CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DOCTRINE

Created: 1/17/1964

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CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY DOCTRINE

Chinese military doctrine, developed by Mao Tse-tung in theo meet pre-nuclear alll-tary aituatIons, has been maintained alnost intact into. The major problem facing tho Chinese militaryto defend China against anod with nuclear weapons and othernot been met but has been side-stepped. Although this is partly because the Chinese, with no nuclear capability, have no simple alternative, lt Is also the result of the heavy influence of political ideology on military

Mao's decision to challenge the Soviet Union has affected military doctrine in two ways: the cutoff of Soviet aid in modernizing China's armed forces requires adherenceoctrine In many ways as antiquatod as Its instrument, and Mao's writings on military strategy are trumpeted so as to enhance the claim that he has creatively enriched Marxist-Leninist thought in this area as in others and thus deserves to lead the Communist world.

Aside from its weaknessefensive strategy for China today, Maoist revolutionary doctrine doesajor application in theandoctrine to be used by Communists incountriesuide in their attempts to overthrow established governments.

of Chinese Doctrine

Chinese Communist military doctrine Is the product of more thanears of development. Although Influenced by thestrategy of foreignin particular that of the Soviet Union, the Chinese have relied primarily on their own experience for their military strategy and tactics.

As in every othvr aspect of current Chinese Communist

thinking, the seminal influence has been Mao Tse-tung. His basic concepts were formulated during the days of the Chinese Communist guerrilla warfare and are still maintained. Any attempt to separate out the elements which still haveand aro consciously applied from those maintained for purely propaganda purposes must remain tentative because of the lack of available Information. the Soviet Union, China permits no open discussion of over-all military doctrine. No

Chinese reviews dealing with mil are regularly av onlyiberation Army obtained in trie The single most has been the sec raunist military tured by Tibetan

The Basic Doctrine

These documents indicate that Chinese pi1itary doctrine still focuses on defensive war, and there is virtually nothat Chinese Communist leaders are preparing for or thinking in terms of anstrategy by their own forces outside Chinese References to policy, preparedness and training are concernedefensive war fought on Chinese territory against an enemy, probably the US, employing nuclear weapons.

Chinese doctrine thuscentered on the means available to destroy anyforce. The strategyin the war against Japanp Involving the use of bothand regular warfarep would probably be modified and used in any war against another invader. The Chinesethat nuclear weapons can destroy China's Industrialbut they argue that the effectiveness of nuclearused tactically will be reduced markedly byclose contact with the enemy and by fighting at night.

Mao's doctrine stresses the dominance of men and of politics, and maintains that the thoroughly indoctrinated and trained soldier will always be more important than the weapons he employs. Another basic doctrine, that of the "people'sn which "every manmounts to total mobilization in all areas under Communist control. Faced initially with an overwhelmingly stronger enemy, Mao rejected "the completely groundless theory of quick victory" for either side, and formulated the strategy and tacticsprotracted" war.

These principles envisage an initial retreat beforeenemy forces untilsupply lines and enemywould permit theof defense positions. There woulderiod of stalemate as Chinese forces were concentrated to bring about the defeat and annihilation of enemy forces through superior mobilityoncentration of force in critical areas. The theory calls for trading space for time,radualof forces, and for theof the enemy's will to fight by both military andwarfare. During the stalemate stage there is to be heavy dependence on the militia and on guerrillaand the major goal of the Communists is to change the balance graduallyarge-scale reduction of the enemy's armed forces and thus set up conditionsounter-offensive-

The Role of Nuclear Weapons

Chinese thought on the role of nuclear weapons In Military doctrine Is ambiguous and reflecting thein which the Chinese find themsolves because theyostile world view without adequate arms to back up their hostility. Although Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders have repeatedly

downgraded the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, the regime

nevertheless tacitlytheir Importance byconsiderable effort and

investment to develop its own nuclear weapons.

In recognition of their vital role today, ChineseMinister Chen Yl stated in3 that China would have to manufacture nuclear weapons, missiles and supersonic aircraft or degenorateecond-class or third-class He expressed thiswhen he noted that the Chinese would develop nuclear weapons, even if lteduction in consumer goods even if lt meant they had to go without trousers.

Peiplng'H willingness to beggar itself in order tomodern means of warfare suggests that the Chinese debunking the power and role of these weaponsuture is largely an effort by the Chinese leaders to rationalize the predicament in which they find themselves. The Chinese refusal to discuss realistically

the effects of nuclear weapons, even In the classified Tibetan documents, might reflect an inadequate knowledge of their true effects, but it more likelyecognitionower without these weapons must ignore or derogate them if it is to continue to insist that ltreat power. Inas Mao has himself pointed out, any undue emphasis on the use or destructiveness ofweapons could onlyetrimental effect in China, frightening the people and undermining their morale and their will to fight.

Thus Chinese doctrineto maintain that weapons cannot be decisive in war, that the thoroughly indoctrinated and trained soldier will always be more Important than the weapons he employs. It Is In this context that the Chinese claim that the "spiritual atomic bomb" is more important than the material one. Suchmade partly to maintain the morale of the Chineseman, must be read in the light of the high priority given to the nuclear weapons program <

In another notable between Chineseand Chinese action, Pei-ping claims that the US will never dare to use nuclearbut it has been careful since the Korean war to avoid situationsirectwith US military power would arise. In this way the Chinese remain true to

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CHINESE AND SOVIET VIEWS ON NUCLEAR WARFARE

Yah Chien-ying, ol Military Training Conference,1

I' thereor in ihe next >eveml years, whor kind of weapon shall we principally rely on to defeat our enemies? Here weuestion concerning the rela-tionihip between conventional endweapons. Atomic weapons are Indeed very powerful but they cand only to deitroy strategic point! and the economic potential of the country during strategic olr attacks, ond to prepor* the woy for an actual offensive oltack, However, tho army and conventional weapons ore necessary to solve ihe main problemor, to eliminate the enemy, to occupy battlefields, and toictory.

To rely on the ormy and conventional weapons Is to rely on manpower. Therefore, manpower Mill constitute* the moln factor In war. We rely on manpower, and stress the political factor. US militarists know clearly that ihey cannot rely on manpower toictory over China and the Soviet Union, have to rely on nuclear weapons.

If thereor within the next several yean, we will have to rely on the weapons we have on hand. How con we defeat our enemy by using the weapons we have onr enemy It stronger than we are in distantbul close fighting, especially face to face fighting. It more odvontogeous to us. In the event of wor in the next several years, we can defeat our enemy by using close combat even though we have no unconventional weapons.

Marshal of Aviation9

The underestimation of the tnfonlty reflects the fear of ihe imperlollil bourgeoisie of their peoples, of moie Not havingreserves of manpower at their disposal, the warmongers boom and exaggerate the role of air power out of all proportion. These ideas emanate from she completely distortedthai the outcome of worbe decided by sons kind of weapon alone. Histary heeproved the reverse more ihan once.

Marshal4

Soviet military science decisively rejects any arbitrary fabrications of bourgeoisietheorists that one could achieve strategic victory by employment of one or another new weapon. There ore no such weapons which possets exceptional and oil-powerful Qualities. Historical experience leaches thai with ihe appearance ol new technology, new moreand more destructive weapons, theof men on the battlefield not only does not decrease but Increases all the more.

From Military? (Editor: Marshol Sokolovsky)

Modem strategicmake it possible to achieve decisive results end at times even victory without vtiliilng the means and forces of the tactical ond operartenalnder modem conditions,tate does not haw nuclear weapons ai Its disposal, it could never achieve victory over an opponent thathe country that finds Itself in asituation as the result of mass nuclear-missile strikes may be forced to surrender even before Its armed forces hove suffered anydafoat.

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

hfao's dictum, "despise the enemy strategically, but respect him tactically." They can continue to claim that the USpaper tiger" without testing whether or not it has teeth.

In their propaganda, the Chinese havearallel between the use of poison gas and the use of nuclear weapons in war, declaring that nuclear weapons are no more likely to be used today than was poison gas in World War II. They have in the past attributed USto use nuclear weapons to fear of Soviet The probable loss of their protected position behind the Soviet nuclear "umbrella" does not appear to weigh as heavily as might be expected with the Chineso leaders, nor do they profess to be asof the prospect of general nuclear warfare as Moscow is.

While the Chinese often publicly state that theof war Is not high, the Tibetan documents make numerous references to the possibilityurprise attack. Allavailable indicates that, though the Chineseurprise nuclear attack would be enormously destructive, they have an equally firm belief that it would not be decisive or mean defeat for China in the initial stage of the war.

Chinese statementsthe impact of nuclear weaponsuture war are similar to those of the Soviet Union before itajor nuclear power.

During that period statements Bade by Soviet political and military loaders discounted the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, and there was little stress on nuclear warfare in Soviet strategy and tactics.

Now, however. Sovietthinking, which in the past has concentrated on the problems of waging war In the European land theater, has been broadened to include the strategic problems of intercontinental warfare. It considers the initial nuclear exchangein the sense that if one loses it, ail is lost. But lt continues to stressong war, conducted by large armies and won by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and the seizure andof his territory.

In contrast, Chineseconcerned primarily with defensive warfare, has not delved Into the problem ofand occupyingotential aggressor such as the US. Considering the capabilities of the Chinese armed forces,iscussion would bo wholly academic.

Tho Tibetan documents do not reveal any concentratedto prepare for nuclearor even for large-scale conventional bombing attacks. The few surface-to-air missile sites available are insufficient to acteal deterrent to an attackodern bomber force. There have been Isolated reports that atomic training,

secret

of the passive defensive type, la being given to Chinese troops. There have beenreports of air-raidew army officers were assigned0 to scientific research organs and specialized technical units, indicating preparations for Integration of advanced weapons as they become

A campaign was initiated in0 to disperse military bases and to carry out future construction near or under hills and cliffs in order to reduce the effectsuclear attack. The Tibetan documents indicate that this plan was unsuccessful0 andmince then seems unlikely in view of the sharp reduction in all construction. 1 directive claimed that failure to carry out this plan resulted from general apathy and lack of awareness of tho destructlveness of nuclear weapons. So long as Peiping's Lack of nuclear weapons requires lt to downgrade their this situation can beto continue.

The Policy of "Sclf-Rellanco"

As is the case with Chinese rationalizations on the effects of nuclear warfare, Peiping's insistence on the need foras well as economic, self-reliance isustificationolicy. he Chinese were more than willing to accept Soviet assistance In modernizing their armed forcos, as they accepted economicto modernize their entire economy. Their open refusal to accept less than an equal status in the Communist bloc, however,oviet decision to halt military assistance, as well as to apply economicin an effort to curbindependence. Because there was no simple alternative open to the Chinese short of surrendering this Independence, theyolicy of self-reliance.

The Tibetan documents showed the severe setback which thofor modernizing the armed forces suffered01 and the concomitant steadyin their capability to fight an enemy well equipped with advanced conventional and unconventional arms. Theinformation available since then indicates continued decline2 and particularly the air force and the navy. Even in the army. Items of heavyincluding armor, are not being Increased,erious question of its ability toeven its present armored capability has arisen. Thein the supply of new weapons has forced the military to place recewed emphasis on maintenance and economy.

Thisituation which no professional military leaders could accept with equanimity and the Chineso were no exception. The policy of militarywas vigorously opposed by many military leaders, led by Peng Te-huai, then minister of national defense. Pong argued

SEC

the continuing need formilitary and economic assistance, even if this neant some degree of Russian control over Chinese military-economic policies. Mao, however, had already made the decisiop to be independent of Sovieteven if it cost theSoviet assistance, and inengumber of his followers were purged.

This drastic move apparently has stopped open expression of disagreement within thewith Mao's present policies, but it could hardly have erased all military dissension. in high military circles over the delays in modernizing the armed forces still exists, particularly In the air force, where someare reported toolitical accommodationeans of restoring Soviet military aid to China. There are no indications,that disgruntled military men are willing to take on the party leadership in regard to the dispute with the USSR or the schedule of priorities established in over-all economic development.

In the Chinese adoptionolicy of "self-reliance" in military affairs can be seen the direct impact of political thinking on military affairs. Itlear illustration of how political decisions shape military doctrine over theof the military hierarchy and to the detriment of China's military posture. The loss of

outside aid In modernizing the Chinese military machine condemns the Chinese for sone time to come to make do with what Is essentially anforce. They are forced

thereby toilitary doctrine developedifferent time andifferent situation, because it takes into account the type of military forces they still have and the only type of war they would be able to fight. This is likely to be aexpedient and the Chinese can be expected, when they are able, to modernize their armed forces and then adjust their military doctrine to meet their new capabilities.

"National-Liberation" Wars

The Chinese point to their own successfulas an example for in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and believe that in conflicts that have taken place in Indochina, Cuba, and Algeria, and in the one now under way in South Vietnam, Maoist revolutionary doctrine has considerable These claims have much more validity than the views of the Chineso that Mao's doctrine is applicable to the defense of the mainland against armed forces equipped withweapons.

Leaders of the revolutions in Cuba, Indochina, and Algeria have acknowledged their debt to Maoist strategy and theexperience. Castro,

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secret

of guerrilla warfare inreferrod to the precodent of the Chinese struggle Vo Nguyen Glap, sinister of defense of North Vietnam and commander In chief of the Viet Minn Amy, in his book. People's War, People's Army, referred to the lessons learned "from tbe valuableof the Chinesewhich have enriched the theories of the national democratic revolution, ofwar, and of the amyenieoloniallgerian leaders have referred to "the "vast Influence" of the Chinese revolution on their revolution and on otherMovements in Asia and Africa .

Maoistinfor using the peasants as the main force in this type of war and for the establishment of rural base

areas protected byales as the "only way to surround the cities" and finally take them. Politically, Mao stresses the use of the united fronteans for Communists to gain control of nationalistln underdeveloped areas. His doctrine emphasizes the necessity of building upsupport before victory can be won lnar, but denies the need for such support to begin one.

3 the Chinese placed an Increased emphasis on Maoist revolutionary doctrine

This is indicated by theof the Selected Military Writings of Mao Tso-tung, by the extontfiTd observance ofh anniversary of theof Xiao's On ProtractcC War and by the concern of PSople'g Dally, theeview ,l other Chinese publications with tho applicability of Maoist doctrine to "revolutionary struggle" in underdeveloped areas. This concern with "national liberation" wars is due partially to the Chinese Communists' belief that the time Is ripe for pushing Maoist revolutionary doctrine lnareas and partiilly to their feeling that stress on guerrilla war and revolution will give them the edge over the USSR in the struggle to gain control of Communist movements in these areas.

Outlook

Tho Chinese Communists' military doctrine is and will continue to be basicallyao long as they do not have nuclear weaponselivery capability. Pelping, however, remains willing to use its armed forces in Asia in circumstances that Chinese leaders deem to-involve little risk of war with the United States.

Hao's guerrilla concepts, adjusted to suit localwill continue to be stressed by the Chineseuide to be used by revolutionaries

secret

in "national-liberation" wars. In Southeast Asia, for example, the terrain, the politicaland theproblems wouldalmost exclusive reliance on guerrilla warfare.

The Chinese realize that nuclear weapons can cause lm-nense destruction and appear determined to continue to give high priority to their ownweapons program. However,uclear capability is achieved, they are likely to continue to stress the dominance of men and of politics in war

and to place heavy emphasis on the major role of the ground forces and reject any theory that use of nuclear weapons might bring quick and decisive victory. They will alsoto profess less concern over both the possibility of and disastrous effectsuclear war than the USSR and useartial Justification for urging on the world Communistard lineetente with the US and favoringand violencef obtaining power. WflMI

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