CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE SECURITY OF INDIA'S HIMALAYAN FRONTIER
The following staff study on "The Security of India's Himalayan Frontier" was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence inresponse loorequest from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of Stole. If is being circulated for the information of offices dealing with South Asian affairs.
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PUNJAB, HIMACHAL PRADESH, UTTAR PRADESH .
J. NORTH INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS II. JAMMU AND KASHMIR III. HIMALAYAN FRONTIER AREA
Geography. The Himalayan mountain chain, whichthe boundary between the Indian subcontinent and Tibet,ignificant but by no means impenetrable barrier. rough terrain, difficult transportation problems, and cold or rainy climates, thousands of traders andave until recently regularly crossed the considerable number of passes between India, Nepal, Sikkira, Bhutan and Tibet each year. Even many of those passes which tend to be blocked by winter snows for periodsew days to seven months can be crossed by persons determined to do so.
Terrain in the Himalayas favors an invader from the north. The approach from the high plateau of Tibet is usually over relatively flat barren plains, and the final ascent to the border passes is relatively short. In contrast, the approach from the plains of India to the mountain crests is generally up through steep, heavily wooded mountain valleysiles long. In the eastern portion of the Himalayas, where altitudes are lower, the problem of snow in the mountain passes is relatively minor, but heavy monsoon rainfall on the southern slopes between June and September creates rushing mountain torrents and landslides which seriously hamper The northern-invader has the advantage of choosing his point of entry. The Indian defender isisadvantage, since he cannot readily move forces in an east-west direction because of steep-sided river valleys and sharp ridges which run roughly north and south at right angles to the general east-west direction of the mountain ranges themselves. NEFA and Assam are particularly vulnerable, having direct land connection with the rest of India only by meansarrow corridor crossing between East Pakistan and Bhutan. Through this corridor runs only one single-track railway line.
The people. The peoples who. inhabit the Himalayas are the backwash of many civilizations, remnants of populations driven into refuge areas by succeeding waves of invaders and conquerors. Living in mountain valleys, usually isolated by streams and ridges from neighbors to tbe east and the west, they form heterogeneous groups of several racial backgrounds, many differentide variety of religions ranging from simple animism to complex Hindu and Buddhist philosophies, and cultures of which some are unique while others are related to those on the plains of India or the plateau of Tibet.
There is little sense of national unity among the peoples in any part of India's Himalayan uplands, most groups caring little about others outside their own valleys, and leaders tend to be highly localized in their influence, in Nepal, whichiles of frontier against Tibet, the authority of the king carries little real weight beyond^ the 'edges of the Katmandu valle;
There are no outstanding animosities between groups of any significant size within the Himalayan hill regions,in the Northeast Frontier Agency of Assamhere highly localized, small-scale, intertribal feuding takes place. Possibly the strongest intraregional irritation is caused by Nepali emigrants who have settled in considerable numbers in southern Sikkira, the hill districts of West Bengal state, and in southern Bhutan and have taken over much of the economic leadership there. Between hillmen and the outside world, the main problemeeling of antipathy toward the people and government of India in the plains. Among hill residents in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh states, this feeling is one of being discriminated against by the Indian plainsmen. In Nepal there is dislike of being dominated by an outside power. In Sikkim, Bhutan, and NEFA, there is some resentment at interference from Indian outsiders seeking to "civilize" the local people who would prefer to be left alone.
Few in number, geographically scattered, culturally backward, and lightly armed, the population of the Himalayas io its present state of civilization would be unable either significantly toilitary invasion from Tibet or to defend India against an aggressor.
Indian activity. The government of India thinksin terms of securing the Himalayan frontier against attack from Tibet.
efending the Indian subcontinent during any future" Chinese invasion. Host immediately, New Delhi would like to recover lost prestige by ousting Chinese forces from all territory lying within Indian-claimed boundaries. Unable to do this at present, the Indian government is concentrating on improving its political and economic position in the hills.
Having been awakened by the Chinese conquest of Tibet1 to the possibilityong-range threat from China, India began slowly andmall-scale to strengthen its
border defenses, especially in the eastern Himalayas. the Tibetan revolthe Indian effort was greatly stepped up throughout the Himalayas from Ladakh to NEFA. Politically, one of New Delhi's major efforts has been to prove "the historical claim that its administrative control actually extends all the way to the border. For military as well as economic reasons, India bas attempted first of all to improve road and telecommunications networks leading into the high altitudes. Concurrently it is introducing economic development programs involving agricultural improvements, small industries, health and welfare measures and otherdesigned to increase the loyalty of the local people by raising their standards of living. In the case of numerous groups who formerlyarge part of their living through trade withlargely cuteconomic activity is necessary to provide alternate means of livelihood. hole, development measures, begun in earnest onlyong way to go to be effective and probably have not as yetajority of the hill population. Regional factionalism within the Congress Party and Prime Minister Nehru's weakening grip on his government have hindered this program.
Propagandistically, India is attempting to create among the northernense of belonging to India and of antagonism toward potential Chinese aggressors. It beams some radio programs toward special groups such as the Ladakhis, but the actual content of the program is not known in detail. ress and pamphlet campaign is also under way, but its effectiveness may be limited among the hill peoples who have very low literacy rates. The Dalai Lama, now in Dbaramsala in Punjab state, seful symbol around which to rally Tibetan hopes and activities.
ndia has the psychological disadvantageeries of defeats beginning8 with the capture of its first patrol sent to eastern Ladakh and ending with thein NEFA Literally as well as figuratively, India is fighting an uphill battle, with the Chinese having the advantage. India's efforts to build up Its military strength are hamperedaucity of production capacity for heavy military equipment, by the difficulty of shifting the complex Five Year Plan organizational machinery into war-oriented patterns, and by the newness of its experience and research on operations at high altitudes. Western arms aid has eased the military problem on an immediate basis and raised Indian morale. Equipping, training and hardening of
the considerably increased armed forces will require time, however. The Indian army is not yet effective in theas many Indian servicemen from the tropical plains require considerable acclimatization to high altitudes. Militarily, the Himalayan uplands now are only lightly held by Indian forces, and Indian commanders do not wish to try to retake claimed Indian border areas as long as the Indian army remains relatively weak.
Indian political security measures in the Himalayan regions date back many years, and an "Inner Line" beyond which non-residents cannot pass without government permission exists along the whole length of the mountains except below Nepal. India has taken strenuous measures to minimizeChinese Influence in the hill regions,hinese trade mission at Kalimpong, shutting down the operations of the Bank of China in India, banning Chinese publications, arresting and deporting two thousand Chinese andlose watch on others. The Indian government is also building up Home Guard units, the National Cadet Corps, and other civil defense organizations, especially in northern The government also maintains surveillance over Indian Communist Party activities, and it arrested many pro-Peiping Communists last fall. Politically, the Communist Partyno serious threat to the Indian government, especially as the split between pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions grows sharpe:
Chinese activity. Chinese Communist policy apparently does not envisage the acquisition of significant new territory in the Himalayan borderlands in the neareiping now holds the areas it considers to have "strategic value. While it has said publicly it would fight to retain theseespecially the Aksai Chinwould prefer that India
not force it to do so. China does not insist that NEFA is of strategic importance to it, and in fact hasillingness to trade its claims in NEFA for Indianof China's control of the Aksai Chin. China maintainswillingness toorder settlement with India which would formalize this situation. Peiping apparently considers both Slkkim and Bhutan to be entities separate rom India. It is working to move both states out of the sphere of Indian influence andosition ofhina has said it would recognize only India'srelations with these two states and that it would not discuss their boundaries with Indian officials.
In accordance with this policy, China's activities in the borderin Ladakn andbeen confined mainly to the Tibetan side of the frontier where they have subdued most of the Tibetans politically and organized them economically. The Chinese have built aof roads in southern Tibet. They have developed good east-west communications routes, with feeder roads running south toward the Himalayan border.
Chinese international propaganda actively attempts to convince the peoples of Asia and the world of Chineseand Indian-intransigence. Inside Tibet, the Chinese effort seems to bo to convince the border Tibetans that Chinatronger power than India and that the Tibetans will do well to cast their lot with China. Except for tbe brutality they practised during the Tibetan revolthe Chinese apparently have treated the Tibetans firmly but have attempted rto win them over. The Tibetan radio broadcasts programs both In Tibetan and in Mandarin, but no radio propaganda is known *to be beamed at any specific ethnic group along the border.
Since the punitive attacks in NEFA and Ladakhhinese troops have not probed actively along the Himalayan border, presumably to strengthen China's claim of peaceful Intentions. Their military construction activities in Tibet seem mostly to beefensive character. China has warned, however, that if India attempts to reestablish cbeckposts along or on the Chinese side of the "line of actual control" they will be wiped out.
TO TTITtETQH PI33EM
Conclusion. Much of the Tibetan-Indian frontierepth of SOiles into Indian territory now appears toartialeconomically, and militarily. India,irm intent to make itsdefensible up to the high mountain crests, is ain the field of border development activity and has not yet made good its aims. Communist China apparently has no immediate desire_to seize military control of the
southern Himalayan slopes.
Summary. Tbe higli, barren mountains and plains of Ladakhinimal population which ekeseagre existence from marginal agriculture, pastoralism, and trade. As the Chinese Communists have demonstrated, military movement in the virtually uninhabited plains of eastern Ladakh may easilyndetected, and defense against aggression is thereforeicult. There is little evidence that the Indian armed forces based in Ladakh have significantly improved their overall military posture since their encounter with Chinese troops last fall, and India's hold over that part of Ladakh remaining in its hands is probablyenuous one. India's position is not subject to challenge by the passive Ladakhi population, but it is vulnerable to further Chinese attack. Chinese troops could probably take and hold the rest of Ladakh east of Leh should they so desire, Chinese capture of Leh would seriously weaken India's defensive position in Ladakh.
Geographical factors. Ladakh consists of high, barren terrain, largely inaccessible, lightly populated, lacking in exploitable resources. The disputed 3rea of eastern Ladakh is an extension of the Tibetan plateau, characterizedumber of nearly uninhabited, flat plains at altitudes00 feet and separated from each other by ridges and mountains with peaks rising0 feet. Annual precipitation in the area is3 to 6snow is not muchroblem. The Karakoram pass leading to Sinkiang is seldom blocked. Low temperatures and high winds in winter limit military action. Movement in eastern Ladakh, much of which is occupied by the Chinese, is relatively easy, and the Chinese haveetwork of raotorable roads leading westward from their main Tibetan routes primarily into the Aksai Chin region. Though of little military use to India, the barren plateau occupied by the Chinese is of strategic value to China because of the road through it connecting Sinkiang with southern and eastern Tibet.
The western part of Ladakh, occupied by India, consists of more rugged, difficult country dissected andby streams and rivers and crossed from northwest to southeast by the Great Himalaya and Zaskar mountain ranges. Access to this region from India proper is limited, and the main road from Srlnagar, Kashmir, to Leh twists tortuously through rugged mountain valleys. Road maintenance isand expensive, and movement is restricted in some
sections to one-way traffic. Furthermore, the passes in the southern Himalayas west and south of Leh receive more precipitation than ln the north and are frequently blocked by snow from November to June of each year. Although Indian supply lines into Ladakh are shorter, the Indian logistic position there is more difficult than the Chinese, and many Indian military posts have to be supplied by pack animal or^ ai rdrop.
The people. The Indian census11 persons ln that part of Ladakh held by India, an area of0 square miles. About three fourths of the population is located ln the districts of Leh and Kargil,uarter of the population is spread thinly in the valleys and plains elsewhere. There is virtually no population in the Aksai Chin area held by the Chinese.ersons live in and near the town ofeet) andt Kargil. The effect of the Sino-Indlan conflict on the location and concentration of the Ladakbi population is unknown. Onlyersons per thousand were literate
Racially, linguistically, religiously, and culturally, the people of Lndakh are related to the Tibetans. They not onlyompletely separate entity from the Indians of the plains, but they differ even from the other inhabitants of Kashmir who live ln tbe Vale acid ln the Pakistani-held portions of the state. The majority of Ladakbls areln racial type. Theyibetan languageto the Dardic Kashmiri of the Vale or the Pahari spoken on the southern Himalayan mountain slopes. Over half of them are Buddhists of the Tibetan variety, in whose religion deities appear In human form and ln which there is an emphasis on good and evil spirits. Religiously, the most resoected sect ln Ladakh appears to be that of the "Red Hat" Buddhists, the oldest Buddhist sect In Tibet and the one whose Ladakh! chiefthe Hemis monastery nearthe most revered. Politically, the "Yellow Rat" sect in dominant. This sect, of which thenn is the leader, iseformist one with stricter behavioral rules for its adherents. The relative number of followers of each of these sectsdakh is not known, but they have not been reported to be ln political conflict with each other. inority of the Ladakhl population are Muslims, centerod around Kargil. There are some Muslims and some Christians at Leh.
The pattern of settlement ln Ladakh is closely related to the type and elevation of the terrain. Valleyeet usually are cultivated andmall sedentary population. The higher valleys and high plains are utilized by herdsmen, and some barren valleys and plains are uninhabited. The agriculture practices in small plots in the narrow river valleys includes the growing of grain, some fruit, andyellow flavoring highlyn India for use in curries and cosmetics. Poplar'andtreesinimum of wood for building and fuel. Ladakhhole is deficient in food supplies, some of which are imported from Kashmir proper. The area in generalrain on the Indian economy. Originally, the wealth of Leh and Kargil was based on trade between India, Tibet, and Yarkand in Sinkiang. Trade with Yarkand dwindled after the Chinese takeover and has been cut off sincerade with Tibet slimped to virtually nothingut apparently continued at least sporadically tillew summer-operated customs post was set up atE) on the road leading southeast from Chushul to Tashigong following the lapse of the Sino-Indian trade agreement Leh and Kargil now are dependent on their own local resources, which consist chiefly of wool,stones, and saffron.
Ladakhis apparently are not deeply interested in politics. While having no particular loyalty either to the former Maharajah of Kashmir or to the Indian government, the Ladakhis nevertheless have caused no trouble for India either at the time of7 or since. They apparentlyassive group, who probably would prefer to be left alone but who are not prepared to oppose Indian administration.
Indian political and economic activity. Priorndia administered Ladakh rather lightly and political activity was kept in low key,adakhi branch of the ruling Kashmir National Conference party was established. The leader of this Ladakh branch, Kushakrominent "Yellow Hat" lama of Leh, sometimes clashed with the then premier of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, but3 he has cooperated with the present premier, Ghulara Mohammed Bakshi.
The discovery of the new Chinese-built road in the Aksai Chin area7 and the capture of an Indian investigating patrol in8 considerably increased New Delhi's interest in Ladakh. he Deputy Commissioner of Ladakh at Leh was reinforced by Additional Deputyat Leh and Kargil, by Assistant Commissioners at
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Nubra and Chushul, and by subordinate officers at Leh, Kargil, Dras, and Zanskar. uperintending engineer was placed ln charge of roads and public works under the Deputy Commissioner, who was also named as Development Commissioner. An effort was made to set up the Indian system of village panchayats (or self-governing village councils). Top men from the Indian Frontier Servicessigned to posts in Ladakh.
. Ladakhi representation in the Kashmir statewas upgraded, and Indian Home Ministry officials also began to pay more attention to Ladakh. Ladakh for some time had been represented in the state legislative assembly by two representatives, Kushakuddhist from Leh, and Aga Syed Ibrahimuslim from Kargil. Bakula, long the main political contact between the Ladakhi people and the government of India, was made Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs in the Kashmiri hierarchy. ecretary for Ladakh Affairs was appointed to coordinate developmental activities in Ladakh. Kashmiri Premier Bakshi began to take personal interest ln Ladakhi affairs, which he now reportedly controls completely. An additional Kashmir Secretary in the Indian Home Ministry lives in Srinagar, and both he and the Kashmir Secretary in New Delhi frequently visit Ladakh.
Kushak Bakula and the Muslim Ladakhi representative in the Kashmiri assembly belong to Premier Bakshi'sConference, which completely controls Kashmiri politics. Bakula, Ladakh's chief spokesman, has been described as loyal to both Bakshi and Prime Minister Nehru, to whom he has ready access. Bakula appears to have no political rival in Ladakh and probably will be in officeong time. No information is available as to elec-tion
Indian administrators have given economic development projects inelatively high priority. Roads are being builtrash basis,ibetan refugees were imported for roadwork Leh has been electrified by means of diesel generators, and the possibility of developing hydroelectric power is being studied. adio telephone circuit from Srinagar to Leh was'installed in. Irrigation works, seed farms, ahospital, stock improvement farms, and cooperatives are among Indian government activities. eaving center
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-mo renin CH DICL'LM
has been started at Leh, and other small industries are being developed elsewhere. Hospitals, dispensaries, and maternity and child welfare centers are being established. Asherechools for boys andor girls,otaltudents attending. Additional schools are being planned. High school graduates attending college ln Kashmir or in India are all given frontierollege for the study of Buddhism has been established in1 Leh, apparently mainly to prevent scholars from wanting to visit Lhasa, where they might bo indoctrinated with The Ladakh budgetalled forexpenditures of0 and the sum now has risen to The government of Indiaf development costs in Ladakh, and all of thecosts.
The effect of the Indian military occupation ln Ladakh has been slight. The Indian armed forces take virtually no supplies from the local population, which has none to spare. Service in military labor teams hasew source of cash income for the Ladakhis, but high prices ln the local market have lessoned this benefit.
Indian and Kashmiri press and propaganda activities in Ladakh are unreported ln detail, and the generalof the Ladakhi population regarding world events and the Sino-Indian conflict cannot readily be estimated. Radio Kashmir is known toLadakhi Program"S hours weekly, however.
Indian The Indian
army in Ladakh was relativel^iiiacRve uphen lt bogan patrolling to determine tbe extent of the Aksal Chin road and other Chinese Communist activities. This wasby the establishment of checkposts toatch -on Chinese actions, and2 new checkposts were pushod forward into areas claimed by the Chinese. The Indian army was surprised and severely Jolted, however, by the combat capabilities displayed by the Chinese troops innd its morale and prestige sankow ebb at that time.onsistent record8 of defeat or capture by the Chinese of Indian patrols andnearIndian army in2 wasdefensively, notetermined defense until the Chinese closed in on Leh. Indian air force planesused only for reconnalssanco and resupply ln the border areas during the fighting2 and did not probe deeply into Tibet for fear of Chinese reaction. Sincehe Indian 3rd Division and two Ladakh Scout battalions
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in. Ladakh have been .reinforced by another brigade and their training has probably been stepped up. Their morale has also probably improvedesult of Western military aid and the United States' agreement to provide road and airport improvement assistance.
toowever, Indian forces res China's self-imposed demilitarized zone and the of the Colombo powers and made little effort to close touch with Chinese forces. In late June 3rd Division was authorized to step up its patr order to check on reports of increased Chinese activity, but troops were told to move "cautiou in early August was it reported that "vigorous"
are not eager to press forward again into close with the Chinese, and they are probably ignoran activities ln large parts of Ladakh.
Indian security measures
:'n Ladakh include strict control over foreign visitors, who are not permitted to pass beyond Sonamarg on the Srlnagar-Leh roadormal authorization. The Indiansa few newspapermen and foreign visitors to fly from Srinagar to Leh, but their visits are limited both in time and scope. Kushak Bakula said in the Kashmir assembly on3 that "adequate measures" had been taken to check. Chinese Communist infiltration. Given the cautious attitude displayed by Jndlan military authorities
ie prospect is that thein theappear without warning in positions more advanced than they were believed to occupy.
Chinese Communist political and economic activity. Politically, there is no evidence that Chinese military or civilian authorities make any special effort to govern the sparse population ln those parts .of Ladakh occupied by them. The seven supposedly "civilian" checkposts set up following the Chinese withdrawal in2 apparently
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do not reflect tho existence of any Chinese civilian administrative organization in Ladakh, The firstChinese economic interest in Ladakh came to light with the discovery of the Aksai Chin road which had been completed Subsequently, the building of other roads and the establishmentine of military chock-posts and fortifications in eastern Ladakh was revealed. here is no other known development activity conducted by the Chinese, however. Local people are not known to be employed by the Chinese army, which probably finds lt easier to utilize Its own manpower on construction
ibetan lamas in Ladakh reportedly told residents near the Tibetan border that they would suffer the same fate as the Tibetans- This created some fears, but there was no general eovement of Ladakhis away from the few border villages in southeast Ladakh. be revival of Sino-Indian friction created some new panic in western Tibet, but the Chinese were said to be treating the Tibetans with relative restraint at this time, in the hope of preventing their migration to Ladakh, Some Khamba refugees, howevert entered Indian-heldln southeastern Ladakh in the summer
Chinese Communist mitlllWilllliB^BBMM activity.ese military activity in Ladakh begai^wTTl^patrolling78 in the area of the Aksal Chin road, the intent presumably being to protect this strategiclink. Idollowing the capture of two Indian patrols, the Chinese limited their own patrolling to small scale reconnaissance. As India began to move troops and icheck posts into Chinese-claimed territory ln eastern Ladakh, Chinese patrolling aad military construction activity increased, and small clashes gradually grew Into full scale -war in Following the Chinese cease-fire andChinese activity decreased. Between April and however, Chinese military patrols again became active along0 claim line. These small forces encountered Ladakhi herdsmen near Spanggur, in some cases forcing the latter to withdraw and in others leaving them alone. Some effort was made to interrogate the herdsmen regarding Indian army strength, the number of vehicles In Chushul, and the types of aircraft using Chushul airfield. Chinese troops evidently attempted not to antagonize tho Ladakhis. In3 tho government of India accused the Chinese army of reoccupying posts in the demilitarized zone.
Local reaction to the situation. Partly because of tight Indian censorship, very little' is known of theof the local Ladakhi population toward India and Communist Chica or toward the present confrontation between the two countries. As mentioned above, the passive Ladakhis apparently have maintained good relations with the state government of Kashmir as well as with the government of India Their chief leaders appear loyal to India. Brutal Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt9 is said to have warned thef the consequences of Chinese rule. Ineople in Leh reportedlyeeting to protest Chinese refusal to return Stagaldan Raspa. iS-year-old "Red Hat" lama of Itemis monastery near Leh. who had beer, studying in Lhasa and who was detained by the Chinese. Other less prominent Ladakhis, of whomere in Lhasa ir. were allowed to return home. Indiar, authorities are not anxious to effecteturn to Ladakh for fear he may have been brainwashed.
Two battalions of Ladakhis in the Ladakh Scoutswell in encounters with the Chinese. Tibetans in Ladakh are said to be unhappy that they do not receive more military training. There is no evidence, however, that the tddakhi population in general would or could, serve as an effective deterrent or defensive forcehinese drive on Leh.
KASHMIR AND JAMMU
Summary. Tbe security of the Indian frontier ln Ladakh is further weakened by geographic, political, and military situations which exist In the rest of Indian-held Kashmir. The Indian army in Ladakh is loglstlcally dependent on air transport andingle tortuous road winding from the Indian plains through the Vale of Kashmir to Leh. in Indiana constant military threat in western Kashmir by virtue of its claim to possession of the whole state. The population of the Vale is generally believed to prefer Independence or incorporation into Pakistan rather than integration with India, although there have been nosamplings of opinion. New Delhi and the pro-Indian Kashmiri puppet government have therefore been forced tolarge military and police contingents ln Kashmir, far out of proportion to the Pakistani military threat. Pro-Communists are prominent in tbe Kashmir state government, Communists are leaders in local political parties, and some Communists probably have infiltrated strategic installations such as power stations and transportation centers. As long as army, militia units, police, and counter-intelligence units maintain their present control and surveillance capabilities, New Delhi probably needs fear no large-scale popular uprising. Under conditions of actual invasion from Pakistan or Tibet, however, the local Kashmiri population would probably be
Gfufir:iphlcal factors. That portion oi l Kashmir lying westeh consists for the most part of very rugged mountain territory, Including the Zaskar, Great Himalaya, Plr Panjal, and Slwalik ranges, which He parallel to each otherenerally northwest-southeast direction and have individual peaks reaching altitudes00 feet. Lying between the Great Himalaya and Plr Panjal ranges Is the Vale ofalleyiles long andiles broad. This valley, the most heavily populated and desirable portion of the state, contains almost half of tbe state's population in aboutf its total area, and lt Is the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan. The Jammu region, which lies on the southern slopes of the Slwalik range and extends onto the Punjab plain, differs materially in character from the more mountainous parts of tho state. The rugged mountain and valley area of Pakistani-held Kashmir has alwayseparate identity and is most easily reached by routes lying in Pakistani territory.
Strategically, India has very poor access to most of Kashmir and Ladakh, though Jamau is readily accessible. The sole motorable link between India proper and Ladakhile road which runs roughly northward froa the railhead at Pathankot in Punjab State to Jamau, then via either the Banihal Pass or tunnel to Srinagar in the Vale of Kashmir, and thonce eastward at altitudes00 feet to Leh. The only other potentially motorable route to Lehile caravan track running northward from Mandl, Kulu, and Vanali in Himachal Pradesh and Punjab states to Leh via the Rohtanghe Bara Lachand the Taglangeet). This route is now motorable only to the vicinity of the Rohtang Pass, which is blocked by snow from November to June. hird caravan track from Pathankot via Chamba and the Umasieet) intersects the road from Kargil to Leh at Khalatse, but it is very difficult and probably cannot be convertedmotorable route. Lateral routes paralleling the main mountain ranges ln Kashmir are virtually non-existent.
By contrast, road communications between the Vale and Pakistani-held Kashmir and West Pakistan are considerably better, crossing the Pir Panjal and Slwalik mountains by means of relatively low passes fron Baramulla to Huzaffarabad, from Poonch to Mirpur, and from Poonch to Rlasi, Jannu, and Sialkot. These routes formed Kashmir's natural outlets for trade and travel prior The relatively easy access from West Pakistan to the Vale is of constant concern to India and has ledoncentration of Indian troops on this part of the cease-fire line.
The people. The Census of India1 enumeratedersons in the three districts of Anantnag, Srinagar, and Baramulla, which constitute the Vale of Kashmir, with the population about equally divided amongst the three districts. The population of Jamrau, on the southern mountain slopes ln Doda, Udhampur, Jammu, Kathua, and Poonch-Rajouri districts wasainly centered on the towns of Jammu and Poonch. The mountainous region of Kashmir east of tbe Vale is virtually unpopulated exceptew isolated settlements along the above-mentioned caravan routes.
Kashmir, durings its history, has been ruled by Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, and Muslim overlords from India and has been overrun by Huns, Tatars, and Afghans as well. Itsis therefore varied. Culturally, however, theof any given area in Kashmir tends to be homogenous regardless of the languages they speak or the religion they profess.
The people of the Vale and the mountains of northwest Kashmir are related primarily to the peoples of southwest Asia. Racially, they are Caucasold, and many Kashmiris are very fair in complexion. Linguistically, they are more varied, the inhabitants of the Vale speaking mainly Kashmiri, an Indo-Iranlan language of the Dardic variety. Urdu is the official language here, and other languages are also spoken. (In Pakistani-held Kashmir to the west, the southernmostspeak the Afghan Pushtu; the people of Hunza,farther north, speak Burushaski,anguage with no known relatives; and in Baltistan. southeast of Hunza, the language is also southwest Asian in character.) The majority of people in the Vale and in northwestern Kashmir are Muslims, the Vale itself beinguslim. Literacy runs fromn the districts of this area.
Economically, the people of the Vale are agriculturalists, raising rice, wheat, corn, vegetables, and fruits. Higher up the mountain slopes are found herdsmen who raise cattle, horse, sheep, and goats. Long famous as artisans ln weaving, woodcarving, and papier-mache work, Kashmiris may be found throughout India. Trade in timber constitutesf the annual revenue of the whole state and has its mainthrough Pakistan.
On the southern mountain slopes in Jammu, the population is more Indianized. Still Caucasold in racial type, theconsists in large part of the descendants of Dogra Rajputs displaced from what is now the state of Rajastban. Theyariety of mountain dialects called Paftari,from the same Sanskrltic roots as Hindi and Punjabi but not mutually intelligible. The Pahari languages of these hill slopes from Kashmir to central Nepal are more closely related to each other than to tbe languages of the plains. Religiously, about half the people of Jaaau are Hindus, the rest being Muslims and Sikhs. The Hindusin the caste and other social observances of the plains but tend to have their own local varieties. Most of the people are settled agriculturalists, those in the plains growing primarily wheat, barley, millet and legumes. Literacy is slightly higher than in tbe Vale, running froan various districts.
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None of the people of tho Vale or of Jaaciu have any significant relationships, except in trade, with the Mongoloid Tibetan-speakers of Ladakh. Politically, the difference between the Muslins of the Vale and the Hindus of Jammu is important, tbe strongest opposition to Premier Bakshi's ruling National Conference party being found in Jamnu and Poonch.
Indian political and economic activity. Following the partition oi India, the then Maharajah of Kashmirindu, elected to remain independent rather than to join either India or Pakistan. uslim revolution in the western part of Kashmir, in which irregular troops from Pakistan joined, led him to accede to India and to call upon the Indian army for assistance. With the entry of Pakistani regular army forces into tho conflict, warfare developed between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. The fightingendedease-firerranged under the auspices of the United Nations. Since then,has held the western and northern third of the state and India the central and eastern two thirds, including the Vale. India, however, elates the whole state and to date has flatly refused any settlement which does not permit it to retain at least that portion of the state it now holds.
ndian-held Kashmir has been ruledolice-stateuppet government tightly controlled by New Delhi. The nominal head of state is the son of the former Maharajah. Under himraan Council of Ministersremier at its head. The legislative body is the popularlyman Kashmir State Assembly, which holds an additionaleats open for members from Pakistani-held KashmirJoin the Assembly at some future date.
Kashmir's first Premier, Sheikh Abdullah, has been in Jailaving displayed too open an inclination for independence. The present Premier, Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi, owes his position to New Delhi and would bewithout Indian support. Bakshi is widely believed to haveizable personal economic empire]
Is disliked for this reason among others. Baksh^neverT theless rulesirm hand, and, presumably because of his financial and political Interests strongly opposes any
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Kashmir settlement which would alienate Indian-held territory. The population under his control is submissive, mainly for fear of military and police repression, though many profit through association with Bakshi
Elections to the State Assembly ore routinely _ n favor of the pro-Indian Kashmir National Conference, which has dominated the political scene in Kashmir All but five of theembers of the Assembly this party. Opposition parriesr Largely ineffective
They include the left-wing dissident >eoocratic National Conference, which broke away from the National Conference7 and then rejoined itxceptmall Communist-dominated faction which still calls itself the Democratic National Conference. The Praja Parishad, which is affiliated with the Bharatiya Jan Sangh party in India, is the mouthpiece of extremist Kashmiri Hindus. It is for total Integration with India and holds two seats In the State Assembly. Its strength is mainly in Jammu. The Political Conference, which advocates union with Pakistanis largely suppressed, as is the Plebiscite Front, comprised of Sheikh Abdullah's followers whoree plebiscite and self-determination.
Recognizing the basic antipathy of much of the Kashmiri population and the danger of subversion or outright invasion from Pakistan, India has from the beginning strenouslyto secure the loyalty of the Kashmiris through economic development measures as well as military domination. Kashmir is one of the poorest areas of the Indian subcontinent, most of its people being unemployed in winter and havinghort summer employment during the crop and tourist season. Except for timber, Kashmir's resources are mainly untapped. India's effort to improve the situation -has included special attempts through land reform, and new agricultural techniques to Increase foodIn the Vale. New Delhi hastandard program of community development similar to that found throughout India. It has assisted in establishing new small industries, including drugs. Joining, tanning, bricks and tiles, paper and pulp, and plywood, and has expanded the traditional output of forest produce, woolen textiles, and silk goods. It has set up three industrial estates tosmall industries and opened industrial training institutes in Srinagar and Jammu. Power has been augmented by oxpanding power stations at Candcrbal (outside Srinagar) and Mohora and by borrowing power from neighboring Punjab
state. An increasing number of villages are being electrified. Eight-channel telephone carrier systems have been established botween Jullundur, Jamau, Udhampur, and Srinagar, and telephone exchanges were opened at five new locations12 Radiotelephone service between Delhi and Srinagar was opened1 and has probably been extended to Leh by this time. Education up to college level was declared free asnd the number of students at all levels has rlson rapidly since then. Twenty-five colleges within the state werewith the University of Kashmir. The first Kashmiri medical college was founded9 and the first engineering college Heavy emphasis has been placed by Indians on roadbuildingeans of alleviating and many Kashmiris are also employed in labor andactivities in support of Indian troops near theline.
Indian! :ntelligence activities. Indian military and police activities in Kashmir have tended toany goodwill won by India through economic development measures. ainly to prevent further intrusions from Pakistan but partly to keep the local Muslim Kashmiri population submissive, India has maintained about three infantry divisions in Kashmir. These have been concentrated along the cease-fire'line, at Srinagar, and in Jammu. In addition to these, Jamau and Kashmir Militia units have been raised, and both Indian and Kashmiri armed police have been organized. ome Punjab State Armed Police and Uttar Pradesh Provincial Armed Constabulary units were moved into the cease-fire line area to replace regular Indian array troops sent from the cease-fire line to Ladakh. In addition to these, various intelligence and counter-subversion elements of both Indian and Kashmiri government subordination operate ln Kashmir. Indian armyand presumably that of other securitybeen'made considerably more rugged-since the Chinesetook place in Close surveillance ofstandard procedure up to aboutprobably been relmposed throughout Kashmir
Chinese political, economic, and military activity. There is no evidence of direct Chinese Communist interest or activity in the Vale or in Jammu. The Chinese, however, have antagonized New Delhi by taking an anti-Indian position in regard to the western and northern part of Kashmir held by Pakistan. Peiping argues that itight toorder agreement here with Rawalpindi because Peiping has never accepted Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, that in any
case the negotiations did not involve the question ofof Kashmir, and that after the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir is settled boundary negotiations with China will be reopened. Some possibility of Chineseinto Kashmir would exist if, as suggested following the signing of the Sino-Pakistani border agreement, routes are opened again from the Sinkiang border down into Pakistani-held Kashmir.
Soviet bloc interest in Kashmir. Soviet bloc countries, unlike the Chinese, have displayed some interest in Kashmir, probably for intelligence rather than subversive purposes. The benefit, if any, gained by China from such activities is doubtful, especially in view of the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. Security-minded India may have permitted this Soviet bloc interest because of the USSR's support for India against Pakistan on the Kashmir question. 6 both Czech and Hungarian technicians visited Kashmir to study industrial possibilities, and the Hungariansontract to supply equipment to two hydraulic power stations. One of these, at Ganderbal outside Srinagar, lies at the foot of the sole motorable road leading to Kargil and Leh, along which all Indian military movements to Ladakh are made. oviet trade official placed orders for Kashmiri handicraftsand Rumanians and Czechs offered to build cement plants in that sane year. The Indianwas told in7 that the Czechs would help setosmic ray research station at Gulmarg. oviet economic delegation visiting Kashmir suggested establishmentrug industry there. eported Soviet attempt toASS office in Kashmir apparently aborted, 9 Czechoslovakiaontract torick factory near Srinagar. eam of Soviet experts surveyed Kashmir's forest resources and studied the possibility of settingulp and paper plant. 3 -East-Germany expressed interest in^setting up:-fruit canning, printing machinery, coal processing, and cement plants in Kashmir. These plants, though innocuous in themselves, would provide Bloc technicians with opportunities toIndian military Installations and movements and might provide local Communists with the means of infiltrating work forces at strategic installations.
Kashmiri Communists. Thereommunist movement within Kashmir. The benefit, if any, gained by Coraicunist China from this movement, however, is unknown. Superficially, the movement appears politically weak, subversively not active, and incapable of major sabotage because of Indian security
W gfiBBICM PIOOCM
measures. At the same time, it would appear to beosition to exert considerable influence should it so desire. Four leftists or pro-Communists, Ghulara Sadiq,. Dhar, Girdhari Lai Dogra, and Mir Qasim, have for years held key posts in the Kashmiri cabinet.
)ther outright Communists have
participated actively in party politics, mainly under the aegis of the opposition Democratic National Conference but also from within the ruling National Conference party. On various occasions, and most recently inheParty of India has considered establishing an overt branch of the party in Kashmir, but nothing much has come of this. mall core of party followers continues to operate in undisclosed ways inside Kashmir under the guidance of Harkishen Singh Surjit of the Punjab state partyplinter group of the Democratic National Conference is apparently fairly openly identified with Communist aims. ranch of the all but defunct All-India Kisaneasant organization, is also under Communist control in Kashmir.
Communist Party policy in Kashmir is not readily Some elements of the party, mainly in the Vale, have been reported as pro-Chinese. Others in Jamrau are pro-Indian, and in3 wereactivelypro-Soviet literature. The influence of left-wing cabinet members on Premier Bakshi is unknown, and the relationship of Kashmiri leftists to Nehru and the Indian government is unclear. Bakshi supposedly suppressesbut does not hesitate to bring pro-Communists into his cabinet and is close to Krishna Menon. Why the security-minded government of India tolerates the presence of fellow-travellers in the Kashmiri cabinet has been an enigma for years, though the answer may be that they can be counted upon to be anti-Pakistan in outlook.
Local reaction to the situation. Because of Indian security measures and the American "hands-off" policy^ shnijjpasaa
attitudes toward India, Pakistan, the USSR or Communist China. Generalities widely acceptedhat the inhabitants of Pakistani-held Kashmir are loyal tohat the Muslim majority population in the Vale probably would prefer independence under Sheikh Abdullah but would vote for union with Pakistan if given the chance to do so,hat the population of Jammu would vote to accede to India. Certain individuals such as Premier Bakshi owe
aay question whether Pakistan would do as much for them. On the other hand, tbore is little indication that the hundreds of millions of dollars spent in Kashmir by India7 have perceptibly Increased the loyalty of the local popula-tion. Inn individual publicly supporting with both funds and propaganda the cause of imprisoned former premier Sheikh Abdullah was expelled from Kashmir. In the spring3 the American Embassy in New Delhia "demand" purportly signed byeligious "divines" in Kashmir for the release of Sheikh Abdullah, and the British High Commissionommunication supposedly signedesidents cf the Vale askingneutralized" Kashmir. On3 there was an explosion in Premier Bakshi's official residence, which followed shortly after the burning of Kushak Bakula's bouse in Srinagar. Though these incidents suggest that disaffection continues in Kashmir, it is generally agreed that military and police forces there are sufficiently large to prevent any open revolt by the long-oppressed and presently submissive populationhole. Kashmiris of the Vale reportedly were throwntate of panic upon learning of Chinese military successes in eastern Ladakh Whether they would rise ln supportPakistani invasion cannot be indicated with certainty. The main threat to Indian border security at present would appear to be from Communist attempts to sabotage communications and supply systems leading to the Vale and to Ladakh ln the event of serious hostilities with China.
PUNJAB, HIMACHAL PRADESH. UTTAR PRADESH
Summary. The Indian frontier districts which lieKashmir and Nepal, comprising parts of PunjabPradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, formiles wide, oriented in adirection on the southern slopes of theregion, of all those along the borders ofSikkira, Bhutan, and NEFA, is probably thoto large-scale military invasion byand possibly the best secured on tho Indianwhich has made major territorial claimsand NEFA, has only minor disagreement withthis particular portion of the border. This areafar removod from the main Chinese logistic basesWest China, and Lhasa. Minor patroloccurred in tre neighborhood of Bara Hoti, inwhere the Chinese claim possession of thethe crest of the mountains, but co major militaryhas taken place in this region. Politically, on the Indian side of the border have in thesupported the ruling Congress Party, and manybelong to the martial classes which form theof the Indian army. Nevertheless, both thethe Indian Communists huve been spreading someamong
fo counter sue!
ictivity, the Indian government has strengthened its administration of the border area and is speeding economic development projects.
Goographic factors. The area discussed here includes the following districts of three states:
Punjabimla, Kangra, and Lahul and
Spiti districts. Ilimachalhamba, Mandi, Bilaspur,
Mahasu, Sirmur, and Kinnaur
Uttarehra Dun, Naini Tal, Almora, Garhwal, Tohri-Garhwal, Pithoragarh, Chamoli, and Uttar Kashi districts.
Topographically this region rises from the Indo-Gangotic plainoothills belt characterized by interspersed cultivation and scrub jungle. The bulk of the area's population is located in this bolt omewhat higher altitude, the forest becomes denser and consists in largo part of oak, pine, and cedar. The
population is smaller here, and more limited in distribution to isolated mountain valleys with individual characteristics. At the highest altitudes are barren reaches with little vegetation and features similar to those in the highof Kashmir, Ladakh, and Tibet. The Splti and Lahul valleys in particular contain flora and fauna more like those of Tibet than of South Asia. Population here is sparse. The Himalayas in this region reach noteworthy heights, with peaks ranging00 feet and passes lying00 feet.
Climate varies according to altitude. The plains fringe to the south is hot and dry, except during tbe monsoonbetween June and September, when up tonches of raia are deposited near the foot of the hills. Precipitation in the middle altitude belt ranges betweennches, with Simla, in the Punjab, receiving aboutnchesand Dharamsala an annual averagenches. Winter "rains also occur at this altitude. The high Himalayas are cool throughout the year, and passes aro periodically closed by snow in winter.
Several of the largest rivers of the Indian -subcontinent rise in this region and eventually flow to the sea through West Pakistan. The Chonab rises in Spiti and Lahul district, the Ravi in Chamba district. The Beas rises near the Rohtang Pass in Kashmir, and traverses tbe Kulu valley in the Punjab and Mandi district in Himachal Pradesh. The Sutlej, rising in Tibet, enters Uttar Pradesh near the Shipki La (Shipki Pass). The Jumna, the only one of tbe rivers which flows eastward, rises in Tehri-Garhwal district.
Four major strategic routes affecting Indian border security run through this part of India, mainly following river valleys. Theseackdoor route to Ladakh, via Kulu, Manali, and the Bara Lacha Pass (describedoute up the Sutlej river valley from Simla to Shipki La (Shipki Pass) and Gartok in Tibet, which is the chief traditional Indo-Tibetan trade route in this region, everal routes branching off from Joshimath in Uttar Pradesh and leading to Toling in Tibet, mainly via the Mana La but also via the pilgrimage town of Badrinath and Bara Hoti,oute from Naini Tal and Almora along the western Nepal border via Lipulek Pass to Taklakhar (Taklakot) and the famous Mt. Kailas-Lake Manasarowar pilgrimage area in Tibet. All these are trade routes, motorable up to the middle-altitude belt in the mountains. Though the Chinese have developed relatively good east-west as well as north-south road networks fairly close to the border, there is
-no sonsiar Draaiw-
very little east-west communication on the Indian side north of the Indo-Gangetic plain. In India, however, railway spurs run northward from the main Bareilly-Amritsar line to several points, including Pathankot, Simla, Dehra Dun, Rishikesh, and the vicinity of Naini Tal, and make India's logistic position somewhat easier than China's. Thiswith the situation existing in Ladakh, Nepal, and NEFA.
The people. The total population of the hill districts under discussionersons laving in the hills of the Punjab,a Himachal Pradesh,n the mountains of Uttar Pradesh. The bulk of the population inhabits the lower-lying foothills, wis re the population of each district ranges. The high mountainof Lahul and Spiti contains0 persons, Kinoaurnd Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and Pithora-garhach. Populationin the high altitude districts rangeer square mile in Lahul and Spiti ton Kinnaur andn Pithora-garh. This contrastser square mile in districts close to.the plains.
The population of this area is divided into three separate groups depending on the altitude of habitation. There is no outstanding animosity among them.
The inhabitants of the high Himalayaseet are mainly pastoral nomads of Mongoloid racial stock,ibetan language, adhering to Buddhist faith, and being related in most aspects of material culture to the people of Tibet. The inhabitants of Spiti are "Yellow Hat' Buddhists like the Dalai Lama. The population of Kinnaur district consists mostlyingle tribal group, the Kannauras, of whom those living at high altitudes are Buddhists.and those at lower altitudes Hindus. Some Bhotia traders in the northern parts of Tebri-Garhwal, Garhwal, and Almora districts also are Hindus. These Bhotias move up and down the mountain valleys with the seasons of the year, crossing the high passes to trade with Tibet inand descending to hones in India during the winter. There is no caste structure here, andTibetanpracticed. In the slightly lower valleys such as Spiti, there is some agriculture as well asbarley, buckwheat, and peas being the main crocs. Food in all these high altitudes is scarce. Literacy is low. ranging.
Tbe population ln tbe isolated valleys and refuge areas of the heavily forested middle altitudeseet is basically South Asian rather than Tibetan. Racially, the people are Caucasold. Linguistically, theyariety of languages, generally classified as Pahari (or mountainf types found along the whole southern slope of the Himalayas from Kashmir to central Nepal. These languages, of South Asian derivation, are similar to Rajas-thani, Hindi, and Punjabi, but are closer to each other than to the languages of the plains and are mutually unintelli-ble. roup of pastoral tribes in the lower hills ofand Himachal Pradesh states, known as Gujars and Gaddis, speakongue also related to Rajasthani. The religion of this mountain belt is Hinduism, butooser and less orthodox form than is found on the plains. It contains elements of earlier religions, including spirit worship and animal sacrifice. The caste system is also loose. Among the higher castes are the Rajputs, descendants of warriors from what is now Rajasthan state, who migrated Or were driven into the hills and who include in theirmany ox the former princes and landowners of this region. Members of the Jat peasant caste and the Gujar pastoral groups rank lower in tbe hierarchy. There is more agriculture in tbe middle reaches, of tbe mountains than at high altitudes, and forest products are among the main sources of revenue. Fruitajor industry ln Kulu valley in Kangra district. There are tea gardens in Kangra, Mandi, Sirmur, and Simla districts which produce good quality tea. Terraced rice fields are common to this mountain belt, and wheat, barley, and pulses are also grown. There is some trade with both Ladakh and Tibet. Literacy ranges as highn some districts.
cut off. Literacy is higher here than in the mountains proper, running as high, well over the all-India average, in Simla district in Punjab state.
The population of the plains and foothillseet Is more cosmopolitan and more closely identified with the classic Hindu'peasantry ofndo-Gangotic plain. Leading languages are Punjabi, Hindi, and Urdu. Much of the population is identified with tbe Rajput landowning caste or the Jat agricultural caste. The Jats dominate Punjab politics. Former Rajput princes are important in the politics of Himachal Pradesh. Wheat, barley, gram, and maize are common food staples in this plalns-aad-foot-hiiis region, and irrigation is common. Indo-Tibetan trade
Indian political and economic activity. Politically Punjab, aimachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh states are controlled by the Congress Party, though the party organi-
bre6 states suffers from factionalism, in7 general elections, the Punjab Congress organizationnticipated, but it lost some seat!2 In2 elections, the Hiznachal Pradesh Congress Party improved its position materially. In both72 elections the Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, whichd an overwhelming majority,onsiderable number of seats because of intense factionalism amongst its leaders. In both elections, however, the hill districts in all three states strongly supported the Congress Party, probably because it was the only one to have developed an organization reaching to the small town level.
Bickering and factionalism areoll of Congress strength, however, and gradually weakening the basic loyalty of the people to the ruling party. Additional confusion is also caused by various religious, linguistic, and caste
"nd Hiffiachal Pradesh which are attempting to redraw the boundaries of these states to favor their res-pective groups. The former untouchables and depressedhe hill districts of Punjab state, who previously were oyal to the Congress Party, have beendrifting toward the Communist aad other oppositionpartles^
Economically, the Congress Party in the Punjab has one of the best records in India in the field of economic development activity. In Himachal Pradesh it bas also made considerable headway. Its record in Uttar Pradesh is possibly
J?" ln fQd;a- all three states, however,pelial effort seems to have been made9 to speedand other development projects to help secure the frontier districts against Chinese influence.
as state governments considerablyeir efforts to tighten administrative efficiency along the
istrlct of Lahul and Spiti was created /
tQfSandra district in Punjab state. Its new district headquarters town nowost office, radio-
itiCH'statiOQ' hospital, and high school. In Himachal Pradesh, the new border district of Kinnaur was
rJ^CreatKd in Inthe same year
th.ee new border districts of Uttar Kashi, Chamoli, and
forD>ed and placedingledJvfsion, of which the Chief Secretary of Uttar Pradesh state is ex-officio Divisional Commissioner.
Sfifi. lonal and state eovernments have set aside over S S USed ia sPeclal border developmentm the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh during the Third Five Year Plan period, ofie Indian government will. imon dollars, oy
eS^Share' wil1 be sPent ia Uttar Pradesh. J4 million and Punjab state $ST hI The,chief "Ulster of each of the states has been
cofstructfnn z"lonsec UP to speed rlad
armv conrin?" primarily under Indian
lSSwovementSutlej valley road
haveSJ*fc*SLa- Citizens advice bureausbl"hed t0 giVG direc"ons to citizens asl nereencies and to coordinate the work of
In jSaeri96fnfr "national derensf.
MiniSJv ? v ratS org""ation within the Home
n LIS. I feated to speed implementation
Pradesh, and uttar Pradesh states and in Ladakh.
tnstate- the state university decided in5 irC}asses ia tne Tibetan and Chinese languages. during the Dusslrah festi-
J iS ?ear' In Hinachal Pradesh, youthcamps Dearborder to learn how to
? Uildxng* Tbe State Publlc Works Minister in ut?ar
roads would be reconstructed andiles of new roads
^ oastruction-on therTJZGd3 and Persoos wererOUte- Communications are also
d'elegraph offices were opened at
Sit wfP Ii,Va!ley and atKedarnath in
-andW*reln Kulu- JoshSath, ?rfde ^nS aSa^!- J'theKSaDe tlffle" Stricter controls on Be ngf ^ Ct at aU border
iolltarv and intelligence activitiP^ The ShiDki
inn?.. Chinese penetrated into Ladakh aod NEFA. Sino-
a?medn agreement thaiian-Clvilian ad*"istrators could collect taxes
SSls SETSnd thatials could collect revenue from Tibetan traders in the same
location. Subsequenttalks, however, have failed to leadinal settlement and demarcation of the border.
The most important recent step taken by India to improve military security in the Punjab-Himachalradesh border region was the establishment in3ew army Central Command, with headquarters at Lucknow. This new command assumed responsibility for the defense of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa states, which formerly were under the jurisdiction of the Eastern Command. Troops ur.der this new command consist of the 6th Mountain Division, with headquarters at Eareilly, one brigade at Ranikhet, another at Rishikesh,hird brigade at Tanakpur. These forceshree-fold increase in troop strength in this area. In the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh area, which is under the jurisdiction of the army Western Command, there is one brigade atore battalions at various locations, the 4th Mountain Division reconstituting at Ajnbala after being mauled In NEFAnd an armored brigade in reserve at Patiala. In addition, the 7th Mountain Division is raising at Dharamsala. Troops at present are not located directly on the border but are stationed several miles below the mountain crests on the Indian side. Police postsclose to the border watch enemy movements and presumably will give early warning of any impending Chinese advance into Indian territory. Eight companies of scouts being raised from local border people familiar with their own areas are to be used to harass enemy-invaders and weaken their logistic capabilities. The main elements of the Indian army do not at present intend toetermined defense within about SO miles of the border. No detailed information is available regarding civilian defensesuch as Home Guards and National Cadet Corps unitsraised in this region and the-paramilitary capabilities ?firpopulation therefore cannot be judged. It isthat existing forces could materially slow any Chinese drive across the border into India's hill districts.
Chinese political aod economic activity. As indicated above, the Chinese have never made such extensiveclaims in the Punjab-Himachal Pradesh-Uttar Pradesh area as they bave in Ladakh and NEFA, having limitedmainly to small claims near Bara Hoti (called Wu-je by the Chinese). These claims, originally made4 were the first officially advanced by Peiping against India,uccession of Sino-Icdian talks and temporary arrangements, however, tbe Chinese have maintained their
claim that thisdisputed area." fter the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal in Ladakh and NEFA the Chinese specifically mentioned Bara Hoti as being one o' four remaining areas of dispute. InaaaaaaBaaaaaaasav>B
the Indian government by
consideraoiy expanding the area in dispute at Bara Hoti from aboutquare milesquare miles, possibly paving the way for more extensive intrusions than the Indians had previously believed likely.
that the Chinese would return to India
Other propagan in August.
Chinese political and propaganda campaigns inhave apparently been conductedthe Chinese side of the border. Theyaimed at enlisting the support of the Tibetanfor Chinese programs and at creating theIndia has "aggressive"
Chinese economic activities in recent years havea steady buildup of road and communicationsand improvement of supply positions. hinese troopsereoad leading toward Shipki La, toward which the Indian army was alsootorable roadigh priority basis. oafc?'ty of food supplies on both sides of the border3 led the Chinese to exhort Tibetans to deliver asproduce as they could and, by-implication, to smuggle food across the border from India if possible. Nepali traders at Taklakhar complained inhat their cattle were being taken away from.them, presumably to ease
Chinese closed Taklakhar aod other^ustoa?ar^!arkets to
Indian traders in.the summer Possibly unreliable Indian press reports intated that Pakistani goods were appearing in Cartok and Taklakhar asfor Indian ones.
ChineseBB^^MI aad subversive activities The re" has boon no military clash on this part oi the Tibetan border for sooe years, though prior8 Chinese patrols crossed the border at Shipki La and Bara Hotl with some regularity. Specifically, the Chinese did not attempt to occupy Bara Hoti when they attacked in Ladakh and NEFA last October. Tho Chinese army apparently is holding this sector fairly lightly compared to other areas, despite3 steady buildup and the rounding up of local yak transport during the summer HIHbVb^^bHb^bWthe Chinese cannot readily
a division in this sector and that any Chinese thrust would be in somewhat smaller strength down from Taklakhar via Lipulek pass along the western boundary of Nepal. Chinese logistic difficulties probably would prevent any major push into Indian territory here, and any intrusion would boto reach beyond the foothills.
Communist and Soviet bloc acti
to thi Chinese Ihr^tSKtffhorder^the'0
athreat which Sjato? fiSffia*erlalJ2e' depending on various circumstances
HwS?aDd Soviet Dloc activity inimachal Pradesh, and uttar Pradesh hill districts
The tightly organized and well-led Communist Party in the Punjab has an influence beyond tbe number of seats it holds in legislative bodies. Its sain strength lies among the Sikh peasantry and landless laborers and industrial workers in the western and central parts of tho state. It is not strong among the hill Hindus, but is represented in Kangra, district where it0 votes in theelections Itmaller number of votes in Chaiaba and Mandi districts in Himachal Pradesh, but increased its voting strength here72 and won its first seat in the Himachal Pradesh territorial council from Macdl district0 Communist votes were polled in the billof Uttar Pradeshost of them in the Dehra Dun and Nainl Tal areas at the foot of tho routes leading to Tibet.
The significance of the Communist presence in Kaagra district is that it lies athwart tbe main backdoor routo from the Punjab to Ladakh, where Communists can observe any Indian military movements or development activities. The route also providos tbe Communistsommunications link to Ladakh which could provide tbe Chinese withInformation. Dbaramsala, the present headquarters of
focal point for north Indian Hindu pilgrims, is also located in Kangra district. Communists in Chamba district in Himachal Pradesh are close to the Punjab railhead at Pathankot and the foot of the only Indian military supply route to Kashmir and Ladakh. In Uandl district,mallcenter, thereargo hydroelectric project at Jogindernagar. Sinceost left-faction Punjabi Communist leadors who might be sympathetic tohave boon in jail, and the assistance they might at present render to the Chinese is probably slight.
In Himachal Pradesh, the Communist Party organization, though small, has concentrated on infiltrating the Public Works Department Labor Union and the Government Transport Workers Union, which control virtually all organized labor in the territory and whose monbers are engaged in vital road-building and transportation activities along routes leading to Tibet. Communist opportunities for intelligence collection, communications with border areas, and sabotage are obvious. Tho party is also trying to rally peasants in the state and has made some headway with tbe former untouchable classes. Party members also spread pro-Chiuese Communist propaganda when possible.
Ia Uttar Pradesh in recent years the Communist Party has exploited discontent in the backward hill tracts and hasits organizing activities in the Himalayan upland
oorder- as also been active amongst former untouchables and has gained some ground with them.
!^kSS <luietly in tne villages, mainly stressing economic problems, the Communists have avoided flashy campaigns. Thev have not publicly sided with China but have sought io create doubt and confusion on the China question. That they are working hard on transport and roadbuildlng labor groups is
district in deputy chairman of the humaon Transport Workers Unioa7 divisional secretary of the Public Works Department Employees Union, and president of the Alraora Municipal Employees Union.
Possibly of some interest in connection with local Communist activities in tbe border region is the fact! "cent Soviet bloc development projects seem to be located closer to the border than earlier ones. As stated above, Soviet-Rumanian oil-drilling teams worked at Jawala-mukhi as early eam of Russians waspinning mill at Dehra Dun, the site of an Indian military academy at the foot of one of the routes leadine
n"?te Indiaeries of contracts with the USSR for constructioneavyproject near Hardwar, in Uttar Pradesh, where for the firstumber of Soviet instructors were to be located in India to train upndians annually in technical natters. Previously, Indian students had gone to the U g* Sardwaramous north Indian pilgrimage
?he nsSere<:ma?yPersons congregate each spring. The USSR is also building an antibiotics factory at Rishikesh, near Hardwar. Both Hardwar and Rishikesh are on
l tba base oi *be road leading to Joshimath, SS?at!'JMd the Bara Hoti frontieroute much
5 heading toward the border. On 3I SSRontract to supply equipment forgb* bankPlaQt at Bhakra Dam in Punjab state,? Jar8est hydroelectric power projects in Indiasource of power for much of north India. Theconstructionower plant on the left
elVfS towaxd tbe Sino-Indian dispute and toward the efforts of both sides to influence them. As stated
abovo, at the time of the general elections in2 the bill peoples apparently remained preponderantly loyal to India and to the ruling Congress Party, whosethey returned to parliament and state assemblies in large majorities. The Cocsunists did sake some gains in the elect ions , LaHHLaaaaafl HH landless laborers and former untouchables were becoming increasingly disgruntled over their poor lot. Since then, factionalism and the activity of special interest groups probably have weakened the loyalty of the populace to the Congress Party though not necessarily to India.
The extent to which attitudes have changed since the Chinese attacks in October, is not known. Many villages in tho Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and western Uttarajor recruiting ground for tbe Indian army, lost sons in the fighting in Ladakh and NEFA and their inhabitants presumably are not-well-disposed toward China. Extensive Indiandevelopment activities In tbe border regions presumably are bringing new employment opportunities and new ;ijcnr.itit::.
lessening the feeling ot the hill dwellers that they are neglected and discriminated aga: '
There remains the danger that infightinc among prominent Congress Party leaders, espoclally in Naini Tal and Almora districts, may result in programs being carried out less effectively than advertised. The fact thatparr ^mWkWm^mmaking gains hero suggests that this is so. Probably the main cause for concern is the concentration of Communist strength in roadbuilding and transportation labor unions which could be exploited for the purpose of Intelligence or sabotage if dostred.
- 35 -
Summary. The Himalayan frontier between Nepal and Tibet poses special security problems for India, since New Delhi at present can neither control Nepali defense policy nor directly defend the Nepali frontier with its own troops. Prime Minister Nehru has publicly stated that-India regards Nepal's frontiers as its own for defense purposes and that it would defend Nepal against agression. Nepal, however, being landlocked between India and Tibet, is concerned with both Indian and Chinese Communist views, and India has not succeeded in influencing either the Nepali government or the Nepali people to declareopenly against the Chinese. The government of Nepal, especiallyastrenuous effort to remain neutral both in world affairs and ln regard to the Sino-Sovlet dispute, to increase its ties with as many nations as possible, and to free its political and economic institutions from Indian control or influence.
The Nepali army, despite some years of training by Indian military instructors, can do no more than maintain internal security. It would be ineffective against Chinese invasion, except in localized counteractions. In the eventhinese attack, Indian troops wouldhave the alternatives of entering Nepal unasked, of waiting until Nepal requested assistance, or of remaining on the Gangetic plain and waiting for Chinese forces to debouch from the hills. One way or another, Indian troops would probably be found inside Nepal in the casehinese attack. At present, however, it appears unlikely that Peiping plans military aggression against Nepal. Should the Chinese use economic penetration, subversion, or other non-military measures to undermine the government of _Nepal, India would find it difficult to intervene effectively
Geographical factors. Nepaliles longiles wide and covers an area of0 square miles. The northern border of Nepal coincides ln most areas with the crests of the Great Himalaya range, in some places the highest peaks lie south of the border. Like the hill districts of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh, Nepal is divided geographically into three major east-west belts according to altitude.
Closest to the Tibetan borderigh altitude zone of rugged mountains and sparse population, with mountain crests ranging00 feet and individual peaks rising00 feet. The terrain here is extremely rugged and relatively barren, being marked by steep slopes, narrow valleys, torrential streams, coldstrong winds and perpetual snow0 feet. The economy of the few inhabitants is mainly pastoral, there being little agriculture, but some people depend on trade for much of their living.
To the south of thisroader, middle-altitude belt rimmed by mountains on both the north and south, butumber of large valleys in between supporting about half of Nepal's total population. The Katmandu valleyquare miles area is the largest and by far the most important of these valleys. It contains three of the country's six majorPatan (or Lalitpur) and Bhadgaon (or Bhaktapur). The climate in this belt, which lies0 foot altitudes, is milder. There is moderate rainfall, with clouds and storms being especially prevalent during the monsoon season from June to September. The population, which ranges as higher square mile in density in the Katmandu valley, is oriented toward agriculture, terraced rice fieldsrominent part of the landscape. Wheat and maize are also grown. This belt is also wooded, inportions, with heavy forest at0 feet.
Along the southern boundary of Nepal adjacent to Indiaarrow plains and foothills region called the Terai. The eastern and more heavily watered portion of this area containsf Nepal's total population andhree other major towns in theBirganj, and Biratnagar. The Terai, which rises from the Ganges river floodplain to an altitude ofeet, shares the same hot summer, mild winter, and June to September monsoon season as the plains of India. The forest which covers much of this region is moist, dense, and full of animals and endemic disease. Movement across or through it is complicated by these factors as well as by flooding streams. Rice, wheat, sugarcane, and jute are primary crops.
Although the main Himalayan ranges in Nepal run in an east-west direction, lateral communication isbecause of the north-south orientation of numerous high mountain spurs and most of the major river valleys. Administration, trade, and defense are made difficult because of this terrain problem. Rapid east-west movement at present is possible only by airetwork of small landing fields available mostly to light planes and in some cases to DC-3s. An east-west national highway, surveyed initially by the USSR, is now under construction in spots under the direction of the Nepali government, primarily with local volunteer labor. The main transportation routes in Nepal runorth-south direction. inglehaped route crosses Nepal between Tibet and India. One fork of the route from Tibet enters Nepal below Girang Dzong and the other below Nyalam Dzong and bothat Katmandu. Below Katmandu thereingle, motor-able,aile road leading southailhead in Nepali territory at Amlekhganj and thence to Raxaul in India. This route is now being made motorable from Katmandu to the Tibetan border at Kodari (below Nyalam Dzong). There are onlydditional miles of motorable roads in all of Nepal, mainly in the southern plains and in the Katmandu valley.
Thereozen or more important north-south non-motorable caravan routes leading from Tibet into Nepalariety of smaller trails which make invasion relatively easy and defense difficult because of the lack of lateral communications. Most tracks0 feet in altitude are blocked by snow in winter, but several important routes, including the ones to Girang Dzong and Nyalam Dzong, cross from Tibet via relatively low valleys that are unaffected by winter snowsu Despite the difficulty of many of the passes and trails in Nepal, considerable annual movement of persons takes" place along them; Till recently,0 or more Tibetans found their way to Calcutta to trade each winter,arge number of Nepalis migrated to India for winter trading.
The people. The Nepali population of notersons is both racially and culturally mixed, sharing about equally Caucasoid and Mongoloid racial traits and Hindu and Buddhist religious beliefs. The boundary between India and Tibetan peoples and cultures is not sharp here as in Kashmir and the north Indian states. The strongest Mongoloid racial traits and Buddhist cultural
influence are in the high Himalayas where population densities run as low aser square mile and small villages ofuts or thereabouts cluster on the Indian Hindu influence is strongest in the Terai. The central mountain belt is very mixed. Many groups live in isolated valleys having little contact with each other or with Katmandu, and the people have no special loyalities to any power lying outside their immediate neighborhood.
There are eleven major ethnic and caste groups inThakurs, Chetris, Gurungs, Magars, Newars, Murmis, Sunwars, Kirantis (including Rais andhotias (includingnd Tharus. The Brabmans, Thakurs and Chetris are widely dispersed throughout Nepal. The Caucasold Brahmans are descendants of Hindu political refugoes who left India at the time of tbe Muslim conquest betweenhh. The Thakurs and Chetris are mainly Mongoloid, with some Caucasold mixture. They are Hindu by religion and social customs but have equal-ranked exogaaous clans rather than the caste system. Theyrominent part in Nepali affairs. The Thakurs are descendants of Rajputs from northwest India, driven eastward by Muslim invasions. They intermarried with Gurungs and Magars. The present royal family belongs to this group. The Chetris, of Rajput and Brahman stock, have the same sort of history. Tbe Rana family, formerlyprime ministers of Nopal, belong to this group.
The Magars, who are found throughout the whole central belt of Nepal, and the Gurungs of west central Nepal are of Tibetan origin. They are Mongoloid types, not very Hinduizcd, and have exogamous clans of equal rank instead of the caste system. They are among the groupsalled Gurkhas, and theyonsiderable number of men to the Nepalese, Indian, and British armies. The Newars of the Katmandu valley and adjacent areas probably came originally from Tibet, but they now are very mixed.f the Newars are either orthodox Hindus or Buddhists in approximately equal numbers, while the rest aro of mixed Hindu-Buddhist faith with overtones ofshamanism and animism. The Newars, however, have an elaborate Hindu-type caste system, there being some Hindu castes, some Buddhist castes, some mixed castes, and some untouchables among them. They were conquered by Gurkhas from the west. The Bhotias of the northern
border areas are essentially Buddhists of the Tibetan variety, culturally indistinguishable from Tibetans,ixed economy of agriculture and pastoralism, and much involved in trade.
"The Murmis, Sunwars, and Kirantis of eastern Nepal are Mongoloid racially, not much Indianized, and rather isolated from the rest of the country. Theubgroup of Kirantis, are related to the Lepchas of Sikkim and have migrated to southern Sikkim in considerable numbers in recent decades. They are close to the Bhotias culturally. The Tharu cultivators who live along the whole southern Terai and plains border next to India are an old, indigenous tribal group of Caucasoid extraction. They were apparently driven to the hills by later Caucasoid invaders.
There are aboututually unintelligible languages in Nepal, plus additional dialects. The western Nepali tribes speak Pahari languages related to those in the lower Himalayas between Nepal and Kashmir. The dominant language is Nepali, one of two in Nepalritten literary tradition. It is the language of the Thakurs and Chetris, who led the Gurkha conquest over the Newars of central Nepal. It is related to Kumaoni of Uttar Pradesh to the west and eventually to Rajasthani and Sanskrit. Newari, the other languageiterary tradition, is of Tibeto-Burman stock and is spoken byeople in central Nepal. The Bhotia and eastern tribal languages are also Tibeto-Burman. The people of the Terai, mainly the Tharus, speak Hindi dialects common to the adjacent Indian plains areas. Literacy in Nepal is very low, estimated atith most literates living in the Katmandu valley.
Nepal is self-sufficient in "foodubsistence level, and exports foodgrains to Tibet in return for salt and wool. Ethnic groups and their economies are closely correlated with altitude in Nepal, special groups of staple crops being grown at different altitudes. Up toeet, closely associated with Hindu, Indianized culturalice cultivation is common, frequently in terraced fields, with maize and millet grown as summer crops. Cattle and goats are common domestic animals. In the middle altitudes, as among the Gurungs and Magarseet, people depend on barley and wheat as winter crops and maize and millet as summer grains, with
ummer crop in the higher altitudes of this zone. odified form of Tibetan culture is found among the Bhotias0 feet, with wheat and barley as winter crops andummer crop. Pure Tibetan culture is found0 feet, whereingle crop of wheat or barley is possible each year and yak and sheep replace cattle and goats as domesticated animals. There is very little formalized industry in Nepal, most crafts being of the home variety. Exploitation of forest products is one of the most important industries. There is some manufacturing around Katmandu and in eastern Nepal at Biratnagar, mainly jute products, cigarettes, matches, food products, and cotton textiles. Manydepend on Indian capital, managerial talent, and markets. Nepali industry is not equipped to support any kind of war effort.
Trade is organizedrimitive basis, beingmainly by individual family members making annual trading trips to the plains of India. There is some trade with Tibet, Water power is available but undeveloped, and minerals are largely unexploited. Imports from India have been strictly controlled0 and reexports of strategic items to Tibet supposedly are forbidden. Acutally foodgrains and other items are freely traded or smuggled to Tibet.
Indian political and economic activity. The Indian government, concerned over the defensibility of itsfrontier, suffers conflicting emotions regarding the amount of pressure it should attempt to exert on Nepal. Until recently, Nepal's landlocked position, its primitive political organization, and its dependence on India for trade outlets, foreign exchange, and communications with the..outside world make it susceptible to Indian advice and direction. The Indian government^ hoping to increase its influence in Nepal, tacitly concurred in the1 which overthrew the Rana family of hereditary prime ministers and temporarilyonstitutional monarchy system of government. India also permitted socialist political groups in India to provide supplies to the Nepali revolutionaries. 1fter the king0 had assumed full personal controI_oyer the government by
Since King Mahendra succeeded his fatherNepal has increasingly withdrawn from India's grasp. Mahendra has steadily increased the number of countries with which Nepal has diplomatic relations, the number being four4 (United States, Great Britain, France, and India) and now Nepal recognized Communist China 5 and the USSR Mahendra recently restricted the use of Indian currency, which once circulated as freely as Nepali money. He has taken steps to develop anNepali postal service, thus curtailing India's control over international postal service which formerly had to pass through the Indian embassy in Katmandu.
Mahendra has also expanded trade and accepted economic aid from India, the United States, the USSR, and Communist China, as well as from the United Nationsumber of small .European and Asian countries. During the last two years particularly, he has engaged in diplomatic and economic maneuvers with Pakistan designed to free Nepal's trade and communications from Indian control. irect air route between Katmandu and East Pakistan has been established, and Nepalese trade in limited quantities can now pass in and out without Indian supervision. In economic, as in diplomatic, relations Mahendra has attempted toa balance between the Soviet bloc and Communist China on the one hand and India and the Western world on the other.
Fear of Chinese power in Tibet has led Mahendrasoftly in dealing with Communist authorities; hecareful not to antagonize them but at the samehave treated him "correctly." Trade relationswere formalized by agreement Aagreement was negotiated0 and signed Nepal and Communist China have no immediateconflict between them.
India now is more or less powerless to prevent the above trends for fear that too much pressure will merely lead Nepal into the arms of Communist China. King Mahendra has played skillfully on this fear. Diplomatically India is attempting to keep the Nepalis sufficiently friendly to call in Indian troops if Nepali boundaries or internal security are threatened.
lia has also invited King Mahendra to New Delhi
ana has made sure that the Indian ambassador in Katmandu is less overbearing than before. Economically, India provides
Nepal with funds and technical assistance to counter economic assistance from Communist countries. India commenced economic assistance to Nepal in thes, ave Nepal the equivalentillion for its First Five Year Plannd has assisted it with additional funds since. New Delhi is helping tooad network, and is assisting in community development activities. The Indian domestic airline conducts regular service to Sepal. India and Nepal also exchango cultural visits and exhibitions. The All-India Radio broadcasts programs to Nepal in the Nepali language, probably without much effect on the Nepali people. The government of Nepal has excised Indian film material considered unfriendly to Communist China, but it does not permit blatant anti-Indian propaganda to be disseminated by the Chinese.
Indianctivity. particularly concerned ovcrTcpal's militarythe Chinese completed their conquest in Tibet and it has attempted without marked success toNepal's military capabilities. Nepal, potential threat from China,2 admitted antraining mission to reorganize the thenarmyore effective fighting force onlystrong. India was also invited to improvesystem. he Indian mission had cutof tho army0 men and had reorganized ltbrigades and smaller support-type units. Infourth brigade was being raised to increase theof the army to more As of this
however, Indian training has not yet greatly improved Nepali army capabilities. The Nepali army still lacks good leadership, logistic support, and communications. It loses its best potentialo the Indians and the British, who between them have0 Gurkhas under arms. The main point in favor of the army probably is that -it is the only organized military force in the country. It is loyal to King Mahendra, who depends on it to maintain himself in power. There is no evidence of Communistin the army.
The Nepali army is capable only of maintaining internal ecurity. It would be virtually useless inhinese Communist invasion because its combat troops arc so scattered, so poorly supplied, and have such poorthat their activities could not be coordinated.
Nepali arms are old, consisting mainly of British weapons of pre-World War II vintage, and Nepal is completelyon outside sources for arms supplies. There is no air force to use the small airfields which aro located mostly near tho Indian border and are therefore not useful for distributing troops tohinese attack in the north. Nepali border checkposts, of which there arclong the Tibetan frontier, are manned only by small police units with Indian radio communicators attached.
Nepali sensitivity to Indian domination has prevented Indian troops from being permanently stationed in Nepal, and probably will continue to do so in tho foreseeable future. Nepal Isarty to any military pact and is unlikely to sign any. Nevertheless, Indian troops were permitted to onter Nepal2 to help suppress aThey were again invited into the country to put down anti-government political demonstrations, and3 they helpedandit group in western Nopal. 3 Nepal has indicated some interest in Indian military aid. Indian police have occasionally entered southern Nepal to put down localized unrest. With the recent establishmentew Indian Army Central Command, located in Lucknow. India may be able to improve its military capabilities on the Nepali frontier and eventually place an infantryin position to oppose any Chinese attack through Nepal. At the moment, however, the Indian army is engaged in building up its forces in Ladakh and NEFA and cannot do much for the Nepali army. The Nepalis since2 have had some doubts as to the effectiveness of the Indian array.
There arox-soldiers (Gurkhas) from he Nepali, Indian and British armies now living in Nepal who could meet ago and physical requirements for military service if necessary. Most belong to the Magar and Gurung tribes from west central Nepal and to the Klrantl group from eastern Nepal. These individuals and their fellow tribesmen might be available for military or paramilitary activities if desired. They wouldood source of trained manpower, though their effectiveness could be limited by weakness in leadership or by reluctance to do anything which might jeopardize the pensions received from the British and Indian governments. These pensionsan important source of Nepal's annual financial income. The Bhotias of northern Nepal, who are related to the Tibetans, aro apparently anti-Chinese In outlook, but
some are also critical of the Nepali government forentry into Nepal of Tibetan refugees. The Kiranti tribes of Eastern Nepal have longeparate state and are not motivated in favor of the government at Katmandu. Probably the most effective guerrilla group in fepal isefugee Khanba tribesmen in the Uustang area of north central Nepal who range freely in Tibetan territory between Takhlakhar and Tineri Dzonir and harass Chinese lines of communication.
They get along relatively well with Nepax* checkpost personnel andource of concern to the Chinese, who try to blame India for their activities. An additional small group of Khanbas, recruited by the Chinese Nationalist government, irresponsibly conducts depredations both in Nepal and Tibet and irritates the government of both countries as well as the Dalai Lama.
Chinese political and economic activity. Upepal's outside relations were mainly with India, exceptmall trade conducted with Tibet. owever, China's position in Tibet became something the Nepalis had to consider. Nepal recognized Communist Chinand during the next two years the prime ministers of the two countries exchanged visits. Visits at various levels still continue. epal and Chinareaty of friendship which ended Nepal's privileged position in Tibet by abolishing extra-territorial rights, limiting trade to certain specified points, and requiring passports and visas for travelers. At the same time, however, China granted Nepal the equivalentillion in economic aid. Chinese suppression of the Tibetan revolt9 alarmed the Nepalis, but1 the two countriesorder accord which delimited the frontier andkilometer demilitarized zone. Nepal at this time accepted anillion worth of Chinese economic assistance.
Chinese aid projects in Nepalaper mill, which at last report was making little progress in roposed leather factory has also dropped out of the news recently. ement factory supposed to be built by Chinese is"encountering problems, includingIndian reluctance to permit transit through India of Chinese machinery. The road being built from Katmandu to Kodari with Chinese assistance seems to be the only joint Sino-Nepali project making satisfactory progress at the moment. There arehinese technicians in Nepal, working on these projects. The Chinese have also supplied some communications equipment and three smallircraft to Nepal. Trade between Nepal and Tibet isonormal and informal basis. Alternately, the Chinese seem to encourage and discourage trade. Most recently, they have cut Nepali profits by forcing traders to deal only with the Chinese state trading corporation. The Chinese in Tibet require foodgrains, gasoline, rubber tires, and iron, fair quantities of which seem to reach Tibet despite Indian and supposed Nepali restrictions. The total value of commodities traded between Nepal and Tibet is not great, however.
Tho Chinese propaganda effort directed at Nopal isigh pressure one, the Chinese apparently being satisfied with their basic relationships at present. Chinese films and exhibits are shown in Katmandu and some outlying towns, but there are no special cultural attractions drawing large crowds. The Chinese radio and press tend to fan latent anti-Indian sentiment by repeating anti-Indian comments taken rom the Nepali press, but the government of Nepal has suppressed dissemination in Nepal of Chinese newspaper charges that India is aiding the Kharaba refugees who raid Nepali and Tibetan villages. There is some Chineseaimed at getting Tibetan refugees to return to Tibet. Basically, Chinese diplomatic and propaganda efforts seem directed at maintaining friendly relations with Nepal
while quietly encouraging the Nepalis to be critical of India,
Soviet Bloc political and economic activity. Soviet bloc diplomatic and economic activity in Nepal is conducted along linos similar to the Chinese but is unrelated to the Chinese effort. Nepal has trade, aid, and culturalwith the USSR. King Mahendra has visited the USSR, and other visitors are exchanged at various levels. There are some Nepalese students in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Three Soviet projects are under construction ina sugar factory near Birganj being built with Soviet and Czech equipment andigarette factory at Janakpur, ydroelectric project at Panauti. oviet-built hospital in Katmandulready completed. There aro two Sovietelicopters in Nepal. oviet economic adviser in Nepal's National Planning Council apparently has only limited effectiveness. Aboutoviet technicians were in Nepal in the spring
Soviet bloc trade with Nopal has recently included cement and corrugated iron sheets, export of which isby India. Poland and Czechoslovakia have recently become new Nepali trading partners, having engaged in barter deals for Jute with private Nepali traders.
Nepal Communist Party activity. The Communist Party of Nepal is an additional factor of doubtful weight which enters Into the picture of Nepali and Indian border The party apparently has no capability toKing Mahendra at present, but it may have apotential in certain areas which could mako it
no TORETcn fjiaoca-
dangerous both to Nepal and to India in the eventmilitary action or serious subversiveof party membership rangeothe greatest concentration in Katmandu andtowns and in eastern Nepal. Nepali Communistnot outstanding and tend to take direction from The party was banned2 because ofwith an anti-government revolt. The6 and the party began to press for moregovernment. It did poorly in the firstelectionsinningeatsHouse of Representatives and polling onlyf In Katmandu, however, itf the votethe eastern and central. It works intellectuals and students. The party, longwith Indian Communists, began to getwith the establishmentoviet9hinese Communist embassy inwas banned again1 along with other
parties after King Mahendra took over sole control of the government.
The Communist Party of Nepal is now split into two or three factions, one demanding the overthrow of Kingecond supporting*the king and operating overtly with his tacit approval,hird trying to prevent the other two from splitting the party into ineffective factions. The unity group seems to be developing close ties with the Indian Communist Party's more.moderate centrist faction. The Sino-Soviet dispute has had little effect on the Communist Party of Nepal.
Chinese militaryctivity. There estimated to have0 troops opposite Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, including at least elements of one infantry division, three independent infantry regiments, and two border defense regiments. These troops apparently are actively engaged in roadbuilding and in theof barracks, bunkers, supply dumps, and other defensive installations which are gradually strengthening the Chinese side of the frontier. Since signature of the Sino-Nepali border agreement, Chinese troops have not harassed Nepali personnel at border checkposts, engaged in overt border crossings, or maintained obvious military pressure on the Nepali frontier. This apparently is in line with Chinese
political policy, which uses good relations with Nepalcontrast to the poor relations supposedly createdintransigence, militarynd Chinese troops are capable oflightly held Nepali borderumber of pointstime, however, and of penetrating virtually to
Local reaction to the situation. During the past decade Nepal, like many other underdeveloped Asian and African countries, has been concerned mainly withits economic strength and its stature in world affairs. The efforts of Nepali leaders have necessarily been directed primarily at freeing Nepal from dependence India. In this process, the Nepali government has taken actions irritating to the government of India. This has prompted Indian responses which in-turn have irriated the Nepalis.
_ They have also chafed at Indian trade restrictions, aimed at China, which have cut down exports of petroleum products, cement, and corrugated iron sheets to Nepal Indian criticism of the Nepali agreement with China for construction of the Katmandu-Kodari road has also antagonized the Nepalis. Relations between New Delhi aod Katmandu are therefore subject to periodic strain, with mutual suspicion of each other's actions occasionallymarked.
CHUMSI VALLEY, SIKKIM, BHUTAN, AND WEST BENGAL
Summary. That portion of the Himalayas which includes tho Chumbi valley of Tibet, the Indian protectorate of Sik-kim, tbe kingdom of Bhutan, and the northeastern districts of India's West Bengal state poses special securityfor New Del., . Through this region runs the easiest rade and invasion route from Lhasa to India. This route traverses the Chumbi valley, crosses two alternate passes into Sikkim, and then drops via the Tista river valley to the plains of West Bengal. The Tibetan border here is only aboutrow-flight oiles from the narrow corridor and single-track railway line which are the sole links between the rest of India and the state of Assam.
As in other parts of the Himalayas, the people of this region are diverse, the basic populations of Sikkim and Bhutan being mixed Tibetan and aboriginal stock, with Tibetan racial, linguistic, religious, and culturaldominant. To these have beenore recent strain of immigrants from Nepal, who now live ln the southern portions of both countries and who create political friction there. Most of these Nepalis are Hindus, who through their energy and initiative have taken over much of the economic wealth of the areas in which they live. People of Mongoloid racial stock spill over into the bill districts of West Bengal, but the Inhabitants of the lower slopes and plains are primarily Caucasold, Indo-European-speaking Hindus.
Indian political relations with the hill peoples in this region are complicated by the fact that Sikkim has its own "autonomous" internal administration and that Bhutan is essentially independent, exceptreaty agreement to bey India in conducting its foreign affairs. Though both Sikkim and Bhutan lie more or less at India'stroops are located inthe government of India nevertheless has>to<dealwith both these states to avoid raisingstrong enough to turn local attitudes in favor of China. Bhutan, at least, is vulnerable to Chinese attack. In addition, India is faced in this area with more intra-regional politicalaboriginal and Nepaliexists elsewhere in the Himalayas. There is also some suspicion or antagonism in both Sikkim and Bhutan toward India. Communist Influence2 was strong in tbe Bengali districts of Darjeoling, Jalpalguri, and Cooch Behar, though recent Indian security measures presumably have lessened this threat somewhat.
Chlnesc political and military interest in theSikkim, and Bhutan is also considerable. Chinato recognize India's special relationships withor Bhutan, insists on treating both states asentities, and is attempting to lure them intoof "neutrality" between India and China. have in the pastlaim to portions
eastern Bhutan, but this subject has not been pressed by Peiping. Peiping's propaganda also emphasizes frictions between India, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Chinese military actions along the Sikkimese border consist of construction work, frequent patrolling, and occasional overflights.
Sinceightened Indian censorship and security restrictions on visits by foreigners to border areas have virtually dried up overt and covert reporting on Sikkim, Bhutan, and the northern districts of West Bengal. Thus, the effect of Indian security measures following the Chinesein2 is unknown, and realistic assessments of the dangers of Chinese espionage, subversion, sabotage, and propaganda activities arc precluded.
Geographical factors. Prior to recent hostilities, the main military, trade, and communications route between Tibet and India ran from Lhasa, past Gyantse, through the Chumbi valley to Yatung, thence over the Nathueet) to Gangtok in Sikkim or over the alternate Jelepeet) to Kalimpong in West Bengal, from which point the combined routes descended the Tista river valley to the railhead of Siliguri on the Indo-Gangetic plain. Though trade and communications along this route now are virtually cut off, it still remains the shortest and easiest route alonghinese attack could be pressed to the Indian plains. The road from the Nathu La to Gangtok and Siliguri is motorable on the Indian side, and below Gangtok is mostly hard surfaced.- The Jelep La route is motorable exceptortion between Kalimpong and the border. arrow-gauge rail line extends to0 feet). The single-track meter-gauge railway line at Siliguri is India's sole rail link with the state of Assam, and is vital to the defense of that state.
A lesser route runs from Phari .Dzong, near .Yatung in ,Tibet, by mule trail to Paro in Bhutan and thence by motorable road (completed earlyouth to the rail line in West Bengal aboutiles east of Siliguri. An additional route runs by trail from Bum La and Towang or from
Khinzemane in NEFA to Tashi Gang Dzong in eastern Bhutan and thence by motorable road to Darrsnga on the plains of Assam. There are other minor passes and routes between both Sikkim and Bhutan and Tibet.
The Chumbi valley prior0 belonged to Tibet. It then passed to Sikkim as part of the dowryride married into the Sikkimese royal family. Subsequently it came under British control. 8 it was given back to Tibet by the British and Chinese power was recognized as paramount in it. Today, the Chumbi valleymile-long "dagger pointed at the plains of India." It runs north and south and extends downward between Sikkim and Bhutan to within aboutir miles of the plains of India's West Bengal state. The Chumbi salient consists of the headwaters and upper tributaries of the Tonsa river, wnich cut deep, narrow valleys through steep-sided, wooded hills and mountains. Precipitation in the Chumbi valley varies fromear at the north tonches at Yatung in the south, though some of the higherhills receive much more than this. At0 foot) winter low temperatures average aboutegrees Fahrenheit in January. In summer, average highs rise to the mid-sixties. Elevations in the valley range0 feet at the Tang Lan the north toeet at the Bhutan border in the south.
Sikkim, the Indian protectorate, lies mainly west of the Chumbi valley and is separated from it by high mountain ridges. Itparsely populated statequare miles area,iles long from north to south andiles wide. It is an all-but-enclosed basin, deeply dissected by the headwaters of the Tista river, which cuts through the mountains east of Darjeeling and spills onto the Indian plains. The highest point in Sikkim is Mt.eet) and the lowest at the gap near theeet. Rainfallnches annually, mostly in the June-September monsoon season, makes for heavy forestation and rapid erosion. Snow fallseet. Temperatures are moderate, ranging between aboutndegrees Fahrenheit except in the highest mountains. The highest portions of the hills near the snows are rarely visited. At relatively highare coniferous forests, while in the hot, steamy river valleys at low altitudes are tropical forest trees includingood lumber species. Copper, coal, graphite, gypsum and other mineral deposits are not exploited. Most human habitation is in the middle altitudeseet, Gangtok the capital and largest city beingeet.
Bhutan, which lies east of the Chumbi valley, is considerably more remote. It had no motorable roadsnd its government permitted very few foreigners to enter it until about the same date. Several roads are now under construction, but much movement inside the country is still by pack trail. There are no airfields in Bhutan. The countryiles long,iles wide, and has an area0 square miles. Nearly all of Bhutan Is mountainous, with peaks rising up0 feet in the north. Much of the country is forested. Narrow, north-south valleys at elevationseet are found in central Bhutan, and the major settled areas and administrative centers of the country are located in these valleys. Heavily forested hills and plains mark the southern border. Thimbu, Bhutan's official capital, is near Paro, the administrative center of tho country, and lies at an elevationeet.
The West Bengal districts of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, which reach upward toward the Chumbi valley between Nepal, Bhutan, and Cooch Behar, and through which passes the access route between Assam state and the rest of India, lie at the south of the Invasion route to India. They are locatedtbe river basins of the Ganges and Brahmaputra. They are separated froa Nepal by peaks up0 feet high and from Bhutan by mountains up0 feet. The Tista river, which drains this area, flows southeastward Into the Brahmaputra. The hill towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong lie at altitudeseet respectively. The hills in this area arc heavily wooded, mainly with forests of sal trees, as the south slopes are warm and moist. Monsoon rainfall here is heavy, rangingnches annually at Darjeelingt Buxa in Jalpaiguri district. Erosion is heavy and streams flood heavily as they reach the plains. The foothills of the Terai up toeet are -covered with scrub junglehe growth has not been cut away for agriculture. The alluvial plains are heavily populated and cultivated. In Cooch Behar there are jungles of high grass and reeds rather than trees, the area being lowlying, waterlogged plain, poorly drained and flooded in the rainy season. There is much bamboo and palm growth here. The temperature on the plains seldom reaches aboveegrees Fahrenheit but the humidity is trying. Low temperatures are nearegrees. Movement is difficult ln the Teraiof Jalpaiguri and the jungles of Cooch Behar.
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The people. The people of Sikkim, Bhutan, and northern West Hengal state are of varied types. In Sikkim, the Indian census1opulationf whom were rural dwellers. Density of population was onlyer square mile, fillages havingersons each,aving, andcapital and. f the population wasigure just half of that in India.
The original population of the state consisted of Lepchas, to which were later added Tibetans and Bhutanese and, still later, Nepalis. The Tibetans, now referred to as Bhotias, live in the northern regions. Together with the Lepchas, who inhabit central Sikkim, they consider themselves to be the true Sikkimese, although at present the combined Bhotia-Lepcha population is only one quarter of the total population. The royal family, which is related by marriage to noble families in Tibet and to the royal family of Bhutan, is of Lepcha stock. The language of the Lepchas is Tibeto-Burraan, and Buddhism is the state religion. Because ofwith Tibet, the royal family's affiliation iswith the "Yellow Hat" sect of Tibetan Buddhists, while the majority of the.Lepchas and Bhotias ofthe people ofto the "Red Hat" sect.
About three fourths of the Sikkimese population are descended from Nepali immigrants who were encouraged by the British to settle in southern Sikkim and Bhutan in theh century. These Nepalis multiplied rapidly, and quickly took over most economic institutions in the state. Thisubject of friction between the two ethnic groups, since the Lepchas control the government while the Nepalis dominate the opposition political parties. Most of these Nepalis apparently are Hindus, probably of the mixed varieties that exist in Nepal."
Politics in Sikkim are more formalized than they are in Ladakh, NEFA, and some other parts of the Himalayas. The chief of state is TnG
guiding force of the government is the energetic Maharaj Kumar (crownho is well educated, eager forprogress, and sometimes too enthusiastic for the taste of Indian administrators. tate Council, now consistinglected Lepcba-Bhotialected Nepalilected member atepresentative from the Buddhist monasteries,embers nominated by the palace, actsegislature. The first elections to it were held
3 and the next There have been none since.ominated members give the Lepcha ruling familyover legislation. Since Sikkim is an IndianIndia has until nowewan (executive officer) for the governmentolitical Officer who give's guidance and advice to the Maharajah. 3 the post of dewan will be abolished in deference to Sikkimese sensitivities regarding Indian control. These Indian officials have owed their position to the fact that the Maharajah9 called in Indian troops to suppress popular unrest and0reatyeasure of local autonomy but granting India control over defense, communications, and external affairs.
There are three important political parties in Sikkim. The Sikkim National Party consists of Lepchas and Bhotias, is patronized by the royal family, and supports the present communal electorate system. The Sikkim Nationaltrong offshoot of the National Party, is dissatisfied with the communal electoral system and with Indianin Sikkim. The Sikkim State Congress, whoseare mainly of Nepali descent, favors full adult franchise and direct electionseans of breaking the Lepcha hold over the government. All three parties favor greater public participation in the affairs of state, and they chafe at the slowness of the royal family in implementing reforms.
Other political issues which cause the government of India occasional concern include suggestions, in varying form, for the political unification of eastern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Darjeeling district in West Bengal. These suggestions are pressed by interested parties both inside and outside Sikkim, some of them Communist-inspired. s no Communist Party in.Sikkim. Intra-mural friction also exists between Lepchas and Nepalis on the subject ofqualifications in Sikkim.
The economics of Sikkim are still relatively simple. The main concentrations of population are at the middle altitudes near the center of the state. Settlements are usually small hamlets, scattered widely, rather thanvillages. Agriculture is practised in small plots on terraces or on the very few patches of level ground to be found in Sikkim. Wet rice, cultivated In terraced fieldsajor crop. Dry rice, buckwheat, maize, and millets are grownodified slash-and-burn manner,atch of Jungle is cut down, crops plantedew years, and
the field abandoned for another as weeds and underbrush become too thick. Forests could be extensively exploited but are not. Fruits, including good oranges, apples, and potatoes are grown. inger-like herb, is the chief cash crop. Sikkim is virtually self sufficient inrior to the Tibetan revolt9 thererisk trade in foodgrains, kerosene, and manufacturedith Tibet, supervised by the Indian diplomatic mission in Lhasa and by Indian trade agents at Gyantse and Yatung. Sikkim's chief imports are other foods and clothes. There is very little industry. Sikkira's annual revenue1 was about
Economic development in Sikkim, whose first Seven Year Plan endedas concentrated on the improvement of agriculture and road communications. econd plan,industry and mineral exploitation, began.
In Bhutan, there has never been an official census, and the population is variously estimated as. f the population are Drukpas, physically, religiously, and culturally related to the Tibetans. They live in northern Bhutan, Central Bhutanariety of aboriginal tribal groups including Khens, Kurteys, and Mempas. The Drukpas and the aborigines have become linguistically, religiously, and otherwise weldedingle group which thinks of itself as Bhutanese. The people of this group are Mongoloid racially; their speech is related to Tibetan. They intermarry Into Tibetan families. Their religion is Buddhism of the Tibetan variety and theiraro with the "Red Hat" sect. The many Buddhist monks in Bhutanese monasterieserious drain on the simple economy. The population of southern Bhutan, on the south slopes of the Himalayas consists in large part of recent immigrants of Nepali stock, the same people encouraged by the British in theh century to settle in southern Sikkim and Darjeeling district. These Nepali immigrants speak Nepali, are mainly Hindus, and follow Hindu caste customs. They were only given full Bhutanese citizenship
Politically, Bhutan is now ruled by an energetic young king, whose capital Is at Thimbu. The royal family isby marriage to the leading families of Sikkim and Tibet. The king speaks Hindi and English as well as Bhutanese andively interest in world affairs. His wife, the queen, was educated in England. The king's government used to be somewhat peripatetic, being wherever the king was at the moment, and It shiftedummer capital at Paro to
a winter capital at Punakha. This latter capital has now fallen into disuse. The Maharajah of Bhutan is assisted ln governing by the Bhutanese National Assembly (orn advisory bodyndirectly elected village elders. There are no political parties inside Bhutan, though the Bhutan state Congress party, which consists mainly ofof Nepali descent, agitates against the governmenteadquarters at Siliguri ln India's West Bengal state. This partytatewide anti-government agitation4 and was banned.
Bhutan's foreign relations which, accordingreatyre "guided" by India, are conducted mainly by the j* Maharajah's personalinformallyis primeresides in Gangtok, inore accessible location than Thimbu.
Economically, the people of Bhutan are three quarters agricultural and one quarter pastoral,prinkling of traders among both these groups. By and large the economy isact which has enabled Bhutan toits isolation until recently. Some stream valleys ln Bhutan are wide enough for irrigated rice agriculture to be practised. Elsewhere on gentle slopes, dry-farmed maize and millets are staple crops. Forests produce lac, wax, and musk, Bhutanese oranges are good, and India has helped to establish an orange soft drink Industry in Bhutan. Thereairy farm in the Ha valley, and some other parts of the country also raise fine cattle. Large herds of yaks are grazed ln high pastures.
There is little industry in Bhutan, though efforts now are being made to develop it. Before trade was cut offhutan used to export rice and butter to Tibet lnfor salt. 0 there wereovernment schoolshutan offering free education;tudents (or abouter school) attended. Scholarships were given by theof both India and Bhutan to schools and colleges ln India. Bhutanese schools teach Bhutanese, Hindi, and English. There are very few medical facilities In the country. There is no great wealth and no grinding poverty. Theational income is Culturally, the country * is Just emergingedieval phase In which archery has been the national sport. The process of modernizing tho economy, which began in earnestost the king some popularity when he raised taxes materially and insisted they be paid in cash rather than kind.
Ji'O FfTRKTGV Digger
In the Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar districts of West Bengal, the people are of mixed stock, some of the mixture being of relatively recent date. In the hills at middle altitudes are people with Mongoloid strains,some recent Nepali immigrants. Also found in the hills are pigmoid aboriginal Santal tribesmen from Bihar state who have migrated to work on the extensive tea plantations in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts. In the plains are populations of mixed Caucasoid, Dravidian, and Mongoloid stock. Languages in the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri area are Tibeto-Burman; in the plains they are dialects of Bengali, an Indo-European tongue derived from Sanskrit. Religiously Hinduism dominates, as both the plains people and the Nepalis ofand Jalpaiguri are followers of this faith. There is much Buddhist admixture in Nepali Hinduism, however,ot of spirit worship In the Hinduism of the plains. Christian missionaries have made numerous converts in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri. In Coochf theare Rajbansis and Kochs, whoistinctive caste. The Rajbansis are believed to be of aboriginal Dravidian origin while the Kochs are of Mongoloid stock.
The economy in the hills near Darjeeling includes terraced rice agriculture, with maize and millets grown by dry Tea is also widely cultivated in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri, where it is an important source of income. Tobacco is grown in the foothills. In the plains, rice is the staple food crop and jute an important cash crop. Maize, pulses, sugarcane, and oilseeds are also grown. Rice is traded uphill to tea plantation labor forces, and Jute and tobacco traded to markets in the south. The large immigrant labor population in the tea gardens of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri is frequently exploited for political purposes, mainly by Indian Communists. Nepalis are subject tosuggestionseparate Nepali state be created -from eastern Nepal and parts of Sikkim, Bhutan, and West Bengal.
Indian political and economic activity. India's effort to secure the Himalayan frontier area in the Sikkim-Bhutan region has been complicated by the fact that it bas several different political systems with which to deal.
The fact that Sikkim is an Indian protectorate gives New Delhi an advantage since it can, in the last analysis, achieve its will through the combined efforts of theOfficer and the Indian armed forces located within the state. India, however, has no desire to aggravatealready existing in this sensitive border area as a
result of the Indian presence, and it has not applied great pressures to sway the Sikkimese government toward the Indian way of thinking. Rather, New Delhi has concentrated on economic developmenteans of building goodwill. Sincet has been the prime mover and sole financier behind Sikkim's Seven Year) anddevelopment efforts. These efforts concentrated uring the Seven Year Plan period on improving agriculture and road communications, on broadening educational andfacilities, and on strengthening Sikkim's Tibetan culture. Specific measures included establishmentommunity development organization, and development of forest industries construction of roads, minor irrigationruit preservationeterinaryumber of hydroelectric projects, and schools and hospitals. The total sum contributed by India for this plan was in econd plan, forn development expenditures, beginning in, was to concentrate on industrial development and mineralbut little is known about it and its nature and size may have been radically altered since the NEFA-Ladakh crisis
In Bhutan, India has no direct political control, and itto walk softly to prevent creating antagonisms. Inthe Indian army cannot now effectively defendBhutanese, traditionally suspicious of India, mighthave attempted to counter any Indianby making overtures to the Chinese authorities With the Tibetan revoltowever, Bhutanits foreign policy thinking in the direction"ofboth political and economic relations with Indiagrowing ever since. One of Bhutan's first actionswas to authorize the constructionoadfrom India's West Bengal and Assam statesand connecting eastern-and westernBhutan agreed to construction of astation at Jaldhaka, on the Bhutan-India border,power to the West Bengal districts ofand Cooch Behar. Bhutan also permitted Indiacartographic surveys, both by land and fromhutan made an effort to expand itsto include political and economic contactsand Soviet bloc countries, but India9 treaty right to "guide" the foreignBhutan. Thisertain amount of strain
Bhutanese-Indian relations. Subsequently, however, relations) improved and continued so till the debacle in NEFA
This raised the fears of the Bhutanese regarding India's capability to defend their country and led to new efforts to increase relations with the United States and other countries.
.The northern districts of West Bengal state, whichart of this discussion, are regularly administered as arts of the state, according to the pattern found elsewhere in India. They participate in the same sort of economic development programs under India's Five Year Plan schedules as do other districts of India proper.
Indian India has
0reaty^rTgn^to^statibn troops in Sikkim. Until recently, it did not utilize this right extensively for fear of antagonizing the local Sikkimese population. Even as latelyndian military forces assigned to defend Sikkim were located mainly down on the Indian plains. Since the NEFA debacle, however, theh Infantry Division has moved into Sikkira and actively assumed the task of guarding the border. One brigade of this division is in reserve near Gangtok, one is guarding the Nathu La, and oneiles to the southward guarding the Jelep La. The brigade at Gangtok is responsible for forward patrolling into the high hills "of northern Sikkim,ew road has been constructed from Gangtok to Chungtang to assist in this task, New Delhi1uggestion from the Sikkimese governmentman militia of Sikkimese troops be raised to help defend the protectorate, probably doubting the reliability oforce.
India has no legal right to station troops in Bhutan, and theoretically would have to wait for an invitation to do so. India has, however, suggestedumber of past occasions1 that it be permitted to assist in the defense of Bhutan. These suggestions have been repulsed by the king, who has feared an Indian takeover. The Bhutanese militia, numbering, poorly armed and poorly trained, probably would not be effectiveormal fighting force, despite the king's effort to improve itsew force, allegedly0 men mobilized by the king following2 fighting in NEFA, was in3 waiting for Indian arms and training. IndiaCO's from the Assam Rifles to train this force, but it is not known what progress has been made. Following the Indian defeat in NEFA, Bhutanese respect for Indian militarydwindled, and eagerness for Indian training may have diminished. Inhere were some plans in Bhutan toen for guerrilla warfare.
Indian forces in Sikkim and West Bengal assigned to the defense of the Sikkim-Bhutan area number at0 men, and India would probablytrong defensive stand in this area. In addition toh Division located in Sikkim,h Division is at Hashimari in Cooch Behar district, andh Division is in reserve at Siliguri. An additional Indian brigade is also at Chalsa in Cooch ehar.
are fiveven more tain cont arrested in Sikkim except by Numerous arrested
.lity to control local Communist party activities may be fairlythe police have warning of impending trouble. In the springhe government of West Bengal reorganized its security organization in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts, establishingheckposts along the Darj.
posts along the Bhutanese border, where theen and equipment Is greater and control measureshe West Bengal police apparently main-acts in Sikkim, and special units in Sikkim have suspicious persons there. Movement of foreigners and in the forward areas of West Bengal is banned, special permit which is difficult to obtain, persons of Chinese nationality or origin were and some deported ln2
relatively low-key pamphlet propaganda output effort is also maintained on the Darjeeling side of the border ln an attempt to counter in Tibet the Chinese leaflet propaganda disseminated in India. India is
also making an effort to improve the effectiveness of its Tibetan language broadcasts. The Indian newspaper Hindustan Times reported9 that the Chinese were even then jamming these broadcasts.
political and economic activity. Chinese political and economic initiatives in the Sikkim-Bhutan area have not been as numerous or as far-reaching as in some other parts of the Himalayas. The northern border of Sikkim has notubject of significant disagreement since the Chinese reasserted their control over Tibethina seems at present to be more interested ln wooing Sikkim and Bhutan away from India andtate of "neutrality" than it is in military conquest. As partampaign to treat Sikkim and Bhutan as separate countries, Peiping has refused to discuss their boundtoies with Indian officials. Peiping's propaganda, however, has attempted in various ways to emphasize to the Sikkimese and Bhutanese their points of friction with India.
Despite this present attitude, China has in the past indulged in various political maneuvers aimed at undermining Sikkimese and Bhutanese stability andumber of issues which it could use to justify new political pressures on these states at any time. As part of China's campaign of "cartographic aggression1', Chinese maps up1 showed astern Bhutan as part of Chinese territory. Thisclaim has not seriously been pressed since that date, but it could be revived to justify taking that part of eastern Bhutan which contains the road leading from Towang, in NEFA just east of the Bhutanese border, through Bhutan to India,
The Chinese also have inotential claimant to the throne ofelative of the present Sikkimese ruling family and gratldsonoyal refugee who fled to ibet to escape from the British. Anti-government and anti-Indian political forces in Sikkim might support future Chinese use of this claimant.
The Chinese radio in Lhasa has been reported toin Hindi as well as Tibetan and Mandarin. To whatits Hindi program is heard and understood in Sikkim, Bhutan, and the West Bengal northern districts is unknown. Other Chinese anti-Indianundescribedis said to circulate in Sikkim. Occasionally, Chineseattempts to create uneasiness among the border people,
supposedly to break their will to resist any Chinese aggression. The Chinese have also been flfllHflBBBflflflflH
behind some of the "Greater Nepal" agitation whicheastern Nepal and parts of Sikkim and Bhutan intonation. There apparently have been someto infiltrate Sikkimese monasteries and
Chinese military flMBMflflflflB|B1 11 humbi valley ana tne adjacent borders ox^SiKkim and Bhutan have long been the scene of military alarums and excursions, and India seriouslyhinese invasion along this route.
China is currently estimated to have0 troops opposite eastern Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, including elements of one infantryndependent infantry regiments, and two border defense regiments. These troops are engaged in various forms of military constructionroadbuilding, and patrolling. Each year9 there have been reports of Chinese troops massing in the Chumbi valley, but no serious border-crossing has beenin this area as yet.
Soon after the Chinese conquest of Tibet, Chinesepersonnel wereIn ^ikktn supervisingof rice supplies to Tibet. t thethe Tibetan revolt, Chinese patrols kept close watchSikkimese border. Thereumber of Chineseat this time and some minor clashes. Threewere arrested in Sikkim Id Inpatrols also crossed into Sikkim and one soldier Chinese planes occasionally haveair space during theears and haveoverflying Bhutan.
sance At that time, Chinese troops fighting in NEFA apparently avoided crossing into Bhutanese territory. Presumably, Bhutanese checkposts established along the border with Tibet continue touard against Chinese intrusions of any kind. This border was closed by Bhutan1
Soviet bloc and indigenous Communist activity. In con trast to the situation in the nortnern Indian states and Nepal, there appears to be little Soviet bloc interest in Sikkim and Bhutaninimal Communist influence inside those two states. ew reports prior2 indicated abortive efforts toommunist movement within Sikkim. ndian military and police presumably have taken measures to eliminate Communist influence through-out this regio
The most serious threat to local security comes from Communists located in the towns of Darjeeling and Kalimpong and athwart the railway line which passes through Siliguri to Assam and NEFA. Priorommunist influence was strong in the three districts of Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar. Political campaigning for elections was blatant and intensive, and it included the use of sound trucks, "posters, flags, and large political rallies. Kalimpong was widely knownenter of espionage for many nationsin this part of the Himalayan border. Communist and pro-Communist candidates in7 general elections obtainedotes in Darjeeling, Jalpaiguri, and Cooch Behar districts againstor the ruling Congress Party. In2 parliamentary elections, after the Chinese threat had become fully evident, candidates of the Communist Party and the pro-Communist Forwardotes in this same areaor the Congress Party. While Indian security measures taken since the Chinese attacks2 presumably have lessened
Communist capabilities, Communist organizational work among tea plantation, transportation, and communications labor unions probably continues, and it would be dangerous to underestimate Communist capabilities for disruption and sabotage in the eventhinese attack through the Chumbi valley.
Local reaction to the situation. Attitudes in Sikkim and Bhutan, insofar as they can De estimated, apparently are anti-Chinese at present. On the other hand, they cannot be said to be entirely friendly tooint of which India is painfully aware-
The government of Sikkim actually has no choice except to be anti-Chinese at present. Such leaders as the crown prince probably recognize that they would have little future under the Chinese if they should attempt to make common cause with them. Frequent dissatisfaction over Indianin Sikkim probably does not detract from this basic recognition. It is not known whether the common people, with close ties of many kinds to Tibet, are as impressed by this as their leaders.
India probably suffers disproportionately in Sikkiraof its positionort of occupying power there.
Despite economic development efforts on the part of India, cessation of trade with Tibet may have caused some hardship to Sikkimese traders whose means of livelihood was taken away. On the other hand, the intensive road-building and development efforts undertaken at Indianapparently have provided employment for thousands of Sikkimese,
In Bhutan tho situation is somewhat different. Long suspicious of India and bound to Tibet by many ties of blood, language, and religion, Bhutan maintained9 an attitude of independent neutrality. At that time,the maharajah of Bhutan apparentlyasicthat henceforth Bhutan's future had to be linked to India's. He closod Bhutan's border with Tibet and cut off trade with that region. He contracted to open Bhutan's borders from the south by the constructioneries of roads linking all parts of Bhutan to India. He Intensified his government's economic development program, and accepted increased Indian assistance in doing so. Inhutan's National Assemblyesire for continued Indian economic assistance. In2he maharajah also began efforts to increase Bhutan's ties with the outside world, looking to the United States as well as to other countries for recognition and assistance. To some extent, this may have been the result of thethat Indian armed forces did not offer the protective capability formerly attributed to them. One past point of conflict between Bhutan and India, the anti-government agitation conducted by the exiled Bhutan State Congress from bases in India, may recentlyalthough there is no evidence to indicate this.
It may have taken the same sort of action to
quiet the Bhutanese State Congress.
NOlITHEAST FRONTIER AGENCY, ASSAM
Summary. The geography of the Northeast Frontier Agency in Assam differs from that in the rest of tho Himalayan region in that altitudes are generally lower, passes are less subject to snow blockage in winter, and several low passes leading from Tibet into India are free f snow all winter. Heavy monsoon rains and dense forest on the Indian side of the Himalayan crest, however, hamper both administration and defense of the area.
The peoples of NEFA are among the most picturesque, most isolated and least known of any along the whole Himalayan frontier. Asidemall number living just east of Bhutan, where Tibetan influence is strong, most NEFA tribesmen are related to the peoples of Burma and Southeast Asia rather than to those of South and West Asia. Slavery and headhunting still recur occasionally, and the use of the bow and arrow is common.
Indian efforts to administer and "civilize" the peoples of NEFA are of recent date. British officials prior7 made little effort to govern any part of NEFA except the foothills, contenting themselves with sending Ln punitive military expeditions to quiet rambunctious tribes. Tbeof Independent India7 took tbe view that NEFA tribesmen should enjoy the full benefits of Indian citizenship. Indian administration was pushed up Into the hills and economic development programs were begun amongst the tribes, although considerable parts of the Agency had not been effectively reached by the time of the Chinese attacks The Indian government stepped up its program of road and airfield construction in and near NEFA after tbe Chinese conquest of Tibetut the Indian army did not seriously move into the hill areas until after the Tibetan revolt After thisine of Indian checkposts was established along the Tlbotan border, moderate-sized military forces were stationed In the hills, and forces in main bases on the plains were strengthened. Following the disastrous defeat by the Chinesehe Indian army has moved very cautiously in NEFA. Regular army troops remain on the plains, outside NEFA, and lighter Assam Riflepolice only areas well removed from the disputed McMahon line boundary.
Chinese interest in NEFA first became evident in thes when maps were distributed showing NEFA as part of Chinese territory. Thenajor Chinese military buildup in Tibet, during which Chinese troop strength and logistic support facilities opposite NEFA were made stronger than in any other part of the Himalayas. The Chinese military expeditions in NEFA and Ladakhhichropaganda campaign regarding Indian aggressiveness and Chinese counter-attacks, displayed Chinese military superiority and succeeded in their probable objective of causing India to lose face in the eyes of the world. In the springhe Chinese repeated their propaganda charges of Indian aggressiveness, conducted somemaller scale thanecond war scare which again took the Indian government's mind off its Five Year Plan programs. Though Chineseare probably to keep India nervous rather than to acquire more Indian territory at present, the Chinese army could invade NEFA and press to the plains without meeting serious resistance. By the time their forces reached the plains, however, the logistics problems of the Chinese would have mounted rapidly, and lt is here that the Indian army apparently intends to hold.
Local tribal reactions within NEFA to Chinese and Indian political and military moves are almost completely unknown, and there is no way of determining what tribal behavior would be in the case of another Chinese attack.
Geographical factors. The Northeast Frontier Agency of Assameparate administrative area,art of Assam state but actually administered by the Ministry of External Affairs of the government of India, through the Governor of Assam, who is assisted by an Adviser for NEFA. .The. area consists of five divisions of whichSubansiri, Slang, and Luhit-lle from west to east along the Tibetan border, while oneadjacent to Burma. These divisions were established in their present form4 as part of the Indian effort to advance full-scale administration up to the McMahon line.
The NEFA area consistselt of steep hill andterrainiles wide0 square miles in area. It rises sharply from the Brahmaputra river valley in Assam to the crest of the Great Himalaya range, where peaks reach up00 foot altitudes. The land is deeply cut by numerous streams, running mainly north to south, whose valleys are choked with heavy vegetation resulting from
high monsoon rainfall. In soae places, generally between hills to the south and high ranges to the north, there are open valleys and rolling hills which porralt sore extensive tribal settlement and agriculture than elsewhere. In eastern NEFA, these valleys lie at altitudes ofeet. The combination of rugged terrain and denseheavy underbrush at lower* made NEFA hard to penetrate from the plains and has hindered the development of internal communications. Priorhe only motorablc Indian road reaching deep Into the hills was that leading to Towang in Kameng division. Others reached onlyoiles north of the plains. There are some small airfields suitable for light planes inside NEFA but airdrops are needed to reach forward posts.
The climate of NEFA is dominated by the summer monsoon which depositsnches of rainfall between June and September and additional rain in pre-monsoon storms beginning in April. Most of NEFA is at such relatively low elevations that cold temperatures and snow are not problems. Only in the high northern passes0 feet does snow block passes and supply routesew daysime, and these passes probably could be cleared without major difficulty. Lower valley routes,.such as those along tho upper Subansirl river tributaries and the Nyamjang river, can be used when the high passes are blocked.
On the Tibetan side, Chinese-held territory opposite NEFA is marked by two different sets of features. Westorth-south line drawn from Gyatsa Dzong to Chayul, theconsists of high barren plains and mountains andopen valleys lying at00 feet. In the open plains south of Tsethang, spring and winter winds usually prevent any significant accumulations of snow. Close to tho border near Towang, temperatures reach zero Fahrenheit, "but most winter lows are betweenndegrees and daily highs aroundegrees. East of tbe above lino, the Brahmaputra rivor (known in Tibet as the Tsangpo) and its tributaries have deeply dissected the plateau surface,omplex pattern of steep-sided ridges and narrow valleys In which many rivers flow through narrow gorges. In lower elovatlons to the east, heavier precipation permits extensive forests, mainly of conifers. The best time of year foroperations on both sides of the border is late summer and autumn.
The people. The population of NEFA is almost There are aboutribes represented in all,isolated from each other but generally sharingcommon traits. There is no tribal political unityarea. Among the most important tribes in thefrom west to east, are
Monpas of Karaeng division, adjacent to Bhutan, who00 persons and are close to the Tibetans in appearance, dress, customs, religion, and trade. The famous Buddhist monastery at Towang, which was until recently administered by Tibet, is in their territory.
Sherdukpens of Kameng division,ersons, whose culture is also related to the Tibetan but not so strongly so as that of the Monpas. They reputedly are friendly toward India.
Mijis and Akas of Kameng0 strong, who have mixed characteristics. The Akas are keen traders who do business in Bhutan. These tribes are closer to Indian influence than some farther north.
Daflas of eastern Kameng and western Subanslri divisions,0, who are noted for their warlike, turbulent behavior and who caused theot of trouble. They are widelyin NEFA and have contacts with many other tribes.
Apa Tanis of Subansiriersons, livingarge villages, who are highly organized, industrious, have stable agriculture, and are the most advanced of the NEFA tribes.
Taglns of northeastern Subanslri and western Slang divisions,rimitive tribe, not very well known, hostile to outsiders, aggressive, and
Hill Miris in Subansiri division,eople. They areighting group like the-Daflas or Tagins, but have close contacts with the Assamese of the plains and have intermarried with them. They trade with the Daflas and Apa Tanis. They are one of the more approachable tribal groups.
Adis (once called Abors) of Siang division,hoonglomeration of aboutinor tribes. They have an old reputation for troubleraaking and slave-keeping, but they now are cooperative and becoming pacified.
Mishmis of Luhit division,0 persons roken into three subdivisions. They live mainly in small family groups rather than villages. Formerly warlike, they are now peaceable. They live in the ruggedest territory in NEFA, but they are keen traders. They used to have considerable trade with Tibet, which is now presumably stopped.
Tangasa, Wanchos, and Noctes of Luhitdivisions, whose territory faces Burma and whoimportant to the present discussion.
The basic unit of social organization among these tribes is the patrilineal family. Polygamyommon form of marriage, though some polyandry is found among tribes close to Tibet. Family units ofoersons frequently live in one large house. There are social classes but no caste system. Many groups own slaves, but this is discouraged by the government of India. Tribes are divided into exogamous clans but intertribal marriage is not common. Clans aresocially but not politically.
Exceptew very primitive hunters and food-gatherers, most tribesmen live in villages of varying size and practice agriculture. Villages generally are governedocalnly the tribes along tho Burma border have chiefs who control several villages,ew tribes have aristocratic families who rule with the aidillage council. The Indian government is trying to establish its panchayat (or village council) system of local government in the tribal areas.
Languages are Tibeto-Burman and number aboutialects. There are four major groupings including Tibetan dialects of the Monpas and tribes of the north; dialects of the Miris, Adis, Daflas and some others; the language of the Singpo, which is related to Thai; and the languages of the tribes along the Burma border which are related to the Nagas farther south in Assam. The lingua franca is Assamese, which is i, spoken mainly in the plains of the Brahmaputra river valley.
Religions in NEFA are mainly animistic, involving beliefsenevolent supreme being and tbe propitiation of numerous spirits. Thereew exceptions, as among the Monpas in Kameng division who are Tibetan-type Buddhists. The Slngpos in Luhit divisionodified form of Buddhism. The Noctes along the Burma border are Hindus.
The economy ishifting form of agriculture, wherein fields are cleared, cultivatedew years, and then abandoned for new fields when underbrush grows thick enough to hamper cultivation. The population in NEFA does not shift from one locality to another as it does inAsia- however. There is permanent agriculture only among the Monpas, Sherdukpens, and Apa Tanis. Rice, millets, and maize are staple crops, and many fruits and vegetables are also grown. Domestic animals Include cattle, pigs, goats, and chickens. There is considerable hunting and fishing. Weaving of textiles and bamboo and cane work are common. There is very little metalworking. There is much tradeocal variety, there being many basic lacks in the village economies. Most of the trading takes place in winter and is mainly with Assam. Trade with Tibet has traditionally been less, although some salt, wool, and Buddhist religious items have been imported. The Indian government has been airdropping salt to tribesmen since thes. Tibetan trade presumably has been cut offxcept for minor exchanges.
Indian political and economic activity. Until recently, NEFA has been isolated from tbe mainstream of development in Assam and the rest of India, having been officially closed to outsiders Under the British,ew ex- lorers ventured into the high hills. Warlike tribes feuded and raided with each other and reacted violently to outside interference. After the Japanese threat to Assam developed in World War-II>-the British began to expand theirup above the foothills.
Tbe government of independent India7 felt more sense of responsibility to the tribesmen and attempted to bring them into the greater Indian family. Partly this effort was dueense of national responsibility. Partly it was to ensure the safety of the Tibetan border against Chinese influence. While Indian activities in NEFA have never been reported ln detail, the broad outlines of the Indian program are evident.
Each of the divisions of NEFA is under the contrololitical Officer, who is assisted by representatives of the technical departments of government such as agriculture, health, education, and industry. Subdivisions are ln charge of Assistant Political Officers, who have Base and Area Superintendents under them. The Indian aim ln NEFA is to achieve all-round development of the tribal people. There' is some conflict between political groups in Assam and the Indian government in New Delhi as to whether the NEFAshould become completely integrated with other Indians or whether they should retain most elements of their tribal culture. The government is committed toomething in between will probably result.
Under India's Second Five Yearas planned for economic development projects including roads, airstrips, power projects, agriculture, medical and health facilities, education, community development, forests, and small Industry. By far the biggest appropriations were for roads. (During theiles ofiles of mule trails,iles of porter trails reportedly were built in NEFA.) In addition, the government introduced improved seeds, held farming method demonstrations, introduced sugar-making and sericulture, taught trades to craftsmen, and built schools (there were two primary schoolsrimary schools,ntermediate schools,igh schools. The government has also setetwork of airfields for light planes and DC-3s,ireless network for rapid communications, and has gradually increased the telephone network ln NEFA. This work was not always easy as the tribesmen sometimes caused trouble and the Assam Rifles had to pacify them.
Most of this program presumably was disrupted by the Chinese attacksnd no information is available as to how much of it has been resumed. Following the Chinese withdrawal inhe Indians waited some time before sending even civil administrators back to all parts of NEFA. Bomdila was reoccupied by civil forcesnd onanuary civil administration was back in Towang. By February, news reports indicated civilian officials were back in all parts of NEFA, but there Is no Information (except at Bum La in Kameng division) as to how close to the border they are located and how actively they are pushing their development programs. NEFA has been kept closed to outsiders, partly toreat Influx of Indians, partly to prevent exploitation of the tribesmen,
andtoprevent espionage. The task of redevelopment was complicated in the spring3 by serious floods, rice shortages, and rising prices In Assam. Inhe Indian Planning Commissionexpenditures in NEFA0 during.
Nothing is knownossible educational and propaganda campaign being waged by the Indian government to convince NEFA tribesmen that Indiaowerful country and that it has their best interests at heart. It is doubtful that India has an effective propaganda program reaching across the Tibetan border in this area. The Indian government has taken considerable pains to indicate to the Chinese that it has not sent troops back into NEFA.
Indian military and intelligence activity. The Indian military position which existed" in NEFA" prior to2 was wiped out during tbe Chinese attacks, and the present situation is rather different.
Insteaderies of small outposts directly on the Tibetan frontier, backed up by units of intermediate size about iles below the McMahon line and larger units on the Brahmaputra plain, the Indian regular array now isto the plains area. Totalling at0 men under the 4th Corps headquarters at Tezpur, the 5th Division is near Tezpur,d Division near Gauhati, and the 2nd Division at the head of the Brahmaputra valley below eastern NEFA. In addition, there are in NEFA five battalions of Assamaramilitary force used for police The array apparently has no intention of moving back up to positions in theis using the Assam Riflesorwardit expects to counter any new Chinese attack in force only when that attack reaches the lowills.
In3 units of the Assam Rifles were sent to ithinilometers of the McMahon line to support civil administrators in maintaining order. At present, they are believed to be scattered widely throughout NEFA in small unit positions.
fightingndian officia moved Soviet technicians working projects in Assam to other tasks
on economic development in Gujarat in western India.
efense Minister Chavan told parliament that the army was going tohorough investigation of its reverses in NEFA to determine what went wrong and "to derive military lessons." What improvements have been made are he NEFA Adviser to the Governor of Assam publicly indicated knowledge of Chinese patrols penetrating into NEFA in May and of Chinese planesNEFA on one or two occasions. He also indicatedumber of suspected Chinese agents, including Tibetans, had been taken into custody.
Chinese political and economic activity. The Sino-Indian dispute over the validity of tne" Mc'Mahon line is well known. India claims that it forms the boundary between NEFA and Tibet, while the validity of the line is challenged by Peiping. The history of the Chinese punitive "counterattack" made last October is also well documented. Little is known, however, of specific Chinese political and economic measures now being taken either on the Tibetan or the Indian side of the McMahon line. Asideumber of supposedly civilian checkposts set up along the NEFA border to assure that the integrity of the demilitarized zone is not violated, Chinese activity seems to be confined mainly to propaganda.
Internationally disseminated propaganda includes material regarding the return of captured Indian weapons, the return of Indian prisoners of war, the kind treatment iven the border peoples during the Chinese occupation of NEFA, the good relations existing between them, and the sorrow of both Indian prisoners and NEFA tribesmen at their leave-taking with the Chinese. The Chineseumber of propaganda
films hava made good use of these themes, especially emphasizing the racial similarities between Chinese troops and NEFA tribesmen. The Chinese have also been reported as trying toedge between Indian and Gurkha prisoners, telling the Nepalese Gurkhas that they were untrue to their country, which has good relations with China. Chinese propaganda has effectively rubbed In the fact of Chinese ilitary superiority over the Indians.
On the Chinese side of the border, the Chinese apparently have indicated to local peoples their ability and intention to return to NEFA and to penetrate to the edge of the plains of Assam. Tibetans have been told to keep pack animals ready for use if necessary. Chinese territorial claims have been reaffirmed, there hasome talk of "liberating" NEFA tribesmen, and some requests for their assistance have beenumorshinese return have also circulated inside NEFA during the spring Much of this propaganda seems to have been psychological warfare, accompanying reportsig Chinese buildup in Tibet. Some effort to attract NEFA tr-.bals is indicated by theesthmen I oi shops on the Tibetan side of the border selling essential articles at cheap rates,
Chinese military MBBBBBBBBBBI act lvlty. Chinese armed forces are presenti^^greaTernurabers north of NEFA than in any other part of the immediate Himalayan frontier area. There are estimated to be0 Chinese army troops in this area, including elements of one and possibly twondependent regiments,order defense regiments. Following the Chinese withdrawal behind the McMahon lino last November, the border remained quiet. By April however, the Chinese "errln forward areas again, and rumorsig militaryegan to reach India. These rumors apparently were exploited by the Indian government for various political purposes, and facts regarding the buildup became difficult to separate from politically inspired fiction. Indian military officersdiscounted tho rumors. By August these rumors were still unconfirmed, despite more aggressive patrolling by Indian troops who had been ordered to investigate them. The Chinese army has the capability of jumping off at any time with little further warning or buildup, however.
Soviet bloc and Indian Comnur.lst activity. The Soviet: bloc apparently does not have as great an interest in, nor as ready access to, the NEFA border as it does farther west in India. There is no Soviet bloc activity in NEFA. There areoviet, Rumanian, and Czech economic aid projects in the plains of Assam, however. Sovietio:; capabilities in NEFA are believed minimal.
Politically, the Indian Communist Party in Assam is not strong, and it is probably weaker than it was2esult of Indian security measures. No Communist movement or Indian Communist-activity is known to exist in NEFA. In the springowever, Assamese Communists wereto create dissatisfaction over floods, riceand high prices.
The most serious danger to be expected from Assamese Communists appears to be their capability to disrupt lines of communication to the fighting forces in NEFA in the eventuture Chinese attack. The Communist Party, which, dominates the labor unions in the Indian government Posts and Telegraphs Department, conducted an embarrassing slowdown in the .telegraph system throughout India in the spring Members of these same unions probably were responsible for thesabotage of nearly all Post and Telegraph open wirelines in Assam and between Assam and New Delhi during tho fighting in NEFA later This was long after the Chinese threat had become apparent and after Indian security measures had been drastically tightened. Evenommunist sabotage capabilities were further suggestedonh explosion onarch on the railway track near Tezpur. Assam, tho Indian army's main base at the foot of the route leading up to Towang, Bum La, and Khir.semane, just east o; Bhi:tan.
Local reaction to the situation. Not enough is known about local attitudes in Nttf'A either before or after the Chinese attacks last October toalid estimate of tribal loyalties or dissidence in that area. Early2
having cultural affinities with Tibet felt it was prudent to cultivate Assamese Communists because of the possibility that the Chinese might some day enter Assam and "liberate" them. Following the October attacks, both India and China made such propaganda capital out of the reception received from the tribals by invading Chinese troops and returning Indian administrators that the truth is not determinable. There have been some hints, however, that the returning Indians have not found the situation to their liking.
Indian administrators bave found evidence of tribal looting and some evidence of collaboration with the Chinese. Furthermore, the tribals are said to view with somethe quick evacuation of NEFA by Indian officials last fall. The most widely publicized incident was one on3roup of Daflas, armed with modern Chinese automatic weaponsozen persons, including some Indian officials who apparently had been attempting to disarm them and restore civil control in their tribal area.
left behind by
:i Chinese rather than intentionally supplied to the Dallas,
reputation for unruliness and would be prime targets for Chinese subversive effort.
On the positive side of the ledger is an Indianreport of3 which says Indian army recruiting efforts, attempted for the first time among NEFA tribesmen, had met with "encouraging" results.