Gray Broadoeating Policy
Approve! by Cccraitteo on Radio Broadcasting3
THE SOVIET bTIOK
In theoauring maximum impact end effectiveness of the total U3 broadcoatine effort directed to the USSR and to Soviet-dotainated areas ln Eastern Europe, the nothods end alas of both official and unofficial American radio stations broadcasting to the area are periodically reviewed in tbe light of current US policy objectives. In accordance with instructions of the Con-mitteo on Radio Broadcasting Policy, individual papers have been prepared for each of the target countries and oa each broadcasting operation concerned, outlining the role each should play in furthering both general and specific American objectives.
She following paper concerns only Gray broadcasts to Uio Soviet Union. It seeks to achieve maximum effectiveness by defining for the Grayonstructive role and positive tone while assuring close conformity of the activities and aims of the station with current policy objectives of the U3 with respect to the Soviet Union. Insofar as practicable, this role is separate and distinct from that of the official Voice of America.
II. PoUcy Considerations
Ihe fundamental alas of US foreign policy ore to maintain the security of the US aad the vitality of its fundamental values aad institutions, and to promote tho general welfare of its peoples.
The USeaceful world community of free and Independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long ao it does not throaton the freedom of others.
about the USSR
1. Sovietumber of significantln the Cocmnmist orbit since the death of Stalin, the threat to the US, and lo fact to the Prec World, fron the USSR remains basically undiminished.
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As fax as can bo determined Communist leaders retain the objective of undermining end ultimately destroying all rival power. Theyilitary capacity of truly formidable proportions whichrowing dally io scale and sophistication. The world Cequalst apparatus although no longer automatically responsiveingle locus of powerowerfulof anti-Westemlsn end subversion. It continues to enjoy the advantage inherentolicy which soeka to exploit ond magnify the world's IXls rather than to overcome them.
he Soviet Governmentncreasingly sorlouo Internal probleos: the failure of agriculture (not alone in the . USSR but throughout thohe rising discontent of the youth and intellectuals, end the increasingly-felt demands of Soviet citizens for status, security,igher standard of living. Moreover, the profound divisions within the Cccraunlst world which have shattered the image of Communism onuniversal system and the irresistible wave of the future have gravely disrupted both Communist organization and Communist Ideology.
However, nothing discernible in the present situation Justifies the Ba3umption that the Communist power structure is in Jeopardy in the near future or that problems within tho Conmiunist caap will compel CojBnunlBt leaders to modify their hostility toward the Vest or abandon any of their objectives. eriod of time the above named factors undoubtedly will produce significant chengeo In the Coorsunlst lobrlc, hut change probably will be erosive rather than explosive. Meanwhile Soviet power is and willard rocMV'-id the Communist threat to U3 and Western aocurlty, undiminished.
C. U5 Policy Toward the USSR
TOie US believes its security will be enhanced if in the long run the Soviet Union conducts itselfesponsible, end cooperative member of the society of nations and evolves in the direction of government responsive to the will of the Soviet people. The precise nature and composition ofovernmentatter for the determination of the Soviet people themselves. The US recognizes that many of the national minorities in the USSR aspirereater degree of autonomy then they now enjoy, but does not favor any course of action which would predetermine governments or otatos that may evolve in tho present territory of the USSR.
The US in pursuit of its long-range objectives weeks to counter end reduce the military threat of the Soviet Union without, however, provoking hostllitlos which could load to nuclear warfare which would endanger tho survival of both Western civilization and the Soviet system. There is no foreseeable prospect of significantly reducing Soviet military strength, which is the core of Ccmnuniat power, except by mutually acceptablewith the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation of such military action is not an acceptable course for the US. Although tho Sino-Soviet dispute has brought about increasing disunity in tho bloc,
the exclusion of Soviet power from Albania, and considerable confusion in toe programs and activities of Ccenrunlot parties and of International CceEsur-ist front organizations, there appears little likelihood thatbetween Moscow end Peiping will become so great as to resultelaxation of Soviet pressures on the WeBt.
Accordingly, US policies are designed to (a) affect the conduct and policies of tbe Soviet Union ln ways that further IE Interest (including safeguardedb) to fostsr tendencies that lead it to abandon expansionist policies; and (o) to encourage political, economic, and ideological independence within the Communist world.
:ursuing this general strategy, the US efforts are directed to:
Cccacuniat aggression snd preventing totalas compatible with US security.
In building the strength and cohesion of the
Sovlot conduct by means of political,Information and cultural programs and actions.
advantage of attitudes, conditions, andthe USSR ln order directly to footer changes ln thepolicies of the 3ovlot Government In ways that further USWorld security.
friction between Moscow and Peiping into dominate the world Cooiminist TOveneot.
or neutralizing the internationalin the Free World.
III. Radio Broadcasting
Policy considerations Affecting radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union
Radio broadcastingeading role among tho limited meansto the un for taking advantage of attitudes, conditions, andwithin the Soviet Union which might foster changes ln the character and policies of the Soviet Government. In view of exlatlng limitations on other effective media, radioeavy responsibility for advancing all U3 information objectives In the Soviet Union even though jwrring und other Soviet countcrmeasures greatly reduce its impact.
For maximum impact on the Soviet audience it is eueential that both the officially and unofficially sponsored American stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union should develop among alligh degree cf respect for tho stations as reliable, responsible, and trustworthy sources of news, coesnentary, and other information.
B. Target Groups In the USSR
It should bo fcoroo in mind that Soviet listeners liveotalitarian state in which possibilities for modifying regime policies throughfron below" or individual action are extremely limited. Although specific Party and government policies and practices are widely unpopular, in the absence on tho horizon of any alternative, the brood doss of the population apparently does not entertain serious thought* concerning its fundamental alteration. It hepes, however, for amelioration of present conditions through changes within the framework of the present system.
. In view cf the US objectives of liberalizing tho regime endevolutionary changes generally, the primary audience of US propaganda media is tho "politicolly-alert"hose who can exorcise the greatest influence in this direction. She "politically-alert" elements include high party and governmental (including military) officials, managerial and administrative personnel, skilled workers, writers, artists, scientists, teachers, aad probably most important of all, tne youth of tliohese categories embrace listeners of ell national origins. this audience also has the greater access to short wave sets. While the aforementioned groups ore the primary radio targets, tho larger audience includes all the diverse elements of the Soviet population. Word of mouth transmittal of "repeotable" items of broadcast extends still further the reaches of radio programs.
Soviet troops stationed outside the USSR, particularly in Eastern Europe and East Germany, constitute an especially valuable target in view of their eventual return toR, their closer contact with the non-Soviet world, and better listening opportunities. One of the objectives of US broadcasts beamed to this group, in view of their greater potential opportunity to escape, is, ln on indirect and discreet manner, to induce defection among top members of the group.
C Gray Bros.dc as ting to the USSR
Gray broadcasting is an unacknowledged instrument of the us Its sole reason for existence is to further U3 policy. Its aims are those of American foreign information policy ln general, which includes specific formulations of policy for both the official radio snd the Gray station.
D. Ibey;er,cvl Official Stations
Gray broadcasting, in furthering these aims, has distinctivewhich differentiate lt from acknowledged official broadcasting, such as VGA. "hi- stems from the fact that the US Government is not formally accountable for the content of gray broadcasts, though its actualmay be inferred.
A careful allocation of roles between official and Gray broadcasting permits each to concentrate on those aspects for which it Is best fitted so that taken together their operations cover tho principal alma of US broadcasting to the Soviet Union. umber of features are common to both types of broadcasting, but by mutual agreement, each carries responsibility for certain specific tasks, separate and distinct from the other.
E. Objectives of Gray Information Programs
Gray informationo lhe Soviet Onion should give primary attention to the following objectives:
Expose Communist alms and duplicity; counter distortions and omissions of Soviet propaganda.
Encourageotations of evolutionary development in the Soviet Union along lines consistent with OS security objectives and the legitimate interests end aspirations of the peoples of the Soviet union.
influential elements aithln the USSR thatalternatives to present Soviet policies which wouldboth with the security of the peoples of theand with world peace.
attitudes among all elements of thotho USSR, including the Soviet leadership, which could& moderation of aggressive features of Soviet foreignwhich might over the long run lead to ba3ic changes inor character of the Comunist regime.
tho viewpoint twoons all Soviet citizensthat the top priority task facing the USSR isof its domestic econocrlc ocd social problemspeoco is absolutely essential.
the extent possible undermine tho faith of theruling classes in their own Ideology by suchencouraging the introduction of elements of pluralism
in Soviet society and respect for universal ideals such as 'freedom under Justice."
the freo exchange of peoples ond ideas betweenUnion and non-Communist countries.
1*. Encourage defection, albeit indirectly, to the Free World
of Soviet nationals, particularly Soviet troops stationed in Eastern
Seek to Implant in all elements of Soviet society the idea tbat even within the Soviet governmental structure there are alternative policies which would better satisfy the real interests and natural aspirations of the Soviet people, at tho same time as these charges would lessen the dangers to world peace.
Expose Communist aline and duplicity; counter distortions emissions of Soviet propaganda.
Stimulate popular pressures for giving top priority to the solution of the USSR's domestic economic and social probleme for which peace is absolutely essential. This would impede on activist, advcnturistlc foreign policy.
While tbc above objectives areegree shared with VDA, the Cray station bears primary res ponsibillty for covering these objectives frea the stsndpoint of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, a* Cray station will share with VOAfor broadcasting in tha national minority languages.
P. Structure of Pray Broadcasting Station
The organizational structure (operating base) aad imageface) of the Cray broadcasting station should be as follows:
1. Organizational Structure
Tho station should be organizedoint endeavor of Americans and emigres, but with policy and operational control and direction resting in American hands. As en instrument for furthering imaroounced policy, the Cray station will bo governed strictly by policy guidance furnished through appropriate channels. In the absence of specific policy guldrv-icoew or unexpected situation, the station will adept neasureo consistent with the overall objectives of the US ond of this statement of Cray Broadcasting Policy Toward the Soviot Union.
The station will maintain liaison with emigre groups aad organizations, but shall not be responsible to them In acy way either for station policy or program content. Emigres working with the station should, however, be encouraged to exercise initiative and Imagination ln exploring new approaches within the framework of established policy.
The Gray station should assiduously cultivate an Imago of itself ss the volco of free erstwhile Soviet citi?en3 spooking to follow countrymen vlio are still under Communist While there may be some question aa to whether or not Soviet citizensarge measure of kinship end sytopatliy toward those who have left tho USSR end that there isond between then that enables Soviet emigres to speak for their countrymen, nonetheless, there ore approximately one million Soviet nationals who have chosen the West9 and en equal number exiled* These people are dispersed throughout the Free Itorld. Their sheer numbers should serverawing force lor th?ir compatriots in the USSR, and the emigre face ia the roost desirable aval)able inage tbe Gray station can asexzse. It should, however, be stressed that it is theof the emigres in the Free Vc-rld and their post acquaintance with Sovieto that are the Gray station's principal assets. It is from thosenot from ary presiced authority ofSoviot emigreo or groups ofthe Gray station should be able to draw and to express thoughts and ideas that will stimulate Soviet li&teners to think critically of the Comcnailst system. Tho station should represent everything in the emigrewhich illustrates the advantages and superiorityree society.
Despite being the spokesmen for the national exile, the radio station must maintain its indepcn3cnce_of_this_exile community and above all'refrain freci identifying itself with emigre polYilcnl parties or organizations; it should not rep recent any emigre political grcup or groupn nor serveehicle for tho platform of such groups. It must seek to serveindow between the Soviet peoples and the Vest through the medium of the emigres in tbe West. To achieve this image the station must achieve stature and respect on its own nsrit, yet drawing fully upon the emigration and western institutionsorm which is sympathetic to the peoples of the USSR and uridors tending of their need to work things cut in their own way and in their own form. The station should not try to represent the emigrationtrong political force. It would place primary stress on trying to identify the emigres speaking over the station with the people they left behind.
The emigre image of the station is potentially useful in the event of open hostilities between the USSR and tho West, or other unforeseen major change within the Soviot Union. Under sucha Gray station would be able to exploit even more than at present an area of Soviet vulnerabilities of demonstrable valueanner which lo denied to officialtations. The emigre image Isaluable holding instrument.
IV. Tho Bole for Gray Radio Broadcasting to the IBS?,
She general nature and content of broadcasts to the USSR will be adapted to tho special characteristics of the Gray radio asoice of the Soviet emigre community interested in the welfare of fellow-Sountrymn in the USSR,n instrument, unattributable to the US Government for furthering US policy.
A. US Policy Control Over the Gray Radio
will adhere to the general lines of USmaintaining objectivity end flexibility appropriate toRadio's identity. With respect to internal andof tlie US which merit or demand treatment tn broadcasts
to the Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will report objectivelylegitimate points of view including those not necessarily in accord with the current public position of the US Government.
As an instrument for furthering unannounced US policy, froo time to time special guidance will be furnished tho Gray Radio through appropriate channels. Such guidance usually will relate to matters or treatment which can be undertaken by tho Gray Radio as an unattributable radio, but which would be inappropriate for an official organ or voice of tbe US Government, and may appear-to conflict with announced US policy.
She Gray Radio will strive for broad and balancedand will avoid the appearance of on American propaganda instrument. In ite coverage of world news and developmentsan important place will be given to American policy ond events in the United States in view of the position of the US as the leading Weotern power and tho great Interest of Soviet audiences in facts on America and American life. However, "it will be kept in mind that the primary responsibility for informing the Soviet audience about life and developments in the U3 lies on the official radio.
fc. Because the US Government and its official medio musta position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, the Gray Radiopecial responsibility with respect to Soviet domestic affairs, the Radio will further the unannounced objectives of the US by discussing with due regard for the sensitivities of its audience the myriad ways ln which the Conmunist dictatorship acts against the legitimate interests and aspirations of tho Soviet people, deprives then of any meaningful role in the making end control of policy, and interferes grossly in their private lives. At the same time, the Radio Indirectly will suggest alternatives to Communist totalitarianism through discussions of the structure and operation of democratic political, economic, and social institutions in free societies.
The Radio will attempt to convince Ita listeners that the US, and the West in general, haa only peaceful intentions toward the Soviet Union, but that world peace cannot be assured until the deep oopirations for peace of the Soviot people can find channels for influencing tho policy of their government. Tho Radio will make clear that it is the aggressive and subversive policies of the Cornunlst regime and its manipulation of the economic and human resources at its disposal, both within the USSR and abroad, which constitute the real menace to the peace of the world. In itsof alternative political systems the Radio vill in no way sugftcst that the West seeks to impose any particular form ofgovernment on the Soviet people, rather that the West deslros only- that the Soviot peopleoTCrnment of their own freeovernment truly representative of the Soviet people.
he Gray Radio will combat Soviet propaganda linos concerning the "decline" of Won torn society, and Communism as the "wave of they calm and seemingly objective reporting of allattesting to the growing unity and internal strength of the democratic West and Its capabilities of defense against possible aggression, the Radio will emphasize the growing awarenessthe world that genuine social and human progress is inseparable from democratically guaranteed civil and individual freedoms.
In the event of emergency ccndltions in tbe Soviet Unionviolent demonstrations, armed uprisings, revolution, or warhe Gray Radio will confine itself to straight factual reporting until It receives directions through appropriate channels.
B. In the implementation of immediate goals of US policy toward the. Soviet Union, the Gray Radio will be guided by tbe following basic principles:
The Radio musteputation for scrupulous accuracy and complete reliability. Only in this way will the Soviet peoples turn to the Grey Radio for guidance in tho eventomestic or International crisis.
In order to have maximum impact on the Soviet audience, the Radio musteasoned, friendly tone and ensure that Its programs are consonant with the contemporary language and psychology of the Soviet peoples.
3- The Gray Radio recognires that the eventual replacement of Communist totalitarianism in the Soviet Union by some form of representative government will stem free, the dynamics of Sovlot society itself rather than from outside pressures. The nature and pace of these fundamental changes will depend upon tho peoples of
the Soviot Union themselves. The Radio's role is thatatalyst, enlarging the numbers of Soviet citizens who aee the world situation and internal USSR developmentsore realistic light byfacts and views suppressed or distorted by official media, stimulating skepticism about the prevailing system, and suggesting alternative methods and institutions.
h. The Gray Radio will rely on indirection to stimulatethought among its listeners and suggestion of points of view and feasible lines of approachiven problem rather than attempt directly or indirectly to urge any Hoc of action or promote any particular political creed.
In recognition that liberalizing currents in other Communist countries canignificant contribution to similarin the Soviet Union, the Radio will attempt to arouse andympathetic understanding among ito listeners of what these peoples are trying to achieve. Such an understanding may be translatedubtle restraint on Moscow's ability to interfere uith positive developments in Eastern Europe as well as intofor Biollor policy modifications in the USSR.
Hews end explanatory comment on the news, objectively written and veil backgrounded, will constitute the main element of the Radio's broadcasts. The Radio will be guided In ito selection of news by considerations of objective Importance, propaganda effectiveness in addreusing the specific audience, end of omissions and distortions of Soviet media. Recognizing tho dearth of factual informationto Soviet citizens on the ncn-ccenunlst world, the Oray Radio will strive constantly to broaden its coverage of world events and of significant political, econouic, social, and culturalin free societies. The Radio will also inform its Soviet listeners of important developments within countries underule, especially those glossed over, ignored, or distorted inmedia.
In broadcasts to the various nationalities concerningof national minorities of the Soviet Union, the Radioguided by tho principle of rjon-predeterainatlon which holdsis the right of the peoples themselvesty*rsdno theof the USSR when they are free to do so.
8, As the voice of free repreoentativeo of the peoples of the USSR dedicated to tho task of helping the Soviot peoples to find their own path to eventual freedom, the Gray Radio must dissociate itself from any and all emigre groups and organizations and their platforms. The Radio will, however, wheneport objectively on the activities of individual emigres
and emigre groups to point up personal rights and opportunities which exist In the Free World. Moreover, the Radio willits characteron-partisan serri.ee organ for tho Soviet peoples by imparting to its Sovieteasure of the diversity of political, economic, social, and Intellectual life of the non-Ccorjnist world.
C. For the consistent implementation of the foregoing basic principles, the Gray Radio will be guided in its daily operations by the following high-priority considerations and practices.
1. General Approach and Tecluilques
view of the complex emotional Involvement ofof the Soviet Union In events and developmentsdecades of Communist rule, and of the patrioticof even those Soviet citizens dissatisfied withanother aspect of Communist rule, it is Imperative thatRadio avoid generalized or vituperative attacksleaders and Communist domestic and Internationalof individual leaders and of the Soviet regimefocused on specific practices and. policies which arethe interests of tbe Soviet people, which are prejudicial
to the longings of the Soviet people for peace, which contravene professed Coomunist principles and goals or the generally accepted precepts of humanity. The Radio will acknowledge the real (as distinct from regime claims of) economic, scientific, social, and cultural progress of the USSR at the same time as it points out cogently and objectively thend heavy human costs of Soviet progress compared with that of other areas of the world.
Radio will attempt to convince its listeners thatcause of Soviot failures to satisfy the people'shuman needs Is the totalitarian nature of the Sovietits basis, the ell-pervasive power-monopoly Partyits control through end in the interests of aof top Party officials. Similar'y, the Radio willincrease ita listeners' awareness of tho disruptivenature of International Communism and offor keeping world tensionsighat tho some time avoiding stimulating the Soviet' pride ln their leadership andystem whichcertain gains from its agression and subversion.
The Radio will depend upon the cumulative effect of calm, factual, objective, analyses on the thinking of the Soviet listener rather than engaging In unceasing polemics with the Soviet regime.
encourage the audience to think in terms ofto the Soviet system the Gray Radio shouldanalyze, explain, and interpret the guidingond actual functioning of important democraticin the non-Communisthoand popular ownership and control of Westernand social institutions. However, there should bothat any particular system of government orexisting or proposed, is being urged onnor any attempt made to conceal the existenceproblems in noo-Cconiuriist societies. Inits individuality and character, the Radio may comment
on the greater or lesser relevance of selected Westernand institutions for the Soviet peoples.
Radio should pay particular attention toand programatlc divergencies withinsing to the maximum, degree possible originalto keep the Soviet listeners fully informed onof attempts by various Communist regimes to applyto contemporary conditions. Knowledge that otherregimes permit their peoples greater freedoms and show
a greater responsiveness to popular desires is likoly toimpact on the Soviet
Manifestations of Intra-blcc rivalry and friction,olly those which ore not known to the Soviot audience, are of primary concern to the Gray Radio. Polemics among Communist parties and their leaders in and outside of the bloc offer an abundance of material and themes for the Gray Radio; tho original source materials are often so condemnatory of Communist loaders and so compromising to world Communism that no gloss isor desirable.
Gray Radio must always approach worldan enlightened Soviet emigre point of view endor contributing to an impression that theprimarily the interests of the United StatesWest in general.
about defectors and emigres, besidesdefection, support the general alms of theby illuminating the inequities of the Sovietthe advantagesemocratic society. In orderreceptivity of their message by the Sovietconflicts inherent in the decision to defect
'should be admitted, as well as the emotional and material difficulties of settlingew life. To further tho emigre image of tbe Radio and to heighten listener Interest, the activities and achievements of prominent emigre figures will be featured.
n ii if j
g. The Radio will also transmit to Its listeners views of prominent Western figures through special Interviews and other techniques and may include in Its programs appropriate messages from Western groups andtudents, writers, artists, scientists, laboro their Soviet counterparts.
Themes and Targets
a. Qray Radio programs should, where appropriate, be developed around and exploit the following themes, among others I
(1) "Wave of the Future." Tbe trend of history is overwhelmingly away frea totalitarianism and toward open societies whose governments are based on genuine popular sovereignty.
Ideological Bankruptcy of Cccanunism. etoacow's polemics with Peiping and the vituperation exchanged between rtoecow and Tirana have epeeded up theof many Communist adherents and sympathizers. The unquestioning belief and loyalty even of long-time Party members has been shaken.
(3) Peaceful Western Foreign Policy. The sole aim of US foreign policy, and that Of the West in general,lnple ono: peaceful world ccetsunity in which too people of independent states are free to choose their own social and political system and mold their own futures so long as they do not threaten the freedom of others.
(k) Destructive Soviet Foreign Policy. Soviet hostility and aggressiveness toward other nations increases the danger of war, disturbs friendly relations between the Sovlot and other peoples, and damages the real national interests of the peoples of the USSR.
(5) "Socialist" System. Even many Communists who have remained within the fold have come to realize that Soviet "socialism" is the exploitation of men economically, politically, socially, and culturally for the benefit of the Communist state. Use of the tens "socialist" to characterize the Soviet systemiction cynically cultivated by Moscow to mislead their own people as well as the outside world.
b. The following observations on certain vulnerabilities la Soviet society are illustrative of ways in which the Gray Radio should moke its programs peculiarly meaningful for the Soviet audience.
(1) The materiel conditions under which the peoples of the Soviet Union live after more than fc5 years of Com-ounist ruleost inportont theme for the Grey Radio. First ofissatisfaction with the low standard of living, and knowledge of the gap between the way of life of high Party functionnalrieo and tlie mass of the people, probablyreater number of people in all strata of Soviet society than any other Grievance. Second, In Une with Communism's materialist foundations, updated in the current Party program, regime spokesmen oil eg* that only "Communist" society (as defined and constructedmail elite) can satisfy the material and cultural needs and desires of the laboring classes.
To tbe extent that the Soviet regime Is compelled to allocate resources to provide rore food, housing, and social services for Soviet citizens, to that extont the regime's maneuverability domestically and. internationally will be. in pressing forward with 'the arms race and with spectacular space projects, Inheavy. Industry of great war potential, and ineconomic aad military aid to bloc and non-bloc countries This Is all the more true sinco limited materialonly whets the appetiteore abundant life. Moreover,essening preoccupation vith obtaining tho basic necessities the Soviet citizens's attention will turn to seeking relaxation of controls oc other areas of life in Soviet society.
The Gray Radio's approach should be subtle and varied. Merely to draw attention to the shortcomings of Soviet economic life or to make simple direct comparisons with standards of living In the West often onlyefensive reaction on tho part of the listeners. The Radio should tell listoners of the effects cf the regime's domestic and foreign policies on tho standard of living of the peoples of the USSR and of tbe part played by inefficient organization, poor administration, andParty control in holding back programs. Regime concessions to the needs of the people should not be ridiculed but used to point up the need for still further concessions. Above all, programs should emphasize the economic feasibility of greatly Improving livingin the Soviet Unionew order of priorities Is adopted.
Programs on tho standard-of-living theme should be oriented also to impress workers la agriculture as veil as ln industry with their importance to Soviet society aad with their potential ability to nako the regimeto their needs and aspirations. For thisfullest publicity should be given to concessions other Communist regimes have given to workers ande.g. ln tho raising of factory wages, improvement of working conditions, and freedom to cultivate private farm plots. Programs emphasizing the increasingof the Soviet regime on the labor efficiency and goodwill of Individual workers in Industry ond agriculture will contribute to this basic broadcasting aim.
In order to encourage and deepen efforts to bringetter and freer life within the Soviet framework, the Gray Radio should systematically transmit evidence from within Soviet society which indicates increasing popular and more articulate--concern for tho material well being of tbe Soviet people and for spiritual and human values neglected or distorted by the regime.
(k) The Qruy Radio will give priority attention to those elements in Sovietparty andofficials, administrators, managers, technicalofficer corps, cultural intelligentsia, youth and students--who do not now occupy command positions in Soviet society, but whoreat potential forthe future course of Soviet development. While many individuals In these groups have benefited from the Soviet system, nevertheless they too, both in theirand private lives, have. the Inflexible rule of the upper Party hierarchy* exclusion from real participation in decision making. Party enforced ideological conformity and controls onspeech, foreign travel. They may also resent the pervading materialism and cynicism of the ruling bureaucracy and corruption in high places. Broadcasts should attempt indirectly to reinforce tho view that the upper Party echelons have, divorced themselves from the interests of tho people..
(5) The rivalry between the USSR and Communist China for undisputed strategic and doctrinal authority over the world Communist movement core clearly than any other development has pointed up the chasm between Communist Ideology and practice, the rigidity and inhumanity of Communist leadership, and the irrelevance of much "Marxism Leninism" to contemporary conditions. TO party members and sympathizers throughout the world lt is evident that
tho re is noingle center of vorld Ccammisaingle Communistn place of themonolithic "socialist camp" there has developed de facto two rival centers. Their approaches to the capitalist world are radically different aa are their blueprints for harnessing Communist human, Ideological, and material resources for the march towardoreover, each demands unquestioning submission to its authority and has ridiculed and abused the other.
The systematic dissemination of accounts of Sino-Soviet differences, of details of the Sino-Albanian dispute, of heterodox views and practices in Bloc countries, ln Yugoslavia, in tbe world communist movement ln general, as well as of the statements of disillusioned ex-Conaunists, is of special importance. Criticism and actual or potential devlatioolst views from Communist sources will be highly persuasive because they are couched in the habitualand frames of reference of the target audience-communication is direct, the approach isoderating developments in countries under Communist rule will provide valuable food for thought for the politically alert targets, tho dlsoatisfied members of which, out of conviction or considerations of practical expediency, tend to think In terms of effecting positive changesasic Communist system. (The Gray Radio' will not advocate the theory of Marxism as such orarxist approach.) At the some time, tho present incliaatlc of Soviet Intellectuals to reexamine Soviet realityoa both of their national traditions as well as of basictheory should be encouraged by broadcastof the best of traditional Russian and other national democratic thought.
In addition progressiva and leftist westernsome of whoaollowing in the USSR, should be used where possible, to stress the basic ree-ias-ments of creative freedom, ln indirect support of Soviet intellectuals who are striving to broaden their areas for expression and to condemn enforced distortion ofto serve political motives.
(6) Although direct appeals by the Gray Radio to the strictly Party professional are likely to be unproductive, the Radio may contribute to tbe creation of an atmosphere of reduced confidence among Pnrty members lo the actives and ability of the top Tarty leadership in forwarding basic Party aims, on atmosphere which will, in its turn, facilitate the general ferment in Soviet society on! make the Party more vulnerable to pressures for change. on dissension and on divergencies from Soviet practice
within foreign Comnunist movements may servo as useful material for this purpose. The same might bo true of thoughtful analyses of the Party's serious alienation of those strata of Soviet society on which theand strengthening of Soviot state power and prestige depend.
that the Soviet state embracesand that desire for national as wellself-expression is an important ingredientferment in Soviet society, the Gray Radio'sto the national minorities should fosterheup regime movesomplete
i^laT%p& of all peoples of the USSR Into one "Soviet people" without, however, arousing inter-nationalof advocating separatism. It should instead emphasize the necessity ofrulysociety in place of the existing Communistregime as the essential precondition for the realization of national and individual aspirations of ell the peoples of the USSR.
Soviet military personnel stationedand Eastern Europe are basically interested" in
the same typo of material as their relatives and fellow- ountrymen at home, the Radio should take into account their special situation by noting the legitimate national aspirations of the peoples of these areaa and their specific grievances against Moscow domination. Broadcasts should highlight policy and institutional differences which contribute to the better living conditions and freer life in these countries. The Radio should stress complaints about regime policies common to all peoples under Soviet domination.
Gray Radio will make no appeals tocivilian personnel to defect. Throughemigres and defectors, it will emphasize theand the fund of opportunities inopen to those who have defected.
V. Pray Radio Broadcasts Will Avoid:
of any material harmful to the interests of the hostwhich might embarrass the radio in the conduct of itsthe host governments.
vituperative or blatantly propagandlsticwill be most effective when constructed and delivered in areasoned manner*
C- Use of any ma to rial which would cause listeners to regard it as the voice'of any government or of any emigre political grouping or faction.
departure from the principle of non-predetermination ofstate structure of the USSR.
which would offend the listeners' self-esteem or
P. Direct encouragement of any action which could expose tho listener to regime reprisal.
which could legitimately be construed as deliberaterevolutionary action.
advice or the promise of outside aid in the ev-nt ofor armed uprisings.
condescending tone or material presented inay as toobvious assumption of the political naivete of the listener.
J. Use of political, ethical or philosophical 6enerallti.es, which ore likely toommunist-perverted meaning for the Soviet audience, without making clear the practicalestations of these concepts.
K. Sensationalism; frivolous or vulgar satire or humor; flamboyant language.Original document.