CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, 1963-1969 (NIE 11-14-63)

Created: 1/8/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose

StibmHiad by th* DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Cencutfd in by Ihr UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indicated4

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Capabilities of the Soviet General PurposeI969

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM

FOREWORD

SUMMARY AND

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES .

II. SOVIET THEATER

Trend* int

Reorganization and ModemtaUon ol Ground

Tactical Air and Missile Support

Personnel Strengths

Size and

Manning Levels of

Number of

Types of

Ground

Tactical Air and Missile

Strengths and

Nondivtsional

Status of thc Re-equipment

Mobilization

Tactical Air and Missile

Theater Force Air Defense

Tactical Nuclear

Other Supporting

III. NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE22

Trends in

Size and Composition

Submarine

Surface Forces

Naval

SiXRtr

Page

C. CuTrcnt Strengths and Weaknesses

Against Carrier Task

Against Sea Lines of Communication

ASW Capabilities

Seallft

IV. CONTRIUUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

Forces

Air and-Missile

V. GENERAL WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST

Opcrational

Available for Employment

Ground Forces

Air and Missile Support

Naval

to Launch Campaigns Against Central

Immediately Available

Remforcement Capabilities

for Naval Operations Against

to Launch Campaigns in Other

VI. LIMITED WAR

A- Non-Nuclear Theater

Nuclear Warfare

Lunited Military

VII. TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES0

Aviation and

and Missile

Forces

ANNEXAND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

ANNEXCHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIETPURPOSE MISSILES. AIRCRAFT. AND SUBMARINES

ANNEX OF LARGE SOVIET THEATER FORCE UNITS

CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the role and capabilities of Soviet general' purpose forces over the next six years, especially against thc NATO area in Europe.

FOREWORD

As considered in this estimate, Soviet general purpose forces include: (a) theaterround combat and tactical air forces plus their associated command, support, and serviceup through the level of military districts and groups of forces; (b) naval genera! purpose forces,aval forcesto fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces but excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and (c) military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Sovietand service elements providing general support to allof the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missUe defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligencend are discussed herein only insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.

It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclearIt is obvious that such an exchange would profoundly affect the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missionseneral war.

IOea for Strategicated3 Keeled Dal. and Memorandum to Holder* of

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

requirements for genera! purpose forces are theof aeonlinuing debate within the Soviet leadership.Communist traditions alike prescribe the maintenanceground forces in being as wellarge mobilizationConservative elements, both military and political,this tradition remains valid, even in the circumstancesnuclear general war. Khrushchev, however, with somepolitical support, stresses the deterrent efTect of medium,and intercontinental range ballistic missilesthat Soviet requirements for general purpose forcesreduced. This debate remains unresolved, butthe trend in the size of Soviet general purpose forcesyears since Khrushchev came to power has

estimate that the personnel strength of Sovietforces nowillion men inn naval units, andnmilitary transport aviation. In addition, there aremen performing command and general supportthc entire militaryeneral purposeestimated toine divisions;and cruise missile submarines;actical fighters and light bombers; andnaval jet medium bombers.

Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern,large number of combat strength divisions backed up by apotential All presently existing divisions haveleast nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized

llie loinl manpower in the Soviet miliiary establishment Is estimated to be approximately as follows;

and General Support

General Purpose

Ground

Air

Naval

Stralegic Defense Forces

Strategic Attack

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rille. or airborne. Tlie modernization program has made heavy demands on resources in short supply in the USSR, and we believe that Soviet ground force capabilities are still adversely affected by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in equipment.)

the past several years, the Soviets havetotal number of their divisions and have also reduced themaintained at high levels of combat readiness. WethatSoviet divisions are now maintainedtercent or more of total authorizedstrength. Thc remainder are atercent of authorized personnel) orercent orven at full wartimedivisions are considerably smaller than US divisions.wartime strength of tank divisions isof motorized rifle divisions,ostorganized into armies, which are also quite small byTlie non-divisional combat and service supportpresently maintained are probably considerably shortrequirements. )

there areombat strengthoviet tactical aircraft in East GermanyWithout prior buildup, this force could launch aattack, designed to maximize the chance ofWe believe, however, that the Soviets would seeka considerably larger striking force ifampaign against Western Europe.be drawn from western USSR and from the Satelliteestimate that under noncombatforce, Including5 Satellite divisions, couldand organized for operations against Westernaboutaysoviet decision to doorce might includeactical aircraft and

' In Unas of manpower, Uieae divisions and their support wouldground troops normally staUoned In Eastand Poland

Soviet ground troops trom

Satellite

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be backed upheater reserve of ground units. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce oncale without detection.)

recent years, Soviet theater forces have acquiredtactical missile capabilities, including unguidedballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxicand warheads have been provided for tactical use;that their release is kept under strict)

thc provision of tactical and air defense missilessupport of theater forces, the strength of Tacticalsharply reduced but has remained fairly stable sincenumber of tactical aircraft seems low in relation to thethe theater ground forces. Moreover, most tacticalobsolescent. Fighter-bombers have been conspicuouslyalthoughype is now being introduced.air defense is limited by the lack of surface-to-airfor low altitude defense and for rapidly

recent years, the Soviet Navy has beentrainedrimarily defensive role. Much of thechange has come from the USSR's concern over. carrier task forces and missile submarines.the former forces at sea, the Soviets havemissiles carried by bombers and submarines. Sovietwarfare capabilities are negligible in open oceanprobably will remain quite limited, but capabilities foragainst carrier task forces have been Improvedof aircraft of Long Range Aviation. The Sovietforce poses an increasing threat to Free Worldin thc northeastern Atlantic and northwesternSoviet surface ships are largely dependent uponair cover and their capabilities are correspondingly )

arc anen in thc Eastground forces (excludingheseivisions at various levels of strength andbelieve that about half of these divisions are sufficiently

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manned and equipped for early employment in conjunction with Soviet lorces. Their political reliability would remain anfactor in some circumstances. )

J. During thc past year, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat their expectation that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitablyTheir recent writings indicate that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remainefforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear opcratioas have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities. The USSR's capabilities for limited warfare in areas remote from its borders remain severely limited. )

K. For at least the next few years, the size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces will probably be governed by compromisesontinuing debate within Soviet ruling circles rather than by any clearly-defined strategic and politicalEconomic considerations, Sino-Soviet relations, andwithin NATO will be critical factors influencing the future of Soviet theater forces. In our view, the chances are good that the number of personnel and divisions in theater ground forces will decline moderately over the next six years.of ground, naval, and air general purpose forces will tend to correct current deficiencies. )

DISCUSSION

L SOVIET POUCY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Geographical, and political factors have madewarfare on the Eurasian continent thc haslc concern ofdoctrine. Except for Long Range Aviation, the Sovietsvisualized independent offensive air operations; in particular.forces arc subordinated lo commanders of theater groundfor the recent development of missile submarines. Soviethas been oriented towurd defense of the homeland, support offorces in Eurasian writers, and interdiction of rea lines of

in the nuclear era. the emphasis on theater warfarespite of the allocation of major resources to strategic defenseforces. So long bl Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclearremained very limited, thc military basts for Soviet policiesrested heavily on war-winning capabilities for theatermisgivings there may have been regarding their viabilitygeneral nuclear war. In terms of actual war-fighting capabilitiesof Western military action, the large ground and tacticalwere, until thes. tbe prime element of the Sovietestablishment. Even today, the bulk of the Soviet strategicas well as most of tbe submarine force, Is best suited forlhe Eurasian area.

As Soviet capabilities for nuclear/missile attack against both Europe and North America began to emerge in thes, the firstchallenge to the primacy of land warfare in Soviet military doctrine was issued. An intense military debate ensued. Khrushchev andajority of the political leadership, supportedinority of the military spokesmen, argued for revision of doctrines ond forces In ways appropriate to nuclear/missile warfare. This school of thought was almost certainly influenced by concern for the strains on the Soviet economy resuIUng from the heavy costs of advanced weapons, new equipment, and manpower for both strategic and theater forces, and the effect of such strains on key nonmllltary programs.

Khrushchev has argued that massive standing armies are an obsolete luxury which the Soviet Union can ill aflord. In his fullest exposition of military doctrine, lnnd in subsequent public and private statements, he has maintained that Uie enormous Increases in firepower achieved by thc Introduction of nuclear and missile weapons greatly reduce the need for military manpower. Khrushchev's public position on Uie relative utility of types of military forces may have been exaggerated In order to maximize the political Impact of hisat home and abroad, and we have no conclusive indications of

far he might actually wish to go in restructuring Soviet forces.Khrushchev's tendency to deprecate the importance of general purpose forces appears toalculation that the existence of nuclear weapons can and will deter both sides from Initiating war.

he military, who are more immediately concerned with developing forces for use in the event deterrence fails, have naturally taken the question of general purpose forces much more seriously. However, they have not been of one mind on the question of the role of theater forces in nuclear war. There has been complex debate over the issue. Some have taken the Khrushchcvian or modernist approach with Its emphasis on deterrence. Most have arguedar-winning military capability in both strategic and theater forces, including mass armies ready for immediate employment. Out of thc debate, compromiseon military doctrine were formulated and were published In the open press. These compromises were contradictory and precarious. That they satisfied no school of Soviet military thought became evident through revisions and criticism In thc public press.

.ut in the numerical site of Soviet forces, which Khrushchev sponsored, was resisted by the military. The process of reduction haden before Khrushchev announced theof Soviet forcesoreign policy move In1 Berlin crisis. Inhen his political position seemed to have weakened, Khrushchev spoke defensively about the primacy of military needs and hinted strongly at Increased military spending. Recently, however, Khrushchev has reverted to public advocacy of reductions in both the military budget and the size of the forces.

sum, the development of Soviet general purpose forces sincehas not, in our view, resulted from Soviet pursuit of aconcept of the role of these forces in war. In the future,towards these and other types of forces will continue to beonlyariety of strategic, historical, technical, economic,factors, but also by differing views about the relativethese factors and by shifting compromises among these views.in this ongoing debate ratheringle,concept arc likely to govern the size and composition ofpurpose forces through the period of this estimate.

II. SOVIET THEATER FORCES A. Post Trends In Development

Reorganization and Modernization ot Ground Forces

Soviets have pursued an ambitious program to convertII rifle, horse cavalry, tank, and mechanized divisions Intoheavily armored units. The modernization of the huge, rela-

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lively unsophisticated ground forces was an enormousade heavy demands on motor vehicles, electronic equipment, and skilled personnel, al! of which were In short supply in the USSRwith the modernization ol the Soviet theater forces, theSatellite armies were organized and equipped from the ground up. In addition, the Soviets also equipped Asian Communist forces with large quantities of materiel, including lhat expended in the Korean War.

e believe that all Soviet line divisions are now at least nominally constituted as modern tank, motorized rifle, and airborne units, although wc doubt that thc process of reorganization and re-equipping has been completed in al] cases. Moreover, it is evident that there werealong thc way. Some equipment adopted as standard was far short of desired military specifications. For instance, thc original armored personnel carriers were general purpose trucks with light armor added. Most armored personnel carriers presently In service lack overhead cover, and, belng'wheeled rather than tracked, have poormobility.

order to provide combat support to the modernized groundthe Soviets required artillery with greater mobility, moreengineer support, much better communications,obile field army air defense system. As thewere progressively converted, their ability lo conducta minimum of logistic support supplemented by fielddiminished. In particular, requirements for fuels, lubricants,for the vastly greater number of vehicles IncreasedSoviets apparently paid less attention to providing thestructure required for the theater forces than tore-equipping the line units.

Tactical Air and Missile Support

The emphasis given strategic defense of the USSR against bomber attack in thes ands hasonsiderable influence on developments in Soviet tactical aviation. The Soviet program during those years to develop and produce jet interceptors was very large, but all models were short-range types and fighter-bombers with offensive capabilities comparable to those in Western tactical air forces never appeared. Tactical air units were equipped with the same interceptors that were provided to strategic air defense units, despite their poor characteristics for ground attack missions. On the other hand, during the9arge number or first generation Jet light bombers {BEAGLE) were produced for strike and reconnaissance roles within theater forces.

, the total number of Jet fighters and light bombers in tactical aviation was reduced to less than half of its prior

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strcngth. The sharpest reductions resulted from thc deactivation of aging BEAGLEs, probably due in large partoviet decision to rely heavily on missile strikes, including MRBMs and IRBMs, in nuclear war. There waseduction In flgbter strength, probably due in large part to increased reliance on surface-to-air missiles Introduced during the same period for air defense of the homeland and of field forces.hc number of combat aircraft ln tactical aviation hasfairly stable.

changes In tactical aviation were accompanied, and inby the advent of missile systems for thc tactical supportforce operations. Since the end of World War II. the SovieUseveral types of short-range unguided rockets andcruise-type missiles for field use. Early generation ballistica Soviet version of thend asystem with about twice Its range. Both of these systemsmobility and slow reaction times. We think tbey weredeployed In large numbers'and that. In any event, they havesuperseded.

he highly mobileun. ballistichas been available to grwind force units. Deploymentto Soviet forces in East Europe and western USSR wasbyore recently, the. cruise missile syslem. has been Introduced. Wethat the SCUD and SHADDOCK are the principal(other than unguided rockets) now in service with SovietTheir increasing availability provides the theater forcesmissile delivery capabilities for high explosive, toxicnuclear warheads.

Personnel S'rengfhs

Uie Korean conflict the number of men in theforcesost-Worldigh of roughly fourthcs, this strength had been reduced to roughly twoAs the net result of changes that have occurredforces have been further reducedovel which wowithin the rangeillion ate believeline divisions and tactical air units haveacti ratedyears, but Uiat Uie reduction ln Uie number of line divisionsbeen proportionate to the personnel reducUona. There is evidence

'"These numbersS million In theater ground forces andn TacUcal Aviation. They excludeeneral command and suppori personnel, most of whom have been Included In previous estimates as part of theater forces. These personnel support all elements of Uie Soviet militaryec Annex A, Tabic 1.

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lhal in many cases the Soviels elected to cut manning levels within divisions, thus reducing the proportion of divisions maintainedow ratio of nondivlsional support units to divisions has continued despite the growing logistic and maintenance requirementsore mechanized army.

IJ. Current Size and Composition

Aio/tninfi Levels of Divisions

here is little direct evidence on which to base an estimate of the actual personnel strengths of Soviet divisions.ariety of reliable sources, including classified Soviet documents, we do know that there are three general categories of divisions. The differences between these categories are measured most conveniently in terms of theof authorized personnel strength normally maintained inThese diflerences, however,ore fundamental element of Soviet planning for mobilization in the event of general warhreat of general war. Much of this planning Is designed to mount and sustain large-scale operations against powerful NATO forces in Europe. The Soviets evidently anticipate that some divisions would need to be. ready for combat on short notice, others would constitute reinforcements for initial or very early operations, and still others wouldonger term mobilization base. This planning, moreover, implies that the required combat effectiveness of divisions'would vary depending upon such factors as the time of their availability for commitment to battle, the tasks they would be expected to perform, and the effectiveness of thc enemy forces they would face when committed.

onsidering the fragmentary direct evidence on division manning levels, limited evidence as to the total manpower available in the ground forces, and the apparent basic structure of these forces, we estimate lhal the three categories of Soviet line divisions have thc followingcharacteristics:

I or combat strength divisions are probably manned ator more of authorized wartime strength. They are readyto combat with little or no augmentation. They areto form the backbone of first-echelon striking forcesenemy forces. They would have thc highest combatof any Soviet divisions when committed.

II or reduced strength divisions are probably mannedpercent of authorized wartime strength. They couldfleshed out with reservists and ready to moveheater ofwithineek or so. They are intended, therefore, toreinforcements for early combat operaUons byivisions.

Their greatest usefulness woulde as second-echelon or theater reserve units.

C Category III or cadre strength divisions are probably manned atercent or less ot authorized wartime strength, containing most of their officer and NCO complements but few troops. They are Intended loonger term mobillzaUon base. They could probably be fleshed out with reservistseek or so. but they would probably not be suitable as reinforcements or replacements for operaUons against powerful enemy forcesatter of months. After several weeks, however, they could probably be. useful for mopping-up operations, llne-of-communlcallons duUes, or reconstrucUon work.

Number ol Divisions

We havehorough review of all evidence bearing on the number of Soviet divisions, their distribuUon by type, end their geographic location. As part of this review wc haveetailed assessmentnUUes, each of which might be considered toivision on the basis of some kind of evidence, and have madeas to which were firmly identified and which should be regarded with lesser degrees of assurance. We have also considered the number of divisions likely to be associated with Uie corps and army structure of Uie Soviet ground forces. Finally, we have calculated the probable number of existing divisions taking into account Uie varying degrees of uncertainty about individual organizations. From the results of these complementary forms of analysis, we conclude that the present number of division-level organizations In thc Soviet ground forcescertainly falls within thc range

Considering Uie evidence available, we believe that no singlewithinange estimated above Is more likely than any other to be the actual total number of Soviet divisions. However, In order to discuss thc probable distribuUan of Soviet divisions by type and location, we have hod to employ the only form of analysis suitable for thisassessment of Individual cnUtlcs. This form of analysisingle, as Uie total number of entities rated as firm. lUghly probable, or probable divisions, excluding those rated as only possible. While using Uie results of Uus analysis ln the following paragraphs and In our tablesatter of convenience, we emphasise Uiat the total, is no more probable than any other lnange. It should be noted Uiat an assumption that Uie total number of Sovici divisions is on the high side of Uie

'This range isivisions lower than the range esUmatcd InCapabilities of the Soviet TheaterJ, SECRET. The change results from re-oaluaUon and should not be taken to mean that thc USSR has reduced Its forces by this amount Jn the past year.

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ange would imply greater requirements for equipment and nondivisional support, and so would tend to maxim ire any Sovietui those respects.

Our analysis indicates that Uie probable number of divisions maintained al Uie highest peaccUme manning level,r combat strength divisions, fall within thc rangen the remainder of this esUmate, to discuss Uie probable distribution by type and location, we use Uie figureumber which is appropriate only if Uie total number of divisions. It should be noted that this procedure maximizes the immediate Soviet threat hi Uie event of war, but it also maximizes the Ume required lo bring addiUonal divisions to combat readiness, since most of the remainingivisions would be at cadre strength if.iven total number ofere mamtained at high strength.

Thc assurance regarding thc Identification ofivisions included in this estimate varies markedly with their locaUon. Of this total,ndividual organizaUons are considered firmly and currcnUy established as divisions (in one or another of the threendf thesere In areas west of Uie Urals. The divisions in Eastern Europe are firmly Identified; most of those in western USSR are firmly identified or highly probable: those ln more remote areas are much less certain. Our evidence also leads us lo believe that divisions in Eastern Europe and western USSR are generally at higher manning levels than divisions deep wlUdn thc USSR. Thus, the uncertainty represented by the rangeinvolves primarily low strength divisions located in areas remote from NATO, and does not significantly affect immediate capabilities against NATO.

Types of Division*

he Soviets Iiave three types of line divisions: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. Even at wartime strength, aU types of Sovietare considerably smaller Uian US divisions. Further, they are much lighter In divisional logistic support and some typos of combat support. Since Uie publicaUon ofe have acquired evidence leading us to believe Uiat In0 Uie Soviets reduced Uie authorized wartime personnel strength of divisions by as much asercent, together with some reductions in combat vehicles and artillery. At the same time, new armaments were authorized forsuch as anU-tank missiles,aunchers, and new combat vehicles.

This compares with the figurestimated Inn that estimate, we made no attempt lo arriveanee of uncertainty. As In Uie case of the total number of divisions, the change results from revaluation.

'Similar to US HONEST JOHN.

SECRET

otorized rilio divisions arc the most numerous of tliethe Soviet (and Satellite) ground forces;ovietabove includeotorized nJlc divisions.f than atIn the course of the postwar evolution of the Sovielthis type of division was developedore compactearlier mechanized divisions. Thc authorized personnel strengthmotorized rifle division lias been gradually reduced. There hasgeneral trend to increase its armor and mobility In order toto thc combined arms ladies and fast rates of advance advocateddoctrine for the nuclear battlefield. It ls almost certainsignificant proportion of the motorized rifle divisions are notequipped according to the latest tables of organization and 1

ank divisions have also evolved from Worldypes. The tank divisions are small and Ught in infantry troops when compared to US armoredn some tank divisions one of the three organic tank regiments is equipped with heavy rather than medium tanks, but there is some evidence that heavy tanks ore being phased out and replaced with mediums. In our recent review of evidence, we have concluded thativisions which we formerly Identified' as motorized rifle or older mechanized division's are probablyoviet divisions cited above Includeank divisions,f them at combat strength. As in the case of the motorized rifle' divisions, tank divisions arc not yet fully equipped according to the latest TOE.

evidence ls available on the organization andSoviet airborne divisions than on other types. The division issimilarotorized rifle division, but without heavier itemssuch as tanks and larger artillery pieces. The numberdivisions has declined over the past few years from ten They are all believed to be at combat strength.

Ground Armies

Soviet divisions arc organized Into combined armstank armies, which contain the bulk of thc combat and servicefor the divisions. The compositionoviet ground armywould vary depending upon such factors as terrain andEvidence from Soviet exercises and classified militarythat the Soviets usually assumeartime ground armyfour or five divisions. In this estimate, we consider this to

motorized rifle and tank divisions at authorised wartime strength are believed to have0en respectively. Seeor TOEs.

These were carried as motorized rifle divisions la

represent thu Sizeypical Soviet army, recognizing that many variations arc possible.

Our evidence indicates that aboutrrmies now exist In thc Soviet ground forces. These armies are much smaller lhan the image often invoked by the termot only because of the relatively small size of their divisions but also because of their paucity of combal and service support elements. Supporting artillery, missile, and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments arc cither allocated to armies or retained under higher command headquarters. Into the armies, there is evidence lhat five to seven corps still exist, and wc believe that these serve, in effect, as small armies.

In the event of general war most of these armies would probably be grouped Into fronts. The Soviel wartime fronl is an echelon roughly comparableestern army group.'" The Group of Soviet Forces, Germanyhich can be regardedront, contains four combined arms armies and two tankhile we have not Identified every army in the USSR as lo type, there appears toimilar ratio of two combined arms armies to one lank armythe ground forces.

t

A typical Soviet combined arms armyn wartime could be composed of one tank division and four motorized rifle divisions with organic army combat and service support troops. We believe that the wartime personnel strength ofAA would behe present strength of the four CAAs in GSFG. however, is estimated to vary0his lower strength is due ln part to the fact that these armiesatherivisions, but probably also to their having an even smaller support structure than lhat estimated for the wartime CAA.

Soviet tanksually contain only lank divisions. We believeypical tank army would be composed of four divisions, although at present the two tank armies in GSFG contain only three divisions each. The estimated personnel strengthypical wartime tank army would behereas the two tank armies ln GSFG are estimated to contain0 troops each. Tne reasons for this difference are probably basically the same as In the case of thc combined arms army. Soviet tank armies probablyCUD missile brigade, but no other nondlvislonal field artillery.

"See Annex C,or llluatraUve organizationartimeec Annex A.or estimated composition ofee Annex C.or IllustraUvc organltaUonartimeee Annex C.or Illustrative oreanlsaUonartime tank anny.

Id

" SCCPtT-

Toclical Air and Missile Support "

doctrine callsacUcal ait army (TAA) toground commands, generallyalio of one TAA per front

Bround armies The siM and composition of the 10

identified tactical air armies varies considerably. With the exception ofh TAA in GSFG. wluch hasombat aircraft these units range in aircraft strength from.

Since the reduction of Tacticalew years ago, it has been generally stabilized in overall aircraft strength, with phasing in of new model aircrarL and continuing retirement of older models. There are currentlyombat aircraft in Tactical Aviation comprisingightersight bombers. Includingaircraft of bothbout half this total strength is with Soviet forces In Eastern Europe, and most of the remainder is in western and southern USSR.

Soviet tactical missile support includes free rocket (FROG) launchers with ranges up to. These launchers are mountedight tank chassis. Sightings of these weapons with Soviet units have been rare, but wc estimate that at least theivisions probably nowROG battalion with two launchers.

actical ballistic missile (SCUD) is found at bothhigher echelons. The SCUD is mountedeavy tankgives it cross-country mobility, and it employs storableThe latest modelaximum rangem. withor nuclear warheads; earlier models, probably sliU In service,range with HE or CW warheads, but only about half theewissiles have been sighted in GSFG,evidence of the extent of deployment is not available. Thesystem has been operational for several years, however, and, onof its probable assignment to field army and higher echelonsthatexist.

Soviets haverowing Interest in cruise missilesuse. The principal cruise missile now employed intheater forces is thc road-mobileSHADDOCK) whichnuclear or CW warheadsange. Thea low alUtude flight profile and fliesowIt may have replacedun.ront weapons system. The evidence is equivocal asSHADDOCK units are assigned to tacUcal.air armies or to

-See Annexor UeUcaJ missile characteristics.See Annex A.or numbers and location.

separate front artillery formations, or lo both. Our knowledge of the extent of deployment of SHADDOCK is even poorer than that available on SCUD, but on the basis of the same general considerations, wea present force level ofaunchers, thc majority of them in western border areas of the USSR.

believe that over thc past year or so. tlie quantity ofmissile launchers in theater forces has remained. while quality has Improved with thc introductionmissUe systems. Although nuclear warheads are probablyarmament for these missiles, there fat some evidence thatwere providedelatively high percentage (aboutproportion is probably declining as nuclear warheads becomeavailable. High explosive warheads are probably also

C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses

ground forcesarge number of linecan be readied for combat on short notice, backed up bya large mobihzaUon potential. Thc ready force Isequipped with modem materiel. Is highly mobile, and Iseffective employmentuclear environment. The troops arehighly disciplined, and have great endurance Sovietare called up for three years or longer depending on theirservice and tills syslem resultsairly stable personneltheater forces. Soviet forces are at peak efficiency in lateearly fall.ecline in combat readiness occurs withturnover in lower ranks later in the fall of thc year.have recognized the need to avoid fluctuations in readinessattempting lo spread the Induction of new recruits morethe year.

Nondivisional Suppori

evidence on nondivisional supporting elements Is eventhan that available on divisions. However, In view ofrequirements of the modernized Soviet ground forces,of personnel in nondivisional elements appears austere.are lnivisions,f them in Category r, then theof personnel in theater ground forces assigned toand service support may now be as small asikely Uiat Soviet forces in East Europe and western USSRnondivisional support than those deep in the interior, butaustere support for major units can be found even tn GSFG,and service, support clcmcnls probably account for no

"Sec- Annex A, Table 1.

secner

more thanercent of the total strength in each of the combined arms armies. Based on thc fragmentary data available, wc think that the number of nondivisional support personnel normallyeacetime is likely to be somewlrat less than half of themsiun force.

Status of the Re-equipment Program

he program of modernization and reorganization has Involved thc introduction tn recent years of more advanced designs of many types of equipment, including many types of missiles and improved combat vehicles. In most Instances, successive generations of equipment have been produced since World War II. Although Soviet ground forces arc not fully equipped with materiel of the later designs, many older models still in service remain generally effective. Despite the Introduction of several more advanced models of tanks. It appears that someercent of tho medium tanks ln GSFG are Worlds. In certain key categories of equipment, such as armored personnel carriers, general purpose trucks, and POL transporters, there are good indications that Soviet forces are short of total wartime TOE requirements.Soviet military spokesmen have alluded to equipment deficiencies and problems of obsolescence.

ur evidence is fragmentary and Inconclusive as to total Soviet produclion and total Inventories of ground forcenestimates we presented inventory figures based on this evidence and on calculated Soviet requirements, bul we now consider that such figures have Insufficient validity to be included Ln an estimate. We arc currently re-evaluating the evidence in an effort to arrive at probable ranges of uncertainty In total equipment inventories. Pendingot this re-evaluation, the evidence docs seem clearly to support the belief that there are shortages of at least the types of equipment mentioned above.

Mobilization Potential

he Soviets havearge pool of trained iwervists to fill out existing units and mobilize additional units.rained ground force personnel enter the reserve force yearly, not counting those in home air defense forces Most of the personnel released from the active force over the past five years or so were probably trained

"In many cases, the evidence It so Incomplete that widely varying estimates can be derived from It, depending on the assumptions made. For example, the available evidenceirm conclusioninimum4 tanks have been produced. The number is almost certainly larger than that. On the basis ol certain assumptions, the available evidence can support an In. ventory figure of moro

SCCftCT

with tho more modern equipment and in current Soviet tactics. Enough of these personnel are available as reservists to provide tlie additional men requiredheater ground force) divisions and their associated nondlvisional support.

As indicated ln previous paragraplis, our information on Soviet equipment Inventories is not good enough toonfidentabout Uie adequacy withivisions could be equipped in the event of mobilization. In general, we believe thatnd II divisions probably have nearly full complements of equipment,only certain newer items. Whatever quantity of equipment is available for Category III divisions, it is probably not as up-to-date as that of the higher categories.

Should Uie Soviets choose to do so, additional divisions could be formed by detaching cadres from existing divisions and calling up trained reservists. There are [TObably sufficient inventories of some types of equipment to allow for mobttlaaUonivision force, but shortages would make themselves felt even more severely If Uieattempted such an expansion. Moreover, it is doubtful Uiat all of the necessary additional combat and service elements could be mobilized at the same rate as divisions.obilization of additionalwould involve the loss of greater and more immediate capabilities which could be achieved through fkshlngorce.

Almost all Soviet aircraft and ships are maintained in active status. Naval and air reservists would probably be mobilized to bring existing units up to full wartime personnel complements. We would expect no significant Increase in the operational Inventory of ships and aircraftesult of mobilization, but supporting elements would probably be expanded

Tactical Air and Mitito Support .

Soviet Tactical Aviation Is currently cliaracterizedowof aircraft reJaUve to Uie size of Uie theater ground forces, limited offensive capabiliUes. and Uie obsolescence of the force. The Soviets arc reducing deficiencies In Tactical Aviation through Uie introduction of improved aircraft and armament, as well as increased trainingon ground support missions. The obsolescent BEAGLEight bomber Is still Uie mainstay of Soviet offensive tactical airbut appears now to be phasing out tn favor of FIREBARew supersonic Jet light bomber, which has entered service In small Someave radar bombing

Most current Soviet fighters were designed primarily asand therefore have poor load-carrying and range capabilities

oflunsivcboutercent of thc lACtical fighters are obsolescent FAGOTS. FRESCOs.FARMERS However, even with their limitations, Soviet fighters canariety of missions in support ol ground forces and can bc equipped to deliver nuclear bombs Some of the newer fighters (FITTER andlthough they were also basically designed as interceptors, have improvedover the older models for offensive missions. The number of new generation fighters In Tactical Aviation has increased fromercent of the total Inventory toercent over the past year.

oviet tactical missiles, particularly thc FROGs and SCUDsave good mobility and appear rugged and simple ln design. However, some classified Soviet articles have criticised the Inability of tactical missile units to maintain continuous fire support because of Lhe time required to displace them to new filing positions. These articles reflected the desire of Soviet theater ground force officers to have MROMs allocated to their operaUonal eontiol. but their proposals were evidently rejected.

Theater force Air Defense Copabffitiot

espite increasing numbers of surface-to-air missiles, Soviet theater force air defenses still rely primarily on automatic antiaircraftmm and smaller) end tactical aircraft. The introduction ofewnterceptors Into Soviet tactical air units (Includingn East Germany) has significantly Increased air defense capabilities.issile units are now believed to be assigned to armies and higher echelons, but because of displacement Ume and lack of low altitude capabilities, this system has onlyapidly moving situation. The automatic antiaircraft weapons currently constitute the only defenses mobile enough to provideair defense for troops when fighter cover is not available, and the effectiveness of these weapons against modem high performance aircraft is minimal.

focf/col Nuctoar Capabilitiet

uclear weapons appear not to be physically located with field forces in peacetime. As far as we can determine, they arc stored In Ministry of Defense depots located within Ihc USSR, although then-is some evidence, which wc have not been able to confirmj

aircraft.

SEC 1'Ll

East Germany. Special units of KGBof State Security) troops have been created to maintain custody of nuclear weapons, not only ln storage, bul also during transportation to firing units. Once their use was authorized by national leadership,

"See Annex D,or estimated close nupport capabilities of tacucal

1 reran

19

SCCRCT

tactical nuclear weapons would be delivered to firing units by the special KGB units.

Command and allocation lines of authority for the use of nuclear weapons run from the High Command to commanders of fronts and, in some cases, armies. These procedures give the national leadershipcontrol over thc numbers and yields of weapons employed In major theaters. Allocations within the theater are governed byguidelines which limit the freedom of field commanders to select targets. The entire system of command and control appears wellto reserve to the national leadership Uie decision to Initiate use of nuclear weapons.

The broad range of nuclear tests12 points to an effort to improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of Uie Soviet military establishment. The numbers of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet theater forces have probably been limited by higher prioriUes afforded the strategic attack forces. Nevertheless, we believeariety ofnuclear weapons Is now available, virtually all of them with yields In the kiloton range; but possibly Including some In the low megaton range. The Sovieis are probably developing subkilcton warheads, but ther; is no present evidence that Uiey arc developing delivery systems specifically for such weapons.

Classified documents Indicate that Soviet military planners for the past few years have beenosition to think in terms of committing upew hundred nuclear weaponsront operaUon. Initialstrikes arc considered crucial to anigh volume of concentrated nuclear strikes is called for prior to offensive thrusts by ground forces, with theater forcesarge percentage of their nuclear weapons allocations in these strikes. The primary targe's in all phases of theater operations remain enemy nuclear deliveryTo the extent of weapons availability, nuclear strikes would also be directed at command and control complexes, air defense facilities, logistical installations, and major troop formations. We believe,that existing procedures, together with deficiencies In logisticwould hamper thc Soviets In terms of operational readiness and rapid response in their employment of tactical nuclear weapons. We have no doubt that the Soviets are working to overcome these deficiencies, although we have no evidence on their progress.

Olhor Supporting Capabilities

Warfare.'* We possess good technical data on thecapability of Soviet theater forces to employ tactical cruisemissiles and FROGS with toxic chemical warheads. In addi-

"uller discussion, secSoviet Capabilities and intentions with Respect to ChemicalatedECRET.

SECRET

tion, chemical bombs and projectiles arc available [or use with other delivery system* such as tacUcal aircraft, artillery, mortars, and barrage rockets. Spray systems and land mines have also been developed. Whereas our evidence indicates that missile warheads are bulk-filled exclusively with one of Uie extremely toxic "V" agents, all otherare apparenUy filled with less toxic nerve agents of the "O" type (sarin or soman) or with agents of older types which first saw use in World War I.

Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment,and research and development can support substantial toxicwarfare operaUons. Although some CW munitions arc probablyavailable to Soviet tactical units, logistical problems might affect thc Soviet's ability to bring their stored CW stocks Into play against NATO forces tn Europe. Aboutercent of thc probable toxicdepot storage we have idenUfied Is in western and central USSR and aboutercent in Uie Far East. Nearly all that In Uie western and central USSR Is located in thc Volga and Turkestan Military Districts. It Is therefore not well sited for usear In the West which began with short warning times and Involved heavy interdiction of transportation facilities.

We believe Uiat ln Soviet thinking Uie same constraints which apply to Uie use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW, and that Uie use of either would require a- decision at Uie highest political level. The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operaUons probably results in part from restricted availability of tacUcal nuclear weapons due to the longstanding nuclear priority assigned strategic forces. Considering this and other factors, we believe Uiat Uie Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by their theater field forceseneral nuclear wor.on-nuclear war, the Soviets probably would not Initiate the use of toxic chemicals.

5S. Biological Warfare. Intelligence derived from Soviet scientific publications Indicates continued interest and research in the field of biological warfare. We have no evidence of current Soviet rnllitary capabilities for application to theater operations, however, and weSoviet tactical use of BW highly unlikely.

her-Ural. Biological, and Radiological Defense. Soviet military authoriUes evidenUy assume Uiat Uie West would use chemical ond biological as well as nuclear weapons In Uie event of general war. All elements of thc Soviet forces stress training tor chemical defense. This training, as well as most Items of chemical defense equipment. Isalso for defense against radiaUon and biological warfare agents. Manual and aulomaUc radiation and chemical detection devices are available, but sensitivity of Uie latter to nerve agents Is inadequate to guarantee human safety. An armored personnel carrier lias been modl-

SCCRCI

- ftftftET-

liecl for mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but we do not know the sensitivity of the detection systems. The chemical defense equipment supplied the individual combat soldier is adequate to protect himoxic environment forhort time.

econnat'tance. While there Is little current Information onbattlefield surveillance techniques. Intelligence available does not suggest that substantial progress has been made in overcomingSoviet deficiencies In this field. Most Soviet aircraft designated for this mission ore obsolescent, although the FLASIILiaHTew tactical reconnaissance aircrafl, is now available. In the theater ground forces'thcro arc apparently no longer any nondivisianal armoredunits; divisions themselves ore expected to perform required ground reconnaissance missions, but their specialised reconnaissance elements are minimal. The reconnaissance equipment ln operation is apparently, for the most part, incapable of rapidly providing the ground missile units with accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed and transmitted. There are probably still serious organizationalin the way of exploitation of collected Intelligence. Some Soviel authors have strongly criticized the system ot battlefieldavailable, at least ups incapable of fully meeting the requirements of nuclear warfare.

irlift.ight transport aircraft of the CAB. COACH and CRATE types andedium turboprop transports of the CAT, CAMP and COB types are assigned by Soviet MilitaryAviation to support of airbornehe assigned transport aircraft of the airborne troops are sufficient toingle airborne division in one sortie. Thc range of the Soviet troop transport aircraft would limit the radius of airborne assault to. from assembly airfields. The probable addition in the near future of more transports will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas. We believe that In several years transportsto support of airborne troops may have twice the present lift capacity, but still to limited ranges.

III. NAVAl GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

A. Post Trends in Development

ntil recent years the Soviet Navy was equipped and trainedrimarily defensive role. An Intensive postwar shipbuildingwhich reached its peakurface fleet Including

"Tor estimated characteristic* and performance of these and other Soviet transport aircraft, sec Annex B, Table 4.

6EGhct

cruisers, destroyers, ana escort ships, which was limited for effective OperaUons lo thc range of shore-based aircraft. The large Sovietforce has been composed, for the most part, of types Ihnilcd to operations in the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific waters. However, In the past few years the Soviets have developed an increasingly diversified naval forceew emphasis on ships, weapons, andof greater range and effectiveness.

of the impetus for technological change in the Sovietcome from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by USforces and missile submarines. To counter these forces atSoviets have introduced medium bombers equipped withsubmarines equipped with cruise missiles, new classes ofwarfare (ASW) ships, and improved weapons andThey have also introduced Improved attack submarines,and diesel. Soviet surface forces have been strengthenedaddition of missile armament to two cruisers and severaldestroyer and patrol craft, and by the Introduction of newships.*'

B. Current Size and Composition Submarlno force **

Soviet capabiliUes for conducting operations at long distances from the Soviet coast derive primarily from the submarine force. The total strength ol the Soviet submarine force has changed little In the past few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate It willto includeirst line units. However, with theemphasis on missile armament and nuclear propulsion, itsare changing significantly. For example,he USSR had only aboutiesei-powered, torpedo-attack submarines capable of conducting patrols off North American coasts. It now hasuclear and diesel submarines with this endurance, about half of them armed with missiles.

The bulk of Uie Soviet torpedo-attack submarine force consists of diesel submarines, built for the most part Ins. These Includelass,lass,lass, andlass submarines.8 the Soviets have producedlass diesel submarines andlass nuclear submarines; both of these classes have sufficientto conduct long-range patrols."

Sec Annex B,or characteristics of Soviet naval missiles.

"See Annex A,or strength and composition.

"See Annex B.or submarine characteristics and armament.

-SECRET

Surface Forces "

surface forces, which are still heavily dependent uponlogistic and air support, appear suited primarily forIn waters adjacent to the USSR Conventionally armedunits now compriseght cruisers.estroyers,scorts. In recent years, however, the Soviet Navy hasincreased the firepower of its surface forces by the additionarmament, including surface-to-air missiles, which haspotential scope of effective operations. The only known majorcombatant ships now being built in the USSR are guidedtypes. Tlie Soviets now have operationalestroyerscruise-type missiles for use against surface targets. Intheir missile armament, most of these ships also carry ASWThey are probably Intended primarily for operationsnaval striking forces and submarines, cither In defense of theto the USSRoastal areas ln support of theater

Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed primarily of older ships,augmented by new tankers and cargo ships, and logistic supportIs being reinforced by the addition of submarineships, repair ships, and missile support ships. Additionalcould be provided by the growing Soviet merchant marine.Soviet fishing fleets could also provide limited supportand they have considerable utility for training,collection of Intelligence.

Naval Avialion "

Sovici Naval Aviationrastic reorganization Inith the deactivation or transfer of all naval fighter units. Navalis now composed largely of jet medium bombers, but also Includes jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions againsttargets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. Defensive air cover for naval operations would have to be provided by fighternot subordinate to Naval Aviation.

f NavalADGER jet mediumare equipped to deliver antiship air-to-surface missiles. These missiles are of two types: the subsonichichange ofnd the.oth are estimated toEPeet against single, well-defined ship targets and some of these mis-

" See Annex A,or strength and composition.See Annex A. Table u. for coaipoalUon and dlslrtbullon.

-SECRET

silcs probably carry nuclear warheads. Missile launching BADGERS arc eithor configured lo carry two AS-l's Or one AS-2.

aval medium bomber strength will probably increase slightly over thc next five years. We believe that Naval Aviation has received some supersonic-dash BLINDER medium bombers, and they will probablyin greater strength within Uie next few years. Some of these may be equipped with air-to-surface missiles.

of the naval BADGERs which are not equipped withassigned to reconnaissance or support roles. Recent evidencean Increasing use of medium and heavy bombers of Longon maritime reconnaissance missions; overflights of USforces also suggest an attack training mission for thesebelieve that the naval requirement for long-range aerialls growing, and that it will be met cither by the continued useRange Aviation aircraft in this role, or by the assignment ofaircraft to Naval Aviation.

C. Current Strengths and WeokneMcs

recent years, the missions of Uie Soviet Navy have beento encompass strategic missile attack against foreignoperaUons against Western naval forces, while retaining theroles of interdicting Western sea lines ofUie littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support forflanks of ground forces. Soviet surface forces operatingwaters would lack air cover, although in certainships may operate beyond Uie range of land-based

Againsi Carrier Task Forces

capabilities against carrier task forces have beencontinued conversion of jet medium bombers to carry antishipand by thc Introduction of submarines equipped withIn Uie European area, BADGERs with antiship missilesogainst surface ships in the northeastern Atkantlc, theand Barents Seas, and much of Uie Mediterranean. Theseare, of course, subject lo problems of target detection andIn the past year or so. reconnaissance of open oceanLong Range and Naval Aviation has increased. Submarineagainst carrier task forces could extend to US coastal waters.

Againsi Sea Lines of Communication

threat of the Soviet submarine fleet to Free World seagreatest in thc northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Theof Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would depend

SCCRCT

umber of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to station, repair and overluiulogistic support, and theof opposition Interdiction operations against North Atlanticroutes would be undertaken largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet. We estimate that Uus force includes someorpedo attack submarines whose endurance would limit operaUons to Uie Norwegian Sea and eastern AUanUc, as well as eight diesel submarines equipped with antiship cruise missues

ot considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleetcould be maintained on station continuously ln Uie easternapproaches to the UK and Europe; this number might be augmented slightly by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostlllUcs. Thc Sovieis could also maintain0 nuclear and diesel torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping in the western AUanUc and In the approaches to tbe Mediterranean. The number hi thc western Atlantic could be more than doubled If Uiewere able to provide logistic support during patrolsorward base such as Cuba.

Uie Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to haveubmarines which they could use against sea lines ofas well as six nuclear and Ihree diesel submarinesantiship missiles. While only one-third of this force hasto operate off the US west coast. Uie remainder canIn those areas through which US shipping must pass toisland bases and Asian allies. The Pacific Fleet now includesand three diesel-powered cruis^missilc-launchlngbelieve the Soviets would employ these submarines primarily lnrole, but they could also be employed against handSoviets could probably maintainubmarines onthe ocean area between Hawaii and Japan, as well as about fiveUS Pacific Coast.

ASW Capabililiot

the, the Soviets haveajor effort inof ASW ships, particularly small coastal types, andnew heUcopters and modified seaplanes. An ASW role mayassigned tolass submarines, as well as toN class Detection equipment and weapons nowinclude air-launched passive sonobuoys, airborne magneticdetection (MAD) equipment, depth charges, mulUple tubelaunchers, and passive homing torpedoes. ASW exercisesln scope, and training doctrine has become morebelieve that the USSR now has the capability to conduct fairlyASW operations withinilesajor Soviet naval base against

SCCnET

a conventional submarine Operatedoderately well-trained crew.onventional submarinerew experienced tn evasive techniques this capabilily would he materially degraded, anduclear submarine it would be very poor. Soviet ASW capabilitiesrapidly as the distance from their naval basesiles, and beyond that distance must sUll bc regarded as negligible.

Wifi

7G. The ampliibious assault capability of the Soviet Navy ts extremely limited. We have re-examuied the numbers and characteristics of thc ships and craft available to the USSH for shore-lc-shore operations;"wc conclude that very few can bc used for assault landings across open beaches, end that these are suitable only for short-distance operations. We now believe that only in the Baltic are there sufficient numbers of appropriately designed ships and craft to lift balanced forces In anassault. In thisaximum of two regiments can be lifted, Token numbers of amphibious ships and craft in other fleet areas could, of course, be used ship-to-shore for logistic support or for small landing operations not requiring assault by balanced forces.

Sovietsotal merchant ship lift in all seas whichsufficient to transport approximatelyotorizedhowever,ift would require port or other extensivefacilities in the landing area. Assuming all Sovietwere available for use ln their respective areas of registry,lift capability would be:

Northmotorized rifle divisions

Baltic motorized rifle divisions

Black motorized rifle divisions

Pacific motorized rifle divisions

IV. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES A. Wor tow Poci

Sinceoviet and European Satellite forces have been partnified riuHlary command established under the Warsaw Pact. The headquarters of this command is in Moscow, and itsin Chiefarshal of the Soviet Union as wellirst Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSK- Satellite defense ministers are designated Deputy Commanders in Chief, but there ts no evidence that they regularly participate in the functions of thc unifiedwhich are evidently handled almost exclusively by Soviet staff officers.

In wartime, European Satellite military forces would bc under the ultimate control of the Soviet High Command, and we believe that

lhc Warsaw Pact command as such would have little ur no operational role. The manner and extent to which the Soviets plan to employ Satellite forces Is prohabiy determined by thc Soviet estimate of their reliability and effectiveness, and by the availability of supportingSelected Satellite divisions, corps, and field armies would bc integrated directly into Soviet field armies or fronts. Others would be retained under national command for offensive missions on secondary fronts, as well as defense against NATO air attack and sabotage, theater reserve, and linc-of-communications security.

B. Grouod Forces

The total personnel strength of the East European ground forces is estimated toexcludingf this total, more than half are in theatellite linehe remainder are in combat and service support units and home air defense forces, as well as general support for the Satellite military establishments. As In the case of Soviet forces In Eastern Europe, our evidence as to the existence of Satellite divisions is relatively good. However, our evidence onand equipment, peacetime manning levels, and equipment status varies from good in the case of some divisions to poor In the case of others.

The divisions are organized generally along Soviet lines. Some of the equipment for these ground forces is manufactured by the Satellite armaments industries, but the bulk of It is supplied by" the Soviets. Those models of ground force equipment which are in widespread use with Soviet units are also on current Issue in thc Satellites. Items of latest model Soviet equipment have been observed in some East European armies, but these are certainly in even shorter supply in the Satellites than in the USSR. In general, the equipment available to East German divisions and to many Polish and Czechoslovak divisions appears to be nearly comparable to that of GSFG in quality. We believe thatf thc Satellite divisions are sufficiently manned and equipped to beto combat on short notice In conjunction with Soviet forces. Of these divisions wc estimatereastulgarian,umanian.

C. Tactical Air and Wiisile Support

the primary mission of Satellite air forces is airunits are being trained and equipped to perform groundas well. These air forces arc made up largely of However, more advanced fighters are being furnished to

For details of location and type, see Annex A, Tabicor details ofnd location, see Annex A. Table 6.

78

thu Satellites and we believe this trend will continue. Certain key cities ot East Europe arc defended by SAMs of theype, but thcstill depend heavily on their fighter aircraft for air defense. The Satellites have dual capable weapons of various types, but the Soviets are almost certainly unwilling to provide them with nuclear bombs and warheads. There Is evidence lhat SCUD and FROG missiles are being provided to some of the Satellites.

D. Reliability

he political reliability of the Satellite forces Isritical consideration in Soviet planning for their employment. Their utility would vary among units and nationalities, and would further depend on the circumstances, Including the cause and nature of the hostilities, and the nationality of the opposing forces. By careful selection of courses of action and missions, the USSR could moke effective use of Satellite forces, but It could not count upon them for the full range of operations against NATO.

V. GENERAL WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO A. Current Operational Doctrine

The Soviets are preparing their theater forces against theof general nuclear war. Soviet military doctrine does not address itself in any depth to tbc variety of circumstances in which general nuclear war might begin. Although there Is Increasinggiven to general war resulting from escalation, most Soviet military writings assume thatar would be Initiatedestern attempt to launch strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In thisrimary Soviet concern is to ensure that the theater forces would be able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by thc enemy and to fight effectively in conjunction with the USSR's own air and missile strikes.

During an Initial nuclear exchange, the role of theater field forces would be secondary to that of strategic attack and air defense forces, but theater forces would be expected to contribute to initial Soviet offensive and defensive action by engaging the enemyroad front and by neutralizing nuclear weapons and bases where possible. Tlie ultimate strategic objectives of Soviet theater operations in general war would be to defeat enemy ground forces and to occupy strategicallyterritory. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces In general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. Sovietevidently calls for moving massive forces rapidly toward the Chon-nel coast in the Initial days ofar.

scckct

operational doctrine recognizes that in the event ofNATO's nuclear delivery capabilityeed forand flexibility In deployment and control of SovietTo meet these needs, Soviet operational doctrine calls for thearmored units as the key element of maneuver, and tacticalrockets with nuclear and CW warheads as the chief elements ofSoviet doctrine also callsapid and continuous ratefor ground forces (upm perithout theof concern for open flanks or by-passed enemy forces.

B. forces Available for Employment

great many variable factors have decisive bearing on thethe forces which the Soviets could and would employ inNATO. Some of the most important of these are: (a) thein which the conflict arose,hether suddenly or more(b) the number of units which would be retained as aand training base; (c) the extent of employment and thcof Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements lnWe are not certain as to the quantities of weapons andavailable for mobilization purposes. However, we believeof some types of combat and support equipment, as welltrained specialists for support units, would impair thean expanded force.

Ground Forces

oviet theater ground forces are disposed inanner that the bulk of their strength is available for use against NATO. Ofivisions whose identification is considered firm, highly probable, orre located west of the Urals.f these are believed to be incombatnd have probably been given the highest level -of support within Soviet ground forces. Our detailed assessment of the types and locations of combat strength Soviet divisions available for employment against NATO is as follows:

Total

of Soviet Forces. Cermany (GSFO) .

to

20

Group of Forces, Poland (NGF)

0

2

Group of Forces. Hungary (SGF) .

4

24

1 4

USSR

T

1 4

iscussion of the validity of these numbers -Excludes four divisions opposite eastern Iran and Afghanistan.

30

Air ond Missile Support

e estimate that Soviet tactical air strength now in EastPoland, and Hungary consists ofet light bombers andhe Satellites (excludinge about 1G5 light bombers andighters, the latter serving primarily air defense functions. In the entire European USSR, there arc in Tactical Aviation anight bombers andighlcrs. In addition to the tactical delivery systems available to the Soviet forces in East Europe and those organic lo reinforcing Soviet formations, some medium and intermediate range missiles and medium bombers would almost certainly be directed against targets of Immediate Interest to thc theater forces.

Naval Support

he units assigned to the tlirec Soviet fleets in the European area arc estimated as follows:

33

32

Of the forces in the Northern Fleet, with unrestricted access to the open seas, we estimate that there are someorpedo-attackwhose armament and endurance makes them best suited for antiship operations in the northeastern Atlantic. The eight cruisesubs are also available for such missions. The surface ships of the Northern Fleet are capable of operations in the northeasternbut their operations would probably be confined to the North, Norwegian, and Barents Seas within the radius of land-based air coverADGER medium bombers, the bulk of them equipped with ASMs, and aboutADGE seaplanes are assigned to the threefleets.

C. Capabilities to Launch Campaigns Against Cental Region

Immediately Available forces

he size of the ground and tactical air forces the Soviets could employ inftiaUy against the Central Region of NATO would depend ln part on whether operaUons were begun on short noUcc oreriod of preparation. The Soviets currently haveine divisions andactical aircraft staUoned in East Germany and Poland. Without

figures In this paragraph Include reconnaissance aircraft.

OCCULT

SCCRL-f

buildup, the Soviets couldimited objective attack against Western Europe designed to maximize the chance of surprise. Such an action, however, would conflict with Soviet doctrine concerning the necessity for numerical superiority in the area of engagement.

Copobf'fifie*

Soviet military doctrine and training exercises indicate that, if circumstances permitted, thc USSR would seek to assemble alarger striking force for any campaign into Western Europe.current Soviet doctrine.for combat organisation and echelon-men t. as well as the geography of the area, we believetriking force forampaign would probably comprise three frontsolalround divisions and air support totallingactical aircraft. Soviet doctrine would also call for some theater reserve forces in Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia.

The ground and tactical air forces to accomplish the reinforcement could bc drawn from the western military districts of the USSR and from the Satellite forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Theombat-strength divisions andactical aircraft in western USSR, as well asf the Satellite divisions, would be the earliestreinforcements. After some delay, additional divisions could be drawn from lower strength divisions ln western USSR, or fromsouthwestern, or southern USSR.

94 In arriving at an estimate of Soviet capabilities to augment forcesampaign Into Western Europe, we haveumber of factors, including the capacity of the East European rail and roadthe time required to prepare transportation systems to operate at peak efficiency, the confusion factors common to all large military movements, and the problems of organizing divisions and supporting elements into effective armies and fronts. Considering all factors, wc continue to estimate that, under noncombotivision striking force could be assembled in Kast Germany and westernand organized for operations against Western Europe within aboutaysoviet decision to do so. orce couldtheoviel divisions normally stationed in East Germany and Poland, plusombat strength Soviet divisions from the western USSR,5 Satellite divisions.11 Inheater reserve of Czech,

H In terms of manpower, these divisions and their support would Include: Soviet ground troops normally stationed In East Ger-

many and Poiiind .

Soviet ground troops from

Satellite

mm

Polish, and Soviet Category II divisions could be assembled in eastern Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce oncale without detection.

O. Capabilities fin Novo! OpcioliunsNATO

9S. Long-range torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, both nuclear and diesel-powered. could be deployed In the North AUanUc for operalions against NATO naval forces, and this would probablyrimary Soviet objective in the initial periodeneral war. Those aircraft of Long Range Aviation and Naval Avialion which are equipped with antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in UieAUanUc. Uie Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much of Uie Mediterranean. The Soviet ballistic and cruise missile submarines could contribute, in thc InlUal period,ampaign against western Europe by attacks against important coastal targets. Attacks could also be directed against some inland targets, depending on their location in rcla-Uon to sea approaches and on Uie depth and effectiveness of Western coastal ASW defenses. Following Uie iniUal phaseampaign, part of the Soviet submarine fleet could be deployed for operations against sea lines of comraunlcaUon from North America,

E. Capabilities to launch Campaigns in Olher Areas

major drive across central Europe would probably beby lesser thrusts in other military theaters, employing theadjacent to them arid the limited numbers of tacUcalcommitted to the main westward thrust. In thc followingwe canvass Soviet strength available for such campaigns, onof the breakdown of divisions by number, category, andIn earlier sections of the paper. If Uie actual number oftoward the low side of our estimateovici forces available for simultaneous campaignsother than NATO Central Region would be smaller thonbelow.

an initial campaign against Scandinavia, Ute USSR couldfour combat strength and four understrcngth divisions facingnorthern Norway. Thc four Soviet divisions in Hungary mightinitial echelonront moving toward Italy.ampaignand Turkish Thrace, Uie USSR has available sevendivisions In Uie southwestern USSR and up to fivefive Rumanian divisions. Some of thc seven Soviet combatin Uie Carpathian Military District, If not sent westward,be used In Uus theater. The posilion of Yugoslavia as neutral,enemy wouldey factor Influencing the strategy of Sovietagainst Italy or Greece and western Turkey.

33

thc Initial stageeneral war. limited operations mightagainst Iran and eastern Turkey, Eight combat strengthare stationed in southern USSK lacing eastern Turkey andof logistic limitations, not all of these divisions could bceastern Turkey.

forces In the Far East number six combat strength anddivisions. Including one airborne division. The Farforces have no significant capability for amphibiousapability to sealift forces in merchant ships againstas Japan, provided that adequate port facilities could betheater forces in the Soviet Far East have been substantiallyrecent years, and it Is doubtful that in the initial phasc of athe Soviets wouldheater campaign in the Far Easternis possible that additional Soviet theater forces will be moved toEast because of an exacerbated Sino-Soviet dispute.

VI. LIMITED WAR CAPABILITIES

A. Non-Nuclcar Theator Warfare

JQO. The Soviets have been especially concerned with developingand capabilities for waging nuclear theater campaigns. This appears to have been in responseATO policy which was frankly basedesort to nuclear weapons from the beginning of hostilities. More recently, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat theirthat any major conflict In Europe would cither be nuclear from thc start or would inevitably escalate. Uccent Soviet writings have indicated that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear warfare in Europe, In view of the US interest In building up NATO conventional capabiliUes. The Soviets recognize the advantages to them if an engagement in the European theater could be kept non-nuclear, and have statedoviet objective Inonflict would be to prevent cscalaUon. But they also recognize that the risk of escalation would bc very great.

hile current Soviet capabiliUes to conduct non-nuclear warfare remain formidable, efforts to gear Uie theater forces for nuclearhave had some adverse effects on convenUonal capabilities. parUcu-larly in terms of firepower The sharp decreases of past years In tactical aviation and tube artillery would hamper Uie Soviet forces In Uieof lnrge-scale non-nuclear operations. Further, while we believe Uiat the austerity of combat and service support at all echelons of Uie ground forces might suffice in Uie "qulck-or-never" context of general nuclear war, it ls doubtful Uiat It couldore protractedconflict without considerable augmentation.

-&CCBR-

limilcd Nuclear Warfare

i,?haVe bee" CVC" ,nore reluctant to admit the possibility^ ?a' nUC'ear Weap0ns cou,dtalroduccd into local war without

<ated any doctrine Tor limited warfare involving the tactical use of

weapons was mentioned for the first time in open Soviet literature

rCProblemst sien,ficantdelivery capability

Sber^ WrEfit5 rCSLSmedium

bomber forces whose bases are inside the DSSR.

C. Oiilonl Limited Military Operations

rtmuas dosieocd for operations the USSR has Increased

itiwTSS J? arfS,rCm0te fr0m

to distant areas and maintain them once deployed However, thc USSR would face

PrCSent attemptnlt,atebar operafonsistant area, or toarge force to such an

mitf' airUfl' ^suable

for distant mUitary operations. Moreover, in many areas it lacks ooUtlcal arrangements to Insure that it could providet

he USSR has established any special military component trained and equipped specifically for lndcuendeni stmu -scale operaUons, although of course it can SpU^IEcJto existing forces. It is possible that over the next few year! uTtortet

distant, limited mlliU^opera

lions through the designaUon and training of appropriatedevelopment of equipment specifically* forto OVCrcomc their .WPW* disadvSftoge

utrCCSneutralist countries to

Sl^ ra(Ue,lng ^^

VII. TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES0 A. Ground Forces

eroundTor^SuthaHdebatrfgaWUn8of Soviet

ground forces will continue within Soviet ruling circles over the next

few years. This debate will be shaped by the convicting viewsevident on the appropriate role of these force! 2een'ralbeonsWerati0 evenTowlZ:

35

shchev is ev,dently pressing anew the case for reducing military manpower

In order lo free resources for higher civilian allocations. Those who support the conceptarge standing army will probably contend. In addition to their customary arguments, that thc contingency of non-nuclear war raised by current NATO discussions and the hostilily of Communist China are new factors reinforcing their propositions. Within thc contextossible force reduction, or independent of it. thereossibility that Soviet forces in East Europe will be scaled down, primarily for political eflect.

will depend on the evolution of NATO itself. Theobserve the Western Alliance not only in order to respond toits military capabilities, but also to assess Its cohesiveness andNATO's ability to agree upon and Implement significantin forces would probably increase the deterrence toto arms, but It would also add to the arguments that thenot reduce its ground forces and should concentrate uponquality.

Interaction of these factors over lhc next six yearswholly foreseen. In our view, however, thc chances are good thatof personnel ln theater ground forces will decline over thedecline might come aboutesult of economic pressures andcompromises in the debate over military doctrinecould lead,heater ground force of about onemillion men, tliateduction ofestimated strength.educed force might haveine divisions, about half of them at combat strength.

On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility of reductions along the lines of0 proposals, whichheater ground force strength of about one-million men, perhaps backed uperritorial militia system.rastic reduction would involve basic strategic decisions which the Soviets thus far do not appear willing or ready to make Considering current indications from Soviet military budgeting, and from the status of the military debate, we believe that current plans for the size of theater ground forces would call for more moderate reductions, such as outlined in the preceding paragraph.

Modernization will continue to Improve the quality of Soviet ground forces. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends in total size; the larger the forces which the USSR elects to retain, the more It will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages. If the Soviets decide that they must seriously respond to the contingency of non-nuclear warfare, they will probably provide increased combat support as well us increased service support. Such efforts would reinforce the pressureseduction in the number of line divisions.

Present trends In the ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of

36

GCCftcr

concentration probably will include improved, more mobile missile weapons to defend against tactical aircraft, increased quantities of thc better armored personnel carriers,2 medium tanks withguns, and of guided missile antitank weapons. The Soviets mayew light reconnaissance tank to replace thchich several Soviet military authors have criticized as being undcrgunned and vulnerable, as wellew medium tank replacing the main gun with missile weaponry. More and better general purpose vehicles andreliance on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence on rail lines for logistic support.

Avialion ond Missile*

believe Jhat the Soviets will continue to modernizeimproving its ground attack capabilities in particular.the rate of modernization to increase over the next few years,believe that tactical aircraft with much unproved range andwill be introduced. Weradual decline inof tactical aircraft. The numbers of guided missiles Inforces will probably remain about constant, but new andsystems will probably bc introduced. It appears likely thatfree' rocket [punchers will be assigned to divisions.

Missile Defense

force air defense capabilities will improve over the nextthrough the modernization of Tactical Aviation andthe introduction of ther follow-on SAM systemsformations. There is considerable evidence that thebeen developing transportable ABM defenses for their fieldwc believe that such defenses could be operationalebasis for determining the extent to which they may be deployed,seems likely that considerable Improvement of defenses againstwouldrerequisite to deploying an ABM vulnerable toattack.

Forces

believe that the numerical strength of Soviet surfacewill remain fairly stable over the next five years. Sovietguided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft willat about present levels. Modernization of destroyers willand additional surface ships will probably be retrofittedarmament. The aircraft strength of Naval Aviation isremain fairly stable with an increased proportion of new modelsBLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. As regards missiles, we expect some

37

SEcwn-

extension of range, either through improvement in missile fuels or design, or by unproved target acquisition means, or both.

he USSK will continue to improve ASW and anticarrierprimarily through the application of Improved submarines and long-range aircraft to these missions. Thc effectiveness of surface units at distances beyond the range of land-based fighter cover will probably be strengthened through the addition of SAM armament. Despite these improvements, however, we believe that the capabilities of the Soviet Navy to conduct surface operations in open ocean areas will remain severely limited. In particular, iL probably will haveimited capability ta detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance onoperating in open seas.

US. There Is little evidence of the development within thc Soviet Navyapability to replenish ships on tlic high seas. However, we believe the Soviels arcystem for emergency mobile basing ofships and submarines in their coastal waters. Mobile bases probably will consist of several small ships for repair, refueling, andof weapons and supplies. As the period advances, we think aof such bases will be deployed in protected coves and fiords to provide wider dispersal and thus enhance the survivability of the Soviet base for naval operations.

Soviets may seek to develop their amphibious liftsignificant Improvement will depend upon their acquisition ofamphibious craft, extensive training, and development of asupport system. There are few current Indications ofthese lines.

E. Nuclear Weapons

of nuclear weapons for support of theater forcesbe alleviatedven if the Soviets allocate priority tomissile defense warheads. If no such priorities interfered,could probably have the numbers of tactical nuclearthey would consider requisite for theater forces within twoyears. Soviet procedures for control and use of tacticalwell as reconnaissance and target acquisition, are likely toover the next year or so, particularly should theto give more credence to thc possibility of limited nuclear warfare.

SECti&T-

SCCRCT

ANNEX A

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

TABLES

TableLLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OP PERSONNEL IN SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE AND GENERAL SUPPORT. FORCES

TableSTIMATED STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES. GERMANY

TableSTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS AS OF3

TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROUND FORCES AS OF3

TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF3

TabicSTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AS OF3

TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY TYPE.O

TableSTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH3 TO9

TableSTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION AS OF3

Table 1

ILLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF PERSON NK I, IN SOVIET CENKRAL PUR-POS8 AND GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES AL PUH"

I. Cnml Purpose Groundnon

CaWy I

CMegorjr ii Md hi ai0OM

Combat

Service 5up(lorl-

eneral Purpose Naval

Forces 'OO.OOO

Supporting Shore Establishment

Coastal

Naval "

3 General Purposa Air

:;: IOO(JO0 w

Mllilar, Transport Aviation 0

TOTAL GENERAL PURPOSE000

ommand aodSupport .

AwumiagivisionsfrUmc" Assumingivision, averagingof adorned wartime strength.

is

esidual basedeneral purposeillion mtD (he ml-.

rc^aS*

Includes appropriateir servicend transport .Wt units-

? KqU^tW'1*Qdand utility

aircraft. Dot in otber functionalre also

fcThia entry presents separately general command and service aunnnrt

T brindoded " En ZSoSSA

llmJT 8eoeralinclude.

ormins .uefa functions as MinMry of Defense stall- service

^aoj motion

*

SCCRCT

Table *

ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THR CROUP OF SOVIET FORCES. CERMANY

osra Tuooi's

Artillery DIvMea

Miulfe UnawfeSS-l

Kngmw

Amphibious Enjiow

Ownl BalUIHMM 0

ScrrtM

AEVEL GROUND TROOPS (C

Molofllcd lUfto Dlvteion*

Tank UivliMM

Arlill'iy

AntlUnk ArUlleiv Regiment*

iwilo Brigades

lmanU

Heavy Ttnk-Aaaault Gun UnlU

Ponlon Bridge Regimente

AmphibiouB Roaj. Buubem

EH'BaHaUowj

ReglmwiUi

ChemicalI^m

Arraynd Spfie* Support

TACTICAL OQ

TOTAL GSFG PERSONNEL S0

occftcr

sccnn

Table 3

ESTIMATED NUMBERS" AND DKPLOYMRNT OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS AS OF3

1

nine

1 cohhat cituccn

[ctBBHUTH| OTKCliCTH

1

IH"Ell STRUMCTH

BIT

2

1

S"

4

0

0

0 13

S

a

M B

ft

Wcilo.n

Soulhwostern

Nwtbwiwlcrn

Southern

Central USSR

- 7

i0

3!

14

Far Kattern USSR

45

wJJrirlUr'The

nttSinonly analytical .p-

wh.cheuued breakdown ol dlvMm by location, type, andcategory.

ivision* manned alerccl ot more ot authorised atrengtb. Tlxae fieurestherobable number. Category, consist will, our climate thai the actualdumberrobably

"

Table 4

DIXMONS

D*rrs*

IXC OR

MRCH.

0

4

10

7

43

4

5 12

02

East Germany

V.Iron.oereeM oftfreogU, except for

* Include! all uondi visional combatort elcmeola.

up-

arc ater.eot atrengih and the Poiiab ai.borne dirfsioorobably under 50

srvlee aupport uoila, home- air defense forces, aod command aod general a

-St*

Bast

10

Hungary

20

Belorutaia

45

Moscow

Leningrad

Trana Caucasus

70

Far East

TOTALS BY. TVPE

180

175

B

h

a

II-

t r

100

60

85

H

340

Rf.f) 3

110

i-rr-

i-isaH-lniie-Lioirr asm D >

135

aflat*!

an

130

m

,

'

Table 6

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AS3

*.c

n. b

II-HBO

n

NT K

BT COO STMT

75

H 50

ISO

40

a

H

630

B

.

m

Tflaft

0

10

Navy

nY

Althoughaa not been fl.mly identified In these countries,elieve that the alrcralt ts no- entering inventory.

sccncT

Table 7

ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT,3 TO

|

Models

eco

Models

Model*

Modda

ico- too

Models*

eoo-i. *N

OM

:

r

Soviet aircraft stowo Ib Ihh Uble Include only those assigned to Tselical Aviation For additional rirtftft which sr* sKigred to sir detenu of ibe USSR, see Memorandum lo Holders of. Tie primary tciesioa of tht Satellite aircraft Ii alt defease, bat thtyi also be used fo; tactical mission*.

Include* FAGOT, FRESCO. FARMER, FLASHLIGHT A. sad BEAGLE, aircrafl wbloh phasedroduction prior to IWO.FLASHLIGHT D, FISHPED. FITTER. FIREBAR A, aircraft which wets lo production FISHPOT may eater 8ate!llta forces by

advanced design lactical fighter eitlmatad to beeorae operational aa early as

the eunent models have been phaaad Into operational units, the older models have beta retslnsd In considerably greater number* than was previously anticipated. The future number* reflect our estimate of probable rellrcratnl of older models due to prolonged tlxe in service. While It seems likely Uiat large numbers will bo retired In the next few years, recent trends auggeat lhat Hies* older model) may bet blgber levels than shown. Their operational autus remains questionable.

Table

ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND DEPLOVMEN'T3 TO

tvpk or ami'

ocroacn

1 II

.

LINE SUBMA-

Missile

or

I

Miwile.

9

Altack

Of SUCCCSSui )

1

15

Missile

on.) ..

Missile

a

- 1

8

Torpedo

F)

Torpedo

R)

Torpedo

Torpedo

LINE SUB-

All Types

LINE SUR-

SHIPS

Destroyer. .

'

Escort .

LINE SUR-

SHIPS

m

line submarines are those ot modern construction. The second line category lists units fromoears old which, by virtue nf age and design are considered useful only (or trsinini; or perhaps coastal defense. Some of the second line shipsprobably be retired from service earlier than on an age criterion.

Surface ships which are at leastears oM are carriedecond line slalus unlil there is evidence of their removal from tlic "eel or until they are finally considered removed (in the absence of contrary evidence) whenears old.

Totals (or future years Include submarines of follow-on classes which may ba buUt during tb* period. An annual eou-etruelion rate0 nuclear-powered submarines of all types law been estimated.

We have previously estimated that constructionlass submarines would terminate by thc endthe possibility exists that this program may still be active. While wcunable to predict the luture numbers of this class with certainty, our estimate reflect* both the past evidence and the possibility that construction will continue lor about another year. Tlie else oflass construction program will probably be InBueoecd by Soviet decisions regarding construction of other classes of missile submarines.

ONGWIN CYLINDER,CLE CYLINDER. It is estimated thatonvcrsion proRrarn has probably been terminated.

Recently sighted oiling the Baltic, evaluated as probably new construction, diesei-powered SSG. Future estimatca reflect construction capabilities and trends ratherirm animate of numbers programmed.

lass (CANVAS BAG) radar picket submarines.lass are In the Northern Fleet and three In the Black Sea.

nits fitted foresearch and Development.

44

-.iti roues.

ii ni

ABBA

BALTIC

aih roncB,Baltic spa

ABE.

BLAC1 EEA

nr. [tt At It rOHC'K,

HFA

PACtfIC ft-BBT AIM

.

Kast AlLEl

Light Bomber

BEAGLE

Jet Medium Bomber

BADOER

BLINDER

Patrol

MADGE

MALLOW

Helicopter

HOOK

HOUND

CO

LO

25

45

IS 6

ao

35

125

2 93

For future years, wcradual phase-out (aboutercent per year) of older aircraft such as the BEAGLE. BADGER, and MADGE,orresponding increase in newer models such as BLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. Unless strength of Naval Aviation is increased through transfer of long-range bomben such as BEAR lo navalwe expect the total number of aircraft co remain fairly stable.

SECRET

ANNEX B

TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE MISSILES, AIRCRAFT, AND SUBMARINES

TABLES

TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET TACTICAL MISSILES AHD ROCKETS

TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SOVIET NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS

TableSTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED ASSUMPTIONS

TableSTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT

TableSTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS

TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET SUBMARINES

ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET TACTICAL MISSILES AND ROCKETS

acciNin

-

a

si st: *i

S'laPOOCX

rnoo-3 | moo-4

- -

(CW

turn.

a at.

i -.

B.to.

n_*v D. Tt am

0

(duc.)

(lbs)'

EE

HE;

, HE

Nuc

Nuc.

Nuc.

Sue

figuration

stage

Ingle stars

stag*

stag*

trans-

a kjai task tFaitti

es-

hi a

a

a

on

oo

tube

tatik

tank

a wheeled

-- -

altitude.

super-

'

liquid

liquid

liq* ii

radio-inertlal

radio

sua.

djs, CEP

CEP

n.m

n.m. CEP

SCO- -

ISO.

CEP

CEP yds CEP

,

? T

Tim*

hours

houra

hours

hour*

- inutes

'- JO

hour*

hours afttr

hours

hour aflsr

arrival at ptesnrveyednutas

arrival

at

st

arrival

at

presur-

presur-

Can be

Can ba

tit*.

be held

at X-

al X-

be held

our

minute*

minute*

our

Heeded

aod

'.

and

X-15

X-15

for

for

erosi-

trees-

ere**-

oa

on high-

cross-roaalry ntobJtt*

v

try

roadi.

lim-

la

In

in

on

con-

con-

dm cm.

mobll-lly.

gooddata oa the CW eipabil.tiw ef SCUD, SHADDOCK and

nil)

0 fl HighE or

NUC ISO ft homing;

t. without homing at leaa than. to. at on. range

Programmtd with radio command override and terminal homing

Turbojet with probable aolld RATC booal

t cad et ti&t.

(HM)

. (tome In thii family

l

Lo* supersonic

E or NUC

ISO fl with terminal homing. against land target*

Preset autopilot Interllal wiih activeactive

mlhoming

Turbojet with RATO boost

iquid fuel rocket probably with RATO bcojl

3.SM II

MaCHO*

C0Ib.HE

or NUC ISO ft

Beam rider with aomlaellve homing

Turbojet with RATO boost

B

B.Hfl4fi*i

a s

N

I I

5-

5

z

n. 3

5-3

is*

6 rr y

I.?

a p

srxnrT

Table 3

ESTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED ASSUMPTIONS*

lie ii* it

LOAD il.BS)

Y

t

FAGOT

(Internal)

xternal Tank)

lbm gunmb bombm tunm guns

230

100

70

xternal Tanks)

mm gunm guns

FRESCO

(Internal)

lb bombsm gunm giics

xternal Taok)

lb bomb III? mm3 mm guns

xternal Tanks)

mm gunm guns

FARMER

(Internal)

lb bombsm guns

xternal Tank)

lb bombm guns

xternal Tanks)

ram rftl0 mm guns

6ec note at and c- ubt-.

Mic-ai

FISHDKI) C

FITTER

FIREBAR

BEACLE

S'OTE:allowance*

'a)

(bl

d)

rata.lbi)

I

(Internal)

t.GOO

(lolcn

(ITank)

anl)

Internal)

(2Tanks)

anks)

2 Eiternal Tanks)

Internal)

It.COO (Internal

KH.dtNT

r

b bomb.m guns

UI.IOO Ib bombm guns

b bombsam guru

mmrL.ti>oda 3iW ram guns

d ib girocbaenba

ace |UUO mm rkta

mb bombs

mb bomb.

Reconnaissance Equipment

b bombs MOO Ib bombs

ts

130

100

140

140

0

fni-r

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OP SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance with USOUA, Basic Mission?

BtTB

atais-

h-ait rrn

ca>scm *

-. '1

CB'.'ISE

(bjtb.*

chuiit-

slTITVM (FT.)

(FT)-

*

Piston

Piston

Piston

OW

Piston

Piston

TwbolM

B

Turboprop

lOTO-lOO

N '

Turboprop

-

Turboprop

"Bl

1

Turboprop

j

Turboprop

Turboprop

0

..

TurboJan

Tursofsi

shown Is forload: PassengtnParatroop Capacity is shownlternate load, hut performance would dlfTar for this load.

Aircraft meat suited for paratroop operations

s cot snows tine* performance Is similar to3 la year of Snt algal

' Calculated at combat wrlgM.

-SCCftCT

54

ttllillllMV.

IIi IS

" 5= a

ii ij ii ii u

IIISI

IU Sill

ANNEX C

ORGANIZATION OF LARGE SOVIET THEATER FORCE UNITS

TABLES

TooleSTIMATED WARTIME TOE OP THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION

TableSTIMATED WARTIME TOE OF THE SOVIET TANK DmSION

TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET COMBINED ARMS ARMY

TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET TANK ARMY

TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET FRONT

SCCRCT

Tibla 3

ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET COMBINED AIIUS

AltMY

urt pnntnlr oalaJormatieai react rains; Or nntM comporiUea ofcombinedUd Germany. Th* Uble also refleeU ji. Igmcnu derived

from Sovieto likely waillme compactions of combined arms armies, which could vary coasldembly depending upun (hc minion of llie army. Hit terrain in Ibe ares of operalions aod other factors.

Memorised llifl* Division (I)

Tank DrritM*

Army Combat Support Units:

AiUllety and SS100

ArUllety

SCUD Brigade.

Antitank Artillery

Heavy Tank and Assault Gun UOO0

Air Defense

SAM

Engineer

i'onlon BridRO

Assault CroMlag

Signal

Signal

Radio Relay

Line Construction

Cla-mical

lataULgestec BalUboo

Headquarters and Service

Total OAA

Table 4

ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET TANK ARM V

Tills table la based primarily oo our InfoimalJoo concern.up. Uie current composition ol the Soviet Unk arnica in Knotbe Uble also reflects judgments derived from Soviet documents a* to bkely wartime eomposiUoni of task armies, which could varydepending upon the mission of the army, the terrain In the area of operation, aod

Division

Army Combat Support Units: Artiayary

SCUD

Air Defense

SAM

Engineer

Ponton Bridge

Assault

Signal

Signal

Radio Relay M0

Line ConstrueUon

Chemical

InteOigenee

Headquarters and Service

Total Tank

Table 6

ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET FRONT

aaed primarily on our UJormauon eorwvrnirig the Group ofermany (GSFG) "bachbe ocai-cat cqauvakatarum* Soviet frtml currcatlr loowever. GSFG lao meet tbe rcqunoMGl* of ita paitieular mia-Uon in East Garod tbu* doee not correspond in drtail Lo our illustrative /twnl coco position, which haa considerably more ground troop* and leu laelital air lupporL Soviet wartime front* would varyompos! Uoo aod strength rtopend'Og upon the mission, tboand otber (acton. Tbla table ia intendedough guide to understanding of Soviet

theater force atrurture rather thane- of delalL

Corabioed-Ajm, Armies

Tank Annlea003

TacUeal Air

Front Combat Support Unit*:

Artillery and SS Mlaaika

ArtflJery Pi

SCL'D Brigade*

Air Dofenan

SAM

Ponton Brtdga

Aaaault Crossing

Pipeline

Signal

Signal

Signal Intercept Reglmenta

Radio Relay BeliaUoos

Charnieal Brigade

lutetligeooc

Total Front. .

Dcadquarter* and Service Elements

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

I. Thiiwo* diisami-ioied by theIntelligencehi* copy it lo* Ike information ond inn of the recipient and ol pertori* oride.idietioneed io know basli Additionalteminoiioo moy be cuihe-iied by the followingithin their rcipccfivr Oepar'irerii.

of Intelligence ond Reteorch. lor lhe Deportment oi Stole

b. Direcior. Defenie Inielligence Agency.the Office or the Secretary of Detente

t. AwitlonI Chief af StoH lor Intelligence. Deportment ol iho Army, for ihe Oeporlmcnl ol the Army

Chief of Novolhc Department of rhe

Novy

Chiel ot StoH. Intelligence, USAF. 'or ih- Oepo-imcni ol the Air

Force

for Intelligence. Join- Staff, for the Join! StoiT

irector ol Intelligent. AfC. for the Atom* Energy Commisjion h. Assistant (bettor, FBI, lo> Iho Federol Bureau of Inveiiigo-ionirector of NSA. for the Notional Seturily Agency

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Agency

Thii copy moy be retained, or defrayed byccordonce with applicable security .egMiotiont. or reigned lo iho Central Intelligence Agency by orrcngement with -he Office of Centrol Reference, ClA.

Whenaic it dittomina'rdrteot .ACiprtnti ma,leriod noft ot one year. Ald ol thii period, the ettimole shovtd either beyed. returned towarding oaercy. o. perm.tt.on should beof the forwarding ogency to retain ir in occordsr.ee wiih2

A. Ihe title of -hit ctlimote -hen uted lepo-otely from thehoulj be dot-

WSTBiBUlfON,

White House

Na-lonol Security

Depariment of S'ote

Deport mem of Detente

Atomic Energy Commlttion

Federal Sureou of InvetKgotlon

Original document.

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