Created: 12/27/1963

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Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare


CooiuriW in by lha UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indicated overleaf3

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preporolion of this estimate:

ihe Central Intelligence Agency ond Iho intBlUgnnco organiiafioni of Ihe Depot'-monlt of Slate, Defenie, iho Army. Ihohe AW Force, ond NSA.


Dlrwior ot Intelligence aodl Stale Director, Detente Intelligence Agency

As*Chlvf of Stall fat Inielligenec, Department of ihe Army Auiironl Chief of Naval Operoiioniepartment of the Navy AssiManl Chief of Sioff. Intelligence, USAf Director ol ihe National Security Agency


Iho Atomic Energy Commitiion Itepretenialtve lo lhend the-ederol Bureau of Investigation, Ihe vjbftxl being ouliide of Iheir (orftdkllon.


Ihii moterTBt tnujolni information affecting Ihe National Defense of lh* Unitedthe meaningJSC,, th-or revelation of which in any iimmiiH in miiim inliiVii A



Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare






Types of 3

Evidence of Production and Stockpiling . 4

Future Developments in Agents and 6



Soviet CW Delivery

Toxic Agent Delivery Capabilities of the European'"

Satellite Armies

Strengths and Weaknesses ol CW Defense Preparations'10






Soviet Equipment and Procedures for CW

Soviet Naval CW Defense Equipment .

Satellite Military CW Defense Preparations

Bloc Civil Defense Against Toxic Agent Attack






To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR to employ toxic chemical warfare agents in military operations, especially against NATO in Europe, over about the next five years.


evidence Indicates that Soviet organization,training, and research and development can supporttoxic chemical warfare operations. There isof toxic agent production rates or amountseliable estimate of the scale on which theythese operations. Main reliance now appears to bevery toxic nerve agents. Research and development areincluding efforts to develop nonlcthal 1

Sovietsariety of chemical munitionsoperations, but we beheve that their use in arole Is not now planned. (Paras.)

and European Satellite forceside rangefor defense against chemical warfare, but theya satisfactory means ol timely nerve agent detection.capabilities are considerably lower than those of )

believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemicalas essentially tactical weapons, but they consistentlywith nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction."


The Soviet leadeis thus probably consider them subject to the same political constraints us those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level. (Paras

E. The Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize tlie use of toxic chemical agents by their theater field forceseneral nuclear war.imited war in which no nuclear weapons were being used, they would probably not initiate the use of chemical weapons )





he sUndard toxic agents now in the Soviel arsenal fall into two main categories: those which first saw use in Worldnd the nerve agents which derive from German and Soviet research before and during World War II. The Worldgents still in tbe Soviet arsenal are mustard, mustard mixed wilh lewisite, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene. Mustard, the primary toxic used in World War I,ery persistent, blistering agentigh toxicity. Hydrogen cyanide and phosgene are nonpersistent lethal agents which Soviet CW tactics prescribe for use in certain situations when tactical gas surprise can be achieved or the battle plan calls for early occupation of the enemy position.

lthough nerve agents have never been employed in warfare,and field testing have shown them to be extremely toxic. Unlike the older agents, these organophosphoms chemicals are practically odorless, and no technique for their timely detection has been perfected. One class of nerve agents, known in the West as "G" agents because of their German origin,ethal hazard by either inhalationinute quantity or contamination of unbroken skin by about one gram ofamily or even more toxic nerve agents, known in the West as "V" agents, has been developed since World War II. Theseazard primarily by skin contamination because of their much lower volatility,ery small drop (on the order1 gram) can be lethal. The Soviet inventory includes at least two "G" agents and one "V" agent, as follows:1

Sarinhis nerve agent, the standard US agent In tho "G" series, is aboutunes as toxic as mustard gas. It is considered in the West toonpersistent agent suitable for usearget which must be occupied by friendly troops, but Soviet research has shown that sarin can persist for several days in cold weather. At least limited production of sarin is believed lo have begun in the USSR in thes.

Somannother agent in the "G" series, soman is morethan sarin andreater skin hazard to masked troops.

1 There il good evidenceabun-like compound was synthesized tn the USSR during WorldhUe the Germans were developing tabun (OA) itself. However, tabun has been characterbicdlassified Soviel article1 as "siBnincanUy inferior" to other nerve agents. Production has probably now ceased, bul some may still be tn the stockpile.


According lo Soviel research, soman contamination may lul lor several months in cold weather. Soman cannot be countered satisfactorily by airopine, lhe standard anltdolc lor the other nerve agents,ecent Cmchoslovak article announced the development ol an improved anti-dole.

VR-ss. Recent article, in classified Soviet military journals liave referred to an agent designatedsed for the bulk-fill of chemleal warheads for tactical guided missiles and FROG's Although we have little information on lhe physical pi op? dies ofe deduce liom these articles that It is more volatile than tlie very persistent standard US agent,nd aboutimes more toxic than sarin. It has been described as rapid in action, and effective by both inhalation and skin penetration. Its persistence in lethal concentrations on terrain andis stated to be from one to three days

Evidence o( Production ond Stockpiling

ur evidence regarding the Soviet chemical warfare program relates largely to the development and the tactical use, rather than to the production, of chemical agents. We know that Soviet research on toxic agents has been extensive: numerous articles in the Sovietliterature attest to an intensive effort to develop simple.processes for the production of nerve agents. Ins, one research groupew sarin process much improved over Uie German scheme. The Soviet process for this "G" agent uses materials and procedures which arc also called for In the production of some of the more toxic members of the "V" agent family. Another research grouprocess whichess toxic "V" agent or an organophosphorus insecticide, depending on the ingredient introduced in the final step. More recently,he Soviets announced anprocess for producing pinacolyl alcohol, needed in soman production and previously not economically available.

c also know that the Soviets have extensive facilities for the storage of toxic agents both in bulk and In filled munitions. We have identified aboutajor depots which we believe are devoted primarily to the storage of toxicome of these are quite large and have been considerably expanded and improved since first photographed dui ing World War II. Assuming that Uie enUre capacity of these facilities Is utilized for toxic agent storage, that the criteria for access and safety arc comparable to those of the US. and that the floorspace devoted to bulk storage is twice that devoted lo filled muniUons,ons of toxic agents could be stored under rool at Uicse depots.

Tree Rocket Overonest John

Map (or locaUoru of Uirie and oUwr Soviet enemies! warfare facilities


n addition,ew general munitions depots, there are small, isolated arras whicli may be devoted to the storage ol tome agentand at one suspect tactical guided missile depot, therearge area containing especially designed buildings which we believe airfoi Uie storage of toxic agent warheads. In general, however, storage spec Ideations lor such munitions as toxic-filled artillery shells nred not diflcr significantly from those for storage of other ordnance items We have therefore not been able to Identify other mixed depots, although Soviet CW tactics and delivery systems argue strongly that others, exist. More im|>oilaiU. wc find no basisonfidentof any particular total quantity of agents and munitions likely lotorage at any of these depots.

e cannot firmly identify any Soviet chemical plant producing nerve agents. The best candidates are two factories which produced toxic agents In World War II, and are located close to facilities forloading and toxic agent storage. Three other plants which also produced toxic agents in World War II are now major Soviet producers of heavy chemicals. Including organophosphorus Insecticides. Because of the hazards involved, they are unlikely to be engaged in theproduction of nerve agents, bul they may be producing essential Intermediate chemicals and could .constitute an industrial reserveA production facility at the Central Chemical Proving Ground at Shikliany maynvolved in nerve agent production.

7 Classified Soviet statements that munitions filled with nerve agents are available to Sovet forces convince us thai quantity production has occurred. We lack direct evidence on production rates, on the amounts which may be In storage at the depots we have Identified, and on theof existing stocks. Such estimates as wc have attempted to make involve so many assumptions that margins of error are extremely high We do not believe that the Soviet storage capacity is beingto its maximum, but we think it prudent to assume thai the total toxic agent stockpile, both in depots and available to tactical units, is at0 tons.*

n any event, we believe the Soviets have not carried on aprogramense of urgency. We have seen no evidence of priorities for related chemical industries or for the construction of new storage facilities Moreover, moderate production rates would provide subilantial stocks. Foringle nerve agent productionof moderate size canons of agent per day, and wefrom Soviet data that this quantity could be used to

'This judement -spencOd that riper wo! in Uir CW section* of prvvtouihichincluded quantltaUvnofSoviet toxicstockpile.

lactical missile warheads, orROG warheads, orb aerial bombs.

some CW munitions are probably immediatelySoviet tactical units, logistical problems might affect lhelo bring Iheir stored CW stocks into play against NATOEurope. Oi the major depots wc believe devoted primarily tool toxic agents, aboutercent of the total capacity is inand Central USSR and aboutercent in the Farall that in the Western and Central USSR is located in lheTurkestan Military Districts. It is therefore not well sited fora war in the West which began with short warning limes andInterdiction of transportation facilities.

Future Developments in Agents and Stockpiles

We expect Soviet research on toxic agents lo continue. Efforts arc probably underway to develop agents with improved fieldwhich would be useful in further complicating Westernin detection, protection, first aid, and decontamination. Both scientific and military literature make it clear that an effort is being made to develop nonlcthal incapacitating agents,ormalfor such agents may exist. An agent causing temporary mental incapacitation might be available for field use as early5 andcausing temporary physical incapacitation might be ready

We see no reason why present production and storage facilities should either be substantially enlarged or reduced. Losses of properly stored agents are minimal, and continued production of the newer agents could be used either to enlarge total capabilities or to retire older munitions from active stocks. If the Soviets desired to reduce oragent production, facilities could be shifted tu the production of organophosphorus insecticides. Expansion of production facilities for these insecticides is being planned as part of the currentimprovement program. This expansion probably would enlarge the industrial reserve for production of nerve agents. In sum, wethat chemical munitions will continue to be available, perhaps in larger quantities and in more effective form, and that substantiallyproduction could be undertaken fairly quickly If desired.


chemical munitions possess certain advantages andwhen compared with other munitions. They can achievearea of lethal coverage than high explosives and their effectspersistent. Unlike either high explosives or nuclear weapons,destroy personnel without destroying installations. Chemicalmay be more effective than other weapons against personnel in

. SErgET

haidened targets. Even the threat of their use may lower the combat effectiveness of well disciplined troops by forcing them to carry and use encumbering protective gear On Uie other hand. weaUier may reduce or negate their effects, proper protection mid adequate warning may achieve similar results, and proper dissemination of the agent is required in order to achieve effective results

oviet military documents and exercises indicate that the Soviets appreciate both the capabilities and limitations of toxic chemicalThey appear to be satisfied that these weapons can play anpart in theater opeiations. documents and exercises stress then utilityumber of specific tactical situations. In sharp contrast, we have no evidence of any kind lo associate chemical weapons with long-range strategic attack, either independently or in conjunction withnuclear weapons, and wehat their useong-rangerole is not now planned. However, if they came to believe strategic CW attack would be militarily rewarding, the Soviets could provide chemical munitions for their long-range deliveryhosein.

While Uie USSR appears to have decided that chemical weapons arc essentially tacUcal weapons, toxic chemical agents have beenand consistently grouped with nuclear weapons as "weapons ol mass destruction" in political declarations and in classified military writings Soviet proposals on disarmament invariably link toxicwith nuclear weapons. The latest available field service regulations characterize modern combat either as waged with weapons of massincluding chemical weapons, or as waged with conventional means Thus, it appears that the Soviets think of these chemicalas subject lo the same political constraints as those imposed upon the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, we believe lhat the initial use ol either of these types of weapons wouldatter for decision at the highest political level.

Soviet tacUcal doctrine for tho use of "weapons of massprescribes the employment of CW primarily in close coordination with nuclear weapons, so as lo capitalize on Uie particular attributes of each The doctrine indicates that CW may be used instead of nuclear weajxjns. for example. In an area ol engagement where material damage to the target Is to be avoided. Through surprise and employment in mass, toxic agent munitions arc Intended to provide large ?cale casualties and demoralization throughout lhe tacUcal zone o( operations; thereby permitting rapid maneuver and seizure of critical objectives by fast-moving ground forces.

There is good evidence from classified writings that, once the Soviet government lias decided to use weapons of mass deslruction, the


Iront rummander will normally determine the operation* In which chemical agents will be used, the numbers and types ol weapons allotted, coordination with other munitions, etc. Special chemical officers and troop units assigned at all levels are churned with providing technical advice To fulfill local tusks, chemical weapons would be used on the decision of divisional commanders-

he Soviets probably do not consider lhat they have adequate stocks of nuclear weapons for their theater forces. Only recentlyeir planners been able lo think in terms of committing; upew hundred nuclear weapons, virtually all wilh yields in the klloton range,ypical jront operation Thus, in addition lo being available to the theater forces for those operations lo which they arc particularly well adapted, chemical weapons have probably also been provided to make upeficiency in the number of nuclear weapons which might be deemed necessary for the conduct of tactical operationseneral war.realer degree of nuclear plenty could diminish emphasis on toxic agents for theater forces except in those special situations for which chemical weapons are especially suited.


Soviet CW Delivery Systems

ROG's and Guided Missiles. The Soviets began developing toxic agent warheads for tactical rockets and guided missiles at least as earlynd9 they staled that such warheads were available. Articles In classified military Journals provide good technical data on theelivery capabilities of: (a) theree rocketaximum range ofm; fb) theallistic missileangeun; and (c) theruise missileange ofm In addition, data indicatesW warhead has been provided for another cruise missileaximum range ofm

hese articles make It clear that in the case of Lhe FROG and Ihe ballistic miistle, the Soviets expect to achieve wide area coverage by opening bulk-fill warheads at altitude:eet for the FROG andeet for the ballistic missile From these same articles, evidence which Is less conclusive leads us to believe that cruise missiles probably also employ bulk-fill warheads lo be detonated at similarto achieve large-areahe lack of US experience lo

In the Sovielrentartime organization composed of several field arm lee Although similar toUS armyron( Is no* directly comparable

According to Soviel data. Ihey expect to achieveercent casualUe*xposed personnel over an area of about yj square mile with the TO(XI. a^ square mile with lhe ballistic missile, and about IV, square miles with the cruise missiles.


dalc Willi liiilk-lllled missile warheads and with agent release al such altitudes, coupled with our scant knowledge of the physical properties olmake it impossible for us to judge lhe agent effectiveness and area coverage the Soviets are likely to achieve with warheads of this lype. However, Ihey probably have explored the advantages andof this concept of warhead design and appear to havein the technique.

or agent delivery by aircraft, SovietII CW munitions included spray tanks, individual bombs,clusters. Although we believe Soviet interest in aerialhas continued, we possess no information that asystem suitable for use with high-performance jet aircraft IsThe line-dropping of small chemical bombs atcan achieve comparable results and there are recentthat the Soviets have adopted this alternative technique.

Rocket, and Other Ground Delivery Systems. have toxic chemical rounds for all artillery pieces ofand larger. Toxic rounds arc probably available for allmortars and for multiple-rail artillery rocket launchers. Becausehigh rate of fire, Soviet tactics recommend these rockets forin intense barrages, which mightinute or less,large-area tactical targets with surprise concentrations of Inumber of other CW delivery systems arefor support of theater force units. In general, the Sovietsolher systems as defensive in nature, to be used to channelenemy forces by creating barrors. Spray systems suitableterrain contamination existariety of forms Turbineproducing smokes and aerosols also can blanket areasconcentrations of toxic materials. Pressure-activated anddetonated land mines, older models of which were filledor mustard -lewisite mixtures, may now also haveor nerve agent fill.

aval Munitions. Toxic agent warheads may be available for navnl cruise missiles. These could1 be used against both naval and land targetsmrom shells and rockets with chemical fill are available, and recent Information indicates lhe stockpilingmm chemical shells for destroyers and cruisers. AH surface combatant ships arc equipped to generate both screening and toxic smokes and are prepared, as are submarines, to release floating generators for creating toxic smoke screens and spray. Toxic muni-

'etailed descriptionmu used to fill aerial and ground munlUons nnd Ih'ir Intended uwi, tee Annex A

Uons apparently are not normally stored aboard slnp in peacetime Wc believe it highly unlikely that chemical warheads are provided lor naval ballistic missiles

tonic Agent Delivery Capabilities ol the European Saielljlr Armies

ll Satellite forces have artillery and aircraft capable of deliver agent munitions In addition, some Satellite armies have received FKOG's and short-range ballistic missiles and moat others are likely to get them soon. We are confident that the Satellites have been in formed of the Soviet CW capabilities with all these delivery systems, and there is good information, some of it quite recent, on Satellite training In the offensive use of toxic munitions. The Czechs, the Last Ccmiuns. and possibly the Poles, have some capability to manufacture nerve agents, but the USSR has probably maintained close surveillance over such limited production as has occurred. The Soviets have almost certainly sought to keep the Satellite armies essentially dependent upon the USSR for these weapons, and wc have no evidence that the Satellites possess toxic agents beyond the quantity required for their modest research and training programs. We believe the Satellites would not employ toxic chemical munitions except upon Soviet direction orMore important, their extensive use would requireSoviet support.

Strengths and Weaknesses of CW Defense Preparation!

he Bloc militaryide range of equipment for use In chemical defense, much of it of recentExtensive training In Its use is integral to military exercises for allnaval, anddilute toxic agents are employed in this trainingand training for CW defense are combined with that fordefense, and the special chemical troops are responsible for both types of defense* The dual nature of such defense is stressed Intraining, and thereumber of recent examples of Soviet forces donning chemical defense equipment following simulatedstrikes.

The single most critical weakness In chemical defense throughout the Bloc Is the problem of nerve agent detection. Although some manual and automatic detectors fnr these agents are available, we do not know of any which is sufficiently sensitive to assure human safely.

According to the most recent available field service regulations, Soviet combat units arc to avoid chemical and nuclear contamination insofar as may be practicable while accomplishing their missions Units

a more deflnlle analysts of Bloc CW defensete Annex B.

etailed description ot the formal military orrantiaUon for CW. aee Annex C


exposed lo contamination then would lie sent lo facilities to beby chemical troops tor treatment and decontamination. Although the equipment and procedures lo be used al these facilities appearlo the task, we have no basis for estimating the extent ofof individual items. We Judge that the chemical defensesupplied the individual combai soldier is technically adequate to protect himoxic environment forhorl time, restricting his unit lo limited tactical objectives.

urrent civil defense preparations and medical trainingthe Bloc arc directed primarily against nuclear effects. The Soviets have conducted systematic civil defense training for chemical defenseumber of years, butow level of chemical defensehas been achieved and shortages of masks and other specialized equipment are general and widespread, especially in the European Satellites.

believe that the Soviets will continue research andon chemical defense, but we have no evidence regardingof development. We presume that major attention will belo problems of nerve agent detection, protection, and treatment.


Several general conclusions emerge from the preceding analysis; Soviet stocks of chemical munitions are probably substantial; the Soviets haveapability for the use of chemical munitions in tactical situations but do not now plan for their long-range strategic use; they have made extensive preparations for defense against chemical agents but there arc several key weaknesses in their defense capabilities; they regard chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level.

Wc believe, in light of the above, that the Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of chemical warfare agents by their fieldthe extent and In the manner front commanders-in the eventeneral nuclear war. In such circumstances, they would probably regard toxic chemical weapons as an important element in the execution of planned ground operations in Europe and the Far East. Any political inhibitions or legal restrictions upon their use almost certainly would be regarded as insignificanteneral nuclear conflict hador not the other side employed them.

On the other hand,imited conflict, the decision to useweapons almost certainly would be regarded as an important politi-


cal decision. The tactical advantage to be gained, particularly if therehortage ol nuclear weapons, of course wouldactor, but it would be overshadowed by such considerations as the likelihood that the other side would respond In kind, the danger that the use of chemical weapons would precipitate the use of nuclear weapons, and the political image which the USSR was attempting to project to those not involved.

We cannot foresee, of course, all the different types or situations which might arise, and indeed even if we could, it would be impossible to estimate with confidence Soviet responses lo postulated circumstances There are,ew judgments or signposts which may befrom Soviet policies and behavior. For example, we havethat if Soviet forces became involvedocal war, the Soviet leaders would seek to keep the war as limited as possible so as tothe chances of its escalation into general war. We have alsothat they therefore would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Wc believe they would regard the initiation of chemical warfare in much the same way; they would fear Lhat their use of chemical munitions would be regarded by the West as an Indication that the USSR was raising the stakes; they would fear that the Western response would be the initiation of nuclear warfare.

A less clear situation would exist if thereocal war in progress In which the use of tactical nuclear weapons had already been initiated. The danger of escalation would be extremely high from the moment nuclear weapons were used, and we believe that the Soviets would fully appreciate this. For this reason, we believe that Inase they would seek to bring hostilitiesonclusion as quickly as possible. If. however, they were unwilling lo move toward aof the conflict, they would probably not regard the use of chemical agenLs as adding materially to the existing risk of escalation and would probably therefore authorize their use by field commanders.

A new situation might arise If. later in the period, the Soviets came to have nonlethal Incapacitating agents available for field use. Should this happen, they might make their capability public and speak of the humaneness of such weapons. If such propaganda struck achord in world opinion, they might then come to feel that they could use them in limited war situations without the opprobrium associated with lethal chemical weapons; indeed, they might even use them in preference to conventional weapons whenever possible.In the absence of such prior public acceptance, the Soviet leaders would probably feel that the political drawbacks to their use would still be substantial and that their introduction would, to some degree at least, noticeably increase the danger of escalation.




For many years, the Soviets have had both gas and gas/fragmentation shells and bombs As the former may be filled with either nonpersistent i'i pcnlBLBll toxic agents, we have found it convenient to distinguish three categories as follows:

L Gas tf/onpersutent) These are to be used to achieve surprise, lethal concentrations among unmasked enemy troops and lo neutralize targets which arc soon lo be occupied by friendly ground and parachute forces The standard agent for shells, artillery rockets, and bombs probably is hydrogen cyanide, although some munitions filled with phosgene may be in the inventory. Aerial bombs of this category are available in several sizes upounds.

ashese are to be used against unmasked and rrtarted troops in the open and to achieve area and materielof long duration. Soviet practice with persistent agents indicates that artillery shells are lo be detonated at heights above the ground of several hundred feet. Within this category, aerial bombs are of two types, those which arc lo be exploded at altitudes of up to thousands ofwith CW missile warheads and those which arc to explode on the ground upon impact orune delay. In this latter type of bomb, lhe toxic agent could be containedanister to be thrown up by the bomb burst for release of the agent at altitudes comparable to those for artillery shells. The standard ageni in this category has been mustard, possibly mixed with lewisite, although some aerial bombs probably now are filledersistentagent such asumber of sizes of aerial bombs are available, the largestounds.

as/Fragmentation. These are lo be used to achieve chemical and fragmentation casualties among enemy troops and thedamage, or destruction of materiel and fortifications. Artillery shells probably are rilled with mustardG" agent such as sarin, while aerial bombs probably are filled exclusively with the latter.he basic type of Soviet chemical bomb, but agent disseminationprobably have limited sizesounds or less.




Soviel Equipment ond Procedures tor CW Defense

The most recent available field service regulations and chemical deictise proccduics indicateoviet unit is ex|>ected to complete its mission, avoiding chemical and nuclear contamination Insofar as may be practicable. Formal treatment ond decontamination Is to be accomplished after the unit is withdrawn from action, at facilities to be established by chemical troops. Before recommitment, the unit would then be replenished with equipment and fresh troops. In World War II, this rebuilding of units was facilitated by paying more attention to the recovery of equipment and vehicles than to the wounded, whose rate of recovery and return to duty was always lower than in Western armies.

Until he has completed his mission, the individual Soviet soldier must rely on hisew Items of protective clothing, and hisdecontamination self-aid kit. His mask provides comprehensive protection, but we do not know the extent of availability of masks and canisters incorporating modifications announced since the first models appearedhe mask, which covers the entire head, hasin that it is not comfortable and severe fogging or frosting occurs In cold2 manual states Uiat even when properly fitted, the mask exerts pressure on the head causing painful sensations and that when worn for long periods, it can cause circulation disturbances. In warm weather, the mask is uncomfortable to the point at which the wearer's efficiency may be impaired. The standard-issue Items ofclothing provide protection against liquid agents for periods which range from less than one minute to about one hour, depending on the item. The capacity of the personal kit would be exceeded by even moderate contamination. An atropine syrette is believed to be included,erve agent decontaminating solution reported to be in production Is not known to be on issue. As in other armies, special protective clothing, which furnishes the best and only long-periodIs reserved for special-duty troops such as those engaged in reconnaissance, decontamination, and the actual handling or toxic agents.

Facilities for the mass decontamination of personnel and clothing difTer little from standard US mobile showers and laundries, although some newer models of the laundries are specifically designed for the


decontamination and reclamation of uniforms. For theof vehicles, large weapons, andumber of specialized units are available. These range from man-pack portable sprayers and kits designed specifically fur machine guns and aitillery pieces to large, general-purpose decontamination vehicles. Although all these items appear adequate to the task, wc have no basis for estimating the client of their availability. Throughout the decade, little change Inprocedures and equipment will be required, and the Soviets presumably could develop dccontaminanls to neutralize new agents

field detector kits apparently are patterned after USavailable during World War II. According lo data suppliedlatest available) of the Soviet kit, It can detectpresumably oilier nerve agents, at the very low concentrationmilligrams per liter of air. The toxic oftecls arcand sarin ol lesser concentrations can be lethal afterexposure. The USSR is aware of Western developments Inalarms, including remote alarm systems, and hasandS device declassifiedut theseare not sufficiently sensitive to assure human safetyare nol In the field in peacetime. An automatic alarmon some armored personnel carriers lo permit mobilebut we do not know the agents delected or thePortable field laboratories and truck-mounted laborsavailable to chemical troops can detect all toxic agents asdetermine the effectiveness of protective items, bul would bemost tactical situations. There is no evidence of thea long-path Infrared system to detect nerve agentsistance.

Soviel Naval CW Defame Equipment

Soviet Navy is provided with essenllally lhe samethe protection of personnel and agent detection as the groundare equipped with decontamination facilities of various types,mechanical, chemical and steam sprays, and salt-waterequally applicable to the removal of radioactive fallouLfor sealing the control and operating stations and the messcruisers and destroyers against the entry of toxic vapors andparticles has been reported, with replacement air to becylinder* In each sealed chamber. While these measureseffective, recent US research has shownhip's combatmay be substantially reduced while scaled. Sovietunder construction In East German shipyards call for suchareas.



Salellilt! Military CW Dirrensc Preparalions

In the European Satellite aimics, chemical defense doctrine is similar to that of the USSK Units are to avoid chemical and nuclear conation insoiai as practicable while completing (heir assignment, and arc to proceed lo decontamination facilities only on orders from higher authority Adequate supplies of defensive materiel probably are available for initial issue lo standing forces bul large-scale chemical operations or mobilization would require increased local production or substantial Soviet support Individual items ol protective equipment and the detection kits on issue aie similar to Soviet models, wilh the same limitations, but there seems to be an almost complete lack of equipment on issue lor self aid or firsl aid treatment of nerve agentmajor vulnerability of Bloc lorces likely to be overcome later in the decade. Mobile field laboratories and automatic field alarms arc either very scarce or not available. ide variety ofequipment has been noted in the Satellite armies, but we do not know the actual extent of availability.

Bloc Civil Defense Aguinit Toxic Agent Attack

n the civilian training courses which the Soviets have conducted almost continuallyonsiderable improvisation Isto overcome persistent shortages of civil defense materiel. In recent years. Soviet civil defense, now subordinau to the Ministry of Defense, has stressed fallout protection rather than chemical defense. Detection kits similar to military models are available for use by trained personnel. The organized training of medical personnel and civilcadres to treat gas casualties can be tracedut theemphasis is on nuclear weapons' effects. Atropine by tablet oris prescribed for ihe nerve agent casualty bul apparently isonly at organized medical centers. Most of the numerous air raid shelters built in the USSK9 have been gas-tight, basement compartments, but many were not equipped for filtered ventilation when last observed. Civil defense Instructions issued2 concede that the civilian gas mask, on saleay not be available for immediate issue in lime of need and users arc specifically warned that "In winter, the rubber is likely lo harden and the rubber arms of the outlet valve may freeze lo the valvealety andprocedures have been well-publicized and special attention has been devoted to winter problems, bul here again, substantialmay still exist even of the specialized equipment and materials to be used by organized units.

reparations for the anlichcmical defense of the civilianof the European Satellites have produced even less results than



Ihey have in the USSR An increase in "volunteer"nbut its effectiveness is doubtful Very little protective equipment is available and the Soviet civilian gas mask lias had limited sales because of its relatively high cost Capabilities lor nerve agenlarc minimal and no atropine is available Air raid shelterhasart of civil defense planningumber ol shelters have reportedly been built As in the USSR, many were not equipped with suitable inters when observed.



Chemical warfare activities In the Soviet Union are conductedumber of organizations subordinate to the Council of Ministers,the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Public Health, the Academy uf Sciences, and olhciv The primary responsibility lor the toxic agent program is probably assigned to the Chief of Chemical Troops, who is subordinate to the Commander In Chief of Oround Forces In the Ministry of Defense. His responsibilities include supervision of research, production and procurement, training, development of tactics, and probably the allocation and distribution of toxic munitions and related equipment to all the services The Chief of Chemical Troops also controls the Military Academy of Chemical Defense In Moscow and other chemical warfare schools, and the Central Chemical Proving Ground al Shikhany. Other proving grounds probably under hisarc believed lo exist at Scmlpalatinsk or in the Yakutsk area for the large-scale testing of nerve agents.

In the Soviet Army, staff supervision extends from the Chief of Chemical Troops to the chiefs of specially trained chemical troops units assigned to each operational command In wartime, chemical troop units would be assigned at front, army, division, and regimental levels. In peacetime, they are organic to military districts and groups of forces, armies, divisions, and regiments The chiefs of these units advise the field commanders on the offensive use of toxic agents and on defense against both chemical and radiological hazards. They also supervise chemical and radiological defense training activities, reconnaissance, and the operation of decontamination facilities and special systems for agent dissemination.

Naval chemical warfare is under the direction of the Chief ol the Naval Chemical Directorate who has liaison through naval channels with the Ministry of Defense. In the organizationajor unit of the Soviet Navy, the Chemical Warfare Section, headedhief of Chemical Service, is on an equal level with the other operatingdirectly under lhe Executiveraduate chemical officer Is assigned to each cruiser and to each destroyer and submarine squadron, while noncommissioned officers are assigned to smaller ships

The Chief of Chemical Troops of the Ground Forces advises the Air Forces on chemical and radiological defensive matters through the Chief of the Chemical Service of the Air Forces, who Is responsible for training and defensive activities of all units of his branch of the service.


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Chemical personnel are assigned lo separate air technical divisions and regiments, and lo chemical sections of air army depots. Air Force chemical defense unlla. each consisting ol at least one officer and several enlisted personnel, have the primary responsibility (or the chemical and radiological defense ol each airfield.

n uddilion. such other forces as the Strategic Rocket Forces and the PVO Strany have chemical defense organizations to providedetection, decontamination, and first aid for chemical and radiation casualties The Bloc countries follow the general Sovietin iheir overall organization for CW, with minor variations at the higher levels.



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Original document.

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