Created: 12/4/1963

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The"following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation

The Central Intelligence Agency and iho Intelligence organization* of theof State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Ajr Force, AEC ond NSA..


Director of intelligence and Research, Department of Stale Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of ihesslnont,lpttffgMict, USAF

Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the .



The UAR Missile Program and Its Implications for Israel



To estimate the probable developments in the UAR missile program over the next five years, and their implications for Israel.


he United Arab Republic (UAR) mayew surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) capableIsrael, but these missiles would probably haveound payload,EP on the orderould not have nuclear warheads, and their militarybe trifling. )

the next five years, the UAR will doubtless seekmore, and more accurate, SSMs. Because of highproduction facilities, and shortage of competentwe believe that the UAR is unlikely to deploy morefew hundred SSMs, and the figure could well be (Para. 7)

leaders claim that UAR missiles, despite theircould seriously affect Israeli morale and disruptthus enabling UAR conventional forces to overrunview of the inaccuracy, limited payload, and limitedthe UAR missiles, we believe it extremely unlikely thatmissile attack would have such serious results, at leastnext five years. )

has contractedrench firm

the factors wmcn have inhibited a

new outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in recent years still apply, the progress of the advanced weapons programs will raise tensions on both sides. In an atmosphere of this kind, there will always be the danger that one side or the other might initiate hostile action. (Paras.


In recent years the UAR has shown an intense interest in acquiring guided missiles and has approached most of the missile-producingof the world. The UAR hasew US-made sounding rockets and has acquired short-range tactical naval missiles, air-to-air missiles, and SAMs from the USSR. Sincehe UAR has also secured the services of WesternWestand technicians to develop SSMs capable ol reaching Israel. With the help of these Westapparently now numberUAR has developed two missiles, the Victor and the

The UAR has alsowo-stage rocket, the Pioneer, which appears toombination of the Victor and the Conqueror. The Pioneer may be designed for use in space research or as partro-grain toatellite, largely for propaganda purposes. We believe that it wouldayload of only about SO pounds if usedissile, and hence would have very little military value.

The Conqueror probably couldound payloadautical milese believe that the Conqueror had elementsrude guidance systemts CEP was very large. Some technical improvements in the guidance system have been observed, and the CEP may now be on the order0 nm. The Victorange ofm,ayload of onlyounds at this range.ange of onlym, however. It coulday-loadew hundred pounds. Victor missiles exhibited by the UAR in3 appeared touidance system for the first time. This guidance system is similar to that of the Conqueror, and the CEP of the two missiles probably is about the same. The fuel for both tho Victor and the Conqueror probably Is nitric acid and turpentine, but the UAR may be trying to convert to nitric acid and hydrazine tothe thrust of the missiles. All these propellents are slorablc. However, the military value of these missiles with conventional warheads is small.

The UAR faces many difficult problems in its missile program. Work on the ground-supporL equipment apparently is still in an early stage. Tho UARest range in northern Egypt and has acquired some crude instrumentation that could be used as partange. Testing apparently Ls going on at the UAR lest area at Wadl Natrun, but we do not know whether flight as well as static tests are being conducted. The missile effort is totally dependent on outside assistance, and withdrawal of the West Germans or Inability to secure materials and components abroad would make it Impossible to Improve the missiles, or even lo carry out the program, in the foreseeable future Even under present conditions, the reluctance of many of the best qualified Western firms to supply components probably makes quality control difficult.

Nevertheless, the UAKissile program going, if it retains Its access tu outside help and components, it probably will in lime be able toetter missile, thoughignificantly improved onethe period of this estimate.

Probable Developments

In seeking to develop SSMs. Nasser has been in part motivatedesire to acquire prestige lor himself and the UAR. He views such weapons as supporting the Unit's claim to leadership among the Arabs and among the nonaligned countrieseemsore important consideration is nis desire toeapon which he believes may not only serve to deter the Israelis from any future attack, but also would enable the UAR to strike deep Inside Israel In the event of another conflict. It is possible that Nasser and the UAR's military leaders considerably overestimate the actualvalue uf such missiles. Also, they very Jikely set great store on the psychological effect ol such weapons on Israel.

We have no reliable information from any source on the number of Conquerors and Victors Ihe UAR intends to produce and deploy over the next five years. Indeed, we doubt that UAR leaders have come to any definite decision themselves in view of the many variable factors involved. The UAR hadissiles of each type byhese numbers probably rose tof each type bynictor was exhibited mountedobile launcher, constructedoviet truck chassis. Acradle, extending over the cab. raises the missileertical firing positionlatform at the rear of Ihe chassis. It appears that the Victor Is nearer to being operational than the Conqueror, and may first appear in greater numbers, though the UAR may also be able tomall number of Conquerors byowever, we have no evidence to date ol any deployment ol either missile, or even of troops being trained in their use.

We believe that thereumber of factors which will limit the .size of the UAR missile buildup. The cost of any sizable missilewouldeavy burden for the UAR.that the UAK isorce of sorM aiiu Conquerorsictors. We estimate that to deployorcc over the next four or five years would bring the total cost to somethingO million, and between one-half and three-fourths of this cost probably would be In hard currency. Such expenditures, on top of the largelor other parts of the defense budget and lor the economicprogram, would be an extremely heavy burden on the loreign exchange resourcesountry which is likely to continue to be in difficult economic straits for the foreseeable future.arge missile program wouldonsiderable expansion of production facilities and occupy the servicesisproportionate number of the UAR's scarce scientists and technicians. While we cannot make an estimate with any great degree of confidence, we believe that, all things considered, the UAR is not likely to deploy moreew hundred

of these missiles over the next five years, and the figure could well be substantially lower.


Even when the UAK has an operational SSM system, its military value is likely to be modest for some time. The UAR's missiles will be of little military value without nuclear warheads, and we see no prospect of the UAR's producing such warheads ln the foreseeable future. Even if the UAR were loissileound high explosive warheadEP of oneuch missiles, concentrated on one Israeli airfield, could be expected to damage onlyercent of theparked In the open and less than one percent of the aircraftby revetments. If the CEF were threeuch missiles could be expected to damage less than one percent of the aircraft, even if there were no revetments,

Although the UAR's missile program does not have much direct military significance, It hasonsiderable psychological effect on the Israelis, who are acutely aware Lhat their small countryompact and vulnerable target. Moreover, the Israelis see theseas weapons against which they will be unable toefense. They also fear thai possession of such weapons may encourage UAR leaders to take greater risks, perhaps even to the point ofurprise attack.

While the UAR missiles would have negligible value against Israeli military installations, they would clearlyelter chance of hitting larger targets such as population centers.tanding army ofhe Israelis depend on iheir ability to mobilisedditional soldiersour period. They contend that the UAR missiles, firedurprise attack, could seriously disrupt mobilization, and enable the UAR's conventional forces to overrun Israel.

The extent toAR missile attack with HE warheads might disrupt mobilization and break down the morale of the Israeli civilian population would depend on the size and Intensity of theeavy barragearticular area, if it could be sustained, probably would disrupt activities there,ew random missiles would not produce any significantissile assault would, of course, be accompaniedan carry as muchayloadould also bring forth Israeli retaliatory air strikes. In view of the inaccuracy and limited reliability of the missiles, the Inherent difficulties ofarge number of missiles.

[we believe it extremely

unlikely that tlie CAR would be able toissile attack which would do enough material damage to disrupt seriously an Israelieffort.*

attacks would have adverse effects on the moralecivilian population, especially if crowded areas of cities were hii.

Sif. "Tlie Arab-Israeliatedor details of Arab and Israeli military capabilities.

Tho use ol chemical warheads by the UAR would not change this picture significantly. The UARilitary chemical warfare (CW) establishment and has employed aerial bombs of highly concentrated tear gas in Yemen. It might attempt to fit its SSMs with CW warheads, usinji perhaps mustard or phosgene, although there ars formidableproblems In missile delivery of CW. Directed at population centers. CW warheads probably would have some terror effect but still probably would not disrupt mobilization.

While Israeli leaders probably du not fully believe the claims they have made regarding the progress of the UAR missile program, they very likely doeal fear of future UAR missile developments.they probably believe thai Israel must acquire SSMs, both to deter the UAR and lo reassure the Israeli people that the country's defenses are adequate. We believe that Israel decided by2 tothe developmentSM system. Israel has contractedrench firmolid propellant missilesange olayload ofounds,EP of about one-half ml'.e. Israel hopes this missile will be operationalsrael may also beissile Independently of its contract with France. In addition, the size of the Israeli nuclear energy program, what we know of its nature, and the amount of uranium concentrate already acquired all suggest that Israel at least intends to put itself in ato be able to produce nuclear weapons relatively quicklyecision to do so. Indeed, we believe that il the Israelis saw no other counterrowing UAR military threat, they would attempt toa nuclear weapon.*

The factors which liaveew outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in recent years still apply. Nevertheless, as the advanced weapons programs progress, tensions will probably rise on both sides. II either country came to feel itself in critical danger, it might go to extreme lengths to maintain its security. If Nasser could notounter to an Israeli nuclear threat, he probably would turn to the USSR to try to ensure his protection. While the Soviet Union might increase its military aid to the UAR. possibly even including SSMsange sufficient to reach Israel from Egypt, we do not believe the USSR would provide nuclear weapons. Israel, likewise, would grow more edgy, becoming increasingly activist in its dealing with the Arabs. In an atmosphere of this kind, there would always be the possibility that one or the other side might Initiate hostile action.

sec. "the advanced weapons proerams ofAR and.ore ex;cn*ivc discussion of me advanced weaponsot the two countries.



I.document wot ditseminoted by Ihe Central Intelligence Agency. or ihe information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jgrttrjfcfion or need to inow bath. Additional essential domination moy be ou-horliedollowing officials within their respective departments:

o' Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State

Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretory o


c Assistant Chief of Scoff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, fi

tho Department of the Army d. Assiilom Chief of Naval Operationsor the Deportment' c

' iht'Ngry- _

Assistant Chief of Stoff, Intelligence, USAF, for Ihe Department of tho A

' - e'A

'. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

of NSA, for the Not'ionol Security Agency

I. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Deportment o

DISTSt-BUTIONi Wh|le Mouse otional Secvrity Council Deportment of Stole Deportment of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Invettigotion

Original document.

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