CIA Presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,3
I. SOVIET MOTIVES IN THE TEST BAN
In your third question, youer of factors which may have led Khrushchev to agreeimited test ban at this time. ant to give you our views on the probable work-ing of these factors in the Soviet decision,with the question of proliferation. Proliferation
We regard the desire to halt the spread of nuclear weaponsignificant but notmotive for tho Soviet switchest ban. CThe Soviets see no advantage to themselves inhey want touclear monopoly in their own camp. Outside their camp, they see certain dangers to themselves in proliferation, especially when they contemplate the prospectuclear-armed West Germany. The Soviets are very susceptible to fears on this score, and they probably hopeest ban will raise the obstacles against this The relationship is an indirect one; they hope, beginning with the present agreement on
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testing, toolitical climate in which greater pressures can be mobilized against any ox the ways by which the Germans might movea nuclearindependent effort, cooperation with France, or participationultilateral force. This, however, is part and parcelarge set of political objectives which the Soviets are seeking, and toill return later.
Beyond the German matter, Khrushchevcertainly recognizes that while he can now berate the French more effectively, he canv*oV
^hardly hope tolhalt de Gaulle's nuclear program. With respect to Communist China, the Sovietsig stephen they cut off their aid to tbe Chinese nuclear program. Since that time, however, they have really had only one direct means of affecting this program: the use of force against Chinese nuclearwhich they would regardomentous
.and dangerous undertaking. Certainly,understands that any test ban negotiated with the West will not dissuade the Chinese from pursuing an independent nuclear capability.
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The Sino-Soviet Conflict
Communist China enters Miscalculationsway, however. At the present stageconflict, the Soviets have an interestwhat the Chinese deny: that acan reach agreements with capitalistwhich are not capitulations but in facttho cause. imited test ban can beln this way, and from Khrushchev'sit ls particularly appropriate because he
can relate it to his side of tbeover nuclear war. Furthermore, hesotituation in which thethey come to stage their firsthave to appearorse light among thoso
for whose loyalty Moscow and Peiping are contend-log.
Soviet Detentecome now to what we consider Khrushchev's
chief immediate concern: tho political gains
hopes to achieve in Europe by bringing about
a general relaxation of tensions. These center
in the first instance on Germany, where four years of threats and pressure have failed to
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yield any lasting returns. He begins with tho desire to get Western endorsement ol* Eastand jaost of his current proposals, such as the non-aggression pact and thoso relating to military forces in the two Germanies, are designed to this end. But he also knows that if he can induce the West to acknowledge and accept the division of Germany, he sets upIn the Federal Republic toward aof present alliances and thereby creates tho preconditions for drawing West Germany away from NATO.
This is only one of the specificwhich Khrushchev hopes to movo forward [onlby bringingeneral atmosphere of detente. He probably has considerable hopes for this course of action, which ho has not seriously exploited since the Camp David era that ended ioor he realizes that in tho meantime newas de Gaulle's aspirations for France and the new fluidity in German politics with tho departure ofaccumulated in the meantime.
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It can bo taken for granted that, in pursuing this line, Khrushchev intends to strengthen the case for various Soviet proposals in the field of arms control, such as nuclear-free zones, and toeneral relaxation of NATO military efforts.
In this connection, we should be mindful of the unhappy fact that it is easier for the USSR to sustain military programs in anof reduced tensions that it is for the West. During the coalng period, the Soviets will go forward in incorporating into their nuclear stockpile the design advances made Inests. They willigorous program of research and development in advanced weapons. It may be that thiswill bring them to what they soe as the threshold of some important military advance, say in the anti-missile field, which requires nuclear testing for its consummation. In this case, they would be tempted toretext for withdrawing from the treaty. Theiratime would dependomplicated weighing of military, political,
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even economic factors in circumstances which, unfortunately, we cannot now foresee. Further Possibilities
You have askedurther question: does Khrushchev's agreement to a limited test banenuine desire for detente with the Wost? If by this is meant, has Moscowew determination of fundamental policy to close out the cold war and accept tbe present limits of Soviet power and Influence,uick and emphatic no. But if we ask whether Moscow may be coming to seeore complicated way and reappraising tho USSR's methods and prospects in thatno such short answer ls sufficient. China
ant to return to tho question of Sino-Sovlet relations. We are persuaded that the division is real and deep and that it arlsos not only from ideological differences, twhlch might after all be narrowed or eliminatedhange of mind or leadership on one side*t^ but from national rivalrytraightforward power struggle for control of the International
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Communist movement. We think that the Soviets fully understand this, particularly now that the Chinese have raised the question of national borders unjustly imposed on China by tho Russian tsars.
This being so, we believe that China's stance and its success in extending control over other Communist parties in Asia, must eventually make inroads on some of the fundamental Soviet conceptions about world politics. Thethat international affairs isipolar struggle of two social systems, that one must eventually prevail and extinguish the Other, is becoming increasingly unrealistic, and the Soviet Unionealistic power. As these conceptions get blurred, the Soviet leaders will find it difficult to referogmaticframework in order to determine, on each new issue, who is the enemy and whoommon interest with them. Already they must be aware of the danger of isolation between two hostile fronts, East and West. Economic Pressures
We do not know how far this process has gone in Khrushchev's mind, but we think it plays a
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greater role in Soviet thinking than was the caso during the last period of detente tactics. There is,econd factor involved in theof genuine detente which is not quite so conjectural. This ls the impact of Military and space spending on the Soviet economy. Five years ago, Khrushchev seemed supremely confident that
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the economy couldilitary force which would be capable of wringing politicalout to the West, and at the same timea big investment program and regular, tan- lble increases in consumer welfare. Little of this has come to pass. Soviet militaryhave been greatly strengthened, but West Berlin still stands and Khrushchev found the US readier than he to fire the first shot in the missile crisis last October. Meanwhile, Soviet economic growth has distinctly.faltered; the growth in GNP has slowed down in recent years, investment increases have been smaller and smaller, and agriculture remains virtually stagnant. Our analysis indicates thatand space spending have been the mostsingle cause of this general slowdown.
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rtrfe note, for example, that military production Is having important effects on deliveries of machinery and equipment to the economy. These civilian deliveries, which were rising at aboutercent per year in the yearshen production for the military was stable or declining, have since grown at an annual rateercent or less while military production has been Increasing by aboutercent per year.fi
Thus the economic caseheck to the arms raco has been gaining strength in the USSR for the past few years. Last winter, however, our evidence on economic policy suggested that the response to tho Cuban crisis was toeaffirmation, and perhapstrengthening of the primacy of defense ovor other economic needs. This wasime whon our political Information indicated that Khrushchev's stock among his colleagues was relatively low. Since about April, we haveteady gain in his political authority, and at tho samehift in economic policy pronouncements. Thoseconomic plan have
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been directed to give primary attention to the consumer and agriculture by upward revisions In the chemical industry. Grandiose plans for fertilizer production have been announced, and even though they will not be met onerious beginning on them can scarcely be made without some general readjustment of other sectors. Khrushchev has told Western officials that tho USSR is "over the hump" ln military spending and can now direct now resources into agriculture.
This is not conclusive proofajor turn in economic policy. We think it possible, however, that those developments reflect aof priorities which ls closelyto the test ban. If Khrushchev wishes to check military spending for the sake ofand consumption, he is under someto bringeduction of international tensions, lest he endanger Soviet security or give the appearance of doing so. In this case, his present intention is probably to sustain the detento lineonsiderable period. tress "his present intention" because, even If this argument is correct, future changes
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within the Soviet leadershipew crisis, arising for example out of Cuba, could greatlytbe circumstances.
We are not trying to suggest tbat, ifChinese problem and economic problem make bis present move toward detente morethan previous phases of this sort, he will come to us with any sort of acceptable overall settlement of East-West issues. Indeed, he would in this case pursue the same sort of tactics on Germany and arms control questionset out earlier, with only thisthat he would be ready to come somowhat closer to Western terms on particular agreements, or that he would be willing to let these Issues llo on the negotiating tablerolonged period without resorting to new tensions, deduction of Soviet Forces
One final point about Soviet policy is the matter of reduction of military manpower. reassertlon of authority In the Presidum, plus the emergonceetente lino In foreign policy, automatically forces us to reconsider this possibility. Khrushchev has never been convinced of the ncod for ground forces of the
the present size, and he suspended tho previous reduction program1 only because of steady pressure from his marshals, combined with the crisis generated by bis Berlin demands. So far, wo have only rumors, accompanied by very little evidence,roject to withdraw Soviet forces from Bungary, but we would not be surprised at the announcementew "unilateral forceundertaken both for economic reasons and^put futher impetus behind current detente tactics. ove might possiblyeduction of Soviet forces In East Germany, although Khrushchev may wish to hold this card in reserve for bargaining purposes. EFFECT ON THE NUCLEAR POLICY OF OTHER COUNTRIES
Aside from the three signatories, themost immediately concerned with nuclear programs are Communist China, France, andave discussed the Chinese earlier. France willjalmost certain^ not sign the partial test ban agreemont, at least until it has awarhead for medium range missiles. If de Gaulle were given complete designs and materials for producingarhead, he might possibly then agree to the test ban. However, de Gaulle
as interested in tbe political effects of being knownhermonuclear power as in the military significance of the weapons. He would be reluctant to forego tbe test which would demonstrate that he hadhermonuclear weapon.
Israel bas embarkeduclear program which is heavily dependent on French aid, and we have estimated that Israel would attempt touclear weapon some time in the next several years. In the new situation, we think that Israel will probably sign the test-ban treaty but continue its development program up to the testing stage. This would put itosition either to test underground If it felt the need to do so, or perhaps even to withdraw from the treaty and test in the atmosphere,ituation developed in which the Israelis be-
lioved themselves threatened by Arab
Elsewhere in theimitedagreement wouldolitical anddeterrent to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons^by countrios other than the threeExcept for the few Communist
Bloc nations which back the Chinese Communist position in tbe Slno-Soviet dispute/ball other
countries will probably support the partial test ban. Once having signed, they will find it dif-ficult to renounce the pactater date if they should decide that new conditions mado it desirable for then to have nuclear weapons.
Indiapecial case, however, due to its border conflict with China. Nehru has an-nounced that India will adhere to the treaty. But once Chinaevice, and partlcu-
after Nehru has gone, India will be undor
strong domestic pressure to embarkeapons
Whether the government would bow to
pressure, would dependumber of factors,
but most crucially on the course of
EOHOPEAX REACTIONS TO TEST BAN AND DETENTE
or not the partial test ban has a
effect within NATO, or pushes the French
West Germans closer togetheruclear
program, depends as much on the forth-
discussions about European political is-
sues as on the test ban Itself. While all NATO countries except France support tbe test ban,
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there is considerable opposition in some oi" them, especially Vest Germany, to any arrangement whichreezing of the status-quo in Europe.
Both West Germany and France will almost certainlyon-aggression treaty which requires individual NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to sign it, arguing thatrocedure would be tantamount torecognlzlng East Germany. West Germany and France will probably also oppose any
taneous declaration by NATO and Warsaw Pactthe West at the same time gets
additional concessions on the Berlin question or on the broader issues of European security. The French government probably also believes that by
supporting West Germany on the non-aggression
issue, its own isolation on the test ban question may be reduced.
If West Germany and France come to feel that they are being pressed into an unsatisfactory non-aggression arrangement by the OS and the UK, they may feel compelled to make common cause on this and other policy questionsuch greater degree than they have yet done under the Franco-German treaty. One field where they night get
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together in the future is obviously that of nuclear weapons. hould emphasize that wc have no reliable evldecco that Joint Franco-German activity on nuclear weapons ls under-
way at this time.) To the extent that OS or British motives in the non-aggression talks actually do differ from French and Westmotives, therefore, the talks may accelerate
divisive tendencies withinhe impact in Europe of tbe test ban and the future non-aggression talks thus quite clearly depends
Beyond the non-aggression agreement, of course, are the other subjects on whichhas said he ls willing to negotiate with tho West. In the prolonged period ofwith the Soviet Onion which we may now bo entering,[problems affecting tbe future of
both Germanies and Berlin are likely to be con-
in the spotlight.^The West Germanwill be acutely worried that any steps toward settling Central European problems will be taken at West Germany's expense or will make the German goal of reunification even morethan it ls at present. Bonn'sin the Onlted States and tbe NATO alliance
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probably will face very severe trials.the negotiating process, France willbe ready to benefit from any Westdisillusionment with the US or NATO.
It is obvious that the test ban agreement and the relaxation which the Soviets Intend to introduce in East-West relations willreat deal of optimism in the West. It Is probably safe to predict, however, that the French government, and the West Germanunder Adenauer, will not be fooled into thinking that the USSR's long-term goals have changed. Even after Adenauer, the Germanwill, for the near term, at any rate, probablyard-headed view of Soviet policy. Elsewhere, in NATO, and especially in Great Britain, there mayuch stronger tendency to believe that long-torm Soviet goals actually bavo changed, and that everythingmust be done to encourage the thaw inrelations with the West. Similar feelings will be more widespread outside official circles in most NATO countries than within tbethemselves. As Khrushchev hopes, an
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of detente will', forake it more difficult for Vest European^"perhaps even including the French,', u> maintain their defenseat planned levels.
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Original document.
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