SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL WARFARE

Created: 12/27/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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THE

L AVAILABILITY OF TOXIC AGENTS IN THE

Types or 3

Evidence of Production and 4

Future Developments in Agents and 6

II. SOVIET CW POLICY AND 6

CW DELIVERY AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES . 8

Soviet CW Delivery Systems

Toxic Agent Delivery Capabilities of the European

Satellite Armies

Strengths and Weaknesses of CW Defense

AFFECTING SOVIET INTENTIONS TOCHEMICAL WEAPONS U

ESTIMATED AGENT FILLS AND TACTICAL USES OF

SOVIET OROUND AND AERIAL CW

SOVIET AND EUROPEAN SATELLITE CW DEFENSE

PREPARATIONS15

Soviet Equipment and Procedures for CW

Soviet Naval CW Defense

Satellite Military CW Defense

Bloc Civil Defense Against Toxic Agent

SOVIET AND SATELLITE ORGANIZATION FORWARFARE19

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL WARFARE

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSK to employ toxic chemical warfare agents in military operations, especially against NATO in Europe, over about the next five years.

CONCLUSIONS

evidence indicates that Soviet organization,training, and research and development can supporttoxic chemical warfare operations. There isof toxic agent production rates or amountseliable estimate of the scale on which theythese operations. Main reliance now appears to bevery toxic nerve agents. Research and development arcincluding efforts to develop nonlethal 1

Sovietsariety of chemical munitionsoperations, but we believe that their use in arole is not now planned. (Paras.)

and European Satellite forceside rangefor defense against chemical warfare, but theya satisfactory means of timely nerve agent detection.capabilities arc considerably lower than those of )

believe that the Soviet leaders think of chemicalas essentially tactical weapons, but they consistentlywith nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass destruction."

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Tlie Soviet leaders thus probably consider them subject to the same political constraints as those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level (Paras.

E. The Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use ol toxic chemical agents by their theater field forceseneral nuclear warimited war in which no nuclear weapons were being used, they would probably not initiate the use of chemical weapons. )

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DISCUSSION

I. AVAIIABIUTY Of lOXtC AGENTS IN TM6 USSR Typci of Agenli

The standard toxic agents now In the Soviet arsenal (ah into two main categories: those which first saw use in Worldnd the nerve agents whlcli derive Horn Genuand Soviet research before and during World War II The Worldgents still in the Soviet arsenal are mustard, mustard mixed with lewisite, nvdrogen cyanide, and phosgene. Mustard, the primary toxic used In World War I,ery persistent, blistering agentigh toxicity. Hydrogen cyanide and phosgene are nonpersistent lethal agents which Soviet CW tactics prescribe for use In certain situations when tactical gas surprise can be achieved or the battle plan calls for early occupation of the enemy position.

Although nerve agents have never been employed in warfare.and field testing have shown them to be extremely toxic. Unlike the older agents, these organophosphorus chemicals are practically odorless, and no technique for their Umcly detection has been perfected. One class of nerve agents, known in the West as "G" agents because of their German origin,ethal hazard by either inhalationinute quantity or contamination of unbroken skin by about one gram ofamily of even more toxic nerve agents, known In the West as "V" agents, has been developed since World War II. Theseazard primarily by skin contamination because of their much lower volatility,ery small drop (on the order1 gram) can be lethal. The Soviet inventory includes al least two "G" agents and one "V" agent, as follows:1

Sarinhis nerve agent, the standard US agenl in the "G" series, is aboutunes as toxic as mustard gas. It is considered in the West toonpersistent agent suitable for usearget which must be occupied by friendly troops, but Soviet research has shown that sarin can persist for several days in cold weather. At least limited production of sarin is believed to have begun in the USSR in thes.

Somannother agent in the "G" series, soman is morethan sarin andreater skin hazard to masked troops.

"There is eood evidenceabun-like compound was synthesized in the USSR during World Warhile the Germans were developing tabun (OA) Itself. However, tabun has been characterisedlassified Soviet article1 as "sienincantlT Inferior" to other nerve agents. Production has probably now ceased, but some may sUt! be In the stockpile

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According to Soviet research, soman contamination may last for several months in cold weather. Soman cannot be countered satisfactorily by atropine, the standard antidote for the other nerve agents,ecent Cseclioslovak article announced the developmentn improved anil-dote

VR-SS Recent articles in classified Soviet military journals have referred to an agent designate!sed lor the bulk-fill of chemical warheads for tactical guided missiles andlthough we have little information on the physical properties olc deduce from these article* Uiat il is more volatile than the very peisistent standard US agent.nd aboutimes more toxic than sarin. It has been described as rapid in action, and effective by both inhalation and skin penetration. Its persistence in lethal concentrations on terrain andis stated to be from one to three days.

tvidence of Production ond Stockpiling

Our evidence regarding the Soviet chemical warfare orogram relates largely to Ihe development and the tactical use. rather than to the production, of chemical agents. We know that Soviet research on toxic agents has been extensive; numerous articles in the Sovietliterature attest to an intensive effort to develop simple.processes for the production of nerve agents. Ins. one research groupew sarin process much improved over the Oerman scheme. The Soviet process for this "G" agent uses materials and procedures which are also called for In the production of some of the more toxic members of the "V" agent family. Another research grouprocess whichess toxic "V" agent or an ornnnophosphorus Insecticide, depending on the ingredient introduced in the final step. More recently,he Soviets announced anprocess for producing pinacolyl alcohol, needed in soman production and previously not economically available.

We altO know that the Soviets have extensive facilities for the storage of toxic agents both in bulk and ln filled munitions. We have identified aboutajor depots which we believe are devoted primarily lo the storage of toxicome of these arc quite large and have been considerably expanded and Improved since first photographedWorld War II. Assuming that the entire capacity of these facilities is utilized for toxic agent storage, that the criteria lor access and safely arc comparable to those of the US, and that the ftoorspacc devoted lo bulk storage is twice that devoted lo filled munitions,ons of toxic agents could be stored under roof at these depots

Rocket Overonest John.

'lice Map for locations of these and other Soviet chemical warfare facilities.

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* This judgment supersedes that expressed In the CW *ccUoru of previouswhichIncluded quanUUUvc esU mates of Uw Soviet toxic agent stockpile.

In addition,ew general munitions depots, there are small, isolated areas which may be devoted to the storage of toxie agentand at one suspect tactical guided missile depot, therearge area containing especially designed buildings which we believe areloi Hie sloiagc ol toxic agent warheads. In gaunt, however, storage specifications lor such munitions as toxic-filled artillery shells need not diner significantly from those for storage of other ordnance items. We have therefore not been able lo identify other mixed depots, although Soviet CW tactics and delivery systems argue strongly thati exist. More important, we find no basisonfidciit calculs lion of any particular tola) quantity ol agents and munitions likely lo be in storage at any ot these depots.

We cannot (irmly identity any Soviet chemical plant producing nerve agents. The best candidates arc two factories which produced toxic agents in World War II, and are located close to facilities forloading and toxic agent storage. Three other plants which also produced toxic agents in World War II arc now major Soviet producers of heavy chemicals, including organophosphorus insecticides. Because of the hazards involved, they are unlikely to be engaged In theproduction of nerve agents, but they may be producing essential intermediate chemicals and could .constitute an industrial reserveA production facility al the Central Chemical Proving Ground at Shikhany may also be involved in nerve agent production.

Classified Soviet statements that munitions filled with nerve agents are available to Sovet forces convince us lhat quantity production has occurred. We lack direct evidence on production rates, on Ihe amounts which may be in storage at the depots we have Identified, and on theof existing stocks. Such estimates as we have attempted to make involve so many assumptions that margins of error are extremely high. We do not believe lhat the Soviet storage capacity is beingto its maximum, but we think it prudent to assume that the total toxic agent stockpile, both In depots and available to taclKal units, is al0 tons."

In any event, we believe the Soviets have not carried on aprogramense of urgency. We have seen no evidence of priorities for related chemical industries or for the construction of new storage facilities. Moreover, moderate production rates would provide substantial stocks. Foringle nerve agent productionof moderate size canons of agent per day, and wefrom Soviet data that this quantity could be used lo

tactical missile warheads, orHOC warheads, oriO-tb aerial bombs.

some CW munitions are probably ImmediatelySovicl tactical unils. logistical problems might afleel tlielo bring their stored CW slocks Into play against NATOEurope. OI the major depots wc believe devoted primarily tooi toxic agents, aboutercent ol the total capacity is inand Central USSR and aboutercent in the Farull that in ihe Western and Central USSR Is located in IhcTurkestan Military Districts It Is therefore not well sited lora war in Lhe West which began with short warning times andinterdiction of transportation facilities.

Future Development* in Agent* and Stockpile!

We expect Soviet research on toxic agents to continue. Efforts are probably underway to develop agents with Improved fieldwhich would be useful In further complicating Westernin detection, protection, first aid. and decontamination. Both scientific and military literature make it clear that an effort is being made to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents,ormalfor such agents may exist. An agent causing temporary mental incapacitation might be available for field use as early5 andcausing temporary physical incapacitation might be ready

Wc see no reason why present production and storage facilities should either be substantially enlarged or reduced. Losses of properly stored agents are minimal, and continued production of the newer ugenls could be used either to enlarge total capabilities or to retire older munitions from active stocks If the Soviets desired to reduce oragent production, facilities could be shifted to the production of organophosphorus insecticides. Expansion of production facilities for these insecticides is being planned as part of the currentimprovement program. This expansion probably would enlarge the Industrial reserve for production of nerve agents. In sum. wethat chemical munitions will continue to be available, perhaps In larger quantities and in more effective form, and that substantiallyproduction could be undertaken fairly quickly If desired.

II. SOVIET CW POUCY AND DOCTRINE

chemical munitions possess certain advantages andwhen compared with other munitions. They can achievearea of lethal coverage than high explosives and their effectspersistent. Unlike either high explosives or nuclear weapons,destroy personnel without desLroylng Installations. Chemicalmay be more effective than other weapons against personnel In

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hardened targets. Kvcn tho threat ol theiry lower the combat effectiveness of well-disciplined troops by forcing then to carry and use encumbering protective gear. On the other hand, weather may reduce oi negate their effects, proper protection and adequate warning may achieve similar results, and proper dissemination of the agent is required in order lo achieve effective results

Soviet military documents and exercises Indicate lhat the Soviets appreciate both the capabilities and limitations of toxic chemical weap on* They appear to be satisfied lhat these weapons can play an im poi Uinl part in theater operations; documents and exercises stress their utilityumber of specific tactical situations, ln sharp contrast, we have no evidence of any kind to associate chemical weapons with long-range strategic attack, either independently or in conjunction withnuclear weapons, and we believe that their useong-rangerole Is not now planned. However, If they came to believe strategic CW attack would be militarily rewarding, the Soviets could provide chemical munitions for their long-range deliveryhosein.

While the USSR appears lo have decided that chemical weapons are essentially tactical weapons, toxic chemical agents have been-and consistently grouped with nuclear weapons as "weapons ol mass destruction" in political declarations and In classified military writings Soviet proposals on disarmament invariably link toxicwith nuclear weapons. The latest available field service regulations characterize modern combat either as waged with weapons of massincluding chemical weapons, or as waged with conventional means. Thus, it appears that the Soviets think of these chemicalas subject to the same political constraints as those imposed upon the use ol nuclear weapons. In other words, wc believe that the initial use of either of these types of weapons wouldailer for decision at the highest political level.

Soviet tactical doctrine for the use of "weapons of massprescribes the employment of CW primarily ln close coordination with nuclear weapons, so as to capitalize on the particular attributes of each. The doctrine indicates lhat CW may be used instead of nuclear weapons, for example, in an area of engagement where material damage to the target is to be avoided Through surprise and employment in mass, toxic agent munitions are intended to provide large-scale casualties and demoralization throughout the tactical zone of operations, thereby permitting rapid maneuver and seizure of critical objectives by fast-moving ground forces.

There is good evidence from classified writings that, once the Soviet government has decided to use weapons of mass destruction, the

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ommander will normally determine the operations In which chemical agents will be used, the numbers and types of weapons allotted, coordination with other munitions, etc. Special chemical officers and troop units assigned at all levels are charged with providing technical advice. To fulfill local tasks, chemical weapons would be used on the decision of divisional commanders

Soviets probably do not consider that they haveof nuclear weapons for their theater forces. Only recentlyplanners been ablehink in terms of committing up to anuclear weapons, virtually all with yields in the kilolona typical front operation. Thus, in addition to being avuilabletheater forces for those operations lo which they arcadapted, chemical weapons have probably also been providedupeficiency in the number of nuclear weapons whichdeemed necessary for the conduct of tactical operations inreater degree ot nuclear plenty couldon toxic agents for theater forces except In thosefor which chemical weapons are especially suited.

III. BLOC CW DELIVERY AND DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

Soviet CW Delivery Systems

FROG'S and Guided Missiles. The Soviets began developing toxic agent warheads for tactical rockets and guided missiles al least as earlynd9 they stated that such warheads were available. Articles In classified military Journals provide good technical data on theelivery capabilities of: (a) theree rocketaximum range ofm; (b) theallistic missileangem; and (C) theruise missileange ofm. In addition, data IndicatesW warhead has been provided for another cruise missileaximum range ofm.

These articles make it clear that in the case of the FROG and the ballistic missile, the Soviets expect to achieve wide area coverage by opening bulk-fWl warheads at altitude:eet for the FROG andeel for the ballistic missile. From these same articles, evidence which is less conclusive leads us to believe that cruise missiles probably also employ bulk-fill warheads to be detonated at similarto achieve large-area coverage* The lack of US experience to

the sovietrontartime organisation composed of several field armies. although similars armyront it not directly comparable.

to soviet data, ihej expect to achieveercent casualties among exposed personnel over art area of about vj square mile with thequare mile <nUi the balusuc missile, and aboutquare miles with use cruise missiles.

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(late with bulk-filled missile warheads and with agent release at such altitudes, coupled with our scant knowledge of the physical properties oiake it impossible for us to Judge the agent effectiveness and nrca coverage the Soviets are likely U> achieve wiih warheads ol this type. However, they probably have explored the advantages andof this concept of warhead design and appear to havein the technique.

Aerial Munitions' Kor agent delivery by aircraft. Soviet World War II CW munitions Included spray tnnks. individual bombs, nnd bomblct clusleis. Although we believe Soviet interest in aerial spray dissemination has continued, wc possess no informationpray tank system suitable for use with high-performance Jet aircraft is now operational The line-dropping of small chemical bombs at regular intervals can achieve comparable results and there are recentthat the Soviets have adopted this alternative technique.

Artillery, Rocket, and Other GruunA Delivery Syslems. The Soviets have toxic chemical rounds for all artillery piecesmm caliber and larger. Toxic rounds are probably available for all types of mortars and for multiple-rail artillery rocket launchers. Because of their high rate of fire, Soviet tactics recommend these rockets forin Intense barrages, which mightinute or less, to cover large-area tactical targets with surprise concentrations ol toxic agents. Inumber of other CW delivery systems arefor support of theater force units, ln general, the Soviets regard these other systems as defensive in nature, to be used to channelenemy forces by creating barriers Spray systems suitable for direct terrain contamination existariety of forms. Turbineproducing smokes and aerosols also can blanket areas with heavy concentrations of toxic materials. Pressure-activated anddetonated land mines, older models of which were filled with mustard or mustard-lewisite mixtures, may now also have hydrogen cyanide or nerve agent fill.

Naval Munitions. Toxic agent warheads may be available for naval cruise missiles. These could be used against both naval and Innd targets.mmm shells and rockets with chemical fill are available, and recent information indicates the stockpilingmm chemical shells for destroyers and cruisers All surface combatant ships arc equipped to generate both screening nnd toxic smokes and are prepared, as are submarines, to release floating generators for creating toxic smoke screens and spray. Toxic muni-

etailed description of stents used to All serialound munitions and their intended uses, see Annrx A

Hons apparently are not normally stored aboard ship in peacetime. We beheve It highly unlikely that chemical warheads are provided for naval ballistic missiles.

Toxic Agent Dcliveiy Capabilities ol the European Satellite Aimies

Satellite forces have artillery and aircraft capable ofagent munitions. In addition, some Satellite armies haveand short range ballistic missiles and most others areget them soon. We are confident that ihe Satellites have beenof the Soviet CW capabilities with all these deliverythere is good Information, some of it quite recent, onin the offensive use of toxic munitions. The Caechs. theand possibly the Poles, have some capability toagents, but the USSR has probably maintained closesuch limited production as has occurred. The Soviets havesought to keep the Satellite armies essentially dependentUSSR for these weapons, and we have no evidence that thetoxic agents beyond the quantity required for theirand training programs. We believe the Satellites wouldtoxic chemical munitions except upon Soviet direction orMore Important, their extensive use would requireSoviet support.

Slrengrhs ond Weaknesses ol CW Defense Preparations

ore definite analysis of Bloc CW defense preparations, see Annex B.etailed devrtption of the formal military organisation for cw. see Annex C

The Bloc militaryide range of equipment for use in chemical defense, much of it of recentxtensive training in its use is integral to military exercises for allnaval, anddilute toxic agents are employed In this training.and training for CW defense are combined with that fordefense, and the special chemical troops are responsible for both types of defense* The dual nature of such defense Is stressed intraining, and thereumber of recent examples of Soviet forces donning chemical defense equipment following simulatedstrikes.

The single most critical weakness in chemical defense throughout the Bloc is the problem of nerve agent detection. Although some manual and automatic detectors for these agents are available, we do not know of any which is sufficiently sensitive to assure human safety.

According to the most recent available field service regulations. Soviet combat units are to avoid chemical and nuclear contamination insofar as may be practicable while accomplishing their missions. Units

exposed to contamination then would be sent to facilities to beby chemical troops for treatment and decontamination. Although the equipment and procedures to be used at these facilities appearto the task, we have no basis for estimating the extent ofof individual items We judge that the chemical defensesupplied the individual combat soldier is technically adequate to protect himoxic environment forhort time, restricting his unit to limited tactical objectives.

Current civil defense preparations and medical trainingthe Bloc are directed primarily against nuclear effects. The Soviets have conducted systematic civil defense training for chemical defenseumber of years, butow level of chemical defensehas been achieved1 and shortages of masks and other specialized equipment are general and widespread, especially in the European Satellites.

We believe that the Soviets will continue research andon chemical defense, but we have no evidence regarding particular lines of development. We presume that major attention will beto problems of nerve agent detection, protection, and treatment.

IV. FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET INTENTIONS TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Several general conclusions emerge from the preceding analysis; Soviet stocks of chemical munitions are probably substantial; the Soviets haveapability for the use of chemical munitions in tactical situations but do not now plan for their long-range strategic use; they have made extensive preparations for defense against chemical agents but there are several key weaknesses in their defense capabilities; they regard chemical weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level.

We believe, in light of the above, that the Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize the use of chemical warfare agents by their fieldthe extent and in the manner front commandersthe eventeneral nuclear war. In such circumstances, they would probably regard toxic chemical weapons as an important element in the execution of planned ground operations in Europe and the Far East. Any political inhibitions or legal restrictions upon their use almost certainly would be regarded as Insignificanteneral nuclear conflict hador not the other side employed them.

On the other hand,imited conflict, the decision to useweapons almost certainly would be regarded as an Important politl-

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cal decision. The tactical advantage to be gained, particularly II therehortage oi nuclear weapons, of course wouldactor, but it would be overshadowed by such considerations as the likelihood that the other side would respond In kind, the danger that the use of chemical weapons would piecipilate the use of nuclear weapons, and the political image which the USSR was attempting to project lo those not involved.

We cannot foresee, of course, all the different types of situations which might arise, and indeed even if we could. It would be Impossible to estimate with confidence Soviet responses to postulated circumstances There are.ew judgments or signposts which may befrom Soviet policies and behavior. For example, we havelhat if Soviet forces became involvedocal war. the Soviet leaders would seek to keep the war as limited as possible so as lothe chances of Its escalation Into general war. We have alsothat they therefore would not Initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Wc believe they would regard the initiation of chemical warfare in much the same way; they would fear thai their use of chemical munitions would be regarded by the West as an indication that the USSR was raising the stakes: they would fear that the Western response would be the initiation of nuclear warfare.

A less clear situation would exist if thereocal war in progress in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons had already been initiated. The danger of escalation would be extremely high from the moment nuclear weapons were used, and we believe that the Soviets would fully appreciate this. For this reason, we believe that Inase they would seek to bring hostilitiesonclusion as quickly as possible. If. however, they were unwilling to move toward aof the conflict, they would probably not regard the use ol chemical. adding materially to the existing rhk ol escalation and would probably therefore authorize their use by field commanders.

A new situation might arise If. later in the period, the Soviets came to have nonlethal incapacitating agents available for field use. Should this happen, they might make their capability public and speak of the humaneness of such weapons. If such propaganda struck achord in world opinion, they might then come to fee) that they could use them In limited war situations without the opprobrium associated with lethal chemical weapons; indeed, they might even use them In preference to conventional weapons whenever possiblein the absence of such prior public acceptance, the Soviet leaders would probably feel that the political drawbacks to their use would still be substantial and lhat their introduction would, to some degree at least, noticeably increase the danger of escalation.

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ANNEX A

ISJIMAIED AGENT FILLS AND TACTICAL USfcS OF SOVIET GROUND AND AERIAL CW MUNITIONS

For many years, the Soviets have had both gas and gas/fragmentalion shells and bombs As the former may bp filled with eithertcrsuiciil toxic agents, we have round it convenient to distinguish three categories as follows:

Goi {Nonperuilenl) These arc lo be used to achieve surprise. Ietrr.il concentrations among unmasked enemy troops and to neutralize targets which are soon to be occupied by friendly ground and parachute forces. The standard agent for shells, artillery rockets, and bombs probably is hydrogen cyanide, although some munitions filled with phosgene may be in the inventory. Aerial bombs ol this category are available in several sizes upounds.

Oashese are to be used against unmasked and masked troops in the open and to achieve area and materielof long duraUon. Soviet practice witli persistent agents indicates that artillery shells are to be detonated at heights above the ground of several hundred feet. Within this category, aerial bombs are of two types, those which are to be exploded at altitudes of up to thousands ofwith CW missile warheads- -anti those which are to explode on the ground upon impact orime delay. In this latter type of bomb, the toxic agent could be containedanister to be thrown up by the bomb burst for release of the agent at altitudes comparable to those for artillery shells. The standard agent in this category has been mustard, possibly mixed with lewisite, although some aerial bombs probably now are filledersistent "O" agent such asumber of sizes of aerial bombs are available, the largestounds.

Oas/Fragmentation. These are lo be used to achieve chemical and fragmentation casualties among enemy troops and thedamage, or destruction of materiel and fortifications. Artillery shells probably are filled with mustardO" agent such as sarin, while aerial bombs probably are filled exclusively with the Utter. This is the basic type of Soviet chemical bomb, but agent disseminationprobably have limited Sizesounds or less.

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SOVIET AND EUROPEAN 5ATELIITE CW DEFENSE PREPARATIONS

Soviet Equipmcol and Procedures (or CW Defense

The most recent available field service regulations and chemical defense procedures indicateoviet unit tt expected to complete its mission, avoiding chemical and nuclear contamination insofar as may be practicable Formal treatment and decontamination is to be accomplished after the unit is withdrawn from action, at facilities to be established by chemical troops. Before recommitment, the unit would then be replenished with equipment and fresh troops, in World War II, this rebuilding of units was facilitated by paying more attention to the recovery of equipment and vehicles than to the wounded, whose rate of recovery and return lo duty was always lower lhan in Western armies.

Until he has completed his mission, the individual Soviet soldier must rely on hisew Items of protective clothing, and hisdecontamination self-aid kit His mask provides comprehensive protection, but we do not know the extent of availablllly of masks and canisters incorporating modifications announced since the first models appearedhe mask, which covers the entire head, hasin that it is not comfortable and severe fogging or frosting occurs in cold2 manual states that even when properly fitted, the mask exerts pressure on the head causing painful sensations and that when worn for long periods, it can cause circulation disturbances In warm weather, the mask is uncomfortable to the point at which the wearer's efficiency may be impaired. The standard-issue items ofclothing provide pro tec lion against liquid agents for periods which range from less than one minute to about one hour, depending on the item. The capacity of the personal kit would be exceeded by even moderate contamination. An atropine syrette Is believed to be included,erve agent decontaminating solution reported to be in production is not known to be on Issue. As In other armies, special protective clothing, which furnishes Ihe best and only long-periodis reserved for special-duty troops such as those engaged in reconnaissance, decontamination, and the actual handling of toxic agents.

Facilities for the mass decontamination of personnel and clothing differ little from standard US mobile showers and laundries, although some newer models of the laundries are specifically designed for the

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dccontammaUon and reclamation of uniforms For theof vehicles, large weapons, andumber o( specialized uniU are available These range from man-pack portable sprayers and kitsecifically lor machine guns and artillery pieces to targe, general-purpose decontamination vehicles. Although all these items appear adequate to the task, wc have no basis for estimating tbe extent of their availability. Throughout the decade, little change inprocedures and equipment will be required, and the Soviets presumably could develop dccoiitaminaiils lo neutralize new agents

4 Soviet Held detector kits apparently are patterned after US models made available during World According to data supplied with the latest available) of the Soviet kit. it can detect sarin, and presumably other nerve agents, at the very low concentration3 milligrams per liter of air. The toxic effects are cumulative, however, and sarin at lesser concentrations can be lethal after several days* exposure. The USSR Is aware of Western developments in auto-malic alarms, including remote alarm systems, and has apparently copied andS device declassifiedut these automatic detectors are not sufficiently sensitive to assure human safety and probably are not in the field In peacetime. An automatic alarm is mounted on some armored personnel carriers lo permit mobile chemical reconnaissance, but we do not know the agents detected or the alarm's sensitivity Portable field laboratories and truck-mounted laboratory facilities available to chemical troops can detect all toxic agents as well as determine the effectiveness of protective items, but would be useless in most tactical situations. There is no evidence of the developmentong-path infrared system to detect nerve agentsistance.

Soviet Novol CW Defense Equipment

he Soviet Navy Is provided with essentially the same equipment for the protection of personnel and agent detection as the ground forces. Ships are equipped with decontamination facilities of various types.mechanical, chemical and steam sprays, and salt-waterequally applicable to the removal of radioacUve falloutfor sealing the control and operating stations and the mess areas on cruisers and destroyers against the entry of toxic vapors andparticles has been reported, with replacement air to be supplied from cylinders In each sealed chamber. While these measures could be effective, recent US research has shownhip's combatmay be substantially reduced while sealed. Soviet merchant ships under construction In East German shipyards call for suchareas.

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Solellile Military CW Defense Preparations

Ihe European Satellite armies, chemical defense doctrineto that of the USSR Units are lo avoid chemical andInsofar as practicable while completing thenare to proceed to decontam unit ion facilities only on ordersauthority. Adequate supplies or defensive materieluvailable for initial issue to standing lorces but large-scaleor mobilization would require increased local productionSoviet Aiippoit. Individual items of protectivethe detection kits on issue air similar to Soviet models, withlimitations, but there seems to be an almost complete lackon issue lor self aid or first aid treatment of nervemajor vulnerability of Woe forces likely lo bein the decade. Mobile field laboratories and automatic fieldeither very scarce or notide variety ofequipment has been noted in the Satellite armies, but we dothe actual extent of availability.

Bloc Civil Defense Agoinst Toxic Agenl Attack

In the civilian training courses which the Soviets have conducted almost continuallyonsiderable improvisation isto overcome persistent shortages of civil defense materiel. In recent years. Soviet civil defense, now subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, has stressed fallout protection rather than chemical defense. Detection kits similar to military models arc available for use by trained personnel. The organized training of medical personnel and civilcadres to treat gas casualties can be tracedut theemphasis is on nuclear weapons' effects. Atropine by tablet oris prescribed for the nerve agenl casualty but apparently isonly at organized medical centers Most of the numerous air raid shelters built in the USSR9 have been gas-tight, basement compartments, but many were not equipped for fillered ventilation when last observed. Civil defense Instructions issued2 concede that the civilian gas mask, on saleay not be available for Immediate Issue in time of need and users are specifically warned thai "in winter, tlie rubber is likely to harden and the rubber arms of the outlet valve may freeze to the valveafety andprocedures have been well-publicized and special attention has been devoted to winter problems, but here again, substantialmay still exist even of the specialized equipment and materials to be used by organized units.

Preparations for the antlchcmlcal defense of the civilianof the European Satellites have produced even less results than

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Ihey have In Ihe USSR. An increase in "volunteer" training is inbut its fleet! veness is doubtful. Very little protective equipment is available and the Soviet civilian gas mask has had limited sales because of lis relatively high cost Capabilities for nerve agentare minimal and no atropine is available. Air raid shelterliasart ol civil defense planningumber of shelters have reportedly been built. As in the USSR, many were not equipped with suilable filters when observed.

ANNEX C

SOVIET AND SA1EUITE ORGANIZATION fOR CHEMlCAl WARFARE

Chemical warfare activiUes In the Soviet Union are conductedumber oi organizations subordinate to the Council of Ministers,the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Public Health, the Academy of Sciences, and oiltci* Tlic pnmary responsibility (or the toxtc agent program is probably assigned lo the Chic( of Chemical Troops, who Is subordinate to the Commander in Chief of Ground Forces in the Ministry of Defense. His responsibilities include supervision of research, production and procurement, training, development of tactics, nnd probably the allocation and distribution of toxic munitions and related equipment to all the services. The Chief of Chemical Troops also controls the Military Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow and other chemical warfare schools, and the Central Chemical Proving Qround at Shikhany. Other proving grounds probably under hisare believed lo exist at Semipalatinsk or in the Yakutsk area for the large-scale testing of nerve agents.

In the Soviet Army, staff supervision extends from the Chief of Chemical Troops to the chiefs of specially trained chemical troops units assigned to each operational command. In wartime, chemical troop units would be assigned at /ronf, army, division, and regimental levels. In peacetime, they are organic to military district* and groups of forces, armies, divisions, ond regiments. The chiefs of these units advise the field commanders on the offensive use of toxic agents and on defense against both chemical and radiological hazards. They also supervise chemical and radiological defense training activities, reconnaissance, and the operation of decontamination facilities and special systems for agent dissemination.

Naval chemical warfare is under the direction of the Chief of the Naval Chemical Directorate who has liaison through naval channels with the Ministry of Defense. In the organizationajor unit of the Soviet Navy, the Chemical Warfare Section, headedhief of Chemical Service, is on an equal level with the other operatingdirectly under the Executiveraduate chemical ofllccr is assigned lo each cruiser and to each destroyer and submarine squadron, while noncommissioned officers are assigned to smaller ships.

The Chief of Chemical Troops of the Ground Forces advises the Air Forces on chemical and radiological defensive matters through the Chief of the Chemical Service of the Air Forces, who is responsible for training and defensive activities of all units of his branch of the service.

Chemical personnel arc assigned to separate air technical divisions and regiments, and lo chemical sections of air army depots. Air Force chemical defense units, each consisting of at least one officer and several enlii personnel, have the primary responsibility for Ihe chemical and radiological defense of each airfield,

n addition, such other forces as the Strategic Rocket Forces and the PVO Strany have chcmKal defense organizations to providedetection, drconlamination. and first aid for chemical and radiation casualties The Bloc countries follow the gcneial Soviet pal-tern in their overall organization for CW. with minor variations at the higher levels.

Original document.

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