Created: 11/22/1963

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CONTENTS (Information as0 EST,



Moscow's handling of this affair suggests anmiscalculation of the repercussions in the US, followed by efforts to minimize tho damage to Soviet-American relations.


release of professor Barghoorn onovember, two days after President Kennedy's public condemnation of Soviet behavior, apparentlyecision by the Soviet leaders to disengage as quickly asfrom this episode and to try to minimize the damage to Soviet-US relations.

Ambassador Kohler believes the Soviet authorities failed to anticipate the US reaction to Barghoorn's arrest and that they were bewildered and genuinely alarmed by the volume andof US protests and Moscow's terseof Barghoorn's release stated that in view of the "concern of high USheGovernment had decided "merely to expel him from the Soviet Union" rather than bring him to trial on espionage charges, Gromyko Informed Kohler privately that this decision was the result of Khrushchev's personaland requested that this be brought to the attention of President Kennedy.

Soviet propaganda has played down the incident, deplored the "hue and cry" raised in the US, and expressed the pious hope that Washington "will correctlythe good will of the Soviet Government" in releasing Barghoorn.

In Ambassador Kohler's view, this episode does noteliberate decision to worsen relations with the US or to jettison the peacefulpolicy and move closer to Chinese Communist positions. Although the ambassadorthat Soviet authorities regard an occasional espionage caseseful device forthe Soviet people against unraonitored contacts withhe feels the primary motive in the Barghoorn affair was the desire to secure afor I. A. Ivanov, anof the Soviet "Amtorg" trade organization in New York who was arrested onctober. Gromyko told Kohlerhat the USSR expects that the US Government "will take the necessary measures" to release Ivanov.

Moscow's apparent desire to avoid further damagingexchanges over this case was evident in Gromyko'ewarning to Kohler that if any US officialattempts to justifybehavior, thus casting doubt on the legitimacy ofactions, the USSR "will reserve the right to publish materials of theIncluding the deposition of F. Barghoorn-


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