fil'l'KCVEi; fcCf HELEASE DATE: 2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Discussions with President Joha.cn ax th* Johnson Ranch on Friday,2Tth
1 arrived at th* ranch by Jet Star from Seattle, arriving at midnight on Thursday,h. tayedu*at rooir at President Johnson's residence. President Johnsonte breakfast alon* the following morning and then withalingerong walk. Following tha discussion two memoranda were prepared by tna for tha President's subs*qu*nt uss. Memorandum markeda* to be used by him in discussing our masting later In tba day when he metarge number of the proas. Memorandumaa for discussion with Secretary Rusk and othora aad forrelsas* to tha proas.
At breakfast the President Immediately brought up hia daalr* to "chango th* imag* of th* DO"loak and dagger red* to th* role of an advisor to tho President on world situation; derived from intelligence sour essa of importance to tha President in reaching policy decisions. For this raaeon ha intended to call upon maroat many activities which would b* different fromof tha past. Aa an *xample, he wished ma to return to California to meat with President Elsenhower toim certain aspect* of the world situation and also tha particular actions which President Johnson had taken in the Interest of government economy.
I responded that this was vary much in line with myaa will Log to do anything that hahen produced the Truman article and th* Starnaa article and explained to himtatement of thia type by President Truman would do groat damage, that it would bey many columnists who enjoyad critic-Uln: OA,
that th* Truman article and later editorial* *uch a* th* Sterne*would undoubtedly be Introduced intoord by *uch critic* of OA aa Senator Eugene McCarthy and would ben aa attempt to bring about legislationoint committee cm intelligence (Watchdog Committee). The Praaldant aald that he had read tha Truman article, that ha thou Jit Itistake and that ha would do ail that he could to arrest any such impT**alon* concerning CIA's activities I
4. Tha specific Items which we discussed are covered In attached memorandum
NOTE: The Ink changes ware made by DCIlean draft prepared for th* Presidenl. The pencil changes ewe mad* by Secretary Rusk, who read the memorandum immediately prior to my departure from Johnson City.
Reference itemthe Pr**ldent expreesed concern over th* *af ety of Americans ln Cyprus.ndicated that we felt that the British military which totalled0einforcements being moved In at th* presant timey of Americana and that theappeared to be reasonably la hand, although the future waa by no mean* ctear.
Th* President askedetailed briefing on the Yemen and how the situation *volv*d. xplained the background of the eMabli.hment of the Yemen Republic under Sailal and our recognition of that Republic at the urging of Naaaar.ndicated that the British had not recognised the Yemen Republic and were critical of us for doing so.old the Praaldant that the Yemenong period of time hundreds ofad been governedhief chosen
on an understanding among tribal leader* and ahelke, the moat recent being Badr. This government was overthrown by revolution and the new government was Immediately supported by Nasser. However, when Nasaer moved In troop* In substantial numbers, military officer* who overthrew the Iman became discouraged. reat many of them defected and returned to their old tribalther, became neutral.esult. Naisero sand In Increaalng numbers of troop* and hla force* now. Thi.bout one-third of his total armed force*. Th* coat* to Nasser of th* Yemeni
operation ar* vary high. Thay ar* estimated atillion doUara. Th* strantion now waa difficult bacaua* th* only militaryustaining tha Yemen Republicwar*nd th* Egyptian* war* really running tha country with th* Yemen political authorities actingubaarviant position and with Uttl* authority. esult, dissension was growing among th* Yemen Government officials who resented th* control aad authorityy th* UAR preaenOC
7. haa said that Ambassador Bunker hadather effectiv* negotiation Last summer undar which Faisal would cease supplying arms ta th* royalists, who hadto th* north logo th* hills, providing th* UAR withdrew tie treopa. ad agreed ta withdrawroopsj however, to data ha bad withdrawn onlyo. Th* initial withdrawals ware to hav* taken place prior to November 4th, al which lima th* authority of th* United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOU) would comaalt. After soma considerable negotiations tha UNYOM was extended until January 4th. Tha problem now waa wbathar Faisal andould agra* to further extension. If thay did not It was highly probabl* that Faisal would again start to supply arms to tha royalists, and that Naeaar would ascalata military actlvitiaa against tha royalists and Into Saudi Arabia.ointed out that thia waa any critical matter, not because of tba Importance ef Yemen,ausa of ourrelatbnshlp with tha Saudi Arabian Cavarnmsat aad th* Importance of Saudi oil reserve* to our national interest. Th* President asksd what should b* don*aidary effort should ba mada to extend the January 4th dat* In th*hat with th* pas saga of tlm* thatm*nt to UAR occupation would Increaseoint wh*r* th* UAR wauld be forced to withdraw Increasing numbars of troop* and tha threat to Falaal would thus ba relieved.
ft. p*ct t* tha situation In Southtated thwr* waa nothing to add to tho report that McNamaraave whan weeek ago. el; that Pr*sld*nt Ma cape a, el's offer to us*dn th* Cambodian dispute was constructive aad we should try to ttaeourag* Macapa^al to lafluanca not only Sihanouk, hat also Sukarno and otherIn th* Far East. xpressed corn*Id*nee In Macapagal aadhat w*lose under standing and ralalloaahlp with him.
We discussedha economic situation ta tha Soviet Union. Communist China and tha satellites. Tha Praaldantrisling for tho Congressional Committee Chairmen, details of which will be dtecuseed Later In this memorandum. The President asked if Khrushchev had taken any action or said anything of Importance recentlyald no,elt that Khrushchev waa pretty well consumed with his internal problems and the Slno-Soviet relationship and that he had been remarkably quiet with respect to the West.id point out however that Castro had mads some state mealsresident Johnson that were not unlike tboee which he had made frontrntf to time about President Kennedy.
1 reviewed briefly the meet recent summary (the CIA-MA assessment ofecember) of the situation In Cuba, advising the President that there had been no additions to tha Soviet forces hut no appreciable withdrawal. There hadubstantial turnover In recent months and the probability wasaw hundredand not moreew hundredSoviets had departed. This wae ebout the extent of tbe net reduction. aid that It appeared that tha Soviet activities were entirelyraining nature, that the Cuban SAM trainees had been deployed at SAM sites end that thereossibility that autonomous Cuban control of the SAM sltea would present aaary dMflcuU situation la tbe Immediate future. Tbe President then asked what could be don* If tho Cubans decided to aee the SAM* against'*. tated that we could not go without continuing aerial surveillance. We had two choice*: either use our, "nowpposed because of Us Importance (or otherr tentatively to actually "take out" the SAM altea. The President remarked that this would then mean waresponded that certainly the destruction of the SAM sltea would mean war, that the degree of escalation could not be determined la advance. tated that this was the moat omlooua situation that confronted us In Cuba in the Immediate future. The President made no comment.
10. The President then nakedeturn to California, arrange to eoe President Elsenhower and brief him In detail on world conditions aad also on th* action* taken by President Johnson to pa-emote economy In government, to reduce government employment, and to tako each
act ton* as ere possible to reduce5 budget, Itbvious that th* President leal* th* need ofRepublican support lo hla tax togtelatloa and wishes tho RapubUcaa atdo of thao know that action* ho ha* taken will reduce5 Budget substantially below the Kennedy level. However, be doe* not hope for anything that wouldalanced budget. Heorecasted Incomeillion dollar* from taxes and other receipt* under the now tax legislation. He explained that the Federal budget would be In the order23 billion. Ho started with theudgetillion. To thi* must be added
casta which ware uncontrollable. lllone added to finance program* which had become law to prior le^ieiatlva action. This IncludedQuestional funds, welfareublic works, etc. Mono of these nejBM be removed, and therefore, th* tookL additions were thusillion. Mereevei. additions requested by each and ovary department had to be considered. , ba had succeeded In reducing move than one billion Defease appropriations oreviously requested and approved by President Kennedy. ecent Cabinet meeting had cut off at0 million front various departments. In addition, ho had leaned atern ordere concerning reduction* In personcisl and ether economy measure*. What ha wanted me to do was to get nil of hi* order* and meaaagaa, go over them in detail with President Elsenhower, aad get Deenhowar'* reactions.g read to.
ACTION: Th* White Houeeo deliver to General Carter copies of the President'* orders. If they de not do eo, Itery Important toopyrinflun dictated by Elsenhower for Johnson on Sunday.h. If thi* do cementot Included In the papers delivered to u* by tbe White Houee, then we should got In touch with Mr. Moyors or Mr. Volenti aad arrange for the President to release this specific document. Inould like as much In the way of definitive figure* aa General Carter can get from the Director of tho Bureau of the Budget.ust rave are eotra specific actions to ahow Elsenhower juat what ls beingm sure that hel that hed If he hoar* only atatatnant* of genoralltlae.
11. Now turning toold the Praaldant that we weretudy in depth of the Soviet and Chinese Communist
economise andslt tbat tha Hand* of State aad two orofficial* la Britain, Germany. Franca aad Italy, aadand parhapa oaa or two othar countries, should batha reason* explained in tha memorandum,
idant agraed aad euggeated that ha might make such an announce-merat. rged that this not ho dona until after ba hadhorough
fa SacraUry Ru*k(
J Tho Pre si dent agreed
discuss this with Ruak upon his arrival at tha ranch anh. He did not state definitely whether ho would announce tho plan today or net. mphasised tha vary great Importance ef having tho fragile nature of tha Soviet economy thoroughly understood by Sukarno and thia might boat bao him through Macapagal. Tha Pr*eldenito dfacuaa with Husk.
Wa should contlau* work on briefing aadon to graphics aat probably
t way that information of thia kind can ba presented oonvlnclngly and briefly to foreign Heads of State.
President than aald he thought ha should callhaa da of all committees of tha Senat* aad House and thatminuts brtdflng on So vial military capabilities,tha extent necessary aadhould followrleflo:Soviet aad CM Com economies. Hohould than baRusk commonttng on world conditions and McNamaraStataa military posture. Tho President would also maketo sum up. Work should b* started on tha briefing Th* President desired tbat tha briefing run ISI do not think he would object seriouslyminuta briefing.
auggaatton by Sacratajy-Ruak.ad aem*aa did, lo oa.^
discuaa th* subject with Rusk which be agreed to do and than woaalk prior to taking any action.ould like th*cons of this considered by th* staff for review with ma upon '
15. Itamaf memorandumequire no further expansion. With reapoct tohe President deaired to have the antlre Business Council for luncheon. elt It would bo more effective tomail group, but be felt It would bo impossible to discriminate betweenof the Council and therefore Intends to ask all of them. He does not feel that business was actually behind Kennedy's fiscal program or Ma tax reduction and reform program, even though some groups of businessmen supported tho Utter. He ls genuinely interested In seeking the advice and counsel of businessmen and does not wish them to be under the impression that he Is "using tham.
Thereumber of itemsad Intended to discuss with the President, but time ran out. They wore:
L The general scop* of activity of CIA, most particularly In tho areas of DDP. m satisfied, after dlecuselng the Truman article with th* President, that he Is In complete accord with our covert operations. Including political action and paramilitary activities. However, ho wishes to emphasise tho correlating, estimating and reporting functionsa) In order to minimize the "clonk snd dagger" aspects of OA and
ntended to suggest to the President that CIA be represented ln his inter-departmental organ! rati em to examine foreign aid. or alternatively that wo have an adviser or consultant alt with the committee.ould like th* staff to give soma consideration to thla
)* m* their views upon my return.
J However, th*r* Is some qoeatlon as to whetherbecome Involved, either by direct participation or aa conaultante In thla field.
J. The political action In Chile was not dlscusssd. ould like more Information upon my return on Itemnd 4b. c
id review briefly tbe Item* which could be covered at an NSC moating. There was ae agreement to call an NSCear the specific purpose of reviewing theattmates on Communist China economy andorces and the Sino-Sovietelieve thla wouldful and should be arranged at an early dais.
6. id not bring up tho queatloa of the reorganisation af USB because It bas not been cleared by the Joint Chief*. ater telephone conversation with Ceneralaked that he advlae Gilpatrtc to postpone th* affective date of the reorganisationavehance to discuss the subject with th* JCS.
t told tha Praaldant that we bndjnatucces.ful
KM l . .-
CORONA ahot and had recovered tha capanle. It waa a] and we wouldonsiderable amount of useful photography.
probably cowing ns muchand
Chi Com territory.
would have frequent flight. In thaeviewed brieflythe photography which waa aant to me. polntia outitems
. of vary uasmi Utuiusencer-1
galnwq mrougn antoUite pSoWaohv.id not go into detail, concerning
|becaue* of the shortness of time. Thla
JaauarygMUC-d daore extenalve brleang inOriginal document.