KSMOKAEIXJM PORi Mr. Edward P. Noziglla
Office of West African Affairs (AFV) Department of State2
Nigeria National Policy Paper
Tbe attached comments are submitted in connection with3 draft of the Nigeria Rational Policy Paper. Theyoordinated view of tho covert,, andomponents of CIA.
Copy to: Mr. W. R. Duggan
Policy Planning Council Department of State1
ConmentS on the Nigeria National Policy Paper
CIA consents on3 draft of the Nigeria Rational Policy Paper are cast both In general and specific terms. General comment0 have been prepared to take account of seme aspects of tbe overall situation In Nigeria) and on certain aspects of tho political situation on vhlch ye have important substantivehe anount of supportovern-
ment of national union. Mors specific comments have been prepared on Dome of the proposed courses of action* end on certain questions where thereifference of Interpretation. Finally* we haveumber of minor errors of fact* and have cuncented on the organization of the paper.
A. Ve would agree with the Judgment)risis in Nigeria's federal system is not imminent* but vequestion whether there Is "widespread support for aof national union." Although several leading Nigerianhave voiced their concern over the need to eliminate party rivalry at the federal level, the amount of support for a
clearly defined government of national union* which would be acceptable to all tbe major political parties* la not widespread. Indeed* the events In the Western Region* problems arising from the census* and other events Indicate that regional considerations remain extremely powerful. These considerations are also relevant to certain statements made on Pagesnd to PolicyHo.age
In this connection* we are troubled by the sentenceeginning* "We must face the It is difficult toituation in which the central (federal) government employsauthoritarian measures to carry out its economicwhile* at the same time* it permits the free flow of party rivalry at the regional level. Taken together with the concept of
with the rough and tumble of Nigerian politics prevailing at the regional level. This combination seems unlikely In the African context. For example* we doubt that the present coalition partners would be willing to meet the stiff terns Chief Awolovo would presumably exact for bringing the Western Regionovernment of national union.
Further/ Policy Recommendationhould be clarified. If it le meant that the US believes that It would be helpful if more 'power were to be placed at the disposal of the Federal Government of Nigeria, then It should be so stated. If something else is Intended, the recommendation should so state.
B. In general, the text suggests that authoritarian measures end temporary restrictions of individual freedoms may beto the achievement of the first priority objective of the US In. national unity. Although we recognize that Western concepts of democracy must be adapted to indigenous mores, experience to date in Africa also suggests that the African brand of authoritarianism does not necessarily serve US interests/ Insure political stability, or prove efficient in paving the way toward economic development. Hence/ there may be ecce merit in seeking toeasure of democracy ln one of the few places In Africa where it stilloothold. Consequently/ we wonder whether the paper might be given an added dimension by adding something like the following language to Objective No.
odel would Include an appreciable rate of economic and social development in en environmentby democratic principles and procedures to the fullest extent consistent with the maintenance of national unity.
C. We vould agree with the judgment (Pagehat the Six-Year Development ZLao has raised unrealistic expectationsthe country and that the prestige of the Federal oWerxtnent is committed to its success. Ecwever, ve helleve that Section IX, Economic Conditions end DXfff'.cultlesortrays an overly optimistic view of Nigeria's economic proepects.
Although Nigeria is endowed with seme economic assets* Its economy remains fairly basic. In recent years; Nigeria'sexports have generally experienced declining prices, and the trade gap has been bridged largely by drawdowns on foreign exchange reserves. Even more significantly, as the Policy Paper noteshe success of the Six-Year Plan depends on Nigeria's willingness to sacrifice present Improvements in living standards to investment for the future. Experience elsewhere in Africa/ and more generally among underdeveloped, states, suggests that leaders are unwilling to melee politically unattractive decisions which are required to achieve this goal.
Moreover, even If all the eccincmic development plana were successfully completed, the annual per capita Increase in private consumption programmed (one percent) during the Plan period would
make little Impression on the public. Indeed, the slow pace of economic growth postulated is likely to provide now ammunition for those disillusioned with the machineryre recent and Nigeria's essentially democratic institutions.
In these circumstances> tho Nigerian political systemalready troubled by regional rivalrieswill be subject to disturbing economic pressures as well. There are likely to be continuing popular demands to meet local needs. Under political pressure this may lead the Federal Government to adopt economically unrealistic measures which would further Jeopardize economic growth and sharpen internal political differences.
D. We note that there isrief referenceo the newly-created Mid-West Region. Aside from theluid situation vhlch exists there and probably deserves some comment* this regionajor* still largely unknown factor to politics at the fedoral level. Also* the establishment of the Mid-West Region provides an opportunity for the North to enhance its already dominant position by obtaining Influence In still another region. Finally/ the implications for and reactions to the new region by the Western Region could usefully be assessed.
E. Seme direct reference to the continuing political fluidity In the Western Region ahould probably be iucludedn the analysis of current political tensions. Intensive, barely below the surface political horse-trading continues in this area. There is atcr* chanceoliticalother than the present HCHC-UPP alliance may emerge.
II. SOME SPECIFIC COJWEKTS Page1
We believe that this sentence oversimplifies the present political situation by bmplylng that the line-up Is oneradical" oppositionconservative" government.
Page li last sentence. Page
On Pageinet is suggested that the US aid program has gene forwardast pace. This la in conflict vith, which notes that there has been delay andWe suggest that the word "maintained" be replaced by developed. We should also note that, in Higerlan eyes, the US aid program la regarded as one that Is basicsllyjjaadequate, and. one that has come slowly.
We should also not! that the Nigerians are well aware of the loportar.ce tbe US baa acalgned to their' country, end rethat consequently Ml^rla'a aid expectations are unlikely to rost at current levels.
There ere clearly limits to the value the US can extract from Its non-colonial position. This is particularly true In coonectlaa with the Angola problemone vhlch increasingly agitates Nigeria.
Page lg, paragraph g
Ccnxaents on the Nigerian view of tho racial situation In the US need revision In light of prevalence in Nigeriaelief that President Kennedy woo assassinatedacist because of his efforts to end diecrininatioc against Negroes.
We are not at all certain that Nigerians see the Federal Government's intervention in tbe Western Region in the terms set down here. We wonder if the "exercisers" of the supreme national authority were not merely acting as easterners and
cortheiters vhoery good opportunity to belabor the westerners through the instrumentality or the Federal Certainly theav it In those terms.
The NPC majority, though still slender. Is growing. Page SO, line 1J
We suggest adding the underlined words: mirs Into something cere aXin.
Page gO. Lice SO
We suggest adding the underlined words: wnS^ ill success in coping with the "southern threat" since.
Ihe estimate of the strength of the AG is too weak. We believe that the AO will continue toajor force in Western politics (although perhaps under some other name).
Page 2k,ines.fa The radical group of Nigerians vho have received aid and guidanceong time from the Bloc Joined under Olantunjl
Otegceye to form the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria (SWFP) The leadership of this party includes leaders of the Nigerian Youth Congressnd of tbe pro-Coranunist Nigerian Trade Union Congresshere is reason to believe that the SVftP is intended to be the nexus of an eventual Communist Party with ties to Moscow.
The SWFP is now actively trying toational Democratic United Front (NOTF). The SKFP's objective is to Join forces with the United Middle Belt Congress and the Northern Elements Progressive Unionommon front. We believe the NYC will almost certainly remain as one of the basic organizations of the NEUP. if and when the latter is organized (end that the BSC will not merely be succeeded by the SWFP).
In these circumstances, we suggest adding tbe following words at the beginning; of line 6: combiningi the various radical elements with such established opposition groupsu and UMBC.
Ve note that the discussion of the Northern Aristocracy falls to note the identification of tbe northern leadership with the Moslem World, This is particularly true of the Sar-dauna who openly demonstrated his affinity during his trip through the Middle East and Pakistan Be has also identified himself with the Arabs* anti-Israeli campaign. These considerations might also be considered in connection with Nigeria's role in the United Nations (Page
We believe this referenceCcnruxnist Party" is misleading since this "CP" as veil as another proclaimed more recently in legos seem to be minute fringe groups having no known relationship to the World Communistor to any other group.
We believe there should be some discussion of theof the formation of the Joint Action Committee. The establishment of the Committee In3 was described, by the US Embassy, as the most significant development in labor in Nigeria
We believe It is probably more precise to note that Nigeria's leadership in intxa-African affairs has not been commensurate vith its size and presumed importance. In part, this has been due to resentment In some quarters over Foreign Minister Wacbuku's heavy-handedness. The growth of Nigeria's stature and influence in Africaas been at least retarded by Wacbuku's antics.
More recently Nigeria has made overtures to the Common Market by seeking some form of association. Indeed, Nigeria's original rejection of the EEC was considerably less than emphatic.
Strike the words: "theeplace by: rty Strike the word: eplace by: the AG's
III. COORDS ON SPECIFIC SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION
A, We believe the discussion of youth and student affairss adequate, although the limitation
on the definition of youth as persons betweenndrobably prevented consideration thereituation which Is noted
elsewhere ln thehe widening rift betweendisappointed and frustrated youth on the one hand, and the government and its lnstltutlcrF.cn the other. The studyeed to keep In touch with developments, but falls to Identify the problem as sharply as future events probably warrant.
Nigeria's political and economic prospects suggest that government leaders will find It difficult to channelresources to satisfy demands which they themselves are stimulating by extensive low-level education of masses of the people who subsequently become uprooted, detriballzed, and disruptive urban elements. The inability of the Nigerian Government to meet these new demands lies at the base of the growing estrangement of the youth from present leadership.
Although the paper recommends seven courses of actiont seems apparent that they cannot hope to solve the basic problem described above. Die proposals are not o_ priori counter-productive; given unlimited time, funds.
and personnel they- are probably quite valuable. However, If the basic problem of achieving an integration of the educated elite, youth, and students into'a constructive process of natlon-bulldlng is cot broached at the tame time these reccm-mendad programs are going forward the latter may actually become counter-productive. That Is, if effective, they vlll stimulate the educated elite, youth, and students, and enhance their abilities while they remainisruptive ccclal factor.
B. We note that CIA is specified as an action agency for certain courses of action; on the other hand, CIA is not mentioned in connection with other courses of action although the Agency may be active in the field.
We strongly urge, therefore, that CIA be omitted from the list of DBO agencies responsible for im-pleeientation of certain courses of action.
The major AG push to expand from Its regional bono came in the9 general election on the eve ofnot after independence.
Herehe RFC baa become Interested inItself outslco the North. He suggest adding the words until recently after "interested."
Page hi,Labor Section)
He note that here, as throughout the paper, thelabor organization Is referred to as the Indepondont United Labor Congress (ZULC). Recently, the IUIC changed its name to the Nigerian Trade Union Congresss It was formerly known.
AND STRCCT1SE OF TEE PAPER
A. We believe the paper Is far too long and would be Improved considerably If cut by at least fifty percent.
B. We assumeew Part I, embodying the pain lines of the study etrailer to that prepared for the Ethiopia Policy Paper, will be introduced* In that connection, ve strongly urge that all courses of action, not only those deemede Included in the Part
Edward P. Noziglia
Office of Vest African Affairs (AFW)
Department of State
Nigeria National Policy Paper
In the preparation of CIA comments on the Nigeria Policy Paper,4 one word was inadvertently omitted.
Please refer toaragraph B,dd the underlined word:
tasks should not be listed.
Copy to: Mr. V. R. Duggan
Policy Planning Council Department of State1Original document.