NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE3
Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
FOREWORD 1
SUMMARY AND 2
DISCUSSION 6
I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES .. SOVIET THEATER FORCES 7
Trends in7
Reorganization and Modernization of Ground Forces
Tactical Air and Missile Support
Personnel
Size and
Manning Levels of10
Number of11
Types of12
Ground Armies13
Tactical Air and Missile15
Strengths and16
Nondivrsional
Status of the Re-equipment
Mobilization
Tactical Air and Mssfle
Theater Force Air Defense
Tactical Nuclear
Other Supporting
AVAL GENERAL PURPOSE22
A_ Past Trends In22
urrent Size and Composition23
Submarine23
Surface Forces24
Naval
Pagr
C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses25
Against Carrier Task35
Against Sea Lines of39
-v,
SeaiiTt17
IV. CONTRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN7
Pact
Forces
Air and-Misstle
V. GENERAL WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST
Operational
Available for Employment
Ground Forces30
Air -and Missile Support
Naval
to Launch Campaigns Against Central Region 31
IrrunedraleJy Available
RelnfOTtxraent Capabilities32
for Naval Operations Against33
to Launch Campaigns In Other33
VI. LIMITED WAR34
Theater34
Nuclear Warfare35
Limited Military
VII. TRENDS IN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES5
Aviation and
and Missile
Forces
ANNEXSTRENGTH AND COMPOSmON OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
ANNEXCHARACTERISTICS OF SOVTETPURPOSE MISSILES, AIRCRAFT. AND SUBMARINES
ANNEX OP LARGE SOVIET THEATER FORCE UNITS
ccncT
CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the role and capabilities of Soviet general'purpose forces over the next six years, especially against the NATO area in Europe.
FOREWORD
As considered in this estimate, Soviet general purpose forces include: (a) theater forces,round combat and tactical air forces plus their associated command, support, and serviceup through the level of military districts and groups of forces; (b) naval general purpose forces, naval forcesto fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and (c) military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Sovietand service elements providing general support to allof the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missile defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligencend are discussed herein only insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.
It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces and their capabilities, wc do not take account of the actions ol opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclearIt is obvious that such an exchange would profoundly affect the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missionseneral war.
'NTS-Soviet Capabilities tot strategicated IB OctoberStCRETl Restricted inu and Memorandum to Holders ot NIEBloc Air and Missile Defense CapaMHUes ThroughTOP SECRET).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Soviet requirements for general purpose forces areontinuing debate within the Soviet leadership. Russian and Communist traditions alike prescribe the maintenance of large ground forces in being as wellarge mobilizationConservative elements, both military and political, argue that this tradition remains valid, even in the circumstancesuclear general war. Khrushchev, however, with some military and political support, stresses the deterrent effect of medium,and intercontinental range ballistic missiles and argues that Soviet requirements for general purpose forces are consequently reduced. This debate remains unresolved, but in general the trend in the size of Soviet general purpose forces over the years since Khrushchev came to power has been downward.)
estimate that the personnel strength of Sovietforces nowillion men inn naval units, andnmilitary transport aviation. In addition, there aremen performing command and general supportthe entire militaryeneral purposeestimated toine divisions;and cruise missile submarines;actical fighters and light bombers; andnaval jet medium bombers.
Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern,large number ol combat strength divisions backed up by apotential. All presently existing divisions haveleast nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized
the total manpower In the Soviet militarystimated to beollow*:
Command and General
Oencral Purpose
Ate (isa.ooo)
O)
Strateelc Defer**
Strategic Attack
- gccrlt
rifle, or airborne. The modernization program has made heavy demands on resources in short supply in the USSR, and wc believe that Soviet ground force capabilities are still adversely affected by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies In equipment.)
* id terms of manpower, ihese divisions md their sapport wouldground troop* normally siauoned in gaitand
soviet found troops from0
satellite
Total
D. During the past several years, the Soviets have reduced the total number of their divisions and have also reduced themaintained at high levels of combat readiness. oviet divisions are now maintained at combattercent or more of total authorized wartime personnel strength. The remainder are at either reduced0 percent of authorized personnel) or at cadreercent or less). Even at full wartime strength. Soviet divisions are considerably smaller than US divisions. The authorized wartime strength of tank divisions isen. and of motorized rifle divisions, Most divisions are organized into armies, which arc also quite small by US standards. The non-divisional combat and service supportpresently maintained are probably considerably short of wartime requirements, ) Currently there areombat strength Soviet divisions andoviet tactical aircraft in East Germany and Poland. Without prior buildup, this force couldimited objective attack, designed to maximize the chance of achieving surprise. We believe, however, that the Soviets would seek toonsiderably larger striking force u* they intended toampaign against Western Europe. Reinforcements could be drawn from western USSR and from the Satellite forces. We estimate that under noncombativision striking force, including5 Satellite divisions, could be assembled and organized for operations against Western Europe within aboutaysoviet decision to doorce might includeactical aircraft and
be backed upheater reserve ol ground units. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce oncale without detection.)
P. In recent years, Soviet theater forces have acquiredtactical missile capabilities, including unguided rockets and ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic chemical bombs and warheads have been provided for tactical use; we believe that their release is kept under strict political control.)
the provision of tactical and air defense missilessupport of theater forces, the strength of Tacticalsharply reduced but has remained fairly stable sincenumber of tactical aircraft seems low in relation to thethe theater ground forces. Moreover, most tacticalobsolescent. Fighter-bombers have been conspicuouslyalthoughype is now -being introduced.air defense is limited by the lack of surface-to-airfor low altitude defense and for rapidly
recent years, the Soviet Navy has beentrainedrimarily defensive role. Much of thechange has come from the USSR's concern over. carrier task forces and rnissile submarines.the former forces at sea, the Soviets havemissiles carried by bombers and submarines. Sovietwarfare capabilities are negligible in open oceanprobably will remain quite Limited, but capabilities foragainst carrier task forces have been improvedof aircraft of Long Range Aviation. The Sovietforce poses an increasing threat to Free Worldin the northeastern Atlantic and northwesternSoviet surface ships are largely dependent uponair cover and their capabilities are correspondingly
are anen in the Eastground forces (excludingheseivisions at various levels of strength andbelieve that about half of these divisions are sufficiently
SCCBCT
manned and equipped for early employment in conjunction with Soviet forces. Their political reliability would remain anfactor in some circumstances. )
J. During the past year, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat their expectation that any major conflict in Europe would cither be nuclear from the start or would inevitablyTheir recent writings indicate that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remainefforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear operations have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities. The USSR's capabilities for broiled warfare in areas remote from its borders remain severely limited. )
K_ For at least the next few years, the size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces will probably be governed by compromisesontinuing debate within Soviet ruling circles rather than by any clearly-defined strategic and politicalEconomic considerations, Sino-Soviet relations, andwithin NATO will be critical factors influencing the future of Soviet theater forces. In our view, the chances are good that the number of personnel and divisions in theater ground forces will decline moderately over the next six years.of ground, naval, and air general purpose forces will tend to correct current deficiencies. )
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET POUCY TOWARD GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
L Historical, geographical, and political factors have made large-scale land warfare on the Eurasian continent the basic concern of Soviet military doctrine. Except for Long Range Aviation, the Soviets have not visualized independent offensive air operations; In particular, tactical air forces are subordinated to commanders of theater ground forces Except for the recent development of missile submarines. Soviet naval power has been orienfced toward defense of the homeland, support of the ground forces in Eurasian waters, and Interdiction of sea lines of
ven In the nuclear era, the emphasis on theater warfare persisted in spite of the allocation of major resources to strategic defense and attack forces. So long es Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclearremained very limited, the military basis for Soviet policiesrested heavily on war-winning capabilities for theater forces-whatever misgivings there may have been regarding their viabilityeneral nuclear war. In terms of actual war-fighting capabUitles and deterrence of Western military acUon, the large ground and tactical alr forces were, until the late USCs. the prime element of the Sovietestablishment Even today, the bulk of the Soviet strategic bomber force, as well as most of the submarine force, Is best suited for operations in the Eurasian area.
s Soviet capabilities for nuclear/missile attack against both Europe and North America began to emerge In thes. the firstchallenge to the primacy of land warfare In Soviet military doctrine was Issued. An intense military debate ensued. Khrushcbcr andajority of the political leadership, supportedinority of the military spokesmen, argued for revision of doctrines and forces in ways appropriate to nuclear/missile warfare. This school of thought was almost certainly Influenced by concern for the strains on the Soviet economy resulting from the heavy costs of advanced weapons, new equipment, and manpower for both strategic and theater forces] and the effect of such strains on key nonmilltary programs.
hrushchev has argued that massive standing armies are an obsolete luxury which the Soviet Unionfford. In his fullest exposition of military doctrine. Innd In subsequent pubUc and private statements, he has maintained that tbe enormous Increases in firepower achieved by the introduction of nuclear and missile weapons greatly reduce the need for military manpower. Khrushchev's public position on the relative utility of types of military forces may have been exaggerated in order to maximize the political impact of hisat home and abroad, and we have no conclusive indications of how
far he might actually wish lo go In restructuring Soviet forces.Khrushchev's tendency to deprecate the Importance of general purpose forces appears toalculation that the existence of nuclear weapons can and will deter both sides from Initiating war.
he military, who are more immediately concerned with developing forces for use ln the event deterrence falls, have naturally taken the question of general purpose forces much more seriously. However, they have not been of one mind on the question of the role of theater forces In nuclear war. There has been complex debate over the Issue. Some have taken the KJirushchevian or modernist approach with its emphasis on deterrence. Most have arguedar-winning military capability in both strategic and theater forces. Including mass armies ready for Immediate employment. Out of the debate, compromiseon military doctrine were formulated and were published ln the open press. These compromises were contradictory and precarious. That they satisfied no school of Soviet military thought became evident through revisions and criticism In the public press.
ut in the numerical size of Soviet forces, which Khrushchev sponsored, was resisted by the military. The process of reduction had stalled even before Khrushchev announced theof Soviet forcesoreign policy move in1 Berlin crisis. Inhen his political position seemed to have weakened, Khrushchev spoke defensively about the primacy of military needs and hinted strongly at increased military spending. Recently, however, Khrushchev has reverted to public advocacy of reductions in both the military budget and the size of the forces.
n sum, the development of Soviet general purpose forces since theas not, in our view, resulted from Soviet pursuitell-defined concept of the role of these forces In war. In the future, Soviet policy towards these and other types of forces will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety of strategic, historical, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative Importance of these factors and by shifting compromises among these views. The fluctuations In this ongoing debate ratheringle, clearly-defined strategic concept are likely to govern the size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces through the period of tills estimate.
II. SOVIET THEATER FORCES A. Past Trends in Development
Reorganization ona* Modernization of Ground forces
he Soviets have pursued an ambitious program to convert World War IT rifle, horse cavalry, tank, and mechanized divisions into highly mobile, heavily armored units. The modernization of the huge, rela-
*
tively unsophisticated ground forces was an enormous undertaking. It made heavy demands on motor vehicles, electronic equipment, and skilled personnel, all of which were in short supply in the USSRwith the modernization of the Soviet theater forces, theSatellite armies were organized and equipped from the ground up. In addition, the Soviets also equipped Asian Communist forces with large quantities of materiel, including that expended in the Korean War.
e believe that all Soviet line divisions are now at least nominally constituted as modern tank, motorized rifle, and airborne units, although we doubt that the process of reorganization and re-equipplng has been completed in all cases. Moreover, it Is evident that there werealong the way. Some equipment adopted as standard was far short of desired rnilitary specifications For Instance, the original armored personnel carriers were general purpose trucks with light armor added. Most armored pernoruiel carriers presently in service lack overhead cover, and, being'wheeled rather than tracked, have poormobility.
n order to provide combat support to the modernized groundtbe Soviets required artillery with greater mobility, more and better engineer support, much better communications, modem tactical aviation,obile field army air defense system. As the ground forces were progressively converted, their ability to conduct operationsinimum of logistic support supplemented by field unprovisatlon was diminished. In particular, requirements for fuels, lubricants, and maintenance for the vastly greater number of vehicles increased sharply. The Soviets apparently paid less attention to providing the modernized support structure required for the theater forces than to reorganizing and re-equipping the line units.
Toclical Air andMiitife Support
he emphasis given strategic defense of the USSR against bomber attack In thes andasonsiderable influence on developments In Soviet tactical aviation. The Soviet program during those years to develop and produco Jet interceptors was very large, but all models were short-range types and fighter-bombers with offensive capabilities comparable to those In Western tactical air forces never appeared. Tactical air units were equipped with the same Interceptors that were provided to strategic air defense units, despite their poor characteristics for ground attack missions. On the other hand, during the9arge number of first generation jet light bombers (BEAGLE) were produced for strike and reconnaissance roles within theater forces.
, the total number of Jet fighters and light bombers in tactical aviation was reduced to less than half of its prior
strength. The sharpest reductions resulted from the deactivation ol aging UEAGLBs, probably due in large partoviet decision to rely heavily on missile strikes, including MRBMs and IRBMs, in nuclear war. There waseduction in fighter strength, probably due in large part to increased reliance on surface-to-air missiles introduced during the same period for air defense of the homeland and of field forces.he number of combat aircraft In tactical aviation hasfairly stable
changes in tactical aviation were accompanied, and inby the advent of missile systems for the tactical supportforce operations. Since the end of World War n. the Sovietsseveral types of short-range unguided rockets andcruise-type missiles for field use. Early generation ballistica Soviet version of thend asystem with about twice Its range. Both of these systemsmobility and slow reaction times. We think they weredeployed In large numbers'and that, in any event, they havesuperseded.
he highly mobile. ballistichas been available to ground force units. Deploymentto Soviet forces in East Europe and western USSR wasbyore recently, the. cruise missile system, has been introduced. Wethat the SCUD and SHADDOCK are the principal(other than unguided rockets) now in service with SovietTheir increasing availability provides the theater forcesmissile delivery capabilities for high explosive, toxicnuclear warheads.
Personnel Strengths
the Korean conflict the number of men in theforcesost-Worldigh of roughly fourthe, this strength had been reduced to roughly twoAs the net result of changes that have occurredforces have been further reducedevel which wewithin the rangeillion ate believeline divisions and tactical air units have been deactivatedyears, but that the reduction in the number of line divisionsbeen proportionate to the personnel reductions. There Is evidence
' These numbersillion In theater ground forces andn TacUeal Aviation. They excludeeneral command and support personnel, most of whom have been Included in previous estimates as part of theater forces. These personnel support all elements of the Soviet militaryee Annex a.. ..
that In many cases the Soviets elected to cut manning levels within divisions, thus reducing the proportion of divisions maintainedow ratio of nondivisiona! support units to divisions has continued despite the growing logistic and maintenance requirementsore mechanized army.
B. Current Size and Composition
Manning love's v> Divisions
here is little direct evidence on which to base an estimate of the actual personnel strengths of Soviet divisions. ariety of reliable sources, including classified Soviet documents, we do know that there are three general categories of divisions. The differences between these categories are measured most conveniently In terms of theof authorized personnel strength normally maintained in These differences, however,ore fundamental element of Soviet planning for mobilization In the event of general warhreat of general war. Much of this planning Is designed to mount and sustain large-scale operations against powerful NATO forces In Europe. The Soviets evidently anticipate that some divisions would need lo be ready for combat on short notice, others would constitute reinforcements for initial or very early operations, and still others wouldonger term mobilization base. This planning, moreover. Implies that the required combat effectiveness of divisions' would vary depending upon such factors as the lime of their availability for commitment to battle, the tasks they would be expected to perform, and the effectiveness of the enemy forces they would face when committed.
onsidering the fragmentary direct evidence on division marinlng levels, limited evidence as to the total manpower available la the ground forces, and the apparent basic structure of these forces, wc estimate that the three categories of Soviet line divisions have the followingcharacteristics:
I or combat strength divisions are probably manned ator more of authorized wartime strength. They arc readyto combat with little or no augmentation. They areto form the backbone of first-echelon striking forcesenemy forces. They would have the highest combatof any Soviet divisions when committed.
II or reduced strength divisions are probably mannedpercent of authorized wartimehey couldfleshed out with reservists and ready to moveheater ofwithineek or so. They arc intended, therefore, toreinforcements for early combat operations byivisions.
Their greatest use fulness would probably be as second-echelon or theater reserve units.
c. Category III or cadre strength divisions are probably manned atercent or less of authorised wartime strength, containing most of their onicer and NCO complements but few troops. They are intended toonger term mob dilation base. They could probably be fleshed out with reservistseek or so. but they would probably not be suitable as reinforcements or replacements for operations against powerful enemy forcesatter of months. After several weeks,hey could probably be useful for mopping-up operations, line-of-comrnunications duties, or reconstruction work.
Number of Divisions
e havehorough review of all evidence bearing on the number of Soviet divisions, their distribution by type, and thclr geographic location. As part of this review we haveetailed assessmentntlUes, each of which might be considered toivision on the basis of some kind of evidence, ond have madeas to which were firmly identified and which should be regarded with lesser degrees of assurance. We have also considered the number of divisions likely to be associated with the corps and army structure of the Soviet ground forces. Finally, we have calculated the probable number of existing divisions taking into account the varying degrees of uncertainty about Individual ccganrzaUons. From the results of these complementary forms of analysis, we conclude that the present number of division-level organizations In the Soviet ground forcescertainly falls within the range of llO-MO.*
onsidering the evidence available, we believe that no singlewithinange estimated above is more likely than any other to be the actual total number of Soviet divisions. However, in order to discuss the probable distribution of Soviet divisions by type and location, we have had to employ the only form of analysis suitable for thisassessment of Individual entities. This form of analysisingle. as the total number of entitles rated as Arm. highly probable, or probable divisions, excluding those rated as only possible. While using the results of this analysis in the following paragraphs and In our tablesatter of convenience, wc emphasize that the total, Is no more probable than any other Inange. It should be noted that an assumption that the total number of Soviet divisions is on the high side of the
lrtsloru lower than the nose estimated inCapabilities of the Sonet TheaterECRET. Tbe chance result* fromand should not be taken to mean that
the USSR has reduced IU force* bT thU amount la the past year.
ange would Imply greater requirements lor equipment and nondivislonal support, and so would tend to maximize any Sovietin those respects.
ur analysis indicates that the probable number of divisions maintained at the highest peacetime manning level.r combat strength divisions, fall within the range In the remainder of this estimate, to discuss the probable distribution by type and location, we use theumber which is appropriate only if the total number ol divisions. It should be noted that this procedure maximizes tlie immediate Soviet threat ln the event of war, but It also maximizes the time required to bring additional divisions to combat readiness, since most of the remainingivisions would be at cadre strength if.iven total number ofere maintained at high strength.
he assurance regarding the identification ofivisions included ln this estimate varies markedly with their location. Of this total.ndividual organizations arc considered firmly and currently established as divisions (In one or another of the threendf thesere in areas west of the Urals. The divisions ln Eastern Europe are firmly Identified; most of those In western USSR are firmly identified or highly probable: those In more remote areas are much less certain. Our evidence also leads us to believe that divisions in Eastern Europe and western USSR are generally at higher manning levels than divisions deep within the USSR. he uncertainty represented by thenvolves primarily low strength divisions located in areas remote from NATO, and does not significantly affect lrnmedlate capabilities against NATO.
Type* of Divisions
This compares with the flfuiestimated Ino that estimate, we made no attempt to arriveanee of uncertainty. As In tbe case ot the total number of divisions, the chance results from re-evaluation.
' Similar to US HONEST JOHN.
he Soviets have three types of line divisions: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. Even at wartime strength, all types of Sovietare considerably smaller than US divisions. Further, they are much lighter In divisional logistic support and some types of combat support. Since the publication ofc have acquired evidence leading us to believe that inhe Soviets reduced the authorized wartime personnel strength of divisions by as much asercent, together with some reductions In combat vehicles and artillery. At the same time, new armaments were authorized forsuch as anti-tank missiles.aunchers, and new combat vehicles.
otorized rifle divisions are the most numerous of Uie types In the Soviet (and Satellite) ground forces;oviet divisions cited above includeotorized rifle divisions,f them at combatn the course of the postwur evolution of the Soviet ground forces this type of division was developedore compact version of earlier mechanized divisions. The authorized personnel strength of the motorized rifle division has been gradually reduced. There haseneral trend lo increase its armor and mobility in order to adapt It to the combined arms tactics and fast rates of advance advocated In Soviet doctrine for the nuclear batUcfleld. It is almost certainignificant proportion of the motorized rifle divisions are not yet fully equipped according to the latest tables of organization and(TOEs).
ank divisions have also evolved from World War II types. Tlie tank divisions are small and light In Infantry troops when compared to US armoredn some tank divisions one of the three organic tank regiments Is equipped with heavy rather than medium tanks, but there is some evidence that heavy tanks are being phased out and replaced with mediums. In our recent review of evidence, we have concluded thativisions Which we formerly Identified as motorized rifle or older mechanized divisions arc probablyoviet divisions cited above includeank divisions.f them at combat strength. As in the case of the motorized rifle divisions, tank divisions are not yet fully equipped according to the latest TOE.
evidence is available on the organization andSoviet airborne divisions than on other types. The division issimilarotorized rifle division, but without heavier itemssuch as tanks and larger artillery pieces. The numberdivisions has declined over the past few years from ten They are all believed to be at combat strength
Ground* Armioi
motorlied rifle and tank divisions at authorized wartime strennth are believed to have0enee Annex C.or TOCa
These were earned as motorized rifle divisions lo
Soviet divisions are organized into combined armstank armies, which contain the bulk of the combat and servicefor the divisions. The compositionoviet ground armywould vary depending upon such factors as terrain endEvidence from Soviet exercises and classified militarythat the Soviets usually assumeartime ground armyfour or five divisions. In this estimate, we consider this to
pft-
reprcseiit the sizeypical Soviet army, recognizing that many variations are possible.
evidence indicates that aboutrrmies now existSoviet ground forces. These armies arc much smaller thanoiten invoked by the termot only because otsmall site of their divisions but also because of theircombat and service support elements. Supporting artillery,antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments are eitherarmies or retained under liigher command headquarters. Inlb the armies, there Is evidence that five to seven corps stillwe believe that these serve, in effect, as small armies.
" see annex c,or illustrauve organizationartime front.see annex a.or estimated eomposfuon of ocko. "see annex c,or illustrauve ortanttauonartime caa. "sec annex c.or illustrauve organkauooartime tank army.
In the event of general war most of these armies would probably be grouped into fronts. The Soviet wartime front is an echelon roughly comparableestern armyhe Group of Soviet Forces. Germanyhich can be regardedront, contains four combined arms armies and two tankhile we have not identified every army in the USSR as to type, there appears toimilar ratio of two combined arms armies to one tank armythe ground forces.
A typical Soviet combined arms armyn wartime could be composed of one tank division and four motorized rifle divisions with organic army combat and service support troops. Wc believe that the wartime personnel strength ofAA would behe present strength of the four CAAs in GSFG, however. Is estimated to vary0his lower strength Is due In part to the fact that these armiesatherivisions, but probably also to their having an even smaller support structure than that estimated for the wartime CAA.
Soviet tanksually contain only tank divisions. We believeypical tank army would be composed of four divisions, although at present the two tank armies in GSFG contain only three divisions each. The estimated personnel strengthypical wartime tank army would behereas the two tank armies In GSFG arc estimated to contain0 troops each The reasons for this difference are probably basically the same as ln the case of the combined arms army. Soviet tank armies probably cooCUD missile brigade, but no other nondivisional field artQicry.
Air andupport "
SL Soviet doctrine callsactical air army (TAA) to support major ground commands, generallyatio of one TAA per front ot (our or five ground armies. The sixc and composition of thedentified tactical air armies varies considerably. With the exception ofh TAAFG, which hasombat aircraft, these units range In aircraft strength from.
Since the reduction of Tacticalew years ago. It has been generally stabilized in overall aircraft strength, with phasing In of new model aircraft and continuing retirement of (rider models. There are currentlyombat aircraft in Tactical Aviation, comprisingightersight bombers, Includingaircraft of bothbout half this total strength is with Soviet forces In Eastern Europe, and roost of the remainder Is In western and southern USSR.
Soviet tactical missile support Includes free rocket (FROQ) launchers with ranges up too. These launchers are mountedight tank chassis. Sightings of these weapons with Soviet units have been rare, but we estimate that at least theivisions probably nowROG battalion with two launchers.
actical ballistic missile (SCUD) is found at bothhigher echelons. The SCUD is mountedeavy tankgives it cross-country mobility, and it employs storableThe latest modelaximum range. withor nuclear warheads; earlier models, probably still in service,range with HE or CW warheads, but only about half theewissiles have been sighted in GSFG,evidence of the extent of deployment Is not available. Tbesystem has been operational for several years, however, and. onof Its probable assignment to field army and higher echelons,thataunchers'exist.
" See Annex B.or tactical raleue efiaracUiliUcs.Annex A.or number* and location
3S. The Soviets haverowing interest in cruise missiles for tactical use. The principal cruise missile now employed In support of theater forces Is the road-mobilehich can deliver nuclear or CW warheadsange. The missileow altitude flight profile and fliesow supersonic speed. It may have replaced.SIBLING) ballistic missileront weapons system. The evidence Is equivocal as to whether SHADDOCK units are assigned to tactical, air armies or to
separate front artWcry formations, or to both. Our knowledge of the extent of deployment of SHADDOCK is even poorer than that available on SCUD, but on the basis of the same general considerations, wea present force level oiaunchers, the majority of them in western border areas of the USSR.
e believe that over the past year or so. the quantity of tactical guided missile launchers in theater forces has remained relatively stable at. while quality has unproved with the introduction of improved missile systems. Although nuclear warheads are probably the primary annamcnt for these missiles, there ts some evidence that CW warheads were providedelatively high percentage (abouthis proportion is probably declining as nuclear warheads becomeavailable. High explosive warheads are probably abo
C. Current Slrenglhi and Weakneiiei
ground forcesarge number of linecan be readied for combat on short notice, backed up bya Urge mobilixaUon potential. The ready force Isequipped with modem materiel. Is highly mobile, and Iseffective employmentuclear environment The troops arehighly disciplined, and have great endurance. Sovietare called up for three years or longer depending on theirservice and this system resultsairly stable personneltheater forces. Soviet forces are at peak efficiency in lateearly falLecline In combat readiness occurs withturnover In lower ranks later In the fall of the year.have recognized the need to avoid fluctuations in readinessattempting to spread the induction of new recruits morethe year.
Nondiyisional Support
" Sec Amies A. Table I.
evidence on nondivisional supporting elements is eventhan that available on divisions. However, in view ofrequirements of the modernized Soviet ground forces,of personnel in rnmdi visional dements appears austere.are Inivisions.f them in Category I, then theof personnel In theater ground forces assigned toand service support may now be as small aslikely that Soviet forces In East Europe and western USSRnondivisional support than those deep in the toterior. butaustere support for major units can be found even in GSFG.and service, support elements probably account for no
GCCRCT
more thanercent of the total strength in each of the combined arms armies. Based on the fragmentary data available, we think that the number of nondlvisional support personnel normally maintained in peacetime Is likely to be somewhat less than half of theivision force.
Sfo'ut of Ihe Re-equipment Program
he program of modernization and reorganization has involved the introduction in recent years of more advanced designs of many types of equipment. Including many types of missiles and improved combat vehicles. In most instances, successive generations of equipment have been produced since World War U. Although Soviet ground forces are not fully equipped with materiel of the later designs, many older models still in service remain generally effective. Despite the introduction of several more advanced models of tanks, It appears that someercent of the medium tanks ln GSFG are Worlds. In certain key categories of equipment, such as armored personnel carriers, general purpose trucks, and POL transporters, there axe good Indications that Soviet forces are short of total wartime TOE requirements.Soviet military spokesmen have alluded to equipment deficiencies and problems of obsolescence.
evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive as to totaland total Inventories of ground forceaestimates we presented inventory figures based on thison calculated Soviet requirements, but we now consider thathave insufficient validity to be included in an estimate. Were-evaluating the evidence ln an effort to arrive atof uncertainty in total equipment inventories. Pendingof this re-evaluation, the evidence does seem clearly tobelief that there are shortages of at least the types ofabove.
Atobi/izaf/on Potential
" In many cases, tbe evidence Is so Incomplete that widely varyinebe derived from lt. depending on the axsumpUons made. For example,evidenceirm conclusioninimumave been produced. The number Is almost certainly larger thanthe basis of certain assumptions, the available evidence can support anOgure of more than
Soviets havearge pool of trained reservists toexisting units and mobilize additional units.force personnel enter the reserve force yearly, notin home air defense forces. Most of the personnel releasedactive force over the past five years or so were probably trained
with the more modern equipment and in current Soviet tactics. Enough of these personnel are available as reservists lo provide the additional men required to fillheater ground forceivisions and their associated nondivisional support.
indicated in previous paragraphs, our information oninventories is not good enough toonfidentabout the adequacy withivisions could bethe event of mobilization. In general, we believe that Category Idivisions probably have nearly full complements of equipment,only certain newer items. Whatever quantity of equipmentfor Category in divisions, It is probably not as up-to-dateof the higher categories.
the Soviets choose to do so. additional divisions couldby detaching cadres from existing divisions and callingrreervists. There are probably sufficient Inventories ofof equipment to allow for mobilization beyondivisionshortages would make themselves felt even more severely if theattempted such an expansion. Moreover, lt Is doubtful that allnecessary additional combat and service elements could bethe same rate as divisions.obilization of additionalwould involve the loss of greater and more Immediatecould be achieved through fleshingivrskm force.
all Soviet aircraft and ships are maintained InNaval and air reservists would probably be mobilized tounits up to full wartime personnel complements. Weno significant increase in the operational Inventory ofaircraftesult of mobilization, but supporting dementsbe expanded.
focf/co/ Air ond Mittilo Support .
oviet Tactical Aviation is currently characterizedowof aircraft relative to the size of the theater ground forces, limited offensive capabilities, and the obsolescence of the force. The Soviets are reducing deficiencies in Tactical Aviation through the introduction of Improved aircraft and armament, as well as increased trainingon ground support missions. Tlic obsolescent BEAGLEight bomber Is still the mainstay of Soviet offensive tactical airbut appears now to be phasing out in favor of FIREBARew supersonic jet light bomber, which has entered service in small Someave radar bombing
ost current Soviet fighters were designed prLrnarily asand therefore have poor load-carrying and range capabilities
for offensiveboutercent of the tactical fighters are obsolescent FAGOTS. FRESCOs. and FARMERS. However, even with their limitations. Soviet fighters canariety of missions in support o( ground forces and can be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs. Some oi the newer fighters (FITTER andlthough they were also basically designed as interceptors, have improvedover the older models for offensive missions. The number of new generation fighters in Tactical Aviation has increased fromercent of the total inventory toercent over the past year.
oviet tactical missiles, particularly the FROGs and SCUDsave good mobility and appear rugged and simple In design. However, some classified Soviet articles have criticized live liability of tactical missile units to mairrtaln continuous fire support because of the time required to displace them to new Axing posJOons. Theso articles reflected the desire of Soviet theater ground force officers to have MRBMs allocated to their operational control, but their prorxwals were evidently rejected.
Theater force Air Detente Capabilities
espite increasing numbers of surface-to-air missiles. Soviet theater force air defenses still rely primarily on automatic antiaircraftmm and smaller) and tactical aircraft. The introduction ofewnterceptors into Soviet tactical air units (Includingn East Germany) has signlficanUy increased alr defense capabilities. issile units are now believed to be assigned to armies and higher echelons, but because of displacement time and lack of low altitude capabilities, this system has onlyapidly moving situation. The automatic antiaircraft weapons currently constitute the only defenses mobile enough to provideair defense for troops when fighter cover is not available, and the effectiveness of these weapons against modem high performance aircraft is minimal
Tactical Nuclear Capabilities
uclear weapons appear not to be physically located with field forces In peacetime. As far as we can determine, they are stored In Ministry of Defense depots located within the USSR, although there is some evidence, which we have not been able to confirm!"
Jin East Germany. Special units orKGBof State Security) troops have been created to Maintain custody of nuclear weapons, not only in storage, but also during transportation to firing units. Once their use was authorised by national leadership,
-See Annex II,or eaUmated cloae aupport capabilities of tacUcal aircraft.
tactical nuclear weapons would be delivered to firing units by the special KGB units.
M. Command and allocation lines of authority for the use of nuclear weapons run from the High Command to commanders of fronts and. In some cases, armies. These procedures give the national leadershipcontrol over the numbers and yields of weapons employed in major theaters. Allocations within the theater are' governed byguidelines which limit the freedom of field commanders to select targets. The entire system of Command and control appears wellto reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate use of nuclear weapons.
SI. The broad range of nuclear tests12 points to an effort to improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet military establishment. The numbers of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet theater forces have probably been limited by higher priorities afforded the strategic attack forces. Nevertheless, we believeariety ofnuclear weapons Is now available, virtually all of them with yields In the kilo ton range, but possibly including some in the tow megaton range. The Soviets are probably developing subkilotoa wartieads, but ther; Is no present evidence that they are developing delivery systems specifically for such weapons.
lassified documents Indicate that Soviet military planners for the past few years have beenosition to think in terms of committing upew hundred nuclear weaponsront operation. Initialstrikes are considered crucial to onigh volume of concentrated nuclear strikes Is called for prior to offensive thrusts by ground forces, with theater forcesarge percentage of their nuclear weapons allocations in these strikes. The primary targets in all phases of theater operations remain enemy nuclear deliveryTo the extent of weapons availability, nuclear strikes would also be directed at command and control complexes, air defense facilities, logistical installations, and major troop formations. We believe,that existing procedures, together with deficiencies ln logisticwould hamper the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response in their employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Wc have no doubt that the Soviets are working to overcome these deficiencies, although we have no evidence on their progress.
Other Supporting Capabilities,
hemicale possess good technical data on thecapability of Soviet theater forces to employ tactical cruise "and ballistic missiles and FROGs with toxic chemical warheads. In oddi-
uller discussion, seeSoviet CapablUUes and Intentions with Respect to Chemicalated TtKC1UST.
scenn
sccna
HOB, chemical bombs and projectiles are available for use with other delivery systems such as tactical aircraft, artillery, mortars, and barrage rockets Spray systems and land mines have also been developed. Whereas our evidence indicates that missile warheads are bulk-filled exclusively with one of the extremely toxic "V" agents, all otherare apparently filled with less toxic nerve agents of the "G" type (sarin or soman) or with agents of older types which first saw use in World War I.
Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment,and research and development can support substantial toxicwarfare operations. Although some CW munitions are probablyavailable to Soviet tactical units, logistical problems might affect the Soviet's ability to bring their stored CW stocks Into play against NATO forces in Europe. Aboutercent of the probable toxicdepot storage we have identified is in Western and central USSR and aboutercent in the Far East. Nearly all that ln the western and central USSR Is located in the Volga and Turkestan Military Districts. II Is therefore not well sited for usear ln the West which began with short warning times and involved heavy Interdiction of transportation facilities.
We believe that in Soviet thinking the same constraints which apply to the use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW, and that the use of either wouldecision at the highest political level. The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operations probably results in part from restricted availability of tactical nuclear weapons due to the longstanding nuclear priority assigned strategic forces. Considering this and other factors, we believe that the Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of toxic chemical agents by their theater field forceseneral nuclear war.on-nuclear war, the Soviets probably would not Initiate the use of toxic chemicals.
Biological Warfare, Intelligence derived from Soviet scientific publications indicates continued interest and research In the Geld of biological warfare. Wc have no evidence of current Soviet military capabilities for application to theater operations, however, and weSoviet tactical use of BW highly unlikely.
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defense. Soviet military authorities evidently assume that the West would use chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons in the event of genera] war. All elements of the Soviet forces stress training for chemical defense. This training, as well as most items of chemical defense equipment, isalso for defense against radiation and biological warfare agents. Manual and automatic radiation and chemical detection devices are available, but sensitivity of the latter to nerve agents is inadequate to guarantee human safety. An armored personnel carrier has been modi-
tsm
Red for mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but we do not know the sensitivity of the detection systems. The chemical defense
equipment supplied the Individual combat soldier Is adequate to protect
himoxic environment (orhort time.
econjusissance. While there Is little current information onbattlefield surveillance techniques. Intelligence available does not suggest that substantial progress has been made in overcomingSoviet deficiencies in this field. Most Soviet aircraft designated for this mission are obsolescent, although the FLASHLIGHTew tactical reconnaissance aircraft, is now available. In the theater ground forces'there are apparently no longern divisional armoredunits; divisions themselves are expected to perform required ground reconnaissance missions, but their specialized reconnaissance elements are minimal The reconnaissance equipment ln operation Is apparently, for the most part. Incapable of rapidly providing the ground missile units with accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed and transmitted. There are probably still serious organizationalin tbe way of exploitation of collected intelligence. Some Soviet authors have strongly criticized the system of battlefieldavailable, at least ups Incapable of fully meeting the requirements of nuclear warfare.
irlift.ight transport aircraft of the CAB. COACH and CRATE types andedium turboprop transports of the CAT, CAMP and CUB types are assigned by Soviet MilitaryAviation to support of airbornehe assigned transport aircraft of the airborne troops are sufficient toingle airborne division In one sortie. The range of the Soviet troop transport aircraft would limit the radius of airborne assault to. from assembly airfields. The probable addition In the near future of more transports will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas. Wc believe that in several years transportsto support of airborne troops may have twice the present lift capacity, but still to limited ranges.
III. NAVAt GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
A. Post Trends in Oevelopment
ntil recent years the Soviet Navy was equipped and trainedrimarily defensive role. An Intensive postwar shipbuildingwhich reached its peakurface fleet Including
-For estimated charaderisUcs and performance ot these and other Soviet transport aircraft, seeable 4.
cruisers, destroyers, and escort ships, which was limited for effective operations to the range of shore-based aircraft. The large Sovietforce has been composed, for the most part, of types limited to operations in the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific waters. However, in the past few years the Soviets have developed an Increasingly diversified naval forceew emphasis on ships, weapons, aodof greater range and effectiveness.
uch of the impetus for technological change in the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by US carrier task forces and missile submarines. To counter these forces at sea, the Soviets have introduced medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles, submarines equipped with cruise missiles, new classes ofwarfare (ASW) ships, and Improved weapons and electronic systems. They have also Introduced Improved attack submarines, both nuclear and dieseL Soviet surface forces have been strengthened by the addition of missile armament to two cruisers and several classes of destroyer and patrol craft, and by the introduction of new mine-warfare ships."
B. Current Size and Composition
Submarine Force "
* See Annex B,or characteristics of Soviet naval missiles.
"See Annex a.or strength and composlUon.
" Sec Annex B.or subcnarlne characteristics and armament.
Soviet capabilities for conducting operations at long distances from the Soviet coast derive primarily from the submarine force. The total strength of the Soviet submarine force has changed little in the past few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate lt willto Includeirst line units. However, with theemphasis on missile armament and nuclear propulsion, itsare changing sigmficantly. For example,he USSR had only aboutiesel-powered. torpedo-attack submarines capable ot conducting patrols off North American coasts. It now hasuclear and dfesel submarines with this endurance, about hall of them armed with missiles.
The bulk of the Soviet torpedo-attack submarine force consists of diesel submarines, built for the most part Ins. These includelass.lass,lass, andlass submarines.8 the Soviets have producedlass diesel submarines andlass nuclear submarines; both of these classes have sufficientto conduct long-range patrols."
Surface Forces
a.nl surface forces, which are still heartly dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive operations In waters adjacent to the USSR. Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseight cruisers.estroyers,scorts. In recent years, however, the Soviet Nary has consider -ably increased the firepower of Its surface forces by tbe addition of missile armament, including surface-to-air missiles, which has extended the potential scope of effective operations. The only known majorcombatant ships now being built to the USSR are guided missile destroyer types. The Soviets how have operationalestroyers armed with cruise-type missiles for use against surface- targets. In addition to their missile armament, most of these ships also carry ASW weapons systems. They are probably intended prirnarily for operations against both naval striking forces and submarines, either ln defense of the sea approaches to the USSR or in coastal areas in support of theater field forces.
Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed prirnarily of older ships.augmented by new tankers and cargo ships, and logistic supportis being reinforced by the addition of submarineships, repair ships, and missile support ships. Additionalcould be provided by the growing Soviet merchant marineSoviet Ashing Heels could also provide limited supportand they have considerable utility for training,collection of intelligence.
Naval Avrofion1*
" See Annex A.or atreneth andee Annex A, Tableor compostUon and distribution.
Soviet Naval Aviationrastic reorganizationith the deactivation or transfer of all naval fighter units. NavalIs now composed largely of jet medium bombers, but also Includes Jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions againsttargets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. Defensive air cover for naval operations would have to be provided by fighternot subordinate to Naval Aviation.
f NavalADGER Jet medium bombers are equipped to deliver antlshlp air-to-surface missiles. These missiles are of two types: the subsonic AS-i. whichange ofnd them.oth arc estimated toEPeet against single, well-defined ship targets and some of these mis-
alios probably carry nuclear warheads. MlsslleiaunclUng BADGERS are either configured to carry twos or one AS-2.
medium bomber strength will probably increase slightlynext five years. We believe that Naval Aviation has receivedBLINDER medium bombers, and they will probablyin greater strength within the next lew years. Some ot theseequipped with air-to-surface missiles.
of the naval BADGERs which are not equipped withassigned to reconnaissance or support roles. Recent evidencean increasing use of medium and heavy bombers of Longon maritime reconnaissance missions; overflights of OSforces also suggest an attack training mission for thesebelieve that the naval requirement for long-range aerialIs growing, and that It will be met either by the continued useRange Aviation aircraft in this role, or by the assigrxment ofaircraft to Naval Aviation.
C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses
recent years, the missions of the Soviet Navy have teento encompass strategic missile attack 'against foreignoperations against Western naval forces, while retaining theroles of Interdicting Western sea lines ofthe littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support forflanks of ground forces. Soviet surface forces operatingwaters would lack air cover, although In certainships may operate beyond the range of land-based
Against Carrier Task Forces
capabilities against carrier task forces have beencontinued conversion of Jet medium bombers to carry antishipand by the Introduction of submarines equipped withIn the European area, BADGERs with antiship missilesagainst surface ships in the rjortheastern Atlantic, theand Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranean. Theseare, of course, subject to problems of target detection andIn the past year or so. reconnaissance of open oceanLong Range and Naval Aviation has mcrcascd. Submarineagainst carrier task forces could extend to US coastal waters.
Against Sea Lines of Communication
threat of the Soviet submarine fleet to Free Work) seagreatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Theof Soviet submarines to interdict those supply lines would depend
umber of factors: endurance of tlic submarines, transit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and theof opposition. Interdiction operations against North Atlanticroutes would be undertaken largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet. We estimate that this farce includes someorpedo attack submarines whose endurance would limit operations to the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic, as well as ciglrt diesel submarines equipped with antiship cruise missiles.
ot considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleetcould be maintained on station continuously In the easternapproaches to the UK and Europe; this number might be augmented slightly by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostilities. The. Soviets could also maintain0 nuclear and diesel torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping In the western Atlantic and in the approaches to the Mediterranean. The number In the western Atlantic could be more than doubled If thewere able to provide logistic support during patrolsorward base such as Cuba.
n the Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to have someorpedo-attack submarines which they could use against sea lines ofas well as six nuclear and three diesel submarines equipped with antiship missiles. While only one-third of this force has sufficient endurance to operate off the US west coast, the remainder conin those areas through which US shipping must pass to support Pacific island bases and Asian allies. The Pacific Fleet now Includes six nuclear and three diesel-powered ciuise-riusslle-lauriching submarines. We believe the Soviets would employ these submarines primarily hi an antishipping role, but they could also be employed against land targets. The Soviets could probably maintainubmarines on station in the ocean area between Hawaii and Japan, as well as about Ave oft the US Pacific Coast.
ASW Capabilities
ince thehe Soviets haveajor effort in the construction of ASW ships, particularly small coastal types, and are testing new helicopters and modified seaplanes. An ASW role may have been assigned tolass submarines, as well as to thelass. Detection equipment and weapons now in service Include air-launched passive sonobuoys, airborne magneticdetection (MAD) equipment, depth charges, multiple tube ASW rocket launchers, and passive homing torpedoes ASW caxnases have expanded in scope, and training doctrine has become more sophisticated. We believe that the USSR now has the capability to conduct fairlyASW operations withinilesajor Soviet naval base agmnst
SrCRLT *
a conventional submarine operatedoderately well trained crew.onventional submarinerew experienced in evasive techniques this capability would be materially degraded, anduclear submarine It would be very poor. Soviet ASW capabilities di-rntnish rapidly as tlie distance from their naval basesiles, and beyond that distance must still be regarded as negligible.
SeaMt
The amphibious assault capability of the Soviet Navy is extremely limited. We have re-examined the numbers and characteristics of the ships and craft available to the USSR for shore-to-shore operations; we concludo that very few can be used for assault landings across open beaches, and that these are suitable only for short-distance operations. We now believe that only in the Baltic arc there sufficient numbers of appropriately designed ships and craft to lift balanced forces In anassault In thisaximum of two regiments can be lifted. Token numbers of amphibious ships and craft In other fleet areas could, of course, be used ship-to-shore for logistic support or for small landing operations not requiring assault by balanced forces.
The Sovietsotal merchant ship lift in all seas which Is theoretically sufficient to transport approximatelyotorized rifle divisions; however,it would require port or other extensive on-loading facilities in the landing area. Assuming all Soviet merchant ships were available for use in their respective areas of registry, thelr approxlmate lift capability would be:
Northmotorized rifle divisions
Baltic motorized rifle divisions
Black motorized rifle divisions
' motorized rifle divisions
IV. CONIRIBUTION OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES A. Wonow Pact
Sinceoviet and European Satellite forces hove been partnified mill Buy command established under the Warsaw Pact. The headquarters of this command ts ln Moscow, and itsln Chiefarshal of the Soviet Union as wellirst Deputy Minister ot Defense of the USSR Satellite defense ministers are designated Deputy Commanders in Chief, but there is no evidence that they regularly participate in the functions of the unifiedwhich are evidently handled almost exclusively by Soviet staff officers.
In wartime, European Satellite military forces would be under the ultimate control of the Soviet High Command, and we believe that
the Warsaw Pact command as such would have little or noole. The manner and extent lo which tlie Soviets plan to employ Satellite forces Is probably determined by the Soviet estimate of their reliability and effectiveness, and by the availability of supportingSelected Satellite divisions, corps, and field armies would be integrated directly into Soviet held armies or fronts. Others would be retained under national command (or offensive missions on secondary fronts, as well as defense against NATO air attack and sabotage, theater reserve, and line-of-communications security.
' B. Groo.id Forces
The total personnel strength of the East European ground forces Is estimated toexcludingf this total more than half are in theatellite linehe remainder are in combat and service support units and home air defense forces, as well as general support for the Satellite military establishments. As in the case of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, our evidence as to the existence of Satellite divisions is relatively good- However, our evidence onand equipment, peacetime rnanning levels, and equipment status varies from good in the case of some divisions to poor in the case of others.
The divisions are organized generally along Soviet lines. Some of the equipment for these ground forces is manufactured by the Satellite armaments Industries, but the bulk of it is supplied by the Soviets Those models of ground force equipment which arc in widespread use with Soviet units are also on current issue in the Satellites. Items of latest model Soviet equipment have been observed in some East European armies, but these are certainly in even shorter supply in the Satellites than in the USSR. In general, the equipment available to East German divisions and to many Polish and Czechoslovak divisions appears to be nearly comparable to that of GSFG in quality. We believe thatf the Satellite divisions are sufficiently manned and equipped to beto combat on short notice In conjunction with Soviet forces. Of these divisions we estimatereastulgarian,umanian.
C. Toctical Air ond Misule Support
the primary mission of Satellite air forces Is airunits are being trained and equipped to perform groundas well. These air forces are made up largely of However, more advanced fighters are being furnished to
- For details of locationype, see Annex A,or details ot type and location, see Annex A. Table 6
SECRCT-
the Satellites and we believe this trend will continue. Certain key cities of East Europe are defended by SAMs of theype, but thestill depend heavily on their fighter aircraft for air defense. The Satellites have dual capable weapons of various types, but the Soviets are almost certainly unwilling to provide them with nuclear bombs and warheads. There is evidence that SCUD and PROG missiles are being provided to some of the Satellites.
D. reliability
he political reliability of the Satellite forces isritical consideration In Soviet planning for their employment. Their utility would vary among units and nationalities, and would further depend on the drcurnstances. including the cause and nature of the hostilities, and the nationality of the opposing forces. By careful selection of courses of action and missions, the USSR could make effective use of Satellite forces, but It could not count upon them for the full range of operations against NATO.
V. GENERA! WAR CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO A. Current Operolional Doctrine
he Soviets are preparing their theater forces against theof general nuclear war. Soviet military doctrine does not address itself in any depth to the variety of circumstances in which general nuclear war might begin Although there is increasinggiven to general war resulting from escalation, most Soviet military writings assume thatar would be Initiatedestern attempt to launch strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In thisrimary Soviet concern is to ensure that the theater forces would be able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy and to fight effectively in conjunction with the USSR's own air and missile strikes.
uring an Initial nuclear exchange, the rolo ol theater Held forces would be secondary to that of strategic attack and air defense forces, but theater forces would be expected to contribute to Initialensive and defensive action by engaging the enemyroad front and by neutralizing nuclear weapons and bases where possible The ultimate strategic objectives of Soviet theater operations in general war would be to defeat cuemy ground forces and to occupy strategicallyterritory. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in general war would be directed against NATO In Europe. Sovietevidently calls for moving massive forces rapidly toward thecoast in the initial days ofar.
SCCRfT -
operational doctrine recognizes thai in the event ofNATO's nuclear delivery ratabilityeed lorand flexibility in deployment and control ol SovietTo meet these needs, Soviet operational doctrine calls for thearmored units as the key element of maneuver, and tacticalrockets with nuclear and CW warheads as the chief elements ofSoviet doctrine also callsapid and continuous ratefor ground forces (upm perithout theof concern for open flanks or by-passed enemy forces.
orces Available for Employment
great many variable factors have decisive bearing on thethe forces which the Soviets could and would employ inNATO. Some of the most important of these arc: (a) theIn which the conflict arose,hether suddenly or more(b) the number of units which would be retained as aand training base; (c) the extent of employment and theof Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements InWe are not certain as to the quantities of weapons andavailable for mobilization purposes. However, we believeof some types of combat and support equipment, as welltrained specialists for support units, would impair thean expanded force
Grovnd Foremi
theater ground forces are disposed inannerbulk of- their strength is available for use against NATO. OfM divisions whose identification Is considered firm,re located west of the Urals.fbelieved to be incombatnd havegiven the highest level of support within Soviet grounddetailed assessment of the types and locations of combatdivisions available for employment against NATO Is as follows:
Air and Mitiilc Support
Wc estimate that Soviet tactical air strength now in East Get-many. Poland, and Hungary consists ofet light bombers andhe Satellites (excluding Albania) hrveight bombers andighters, the latter serving primarily air defense functions. In the entire European USSR, there are in Tactical Aviation anight bombers andighters. In addition to the tactical delivery systems available to the Soviet forces In East Europe and those organic to reinforcing
Soviet formations, some medium and intermediate range missiles and medium bombers would almost certainly be directed against targets
of Immediate interest to the theater forces.
Naval Support
he units assigned to the three Soviet fleets In the European area are estimated as follows:
Northern
BalUc
Black Sea
Escoxts
I 3 SO
1 S
1 32
Of the forces In the Northern Fleet, with unrestricted access to the open seas, we estimate that there are someorpedoattackwhose armament and endurance makes them best suited for antiship operations in the northeastern Atlantic The eight cruisesubs arc also available for such missions. Tho surface ships of the Northern Fleet are capable of operations in the northeasternbut their operations would probably be confined lo the North, Norwegian, and Barents Seas within the radius of land-based sir cover.ADGER medium bombers, tbe bulk of them equipped with ASMS, and aboutADGE seaplanes are assigned to the threefleets.
C. Capabilities lo launch Campaigns Against Central Region
Immediately Available Forcei
ri'ruri
he size of the ground and tactical air forces the Soviets could employ initially against the Central Region of NATO would depend in part on whether operations were begun on short notice oreriod of preparation. The Soviets currently haveine divisions andactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. Without
"The figures In this paragraph Include reconnaissance aircraft.
prior buildup, the Soviets couldimited objective attack against Western Europe designed to maximize the chance of surprise. Such an action, however, would conflict with Soviet doctrine concerning the necessity for numerical superiority ln the area of engagement
Keinforcomenl Capabilities
Soviet military doctrine and training exercises Indicate that. If circumstances permitted, the USSR would seek to assemble alarger striking force for any campaign into Western Europe.current Soviet doctrine-_for combat organization andechelon-ment, as well as the geography of the area, we believetriking force forampaign would probably comprise three fronts,otalround divisions and air support totallingactical aircraft. Soviet doctrine would also call for some theater reserve forces in,Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia.
The ground and tactical air forces to accomplish the reinforcement could be drawn from the western military districts of the USSR and from the Satellite forces of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Theombat-strength divisions andactical aircraft ln western USSR, as well asf the Satellite divisions, would be the earliestreinforcements. After some delay, additional divisions could be drawn from lower strength divisions in western USSR, or fromsouthwestern, or southern USSR
arriving at an estimate of Soviet capabilities to augmenta campaign into Western Europe, wc haveumberIncluding the capacity of the East European rail and roadthe time required to prepare transportation systems topeak efficiency, the confusion factors common to all largeand the problems of organizing divisions andinto effective armies and fronts. Considering all factors,to estimate that, under noncombatforce could be assembled in East Germany and westernand organized for operations against Westernaysoviet decision to do so.orce couldtheoviet divisions normally stationed in East Germanyplusombat strength Soviet divisions from theatellite divisions." Inheater reserve of Czech,
" In terms of manpower, these divisions and their rapport wouldcround troops norma Ur stationed InCOO
Soviet (round troops from western
Satellite
i.uo.ooo
Polish, and Soviet Category II divisions could be assembled ln eastern Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce oncale without detection.
O. Capabilities lo* Novol Operations Againil NATO
ong-range torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines, both nuclear and diesel-powered. could be deployed in the North Atlantic for operations against NATO naval forces, and this would probablyrimary Soviet objective In the Initial periodeneral war. Those aircraft of Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation which axe equipped with antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in theAtlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranean. The Soviet ballistic and cruise missile submarines could contribute, In the initial period,ampaign against western Europe by attacks against Important coastal targets. Attacks could also be directed against some inland targets, depending on their location into sea approaches and on the depth and effectiveness of Western coastal ASW defenses. Following the initial phaseampaign, part of the Soviet submarine fleet could be deployed for operations against sea lines of communication from North America.
E. Copabilitiej to launch Campaigns In Other Aroos
major drive across central Europe would probably beby lesser thrusts In other military theaters, employing theadjacent to them and the limited numbers of tacticalcommitted to the main westward thrust In the followingwe canvass Soviet strength available for such campaigns, onof the breakdown of divisions by number, category, andIn earlier sections of the paper. If the actual number oftoward the low side of our estimateoviet forces available for simultaneous campaignsother than NATO Central Region would be smaller thanbelow.
an initial campaign against Scandinavia, the USSR couldfour combat strength and four understrength divisions facingnorthern Norway. The four Soviet divisions in Hungary mightInitial echelonront moving toward Italy.ampaignand Turkish Thrace, the USSR has available sevendivisions in the southwestern USSR and up to fivefive Rumanian divisions. Some of tbe seven Soviet combatin the Carpathian Military District. If not sent westward,be used in this theater. The position of Yugoslavia as neutral,enemy wouldey factor influencing the strategy of Sovietagainst Italy or Greece and western Turkey.
9B. In the initial stageeneral war. limited operations might be launched against Iran and eastern Turkey. Eight combat strengthare stationed ln southern USSR facing eastern Turkey and Iran; because of logistic limitations, not all of these divisions could be employed against eastern Turkey.
forces in the Far East number six combat strength anddivisions, mcluding one airborne division. Tbe Farforces have no significant capability for amphibiousapability to sealift forces in merchant ships againstas Japan, provided that adequate port facilities could betheater forces in the Soviet Far East have been substantiallyrecent years, and it is doubtful that ln the initial phase of athe Soviets wouldheater campaign in the Far EasternIs possible that additional Soviet theater forces will be moved toEast because of an exacerbated Slno-Soviet dispute.
VI. LIMITEO WAR CAPABILITIES
A. Non-Nuclear Theater Warfaro
The Soviets have been especially concerned with developingand capabilities for waging nuclear theater campaigns. This appears to have been In responseATO policy which was frankly basedesort to nuclear weapons from the beginning of hostilities. More recently, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat theirthat any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitably escalate. Recent Soviet writings have indicated that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear warfare In Europe, in view of the US interest In building up KATO conventional capabilities. The Soviets recognize the advantages to them if an engagement in the European theater could be kept non-nuclear, and have statedoviet objective Inonflict would be to prevent escalation. But they also recognize that tbe risk of escalation would be very great.
While current Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remain formidable, efforts to gear the theater forces for nuclearhave had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities,in terms of firepower. The sharp decreases of past years In tactical aviation and tube artillery would hamper the Soviet forces In tbeof large-scale non-nuclear operations. Further, while we believe that the austerity of combat and service support at all echelons of the ground forces might suffice in the "quick-or-never" context of general nuclear war, it Is doubtful that It couldore protractedconflict without considerable augmentation.
B. Limited Nuelrar Warfare
he Soviets have been even more reluctant to admit the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons couid be introduced Into local war without precipitating escalation to general war. They have evidently notany doctrine for limited warfare involving the tactical use of nuclear weapons. Inowever, this possible use of nuclear weapons was mentioned for the first time In open Soviet literature. Limited nuclear warfare against NATO would pose acute problems to the Soviets in that their most significant nuclear delivery capability against European theater targets rests with MRBM/IRBM and mediumforces whose bases are Inside the USSR.
C. Distant limited Military Operation!
theater forces are primarily designed for operationscontiguous to the Bloc In recent years, the USSR hasconcern with areas remote from Its borders, and tbe Cubanthat It can deploy small ground and air contingents toand maintain them once deployed. However, the USSR woulddisadvantages in any present attempt lo initiate and sustainoperationsistant area, or toarge force to suchIt is severely limited In airlift, seallft. and naval supportdistant military operations. Moreover. In many areas It lacksto Insure that it could provide adequate logistic support.
is no evidence that the USSR has established anycomponent trained and equipped specifically foroperations, although of course it can employ portions offorces. It Is possible that over the next few years Iheseek to improve their capabilities for disLant, ami ted militarythrough the designation and training of appropriate forces,development of equipment specifically for their use andThey may attempt to overcome their geographicapplying such forces by negotiating with neutralist countriesavailable facilities for refueling and maintenance of Sovietaircraft or naval ships.
VII. TRENDS IN GENERA! PURPOSE FORCES0
A. Ground Forces
e believe that debate regarding the proper size of the Soviet ground forces will continue within Soviet ruling circles over the next few years. This debate will be shaped by the conflicting views which are already evident on the appropriate role of these forces in general war. Economic factors will alsoajor consideration; even nowis evidently pressing anew the ease for reducing military manpower
SCCBCT-
In order to free resources for higher civilian allocations. Those who support the conceptarge standing army will probably contend, in addition to their customary arguments, that the contingency of non-nuclear war raised by current NATO discussions and the hostility of Communist China are new factors reinforcing their propositions. Within the contextossible force reduction, or Independent of it. thereossibility that Soviet forces In East Europe will be scaled down, primarily for political effect
will depend on the evolution of NATO itself. Theobserve the Western Alliance not only in order to respond toits military capabilities, but also to assess its eobesiveness andNATO's ability to agree upon and implement significantin forces would probably Increase the deterrence toto arms, but lt would also add to the arguments that thenot reduce Its ground forces and should concentrate uponquality.
The interaction of these factors over the next six years cannot be wholly foreseen. In our view, however, the chances are good that the number of personnel In theater ground forces will decline over the period. The decline might come aboutesult of economic pressures and of repeated compromises In the debate over military doctrine This process could lead,heater ground force of about one and one-half million men, thateduction ofrom present estimated strength.educed force might haveine divisions, about half ot them at combat strength
On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility of reductions along the lines of0 proposals, whichheater ground force strength of about one-million men, perhaps backed uperritorial militia system.rastic reduction would involve basic strategic decisions which the Soviets thus far do not appear willing or ready to make. Considering current indications from Soviet military budgeting, and from the status of the military debate, we believe that current plans for the size of theater ground forces would call for more moderate reductions, such as outlined in the preceding paragraph.
Modernization will continue to Improve the quality of Soviet ground forces. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends In total size; the larger the forces which the USSR elects to retain, the more it will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages. If the Soviets decide that they must seriously respond to the contingency of non-nuclear warfare, they will probably provide Increased combat support ax well as Increased service support. Such efforts would reinforce the pressureseduction in the number of line divisions.
Present trends in the ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of
concentration probably will include improved, more mobile missile weapons to defend against tactical aircraft, increased quantities of the better armored personnel carriers,2 medium tanks witbguns, and of guided missile antitank weapons. The Soviets mayew light reconnaissance tank to replace the PT-7fl. which several Soviet military authors have criticized as being undergunned and vulnerable, as wellew medium tank replacing the main gun with missile weaponry. More and better general purpose vehicles andreliance on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence on rail lines for logistic support
actical Aviation and Missiles
e believe that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical Aviation. Improving its ground attack capabilities In particular. We expect the rate of modernization to increase over the next few years, and we believe that tactical aircraft with much Improved range and payload characteristics will be Introduced. Weradual decline in total numbers of tactical aircraft. The numbers of guided missiles In Soviet theater forces will probably remain about constant, but new andsystems will probably be Introduced. It appears likely thatfree1 rocket launchers will be assigned to divisions.
C Air and Missile Defense
ield force air defense capabilities will improve over the next few years through the modernization of Tactical Aviation and probably Uirough the Introduction of ther follow-on SAM systems into ground formations. There Is considerable evidence that the Soviets have been developing transportable ABM defenses for their field forces, and we believe that such defenses could be operationale have no basis for determining the extent to which they may be deployed, but It seems likely that considerable improvement of defenses againstwouldrerequisite to deploying an ABM vulnerable toattack.
D. Naval Forces
e believe that the numerical strength of Soviet surface naval forces will remain fairly stable over tbe next five years. Soviet production of guided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft will probably continue at about present levels. Modernization of destroyers will also continue, and additional surface ships will probably be retrofitted with missile armament. The aircraft strength of Naval Aviation is expected to remain fairly stable with an increased proportion of new models such as BLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. As regards nfisslles, we expect some
extension of range, either through Improvement in missile fuels or design, or by improved target acquisition means, or both.
The USSR will continue to Improve ASW and anticarrierprimarily through the application of improved submarines and long-range aircraft to these missions The eflectiveness of surface units at distances beyond the range of land-based fighter cover will probably be strengthened through the addition of SAM armament. Despite these Improvements, however, we believe that the capabilities of the Soviet Navy to conduct surface operations in open ocean areas will remain severely limited. In particular. It probably will haveimited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance onoperating In open seas
There is little evidence of the development within the Soviet Navyapability to replenish ships on the high seas. However, we believe the Soviets areystem for emergency mobile basing ofships and submarines In their coastal waters. Mobile bases probably will consist of several small ships for repair, refueling, andof weapons and supplies. As the period advances, we think, aof such bases will be deployed In protected coves and fiords to provide wider dispersal and thus enhance the survivability of the Soviet base for naval operations.
The Soviets may seek to develop their amphibious lift capability, but slgruJicant improvement will depend upon their acquisition ofamphibious craft, extensive training, and developmenteliable logistic support system. There are few current indications of efforts along these lines.
E. Nocleor Weapon*
of nuclear weapons for support of theater forcesbe alleviatedven If the Soviets allocate priority tomissile defense warheads. If no such priorities Interfered,could probably have the numbers of tactical nuclearthey would consider requisite for theater forces within twoyears. Soviet procedures for control and use of tacticalwell as reconnaissance and target acquisition, arc likely toover the next year or so, particularly should theto give more credence to the possibility of limited nuclear warfare.
ANNEX A
STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
TABLES
TableLLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL IN SOVTET GENERAL PURPOSE AND GENERAL SUPPORT. FORCES
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP OF SOVTET FORCES. GERMANY
TableSTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS AS OF3
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROUND FORCES AS OF3
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF3
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AS OF3
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY TYPE.4 TO
TableSTIMATED SOVTET NAVAL STRENGTH3 TO
TableSTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NAVAL AVIATION AS OF3
ILLUSTRATIVE BREAKDOWN OF PERSONNEL in SOVIET GENERAL PUR-POSE AND GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES
Ublc Is baaedaree wiu,l combat .Irength.account, forcstiai.ledry peraouiirf .treogti la. tboM lauud lo^ Asd (PVO). Tho uM, rep^-ot* on],
ooe of nmntna pouible broth do-oa of mri-taryuength-oold be, reasonably eooiilml with Ihe hauled evidence available.
General Purpose
ivision, oM.OOO
Category II ud iii
Anil 4jo!ooo
Service Support
2urpose Naval000
Force*
Supporting Shore EeUbliiom.ol
De/eoM
Naval Aviation 0
General Purpote Air000
ThMloal Aviation
Military Transport Avialioa
TOTAL GENERAL PURPOSE
otnraapd aod Scrvioc Support
Assumingivision*f authoritedalrength.Assumingivision, *vct*gloi li% of eulbori.ed -artim* atreogti.
aa]unit, tono consilient wiifc evideDee oo GSFG.
A residual baaedenerai purpose ground force tolaJillion mm, IheIn our climate. Include, element* up through militarr dillrkts and group* o' forces.
io of DiLLaryIn the ehor. eMsbUahaaeot lo peraoaneiafloat. iw-de. elements up tbrongt th*
appropriateir service detaelMnonU, and transport aircraft unlU.
bc.dqu.rUf. and air aervice deUchment*. aiaon, and utility aircraft, not id other fuocriosal elements, are also Inducted.
entry present, aeparatelyca.ajpe/MeuwL
iartmateaart ofeneral
purposeeneral command and aervice aupport dement* bach up strategic aod air dele.uaail a. Ihe general purposehaao dements Include mflllarype.fornuog aueh function* a* Ministry of Dafeoae staff; *ervic< reboot, andlight training; aooe of interior supply, saedieal. tramportatioo, aad eooatrurtiooitt developeaeat. tat .ad evaluation poaoond-iaUon andstsffs.
-
Teblo 2
ESTIMATED STRENCTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE CROUP OF SOVIET FORCES. GERMANY
CSFG TKOOPS
Artillery
Missfle Brigade
Engineer Regiment...
Amphibious Engineer
Signal Regjmeota
Guard Baltaliotui
Service
O
ARMY LEVEL GROUND TROOPSrmta)
Motoriied Rifle)
Tank Divisions
Mixed Artillery Brigade)
Antitank Artillery Regiments
baile Brigade*
SAM Regimento
Heavy Tank-Aasault Cun Unit*
Ponton Bridge Regiments
Amphibious Engr.
Engr- Coostruelioo Battalions
Signal Regiment*
Chemical BalUliona
Motor Transport Bos
Armynd Service Support300
TACTICALlh 0
TOTAL GSFG
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT BY LOCATION AND TYPE AS OF
3 .
UK*
*
o
Or* OE(')
ny
m
a
-
*
m
ft
. -
*
i
*
m
.
Ii
*
m
-
4
t
m
v
Ca icw*
1
t
4
m
*
m
4
Eaat
m
BY.TYPE
*
Table 6
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFTYPE AS3
l*AOOT
A, C
A
z
D
AT
oft3.
anr
*
*
Navy
4
,
RV TVPP
.
Althoughu not been firmly identified in these countries, we believe that the aircraft is now euteh
[oveotoey*
If
1
Model. '
aoo
1
"
Sovietthews la thleInclude onlylkal Avlatloa. Forlrcratl whleh ate .wiped to air delenae of Ua USSR,lo Holder. of. Tba primary ndailoB ol Oil Satelliteir defenae, but tfcey mmmu alia be utad for tactical mluloca.
Include* FAOOT, FRESCO. FARMER, FLASHLIOBT A, and BEAOI.E, aircraft whleh phased out of production prior
D. FlflHBED. FITTER, FIREBAR A, aircraft which were lo productiontSHPOT mayforce* byit.
4 Ao advanced deaigo tacticalatlmeted to become operational aa early a*
Aa tba eunaol modal, have bear, phaaed inlo op.retlooal un(U. tha oldar model. have baeft retained lo ecoelderablynumber, then waa prevloutly anticipated. Tha future number! refleet our estimate of probable rellremenl of oldet modeU due lo prolonged lime In .ervlce. While ll imdi likely tbal large number, -ill b* retired la lb* nen fewecent Ireode .uggeat (hat theee older modala may be retained alhen ehowa. Their eperetioetl elalu. remain. cueeUeeab'e.
(II or
36
Mimic.
9
Attack
or (UrcoMOf)
IJ
(,'
Minilc
Mlaail*
4
1
n
Torpedo
W '
>
Torpedo
Torpedo
LINE SUB-
A" Type*
LINE SUR-
SHirs
Deatroyer..
'
Eicon...
LINE SUR-
snips
ft
II**are tboae of modern cceMtrocUoo. Th* secondategory lute mU (rootld wtileb, by virtu* of age and deaJga are considered useful only lot traiewg or perbaps coastal defease. Sobm of the aeroed line thipo anil probably be retired Ironearlier tfcaa Om ma aft crllcriao-
Surface ahip* which ate at leanean old are carriedn* statu* untilvidence of tbetr reraeval from the fleet or until they are finally considered removed (in theof contrary evidence) whenaara old.
Total* for future yean Include submarines of follow-on dm" which mar be bout during the period. Aa aoaualrale0 ouclear-powered aubmariaca of all type* ha* been eotitnitcd.
We have previously climated that constructiontas* submarine* would lermloate by the endow-over, tit* poaaf utlity elisla that this program may (till be active. Whllt we arc unable to predict th* (ulur* number* of thUith certainty, our estimate reflects both the peat evidence and the posiibililj that construction will continue for about another year. Tbe rite oflaw eonnlnietlon procram will probably be influenced by Soviet declaioua regarding construction of other classes of missile lubmarlne*.
6 LONGWIN CYLINDER,IYLINDER.stimated thatoo>crakm program ha* probably been terminated.
1 Recently lighted calling: the Baltic, evaluated aa probably new corulrucUon, diesel-powered SSC- Futuretcct eonetruction caoalntitiea and trend* ratherrra estimate of number* programmed.
faaa (CANVAS BAC) radar picket submarfoaa.lan are in the Noethero Fleet aadin (he-.
oii* tlWJ to: missile Research and Denlopmcot
i"
T.blc 9
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF SOVIET NaVaL AVIATION
AS OFl
ntrr
sea
force,
air
rosea,
hits i" -
oca
niece.
..
area
area
Light Bom bo
Medium Bomber
I _ 1
3
For future yrare, weradual phase-out (aboutercent per yaar) ol older aircraft auch aa the BEAGLE, BADGER, and MAOCE.one, ponding Increase io newer model, auch as BLINDER, MALLOW, and MAIL. Unless alrength of Naval Aviationased through Uaaafcr of long-range bombers auch aa BEARaval eub-crdi nation, we etpoct the total number of aircraftairly atabk.
ANNEX B
TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE MISSILES, AIRCRAFT, AND SUBMARINES
TABLES
TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OP SOVTET TACTICAL MISSILES AND ROCKETS
TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SOVIET NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
TableSTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVTET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED ASSUMPTIONS
TableSTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT
TableSTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVTET HELICOPTERS
TableSTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVTET SUBMARINES
Table 2
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED SOVIET RATAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
tift
[ei*;
(llm)
(sim)
altitude
Speed
Wsrhtadend Typa
CEP
OwWllW.
Propulilon
(lbs..
Ua*
ttliltd
High ubeonlc
E ot NUO
t withhoming;ra without homing at Ins than. to. at roai. ring*
Prorammed with radio toomandaad terminal homing
Turbojet with probable aolld RAT0 boost
.
t
AboutW HE
SO ft
Preset autopilot with active let*horning
Storabte liquid fuel rocket probably with RATO boon
soma In this family pcstlbiy
l
Low suptrsonla
I.OCOE or NUC
ISO ft with terminal homing againstn. against laid tergtu
lotertial with active terminal homing
Turbojet wiih RATO booil
n ro
ACMot HE
or NUO ISOft
Beam rider witharalactlv*
Turbo]it with RATO boost
rsataotu at ana at UK*.
" .1
a 23
flllSjIll :
;J1 s
-
z
ss
2 g- si?sls
Iii
3
Is*
TaWc 3
ESTIMATED CLOSE SUPPORT PERFORMANCE OF SOVIETIRCRAFT CALCULATED UNDER SPECIFIED ASSUMPTIONS*
(3mm
Tanks)
iKruJ Ta-ka)
EUAR
3anks)
D..
BEAGLE.
(Into, nail
M.riOO
lalcr-al)
ii) mm guru SO lb bombs
m gun
b bombs
ItMonrUvLuanco Equipment
bb bombs
440
395
700
270
!S5
200
235
Mint on allowance*
H Ml
inutes at normal ruledutbound lac Bicb aJUtiade: Climb o* (nunc a: military power CruaM at speed and altitude for majjmum ran**to ana level (no distance credit}-Low altitude: (SL)
Fly at military power, or. if applicable, pertinent limited speed. Combat for flva minutea at oiililary power at sea level (no disUneeeturn kg: Hurt altitude:
CUmb oa eemrac at military power.
Crwsa* to baa* at .peed and altitude for maiiciun raoce. Low altitude'
Fly at military power or. If applicable, at structural limit speed. Raoce free reserve allowance ofinutes maximum endurance al ace. level.
f rrnrr treviir. i
Tablt 4
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OP SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated Idordanith US, Baale
Ml
run Tin
(im)
rUXlOB/
(mm}
aUVItZ
tnm
aLTTTVOI
Crr)
euu-16
Piilon
Ptaloa
Piilon
Piilon
PUton
Turbojet
BOO
ll...
Turbojet
JM
Turboprop
Turboprop
*
Turboprop
Turboprop
Turboprop
soc
Tr-rboprep
Turbofan
Turbofan
:
Performance ihewa la for cargo load: Pntsenger/Perelroop Capacityhown aa alUroat* load, bul performance would dl-Tar for IMiircraft moil Bulled for paratrcop operation
a not ihcwn aloee performance la almllar to CRATE.
a year offlight.
Calculated at combat weight.
Table*
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS '
i
ii
d
s *
III
1
ii
rtwti
r*
0
O
- 1
i
0
s
t Si
5
1!
eft a
59
ANNEX C
ORGANIZATION OF LARGE SOVIET THEATER FORCE UNITS
TableSTIMATED WARTIME TOE OF THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
TableSTIMATED WARTIME TOE OF THE SOVIET TANK DIVISION
TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET COMBINED ARMS ARMY
TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET TANK ARMY
TableLLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET FRONT
=
A
4
A.
1 j
i tm-
Tibial
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET COMBINED ARMS
ARM V
Thia table la baled primarily on our Information concerning the euirtol onrapoailion o( the Soviet combined arma armies In But Cermaoy. The table elao reflect* Judgment* derived from Soviet document*a likely wartime composition* of oombioed arm* armies, which could vary cooeidirBbty depending upon the mlaaloo of the army, the terrain in the area of
operations sod Other 'ectora.
Motoriud Rule Divin'oa
Tank Dlvsaie*
ombat Support Units:
Artillery and S3
ArtlDsry
SCUD
Antitank Artillery
neavy Tank and Assault Gun
Air DetaH
SAM
Eagiaeer
Poo toe Bridge tOO
Assault Creasing
Signal
SigDsl SOO
Radio Relay
Line Conitruclioo
CbomJcaJ
InteUlgenu
Headquarter) and Service
Total CAA
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET TANK ARMS'
Thia table is bsavd primarily on our information eonrerning th* current oompoalUon o- tbe Soviet tank armlaa In East Cermony. Th* tabl* alao rtflocta |udgmenU derivod from Soviet document* aa lo likely wartime compositions of tank armies, which could varydepending upon the minion of tha army, the terrainha area of operation, and other factor*.
Tank Division
Army Combat SupportrtiDary
SCUD
Air Defense
SAM
Engineer
Ponton Bridge
Assault Crossing
Signal
Signal
Radio Relay
Lioe CouilructioQ
Chemical
IntatUgeaxa
Headquarter* and Service
Total Tank
TtbU 5
ILLUSTRATIVE COMPOSITIONARTIME SOVIET FRONT
TbU table la baaed primarily on our iofarmaiisa coixarUng tbe Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSPG) which is the nearest equivalentartime Soviet front currently in extateoce. However. GSFCtailored to meet tbe requirements of ita pertkular mimiop Id East Germany and thus doe* not correspond in detail to our iUua(raUve/rer-compoaltioo, which has considerably more ground troop* and leas tactical air support. Soviet wartimeould vary widely In eomposiiioa and strength depending upon the mission, theand other factor*. This table Is Intendedough guide to understanding of Soviet
theater force structure rather thanource ot detaS.
ConsUned>Arma Armies
Tank Analca
Tactical Air
Front Combat Support Unite:
Artillery and SS
Artillery
SCUD Brigadea
Air Defease
SAM
Engineer
PoDlon Bridge Regiments
Assault Crossing
Pipeline
Signal
Signal
Signal Intercept Regiments
Radio Relay Battalions
Chemical
Intelligence
Headquarters and Service
Total
Original document.
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