Created: 2/10/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


reference to thoeviewed thof the OX on Friday.ind that Drs. Wheelon and Maxie are agreed that the improved Soviet radar capability makes the OX visible both to the long range search radar and the radars associated with the surface-to-air missile systems. Therefore it is impossible to fly the OX over Soviet territory without detection. Originally it was thoughtnd as recently asonths agohat the Soviet radar would not pick up the OX. The findings of Dr. Wheelon disprove this and this fact bears heavily on tbe future use of the OX.

If the decision is made by higher authority not to use the OX for the purposes originally plannedlandestine surveillance of the Soviet Unionhen it must be consideredquick reaction" surveillance asset to be used in times of danger, under circumstances of heightened tension, with the full appreciation of the risks and the provocations.

This raises the question of whether in its reconnaissance configuration it should continueIA asset or be turned over to the Air Force. This question must be examined carefully and, quite naturally, the use of the OXCART over non-Soviet denied territory such as Communist China, Southeast Asia and even Cuba should be taken into consideration.

The above problem is one of the important questions associated with surfacing the OX tfwi. -JStTejlr'thc moat important long term question from the standpoint of CIA, our budget, etc.

I feel it must at some time be surfaced because of the military versions. Also wo are sure to have an accident or forced landingublic airport,hich will have the effect of surfacing. Timing is of importance as well as method, and these should be studied and an in-house decision reached for guidance in talking with tho Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director, NRO and higher authority.

approved fdr release


The second question is the management of NRO. My last discussionepresentative of DoD was with Fubini about three weeks ago at which time heemoeltery sensible plan. nderstand it has run into some difficulties with McMillan andote Dr. Wheelon's alternate proposal.

I would like to reach an in-house agreement as to what part, if any, CIA must play in the operation of proven article, the technical improvements of such an article in order to produce better quality product and the developmentew generation search and spotting satellite to give the ultimate resolution.

Since both Fubini and McMillan want to see me early this week, tho above should be discussed at this afternoon's meeting.


il. f*

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