlrvrl. and aircraft Operate rUnniltim: maximumire.)

t ll> bombload.

ono refuel li b bombload

Oue rrfoel -

ooa refuel d Wiih ASMS-1

one refuel ii. In AS-2

one refuelS-3

oneefuel Speed/AJtiiudo;

apeed at optimum

lb bomblonrl

apeorlfUfjtiit altitude,

b bombload C. ecd.'lamtrlt altitude vllh ASM IS-1

M.

S4 CombatI.ft)

lb bombload orSynC'in Accuracy (CEP) a. Bom0 It. U 0 ft b ary I AS-1

S-2

III AS-3

. AS-1

u

0 ft.

ISO ft. vs. ships:

I nin v? cuoAtnl Inrg^la

t. vg ship*;

m vs.ar get *

O'B30l>

00 fl. t.

m vs. land targets

l.

nd large:*

a. Airrrafl reaehiiin targetNorth America

b ASM reliability on In flight

i.

il.

litf. AS-4

Soviett*uUi4 for laiJlGF.ll eontoin data whichthai Ihe rar.gr of lhe IIA OGlilt ii Im intui rec nunc NfiMoceif. Thttfdnla arc pvtrcnlkj undtr intensiet Undo.

That rttlabmiymayiiucc/fcrtiet opr'-ilio'io. coiuejifioy liairuna no-ttfW, anecknirn)n drierof es%lcm rttiabiMo. and lote .rllafth bonamnimj

range and radius figures given in Ihis table am mailmurri figures. They am applicable to the most up-lo-datc model* of these nirCrnfi, flying optimum minion proliles on direct routes. The. use Of older model aircraft, standard mission profiles, indirect routes, low-level penetration or olher luetics tfcsiKiied Ui delay or evade detection and Inter, ceiilion would reduce lhc effeelivo range. The calculation of degralion in range and radiiii icsulting from sophisticated penclralion tacticsomplex process which .an brat be accomplished for Individual minions.ule-of-thumh for low-level Opeialions of heavy bombers, the radius at optimum altitude "ill be decreasediles for every mile lle-wn at sea level

' HADCERs have been observedissiles.ENNEL, or.IPPER.

' BE Alts have been equipped Id carry ooe.ANGAROO, ratherombload. Theissile is estimated lo weigh0 lbs. Some BEARs are being equipped for probe and drogue

omo carrier, which was observed without refueling probe; range and radius estimatesash.efueling capability could bo developed forl any time.iasluding equipment and carries OneITCHEN; range and radius missions. dash al Mil. Had'J8 estimates for both versions include supersonic dash Into and out of target area, while ranges include dash into area Only.

Bombinij accuracies indicates arc for visual bombing or radar bombing again*', wcll-deliued targets with free-fall hombs These figures are not applicablerogue-retarded bombs, which would be much less accurate.

Includes die following operaUonal attrition rates, excluding combat attrition:l aircraft al home bases would be In commission0 day maintenance sUWddown prior lo Initialf aircraft in commission al home bases would he launched from staging bases;f aircraft launched from staging bases or directly from home baics on un'cfuclcd missions would arrive in target areas;f aircraft launched.efueled missions would arnve inreas. Calculations for HEAR with ASM are based on refueled flights direct from home bases. All others assume Oretfc Staging and refuelingDCEK. BISON, and BLINDER aircraft. It should be noted thatprior maintenance slanddowo, the in commission rate of heavy bombers at home bases would be. ami fo; medium bombers.

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