NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 54/55-63: THE MALAYSIAN - INDONESIAN CONF

Created: 10/30/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

national intelligence estimate

3

The Malaysian-Indonesian Con

segiSet

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

. 1

CONCLUSIONS

L

Considerations

of Interested

H. MALAYSIA

Considerations

MILITARY

andAir and Naval)

THE MALAYSIAN-INDONESIAN CONFLICT*

CONCLUSIONS

Sukarno appears to be set uponinfluence from the Malaysia area and replacing itlong run with Indonesian dominance. To these ends heout to suffocate at its birth the new state of Malaysia,apparently regards as an unacceptable scheme toinfluence and rob Indonesia of territories which itwould fall under its hegemony with the end ofrule. Sukarno probably countsediating role and upon Soviet political and)

policy of "confrontation" appears designed toMalaysia and to upset constituted authority inlater, Sabah (Northoint where ato Indonesia can be subsequently worked out.continue harassment of the northern Borneo territoriesand economic activities against Malaya andto make the continuance of Malaysia unworkableBritish position there untenable. )

anticipate no significant domestic threat toauthority. Inflationary pressures are certain toby the military expense of the "confrontation"and the heavy, though possibly temporary, costs ofin trade relations with Malaysia. The Indonesian Com-

* Previous papers covering problems of this area Include:Prospects for the Proposed Federation ofatedProspects foratednd, "Indonesia's Internationalated

munist Party (PKI) will exploit economic discontent but will be limited in this by its strong support of the anti-MalaysiaOn the whole, we believe that domestic pressures are not likely to impose restraints on the "confrontation" policy.)

the Malaysian position in the conflict is toagainst Indonesian demands under the cover ofprotection, waiting for Indonesia to weaken andof political and economic strains at home. As longstance remains unchanged, Prime MinisterRahman will be under strong pressure from his peopleto maintain an uncompromising position.has for the moment rallied potentiallyforces behind the regime. )

Philippines will probably continue to play ain the conflict, seeking to establish itselfenuineAsian politics, but careful not to alienate Indonesia onquestion concerning Malaysia so long as the US doesstronger measures to dissuade Sukarno from hisactions. Other than the Philippines, Indonesiano non-Communist support for its campaign amongstates. The USSR will probably encourage theto continue the campaign against Malaysia, hopingIndonesia's dependence on the USSR and to profitin the Afro-Asian world from having once more aidedagainst "imperialism." However, the Soviets willnot encourage the Indonesians to enter upon openWestern forces; ifevelopment occurs, thealmost certainly not assume serious risks of their own

F. The outlook is probablyising Indonesian level of efforts to subvert Malaysia. The British are confident that they can contain Indonesian paramilitary activity. While Sukarno will seek to avoid open hostilities, there is danger that, in pursuing his present course, he will miscalculate in responding to British countermeasures andirect military confrontation with UK and Commonwealth forces will occur. (Paras.)

DISCUSSION l. INDONESIA

A. "Confrontation"

Indonesia's actions against Malaysia' are conditioned by thegovernment's desire to be regardedeading Asian power exercising hegemony over all Malay people of Southeast Asia. In moving toward this objective, Sukamo and his followers have expected that as British rule ended in the adjacent states of northern Borneo, they would fall under Indonesian dominance. From the first, therefore, Sukarno has viewed the concept of Malaysia asritish attempt to blockevelopment by orienting northern Borneoalaya stul under strong British influence.

To the Indonesian leaders, Malaysia alsootential threat to the security of Indonesia Itself. They fear that the West might somedayritish-dominated Malaysiaase for operations aimed at breaking thc outer islands of Indonesia away from Djakarta's control and fragmenting the nation. They are also concernedelatively prosperous and stable Malaysia could prove an attractive alternative for the loyalties of adjacent Bornean people and increase latent separatist sentiment in Sumatra and Celebes. The Indonesians also express fear of extension of Chinese power into the area should the largepopulation of Malaysia come to dominate the new state-to Malaysia Is Intensified by Sukarno's strong personal dislike of Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, whom heool of the British. Sukarno probably also believesampaign against Malaysia will assist, as did the West New Guinea campaign, In further consolidating his personal political position at home.

ndonesian hostility toward the concept of Malaysia surfaced ln the fallollowing the settlement of the West New GuineaIndonesia's willingness to take active measures against Malaysia became clear during the abortive2 revolt In Brunei, for which Indonesia provided some military, political, and financialIn turn, the revolt provided an occasion for Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrlo, inoolicy oftoward Malaya. This course has come to encompass all means short of overt hostilities to achieve Indonesia's goal with respect to Malaysia.

Is made up of the former Federation of Malaya, Singapore, and two of the three lormer British dependencies ol northerncrown colonies of Sarawak and 8abah (Northhe third of these dependencies, the protectorate of Brunei, chose not to loin the new state.

Indonesia has refused lo accept the report of the UN team which was sent to Sarawak and Sabah as the result of the Manila summit meeting and which concluded that Malaysia clearly had majority support. Claiming that the UN survey was an inadequate test ofexpression, Djakarta persists inlebiscite and contends that In any properly held plebiscite, free of British influence, the local population would opt for independence rather than inclusion in Malaysia.

Indonesia is now carrying on an active policy of paramilitary and subversive activity against Malaysia. In Malaya and in Singapore, Indonesia is giving financial support to the activities of opposition groups seeking to undermine the Tunku's government. Sarawak, however, has been singled out as the most vulnerable target because of the relative case of access and the existence of significant anti-Malaysia sentiment among the local population. Indonesia is concentrating its effortsapid buildup of guerrilla strength in neighboring Indonesian Borneohese guerrilla forces are being formed from aof local Kalimantan inhabitants, special units of the Indonesian Army, and recruits from among several thousand anti-Malaysia refugees from Sarawak. Oroups of these guerrillas have been sent on raids into Sarawak but thus far not moreltogether have been employed In these operations This Indonesian program is under the general guidance of the Army, although various Indonesian intelligenceand even the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) participate in certain aspects of Its direction. The Army has also made contact with antl-Malayslan elements of the Sarawak United Peoples Partyhe largest political organization in Sarawak, and the PKI has close contact with the militant Clandestine Communist Organizationctive among the Chinese population of Sarawak. The initial hit-and-run raids against Sarawak border towns that began in April have been replaced by commando-type operations led by Indonesian Army personnel and penetrating further Intoew propaganda and sabotage teams have also been dispatched to Sabah.

ell-publicised movements of anny and paracommando formations to Kalimantan have been undertaken to add to the intimidating effect of clandestine operations. Small naval units have moved to Borneo,and the Rlau Archipelago off Singapore. The Indonesian Air Force has dispersed many of its aircraft from Java to bases in Sumatra and Celebes. Overflights of certain Commonwealth bases in Malaysia and Christmas Island (Indian Ocean) have been undertaken. Indonesia is developing several base camps in Kalimantan and is improving land* lng strips and communications in the border area. The principaland operations base is at Pontlanak, on the western coast,oint operations base for army, navy, and air elements is beingSimilar facilities are being developed at Tarakan. on the east

coast, and on Natuna Island, astride the air and sea routes between Malaya/Singapore and the northern Borneo areas.

Concurrent phases of the "confrontation" campaign will focus upon reducing tne will of the indigenous governments and peoples of Malaysia to resist Indonesian demands, and pressuring the Tunku Into conference table concessions favorable to Indonesia. In Sarawak, the pressures will be brought to bear largely through Indonesian-supported guerrillaThe effort will be assisted byhousand hard-coreyouth, organized in the CCO. Many of these are already armed, and the British consider that theyore dangerous threat than other Indonesian-supported guerrillas. In Sabah, Indonesianare presently limited, perhaps out of deference to Philippine claims to the area but probably more because of the absence ofindigenous support for anti-Malaysia activities. The immediate purpose of continuing subversion will be to heighten local insecurity and force the UK to spread Its available troop strength in Borneo more thinly. Sukarno hopes. In the longer run, to wear down the ability andof the UK (and Australia and New Zealand) to support soa containment action. In Brunei, not yet committed to Joining Malaysia, the Indonesians will probably confine themselves to aof covert support for the remnants of the anti-Malaysia Partai Rakjat.

In Malaya itself, Indonesia will continue Its long-term effort toopposition parties and groupsiew to eventually displacing the present pro-Western regime. This includes support for the extremist clandestine Malayan Revolutionary Youth Corps. Other groups ofand Indonesian Army special units, will continue to be trained for subversive assignments in Malaya and Singapore. The current trade embargo will be the principal weapon used against Singapore, where the effects of this measure will be most deeply felt and are therefore most likely to generate pressures for accommodation,

In pursuing his "confrontation" course, Sukarno will seek to avoid evert, large-scale hostilities with UK-Commonwealth forces, primarily because of the military risks involved. Consequently, the Indonesian Army does not contemplate invasion or any all-out assaults, andefforts will be directed toward making the UKilitary aggressor or the obstacle to peaceful settlement of the dispute. Sukarno will probably raise the present level of paramilitary pressures against Malaysia, In the belief that such attacks will not involve unacceptable risks. Thereanger that, in pursuing this course, he will miscalculate in responding to British countermeasures andirect military confrontation with UK and Commonwealth forces will occur. Asource of such danger would be any attempts by the Indonesians to enforce their vast claims to territorial waters and air space around Indonesia, including Natuna Island.

oncern for US reactions has not so far restrained Sukarnoignificant degree ln his anti-Malaysia campaign. He has accepted the loss of projected US and IMF economic stabilisation aid andassistance and is aware of continuing US disapproval of his actions. Sukarno probably believes that US opposition on the Malaysia issue will not advance much beyond this level of diplomatic andpressure. He counts on US concern not to push him toward the Bloc to dissuade the US from exerting stronger pressures. Hehopes that at some stage the US, concerned over its own possible involvement in hostilities, will offer toediating role that will contribute to the attainment of Indonesian objectives. If he came to believe lhat such an expectation was groundless, and, indeed, that the US would.howdown, give firm support to the Malaysia position, Sukarno might proceed more cautiously but he would be unlikely to abandon his program to subvert Malaysia.

B. Military Capabilities*

he Indonesian Army has about three battalions in the Sarawak border area and the equivalent of six others elsewhere In Kalimantan,en ln all. Port and transport faculties are generally inadequate, however, and supply is difficult. Recent operations have required airdrops for troop supply in the border regions. These forces are probably capable of limited operations In the border areas and of deeper penetrations ln small groups, but are probably not capable of seizing and holding any large part of Sarawak and Sabah. Indonesia has at presentnfantry battalions scattered throughout the country. While some of these could be brought to Borneo for moreoperations, Indonesia has had Uttle experience with large-scale military operations and the administration and logistic organization would be hard pressed to support any sizeable movement of troops.

he Indonesian Navy can prevent Malaysian flag ships fromtheir usual course between Malaya/Singapore and Sarawak Sabah. The Navy can also deny Indonesian fishing grounds tofisherman. While all shipping between Indonesia and Malaysia could not be prevented, there are sufficient ships in the Indonesian Navy, supplemented as necessary by air patrols, to permit substantialof the embargo against Malaysian trade. However, because of the limited logistics and repair facilities available In the Malacca Strait and other outlying areas,eneral want of effectiveness on the part of the Navy, it is unlikely that these activities could be sustained for longarge scale. The primary naval threat to Commonwealth sea line* of communication would be presented by Indonesia's guided missile patrol boats, motor torpedo boats, submarines, and mining

See tables at annex.

ndonesian lL-2Bsperating from Medancould range over Malaya and Singapore. When IndonesiaIts airfield preparation ln Kalimantan, these fields will be capable of supporting Jet operations against Sarawak and Sabah. TU-lfls launched from Medan, Pitund three bases on Java could cover all of Malaysia. Marshalling at the forward bases probably would be detected, however, and Indonesian bases themselves are highlyto air and sea attack by Commonwealth forces.

C. Domestic Considcnations

he PKI sets the Malaysia situation as another West New Guinea issue which it can use to strengthen Its ties with Sukarno and touller participation in national affairs. Itharpening ofdiscontent and Is gratified that "confrontation" has ledtabilization program based on economic aid from the West. The PKI can also be expected to increase its attacks on the US charging that in ami ting its aid to Indonesia lt reveals ita real opposition toIndonesian objectives. It will also attempt to move Sukarno toward closer cooperation with Communist countries. PKI participation Inand guerrilla operations Is limited because of close militaryThe party will seek every possible opportunity to have its members undergo military training ln order to prepare for the possibility ofpower through insurrection.

he Malaysians, andesser extent the British, believe that the "confrontation" policy will give rise to domestic strains serious enough to undermine the stability of the Sukarno government and to critically Increase disaffection in the outer islands. However, army ability and willingness to check serious disturbances and Sukarno's apparentin making the antl-Malayslaational crusade will probably keep discontent from reaching unmanageable proportions. Discontent with Sukarno among certain intellectual and Muslim groups ia passive and unorganised at present. In the outer Islands, there Is some resentment of the central government and its policies,evolt comparable in size to8 rebellion Is unlikely since potential

jacket

ship is Imprisoned and organisation is lacking. Insurgent groupsin the Moluccas and southern Celebes are small, isolated, and not likely to become the focus of serious opposition to the central government.

The economic situation In Indonesia will almost certainlyeven furtheresult of the cost of military and paramilitary operations and the breaking of trade relations with Malaysia.pressures will become severe as the short-lived economicprogram is abandoned in favor of deficit financing. The greatest Impact will be in the disruption of normal trade, shipping, and financial channels for Indonesian exports. Imports from Malaysia are small in volume and easily purchased elsewhere. However,ercent of2 exports were to Malaysia, providing about0 million in foreign exchange. The loss of foreign exchange willa sharp reduction in Imports of industrial raw materials and spare parts, thereby further cutting Indonesia's already low manufacturing output, with reduced availability of consumer necessities.

However. Indonesian leaders seem willing to accept this economic setbackolitical necessity. They also view the severe effects of the trade break with Malaysia aa only temporary. They feel that Indonesian products have an assured world market and that, within six monthsear, new trading and processing channels will open to replace those In Singapore. To accelerate this switchover, they are negotiating with traders in Japan, Hong Kong, and the Philippines as well as soliciting assistance from Soviet and other Bloc sources. It Is probable that, in time, they will be able to find new markets and build up facilities that will in large part replace the entrepot services of Singapore.the short-term Impact of the trade disruption may be morethan the Indonesians realize or care to admit.

D. Attitude* of Interested Powers

The Philippines. Indonesia In general has the support of the Philippines In the Malaysia dispute and will probably continue to have lt.S-Indonesian showdown. Thc Philippines Is concerned to keep alive its claim In Sabah. Beyond this, however, theretrong desire, despite concern over Indonesian expansionism, to act in concert with Indonesia politically and diplomatically since many FilipinosIndonesia the future dominant power in Southeast Asia. The Philippines has been far less vigorous In pressing the cause of "Borncanut it has not yet compromised Us stand on the Malaysia recognition issue and seems unlikely to do so until such time as such an act would be acceptable to Indonesia.

The USSR. The Soviet Union sees Malaysiaritish device to retain control over former colonial territories. Nevertheless, though critical of the new state, the Soviets have hinted that if Malaysia seemed

to bet might gain Soviet diplomatic recognition.has alsoukewarmness to the Indonesian case. These Soviet attitudes are almost certainly conditioned by misgivingspotential Chinese Communist influence in the Malaysian area, uncertainty about the future course of relations with Sukarno and the value of Soviet gains to date, and the generally pro-Chinese orientation of the PKI leadership.

On the other hand, the opportunity toajor Asian country with "imperialism" must hold great appeal for the Soviets. They would hope te further alienate Indonesia from the West and to increase its military and economic dependence on the USSR. Thewill probably therefore encourage Sukarno to continue hisand may augment their limited economic assistance. However, the Soviets will probably discourage Indonesia from becoming Involved in open hostilities and. If these occurred, would be likely to limitto such low risk operations as would avoid overt clashes between Soviet snd Western personnel in the area.

Communist China. Indonesia can expect much less in the way of tangible assistance from Communist China. Peiping has anattitude on the issue. It probably sees the possible breakup of Malaysiaseful step in forwarding Its own subversive aims in the area. On the other hand, it would be reluctant to see the Chinesein northern Borneo fall under Indonesian domination.after some hesitation, Peiping hasorthright pro-Indonesian anti-Malaysian stand and has offered "moral and material" support. Its material support will probably be negligible, butamong leftist Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia may assist Djakarta's cause. Communist China may also be of assistance inCCO support in Sarawak for the anti-Malaysia struggle, but as yet there is no evidence of such activity.

Afro-Asian States. On the Malaysia issue, Indonesia hasnone of the type of support traditionally expected from former colonial states. This lack of support has dampened Indonesian hopes of using the UN machinery to promote its objectives. The generallyAfro-Asian attitude toward the Tunku and some apprehension in this quarter over Sukarno's growing aggressiveness and ultimatehave combined to almost isolate Indonesia on the issue. Although Algeria and the UAR have expressed mistrust of UK motives and support for Sukarno, Commonwealth states, such as India, Tanganyika, and even Ghana, have been pro-Malaysia. It seems probable that Sukarno will continue to And little support for his alms in the UN, although most countries would probably assist efforts toompromise on the issuelear threat to the peace should develop.

Indonesia is counting on Japanese economichelp fill the financial gap left by tbe suspension of US and IMFprograms and the abandonment of various otherto assist Indonesia's economy. The Japanese are probablyassist thc Indonesians to some degree and are especiallyworkingonger range reorientation of certainpatterns toward Japan, but they have no desire to take overportion of the economic burden in Indonesia. Althoughtrade Is twice that with Indonesia, this has apparentlya factor in their considerations to date They will wish, toat least, to coordinate their policies with the US. Japanto gam from the present conflict and Prime Minister Ikedaactively seeking to mediate and moderate the dispute.

II. MALAYSIA

A, Domestic Considerations

Basically the Malaysian position is to stand firm againstdemands under the cover of Commonwealth protection, waiting for Indonesia to weaken and retreat because of political and economic strains at home. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman is stronglyby his Alliance party leaders in his determination not lo resume diplomatic relations or negotiate with Indonesia until it first recognizes Malaysia and ceases attacks and subversion ln the Borneo territories.

The Tunku's political position, although strong, is notHootential rival in Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. Suchas the Tunku has made to Indonesia have been criticized by an emotionally aroused population, deeply resentful of Indonesian actions. His role ln thc Internal negotiations and arrangements involved inMalaysia have alao aroused resentment in some groups and areas. These criticisms and his consequent loss of prestige reinforce the Tunku's reluctance to enter negotiations with Indonesia and theNevertheless, If in his view, Indonesia seemed prepared to resume normal relations on reasonable terms, he would probably attempt lo secure the support of his Cabinet and his party for negotiations In the belief that Malaysia's long-term stabilityessation of

There are potentially grave areas of conflict within Malaysia which would pose serious problems for the new state even if there were no "confrontation" with Indonesia. Leaders of the component states are jealous of their states' rights. In Malaya, the partnership between the Malays and the Chinese remains an uneasy one. In Singapore, there is hostility from the predominantly Chinese. pro-Communist Barisan

Party, and thereonstant threat of renewed strikes and violence despite the recent arrest of leading leftists. In the Borneo

l&etfET

rilorles, where the Insurgent threat is greatest, the indigenous tribes generally have remained loyal to the British and lo Malaysia, but there is anostility toward the Malays that could be aggravated by acts of Kuala Lumpur or agitation by Indonesia. There are strong anti-Malaysia forces ln Sarawak's largest party, the SUPP, whichthe bulk of the territory's Chinese population.igrants in Sabaharget for Indonesian subversion.

n the context of the conflict with Indonesia, these-divisive forces have been relatively quiescent, and most of the potentially conflicting personalities and groups have Joined, at least temporarily, in opposition to Indonesia. We are unable to estimate with any confidence theof the present relative unity in Malaysia. The scope and pace of the Indonesian effort, the success ofxtnJ fJgtMamMat Bleffective leadership, economic developments, and the constancy and effectiveness of outside support will all have their bearing on theand staying power of Malaysia.

alaysia's economic position is strong compared to that of The conservative fiscal policies of the Kuala Lumpurand the backing of tbe UK have provided Malaysiaood base from which to meet Sukarno's economic thrusts. In Malaya itself, the Impact of broken trade relations has been relatively slight and Borneo is unaffected Nevertheless, the severance of trade relations has hit Singapore relatively hard. It is estimated that Malaysia will loseillion annually ofillion will be lost to Singapore. The burden in Singapore will fall upon firms engaged In processingsmallholder rubber and other agricultural raw materials. An0 workers have already been affected and as many more may shortly feel tbe impact. In view of its chronic unemployment problems, thishreat to the political stability of Singapore.Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's Prime Minister and Malaysia'sChinese leader, can be expected for the time being tohis political rivalry with the Tunku to his belief that Chinesewill be advancedtable and harmonious Malaysia. He is likely, therefore, lo support firm resistance to the Indonesian campaign against Malaysia.

B. Military Capabilities'

* 6ce tables at annex.

y latehe Malaysian Army strength In Sarawak and Sabah is expected to total. With total ground forces0ery small coastal navy,mall alrforce without combat planes, Malaysia could not effectively defend Itselfajor Indonesian assault. Tbe security of Malaysia thus depends upon the support of Commonwealth forces, especially the UK.

C. Commonwealth Support

The VK. The Brltlah have longstanding commitment* to the security of Malaya and Singapore as wellital economic stake which they would fight to defend. The British-Malayan defense agreements7 have been extended to all of Malaysia. Furthermore, the British are determined not to be pushed out of northern Borneo by Sukarno because of the probable impact upon their statusreat power in East Asia and the principal protector of Commonwealth interests in the region. The UK is unlikely to accept willingly any settlement of the conflict that would involve important gains for Sukarno and heavylosses for Itself.

British policy in response to the current insurgency situation in Borneo is toorkable military defense with all available resources and make the guerrilla effort so costly to Indonesia in lives and material and so unpromising of success that Sukarno will abandon his plan to take over Sarawak and Sabah. The present level of localized guerrilla activity and covert border Incursionserious threat to the British position in Borneo and the British arc confident that they can handle any guerrilla effort the Indonesians can mount. If Indonesia tried to seise limited border areas in the Borneo territories, It would probably meet with initial success, but the UK could bringforce to bear to prevent the Indonesians from establishingoccupation. In the caseajor Indonesian effort to occupy Sarawak or Sabah, UK logistics would be strained torolonged campaign. In this event. London might retaliate by air and navalagainst certain Indonesian bases and would certainly press hard for direct US assistance while exerting diplomatic efforts through the UN to end the conflict.

The UK has six combat battalions in the Borneoan additionalattalions elsewhere in the Far East. Thesearmy troops. Royal Marines, and Gurkhas In addition to thiswell-trained troops, thereimited number of special forcesfor specialized duties. It Is possible for the UK toforces regularly stationed in East Asia with units from the UKand other areas. However, these strategic reserve forces arefor emergency redeployment anywhere in the world, and, ifwere required to augment more than one areaime, thethese resources available for Malaysia could be severely limited.

J95I

IS)

espite their commitments to Malaysia's defense, it Is probable that both Australia and New Zealand will confine their militaryfor the next few months to Malaya and Singapore, perhaps thereby permitting the release of OK forces for the Borneo front. In thisonfrontation with Indonesia could be postponed until dictated by urgent military necessity. Australia's future conduct would be affected by the construction put upon US commitments under the ANZUS pact. Should Indonesian guerrilla actions appear likely to cause seriousfor Commonwealth forces, Australia, although recognizing the limits on US obligations under the ANZUS pact, will argue that the point has been reached where subversion and guerrilla warfare have become overt and armed attack.

annex

military forces involved in the malaysian-indonesian conflict

TABLE I

INDONESIAN ARMED PORCES

GroundInfantry Bns

9 Paracommando Bns

Bnsrtillery Bns

Bns

Police Mobile0 ns

1 Ranger Bn

Naval Forces

00 Navalhip Strength:

Light Cruiserestroyers (DD)

Coastal Destroyersestroyer Escorts (DE)ubmarines (SS)

Escorts (PCE)

Patrol Escorts (PF)

2 Submarine Chasers, Small (SC)otor Gunboats (PGM)

Missile Patrol Boats (PGMG)otor Torpedo Boats (FT)

4 Fleet Minesweepers (MSF)nshore Minesweepersank Landing Ships (LST)

Landing Ships, Large (LSIL)

Landing Craft (LCU)uxiliary Craft

ervice Craft

Air Force

asperational squadrons which includeet medium bombers7 jet light bombersndet fighters, andransport capability of itsransport aircraftB) is

Inventory:

Fighter (Day):

18

8

ARMER

FRESCO .

FANG

Bomber:

17

...

12

Bomber:

.

IA

TABLE II

MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES Ground Forces0nfantry Bns

Artillery Bn

Armored Bns

Naval Forces

Includingommonwealth personnel) Ship Strength:

4 Coastal Minesweepersnshore Minesweepers (MSI)ervice Craft

Inventory:

Transport; Twin Pioneer

Pioneer

Other: Trainer

Miscellaneous

14

8

6 5

COMMONWEALTH ARMED FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Ground Forces Commonwealth Forces4 Infantry Bns

Bns

Bn British Forces (Hong Kong):

Bns

Bns Australian Army:

1 Infantry Divtotal

2 Infantry Bns } 0

New Zealand Army:

2 Infantry

Naval Forces British Far East Fleet (Singapore):

1 Attack Carrier (CVA)

I Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH)

1 Light Cruiser (CL)

Purpose Destroyers <DD)

Radar Picket Destroyer (DDR)

Radar Picket Escort Ships (DER)

Escorts (PF)'

I Mine Countermeasures Support Ship (MCS)

8 Coastal Minesweepers (MSC)

5 Submarines (SS)

I Submarine Tender (AS)

1 Repair Ship (AR)

British Far East Fleet (Hong Kong):

3 Coastal Minesweepers (MSC)

RET

Commonwealth Far East Air Forces (New Zealand)

Freighter

British Far East Fleet (Singapore) Air Arm:

Vixen

Fighter-Bomber: Scimitar

Helicopter

Miscellaneous

Air Force: Fighter:

Meteorea Vixenvon^Sabre

Bomber: ASW:

Canberra

reighter Mk-31

Trainer

Miscellaneous

Australian Naval Air Ann:

Venom

As-1

Trainer

Miscellaneous

New Zealand Air Force:

Light Bomber: ASW: Transport:

Vampireunderlandouglasreighterakota)

Miscellaneous

^SECRET

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