Created: 1/8/1964

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SlC national intelligence estimate



Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose

Submitted by tbe


Concurred In by m* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated4

f'AO IED FOS JL' tats*




Capabilities of the Soviet General Purpose








Trends In

Reorganization and Modernization of Ground Forces . 7

Tactical Air and Missile


Size aad

MaxiiuTin; Levels of Divisions

Number ofU

Types of Divisions

Ground Armies

TactlcaU Air and Missile

Strengths and

NondlvBional Support

Status of the Re-equipment 17


Tactical Air and Missile

Theater Force Air Defense

Tactical Nuclear19

Other Supporting Capabilities


Trends in

Sire and Composition


Surface Forces

Nava: Aviation



C. Current Strengths and

Against Carrier Task

Against Sea Lines of

ASW Capabilities


Air and Missile



Available for

Ground Forces

Air and Missile Support

Naval Support

to Launch Campaigns Against Central

Immediately Available

Relniorcemeril Capabilities

for Naval Operations Against

to Launch Campaigns in Other


Theater Warfare


Limited Military Operations


Aviation and

and Missile Defense








To est; mate tbe role and capabilities of Soviet general' purpose forces over the next six years, especially against the NATO area in Europe.


As considered in this estimate, Soviet general purpose forces Include: (a) theaterround combat and tactical air forces plus their associated command, support, and serviceup through the level of military districts and groups of forces; <b) naval general purposeaval forcesto fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and <c) military airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Sovietand service elements providing general support to allof the Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those Soviet forces which perform other military missions, notably long-range striking forces and air and missile defense forces, are the subject of other National Intelligencend are discussed herein only insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.

It should be emphasized that, In discussing Soviet theater forces and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of opposing Western forces. In particular, we do not assess the effect on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclearIt is obvious that such an exchange would profoundly affect the ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missionseneral war.

Soviet Capabilities for Strategicated3 (TOP SECRET) Restricted Data and Memorandum to Holders of NIE"Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Throaghated3 (TOP SECRET).



requirements for general purpose forces areontinuing debate within the Soviet leadership.Communist traditions alike prescribe the maintenanceground forces in being as wellarge mobilizationConservative elements, both military and political,this tradition remains valid, even in the circumstancesnuclear general war. Khrushchev, however, with somepolitical support, stresses the deterrent effect of medium,and intercontinental range ballistic missilesthat Soviet requirements for general purpose forcesreduced. This debate remains unresolved, butthe trend in the size of Soviet general purpose forcesyears since Khrushchev came to power hasS)

estimate that the personnel strength of Sovietforces nowillion men inn naval units, andnmilitary transport aviation. In addition, there aremen perfonning command and general supportthe entire militaryeneral purposeestimated toine divisions;and cruise missile submarines;actical fighters and light bombers: andnaval jet medium bombers.

Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern,large number of combat strength divisions backed up by apotential. All presently existing divisions haveleast nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized

'Thus the total manpower In the Soviet military establishment Is estimated

and GeneralPurpose Forces

Ground Air


Strategic Defense Forces Strategic Attaefc Porces




rifle, or airborne. The modernization program has made heavy demands on resources in short supply in the USSR, and we believe that Soviet ground force capabilities are still adversely affected by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in equipment.)

the past several years, the Soviets havetotal number of their divisions and have also reduced themaintained at high levels of combat readiness.oviet divisions are now maintainedtercent or more of total authorizedstrength. The remainder are atercent of authorized personnel) orercent orven at full wartimedivisions are considerably smaller than US divisions.wartime strength of tank divisions isof motorized rifle divisions,ostorganized into armies, which are also quite small byThe non-divisional combat and service supportpresently maintained are probably considerably shortrequirements. )

there areombat strengthoviet tactical aircraft in East GermanyWithout prior buildup, this force could launch aattack, designed to maximize the chance ofWe believe, however, that the Soviets would seeka considerably larger striking force ifampaign against Western drawn from western USSR and from the Satelliteestimate that under noncombatforce, including5 Satellite divisions, couldand organized for operations against Westernaboutaysoviet decision to doorce might includeactical aircraft and

terms of manpower, these divisions and their aupport would Include: Soviet ground troop* norrnaily staUoned in East Oer-

many and

Soviet ground troops from Western USSR

Satellite ground

Total .

be backed upheater reserve of ground units. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce cmcale without detection.)

F. In recent years. Soviet theater forces have acquiredtactical missile capabilities, including unguided rockets and ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic chemical bombs and warheads have been provided for tactical use; we believe that their release is kept under strict political controL)

Q. With the provision of tactical and air defense missiles for the support of theater forces, the strength of Tactical Aviation was sharply reduced but has remained fairly stablehe number of tactical aircraft seems low in relation to the size of the theater ground forces. Moreover, most tactical aircraft are obsolescent. Fighter-bombers have been conspicuouslyalthoughype is now being introduced. Theater force air defense is limited by the lack of suirface-to-air missile systems for low altitude defense and for rapidly moving situations.

recent years, the Soviet Navy has beentrainedrimarily defensive role. Much of thechange has come from the USSR's concern over. carrier task forces and missile submarines.the former forces at sea, the Soviets havemissiles carried by bombers and submarines. Sovietwarfare capabilities are negligible in open oceanprobably will remain quite limited, but capabilities foragainst carrier task forces have been improvedof aircraft of Long Range Aviation. The Sovietforce poses an increasing threat to Free Worldin the northeastern Atlantic and northwesternSoviet surface ships are largely dependent uponair cover and their capabilities are correspondingly )

are anen in the Eastground forces (excludingheseivisions at various levels of strength andbelieve that about half of these divisions are sufficiently

manned and equipped for early employment in conjunction with Soviet forces. Their political reliability would remain anfactor in some circumstances. )

J. During the past year, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat their expectation that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitablyTheir recent writings indicate that some thought has beer, given to the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remainefforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear operations have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities. The USSR's capabilities for limited warfare in areas remote from its borders remain severely limited. )

K. For at least the next few years, the size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces will probably be governed by compromisesontinuing debate within Soviet ruling circles rather than by any clearly-defined strategic and politicalEconomic considerations, Sino-Soviet relations, andwithin NATO will be critical factors influencing the future of Soviet theater forces. In our view, the chances are good that tbe number of personnel and divisions in theater ground forces will decline moderately over the next six years.of ground, naval, and air general purpose forces will tend to correct current deficiencies. )



Historical, geographical, and political factors hare made large-scale land warfare on tbe Eurasian continent the basic concern of Soviet military doctrine. Except for Long Range Aviation, the Soviets have not visualized independent offensive air operations: in particular, tactical air forces are subordinated to commanders of theater ground forces. Except for the recent development of missile submarines, Soviet naval power has been oriented toward defense of the homeland, support of the ground forces in Eurasian waters, and interdiction of sea lines of

Even in the nuclear era, the emphasis on theater warfare persisted in spite of the allocation of major resources to strategic defense and attack forces. So long as Soviet capabilities for strategic nuclearremained very limited, the military basis for Soviet policiesrested heavily on war-winning capabilities for theaterwhatever misgivings there may have been regarding their viabilityeneral nuclear war. In terms of actual war-fighting capabilities and deterrence of Western military action, the large ground and tactical air forces were, until thes, the prime element of the Sovietestablishment Even today, the bulk of the Soviet strategic bomber force, as well as most of the submarine force, is best suited for operations in the Eurasian area.

3 As Soviet capabilities for nuclear/roissue attack against both Europe and North America began to emerge in thes, the firstchallenge to the primacy of land warfare in Soviet military doctrine was Issued. An intense military debate ensued. Khrushchev andajority of the political leadership, supportedinority of the military spokesmen, argued for revision of doctrines and forces In ways appropriate to nuclear /missile warfare. This school of thought was almost certainly Influenced by concern for the strains on the Soviet economy resulting from the heavy costs of advanced weapons, new equipment, and manpower for both strategic and theater forces, and the effect of such strains on key norunilitary programs.

hrushchev has argued that massive standing armies are an obsolete luxury which the Soviet Union can Ul afford. In bis fullest exposition of military doctrine, Innd in subsequent public and private statements, he has maintained that the enormous increases In firepower achieved by the Introduction of nuclear and missile weapons greatly reduce the need for military manpower. Khrushchev's public position on tbe relative utility of types of military forces may have been exaggerated In order to maximize the political Impact of hisat home and abroad, and we hare no conclusive Indications of how



far he might actually wish to go in restructuring Soviet forces.Khrushchev's tendency to deprecate the importance of general purpose forces appears toalculation that the existence of nuclear weapons can and will deter both sides from initiating war

The military, who are more immediately concerned with developing forces for use in the event deterrence fails, have naturally taken the question of general purpose forces much more seriously. However, they have not been of one mind on the question of the role of theater forces in nuclear war. There has been complex debate over the issue. Some have taken the Khrushchevian or modernist approach with its emphasis on deterrence. Most have arguedar-winning military capability in both strategic and theater forces, including mass armies ready for immediate employment. Out of the debate, compromiseon rnihtary doctrine were formulated and were published ln the open press. These compromises were contradictory and precarious. That they satisfied no school of Soviet military thought became evident through revisions and criticism in the public press.

Theut In the numerical size of Soviet forces, which Khrushchev iponsored, was resisted by the military. The process of reduction had stalled even before Khrushchev announced theof Soviet forcesoreign policy move in1 Berlin crisis. Inhen his political position seemed to have weakened. Khrushchev spoke defensively about the primacy of military needs and hinted strongly at increased military spending Recently, however. Khrushchev has reverted to public advocacy of reductions in both the military budget and the size of the forces.

Ln sum. the development of Soviet general purpose forces since thes has not, ln our view, resulted from Soviet pursuitell-defined concept of the role of these forces in war. In the future. Soviet policy towards these and other types of forces will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety of strategic, historical, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance of these factors and by shifting compromises among these views. The fluctuations In this ongoing debate ratheringle, clearly-defined strategic concept are likely to govern the size and composition of Soviet general purpose forces through the period of this estimate.

II. SOVIET THEATER FORCES A. Past Trends in Development

Reorganization and Modernization of Ground Forces

8 The Soviets have pursued an ambitious program to convert Worldifle, horse cavalry, tank, and mechanized divisions Into highly mobile, heavily armored units. The modernization of the huge, rela-

lively unsophisticated ground forces was an enormous undertaking. It made heavy demands on motor vehicles, electronic equipment, and skilled personnel, all of which were in short supply In the USSR.with the modernization of the Soviet theater forces, theSatellite armies were organized and equipped from the ground up. In addition, the Soviets also equipped Asian Communist forces with large quantities of materiel, including that expended in the Korean War.

9 We believe that all Soviet line divisions are now ai least nominally constituted as modern tank, motorized rifle, and airborne units, although we doubt that the process of reorganization and re-equipping has been completed in all cases. Moreover, it is evident that there werealong the way. Some equipment adopted as standard was far short of desired military specifications. For instance, the original armored personnel carriers were general purpose trucks with light armor added. Most armored personnel carriers presently in service lack overhead cover, and. being wheeled rather than tracked, have poormobility.

n order to provide combat support to the modernized groundthe Soviets required artillery with greater mobility, more and belter engineer support, much better communications, modem tactical aviation,obile field army air defense system. As the ground forces were progressively converted, their ability to conduct operationsinimum of logistic support supplemented by field improvisation was diminished. In particular, requirements for fuels, lubricants, and maintenance for the vastly greater number of vehicles increased sharply The Soviets apparently paid less attention to providing the modernized support structure required for the theater forces than to reorganizing and re-equipping the line units.

Tactical Air and Missile Support

The emphasis given strategic defense of the USSR against bomber attack in thes andasonsiderable influence on developments In Soviet tactical aviation. The Soviet program during those years to develop and produce jet Interceptors was very large, but all models were short-range types and fighter-bombers with offensive capabilities comparable to those ln Western tactical air forces never appeared. Tactical air units were equipped with the same Interceptors that were provided to strategic air defense units, despite their poor characteristics for ground attack missions. On the other hand, during the0arge number of first generation jet light bombers (BEAGLE) were produced for strike and reconnaissance roles within theater forces.

, the total number of jet fighters and light bombers ln tactical aviation was reduced to less than half of Its prior

strength. The sharpest reductions resulted from the deactivation of aging BEAGLES, probably due in large partoviet decision to rely heavily on missile strikes, including MRBMs and IRBMs. in nuclear war. There waseduction in fighter strength, probably due in large part to increased reliance on surface-to-air missiles introduced during the same period for air defense of the homeland and of field forces.he number of combat aircraft in tactical aviation hasfairly stable.

The changes ln tactical aviation were accompanied, and in part caused, by the advent of missile systems for the tactical support of ground force operations. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets have developed several types of short-range unguided rockets and ballistic and cruise-type missiles for field use. Early generation ballistic missilesoviet version of theoviet-designed follow-on system with about twice its range. Both of these systems had low mobility and slow reaction times. We think they were probably not deployed in large numbers and that, in any event, they have now been superseded,

Sincehe highly mobile SCUD. ballistic missile system has been available to ground force units. Deployment in strength to Soviet forces ln East Europe and western USSR was probably accomplished byore recently, the, cruise missile system, has been introduced. Wethat the SCUD and SHADDOCK are the principal surface-to-surface missiles (other than unguided rockets) now in service with Soviet theater forces. Their increasing availability provides the theater forces with important missile delivery capabilities for high explosive, toxic chemical, and nuclear warheads.

Porsonnaf Strengths

uring the Korean conflict the number of men in the Soviet theater forcesost-World War LT high of roughly four million. By the, this strength had been reduced to roughly twoAs the net result of changes that have occurredhe theater forces have been further reducedevel which we estimate is within the rangeillion ate believe that numerous line divisions and tactical air units have been deactivated over the years, but that the reduction in the number of line divisions has not been proportionate to the personnel reductions. There is evidence

"These numbersillion In theater ground forces andn Tactical AvtaUon. They excludeeneral command and support personnel, most of whom have been Included in previous estimates as part of theater torces. These personnel support all elements of the Soviet militaryee Annex A. Table 1.

that in many cases the Soviets elected to cut manning levels within divisions, thus reducing the proportion of divisions maintainedow ratio of nondivisional support units to divisions has continued despite the growing logistic and maintenance requirementsore mechanized army.

B. Current Sire and Composition Manning Levels of Divisions

here is little direct evidence on which to base an estimate of the actual personnel strengths of Soviet divisions ariety of reliable sources, including classified Soviet documents, we do know that there are three general categories of divisions. The differences between these categories are measured most conveniently in terms of theof authorized personnel strength normally maintained in These differences, however,ore fundamental element of Soviet planning for mobilization in the event of general warhreat of general war. Much of this planning is designed to mount and sustain large-scale operations against powerful NATO forces In Europe. The Soviets evidently anticipate that some divisions would need to be ready for combat on short notice, others would constitute reinforcements for initial or very early operations, and still others wouldonger term mobilization base. This planning, moreover, Implies that the required combat effectiveness of divisions would vary depending upon such factors as the time of their availability for commitment to battle, the tasks they would be expected to perform, and the effectiveness of the enemy forces they would face when committed.

onsidering the fragmentary direct evidence on division manning levels, limited evidence as to the total manpower available In the ground forces, and the apparent basic structure of these forces, we estimate that the three categories of Soviet line divisions have the followingcharacteristics:

ar combat strength divisions are probably manned atercent or more of authorized wartime strength. They are ready for commitment to combat with little or no augmentation. They areto form the backbone of first-echelon striking forces against powerful enemy forces. They would have the highest combatof any Soviet divisions when committed.

b. Category II or reduced strength divisions are probably mannedercent of authorized wartime strength. They could probably be fleshed out with reservists and ready to moveheater ofwithineek or so. They are Intended, therefore, toreinforcements for early combat operations byivisions.


Their greatest usefulness would probably be as second-echelon or theater reserve units.

c_ Category III or cadre strength divisions are probably manned atercent or less of authorized wartime strength, containing most of their officer and NCO complements but few troops. They are intended toonger term mobillxntion base. They could probably be fleshed out with reservistseek or so. but they would probably not be suitable as reinforcements or replacements for operations against powerful enemy forcesatter of months. After several weeks, however, they could probably be useful for mopping-up operations, line-of-comrounlcations duties, or reconstruction work.

Number of DrVWotll

We havehorough review of all evidence bearing on the number of Soviet divisions, their distribution by type, and their geographic location. As part of this review we haveetailed assessmentntities, each of which might be considered toivision on the basis of some kind of evidence, and have madeas to which were firmly Identified and which should be regarded with lesser degrees of assurance. We have also considered tbe number of divisions likely to be associated with the corps and army structure of the Soviet ground forces. Finally, we have calculated the probable number of existing divisions taking into account the varying degrees of uncertainty about individual organizations. From the results of these complementary forms of analysis, we conclude that the present number of cUvuoon-level organizations in the Soviet ground forcescertainly falls within the range

Considering the evidence available, we believe that no singlewithinange estimated above Is more likely than any other to be the actual total number of Soviet divisions. However, in order to discuss the probable distribution of Soviet divisions by type and tocaXion. we have had to employ the only form of analysis suitable for thisassessment of individual entitles. This form of analysisingle, as the total number of entitles rated as firm, highly probable, or probable divisions, excluding those rated as only possible. While using the results of this analysis in the following paragraphs and in our tablesatter of convenience, we emphasize that the total. is no more probable than any other Inange. It should be noted that an assumption that the total number of Soviet divisions Is on the high side of the

range Isivisions lower than the range estimated InCapabUiues of the Soviet TheaterECSKT. The change results fromluatlon and should not be taken to mean that the USSR has reduced Its forces by this amount In the past year.


ange would Imply greater requirements lor equipment ond nondivisonaJ support, and so would tend to maximize any Sovietin those respects.

ur analysis indicates that the probable number of divisions maintained at the highest peacetime manningr combat strength divisions, fall within the rangen the remainder of this estimate, to discuss the probable distribution by type and location, we use theumber which is appropriate only if the total number of divisions. It should be noted that this procedure maximizes the immediate Soviet threat in the event of war, but It also maximizes the time required to bring additional divisions to combat readiness, since most of the remainingivisions would be at cadre strength if,iven total number of personnel,ere maintained at high strength.

he assurance regarding the identification ofivisions included in this estimate varies markedly with their location. Of this total,ndividual organizations are considered firmly and currently established as divisions (ln one or another of the threendf thesereas west of the Urals. The divisions in Eastern Europe are firmly identified; most of those ln western USSR are firmly identified or highly probable; those in more remote areas are much less certain. Our evidence also leads us to believe that divisions in Eastern Europe and western USSR are generally at higher manning levels than divisions deep within the USSR. Thus, the uncertainty represented by thenvolves primarily low strength divisions located in areas remote from NATO, and does not significantly affect immediate capabilities against NATO.

Types or" Ofcrnom

he Soviets have three types of line divisions: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. Even at wartime strength, all types of Sovietare considerably smaller than US divisions. Further, they are much lighter in divisional logistic support and some types of combat support. Since the publication ofe have acquired evidence leading us to believe that ln0 the Soviets reduced the authorized wartime personnel strength of divisions by as much asercent, together with some reductions in combat vehicles and artillery. At the same time, new armaments were authorized forsuch as anti-tank missiles, FROG7 launchers, and new combat vehicles.

'This compares with tbe Scorestimated lnn thate made no attempt to arm*ange of uncertainty As ln the case of tbe total number of divisions, tbe change rosulta from re-evaluaUoo.


'Similar to US HONEST JOHN.


Motorized rule cuvisions are the most numerous ol the types in the Soviet (and Satellite) ground forces;oviet divisions cited above includeotorized rifle divisions,f them at combat strengthIn the course of the postwar evolution of the Soviet ground forces this type of division was developedore compact version of earlier mechanized cUvisions. The authorized personnel strength of the motorized rifle division has been gradually reduced. There haseneral trend to Increase its armor and mobility In order to adapt it to the combined arms tactics and fast rates of advance advocated in Sonet doctrine for the nuclear battlefield. It is almost certainignificant proportion of the motorized rifle divisions are not yet fully equipped according to the latest tables of organization and(TOES).

Tank divisions have also evolved from Worldypes. The tank divisions are small and light in infantry troops when compared to US armoredn some tank divisions one of the three organic tank regiments is equipped with heavy rather than medium tanks, but there Is some evidence that heavy tanks are being phased out and replaced with mediums. In our recent review of evidence, we have concluded thativisions which we formerly identified as motorized rifle or older mechanized divisions are probablyoviet divisions cited above includeank divisions,f them at combat strength. As in the case of the motorized rifle divisions, tank divisions are not yet fully equipped according to the latest TOE.

Less evidence is available on the organization and strength of Soviet airborne divisions than on other types. The division Issimilarotorized rifle division, but without heavier items of equipment such as tanks and larger artillery pieces. The number of airborne divisions has declined over the past few years from ten to seven They are all believed lo be at combat strength.

Ground Armies

ost Soviet cUvisioos are organized into combined arms armies or tank armies, which contain the bulk of the combat and servicefor the divisions. The compositionoviet ground army in wartime would vary depending upon such factors as terrain andEvidence from Soviet exercises and classified military writings shows that the Soviets usually assumeartime ground army will contain four or five divisions. In this estimate, we consider this to

motortred rifle and tank divisions at authorized wartime strength are believed to have0en respecUTelj. See Annex C.or TOEs.

were carried as motorized rifle divisions In

represent the sizeypical Soviet army, recognizing that many variations are possible.

ur evidence indicates that aboutrrmies now exist in the Soviet ground forces These armies are much smaller than the image often invoked by the termot only because of the relatively small size of their divisions but also because of their paucity of combat and service support elements. Supporting artillery, missile, and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments are either allocated to armies or retained under higher command headquarters Into the armies, there is evidence that five to seven corps still exist, and ve believe that these serve, in effect, as small armies.

In the event of general war most of these armies would probably be grouped into fronts. The Soviet wartime front is an echelon roughly comparableestern armyhe Group of Soviet Forces, Germanyhich can be regardedront, contains four combined arms armies and two tankhile we have not identified every army in the USSR as to type, there appears toimilar ratio of two combined arms armies to one tank armythe ground forces.

A typical Soviet combined arms armyn wartime could be composed of one tank division and four motorized rifle divisions with organic army combat and service support troops. We believe that the wartime personnel strength ofAA would behe present strength of the four CAAs In OSFG, however, is estimated to vary00 This lower strength is due In part to the fact that these armiesatherivisions, but probably also to their having an even smaller support structure than that estimated for the wartime CAA.

Soviet tanksually contain only tank divisions. We believeypical tank army would be composed of four divisions, although at present the two tank armies in GSFG contain only three divisions each. The estimated personnel strengthypical wartime tank army would behereas the two tank armies in GSFG are estimated to contain0 troops each. The reasons for this difference are probably basically the same as in the case of the combined arms army. Soviet tank armies probablyCUD missile brigade, but no other nondivisional field artillery.

" See Annex C.or illustrative organizationartime front

" Sac Annei A,or tiumated composition of OSPO.

" See Annex C,or lUustraUve organizationarUms CAA.

See Annex C,or IllustraUve organizationartime tank army.

Tactical Air and Mtuih Support "

Soviet doctrine callsactical air army (TAA) to support major ground commands, generallyatio of one TAA per front of four or five ground armies. The size and composition ot thedentified tactical air armies varies considerably. With the exception ofh TAA in GSPO. which hasombat aircraft, these units range in aircraft strength from.

Since the reduction of Tacticalew years ago. it has been generally stabilized In overall aircraft strength, with phasing in of new model aircraft and continuing retirement of older models. There arc currentlyombat aircraft in Tactical Aviation, comprisingightersight bombers, includingaircraft of both types" About half this total strength is with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and most of the remainder is in western and southern USSR.

Soviet tactical missile support Includes free rocket (FROG) launchers with ranges up tom. These launchers are mountedight tank chassis. Sightings of these weapons with Soviet units have been rare, but we estimate that at least theivisions probably nowROG battalion with two launchers.

Theactical ballistic missile (SCUD) Is found at both army, and higher echelons The SCUD Is mountedeavy tank chassis which gives it cross-country mobility, and lt employs storable liquid fuel. The latest modelaximum range. with EE. CW, or nuclear warheads; earlier models, probably still in service, have this range with SE or CW warheads, but only about half the range with nuclearewissiles have been sighted in GSFG. but direct evidence of the extent of deployment is not available. Thesystem has been operational for several years, however, and. on the basis of Its probable assignment to field army and higher echelons, we estimate thataunchersix-launcher brigades exist.

he Soviets haverowing interest In cruise missiles for tactical use. The principal cruise missile now employed in support of theater forces Is the road-mobilehich can deliver nuclear or CW warheadsangem. The missileow altitude flight profile and filesow supersonic speed. It may have replacedm.SIBLING) ballistic missileront weapons system The evidence is equivocal as to whether SHADDOCK units are assigned to tactical air armies or to

" See Annex B.or tacUcal rnisslle characteristics.See Annex A.or numbers and location.




separate front art tilery formations, or to both. Our knowledge of the extent of deployment of SHADDOCK is even poorer than that available on SCUD, but oc the basis of the same general considerations, wea present .'orce level ofaunchers, the majority of them in western border areas of the USSR

believe that over the past year or so, the quantity ofmissile launchers In theater forces has remained. while quality has improved with the introductionmissile systems. Although nuclear warheads are probablyarmament for these missiles, there is some evidence thatwere providedelatively high percentage (aboutproportion is probably declining as nuclear warheads becomeavailable. High explosive warheads are probably also

C. Current Strengths and Weaknesses

ground forcesarge number of linecan be readied for combat on short notice, backed up bya large mobihzation potential. The ready force isequipped with modern materiel, is highly mobile, and Iseffective employmentuclear environment. The troops arehighly disciplined, and have great endurance. Sovietare called up for three years or longer depending on theirservice and this system resultsairly stabletheater forces. Soviet forces are at peak efficiency in lateearly fall.ecline in combat readiness occurs withturnover In lower ranks later in the fall of the year.have recogruzed the need to avoid fluctuations in readinessattempting to spread the uiductjon of new recruits morethe year.

No"divisianal Support

evidence on nondlvisional supporting dements is eventhan that available on divisions However, ln view ofrequirements of the modernized Soviet ground forces,of personnel in nondivisional elements appears austere.are inivisions,f them In Category I, then theof personnel in theater ground forces assigned to iroridland service support may now be as small asikely that Soviet forces in Bast Europe and western USSRnondivisionml support than those deep in the mtertor, butaustere support for major units can be found even ln GSFG,and service, support elements probably account for no

"See Annex A. Tab!*

more thanercent of the total strength in each of the combined arms armies. Based on the fragmentary data available, we think that the number of nondivisional support personnel normally maintained in peacetime is likely to be somewhat less than half of theuvision force.

Status of the Re-equipment Program

The program of modernization and reorganization has involved the introduction in recent years of more advanced designs of many types of equipment, including many types of missiles and improved combat vehicles. In most instances, successive generations ol equipment have been produced since World War II. Although Soviet ground forces are not fully equipped with materiel of the later designs, many older models still In service remain generally effective. Despite the Introduction of several more advanced models of tanks, lt appears that someercent of tbe medium tanks in OSFG are Worlds. In certain key categories of equipment, such as armored personnel carriers, general purpose trucks, and POL trans^rters, there are good mdications that Soviet forces are short of total wartime TOE requirements.Soviet military spokesmen have alluded to equipment deficiencies and problems of obsolescence.

Our evidence is fragmentary and inconclusive as to total Soviet production and total Inventories of ground forcenestimates we presented inventory figures based on this evidence and on calculated Soviet requirements, but we now consider that such figures have inefficient validity to be included in an estimate. We are currently re-evaluating the evidence In an effort to arrive at probable ranges of uncertainty in total equipment inventories. Pendingof this re-evaluation, the evidence does seem clearly to support the belief that there are shortages of at least the types of equipment mentioned above.

Mobilization Potential

Soviets havearge pool of trained reservists toexisting units and mobilize additional units.force personnel enter the reserve force yearly, notin home air defense forces. Most of the personnel releasedactive force over the past five years or so were probably trained

"In many cases, the evidence Is so Incomplete that widely varying estimates can be derived from It, depending on the assumpUons made. For example, the avaUaole evidenceirm conclusioninimum4 tanks have been produced. The number Is almost certainly larger than that. On the basis of certain asaumpUons. the available evidence can support an In-ventory figure of more



Kith the more modem equipment and in current Soviet tactics Enough of these personnel are available as reservists to provide the additional men required to nilheater ground forceivisions and their associated nondlvislonal support.

As IndlcaLed in previous paragraphs, our information on Soviet equipment inventories is not good enough toonfidentabout the adequacy withivisions could be equipped in the event of mobilization. In general, we believe thativisions probably have nearly full complements of equipment,only certain newer items. Whatever quantity of equipment is available for Category III divisions, it is probably not as up-to-date as that of the higher categories.

Should the Soviets choose to do so. additional divisions could be formed by detaching cadres from existing divisions and calling up trainedhere are probably sufficient inventories of some types of equipment to allow for mobilizationivislon force, but shortages would make themselves felt even more severely If theattempted such an expansion. Moreover. It la doubtful that all of the necessary additional combat and service elements could be mobilized at the same rate as divisions.obilization of additionalwould involve the loss of greater and more immediate capabilities which could be achieved through fleshingivision force

Almost all Soviet aircraft and ships are maintained ln active status. Naval and air reservists would probably be mobilized to bring existing units up to full wartime personnel complements. We would expect no significant increase in the operational inventory of ships and aircraftesult of mobilization, but supporting elements would probably be expanded.

Tactical Air and mOM Support

Soviet Tactical Aviation is currently characterizedowof aircraft relative to the size of the theater ground forces, limited offensive capabilities, and the obsolescence of the force. The Soviets are reducing deficiencies ln Tactical Aviation through the Introduction of improved aircraft and armament, as well as increased trainingon ground support missions. The obsolescent BEAGLEight bomber rs rtui the mainstay of Sonet offensive tactical airbut appears now to be phasing out in favor of FIREBARew supersonic jet light bomber, which has entered service in smallSome FIREBAR As have radar bombing equipment.

Most current Soviet fighters were designed primarily asand therefore have poor load-carrying and range capabilities


for offensiveboutercent of the tactical fighters are obsolescent FAGOTs, FRESCOs. and FARMERS. However, even with their limitations, Soviet fighters canariety of missions in support of ground forces and can be equipped to deliver nuclear bombs. Some of the newer fighters (FITTER andlthough they were also basically designed as interceptors, have improvedover the older models for offensive missions. The number of new generation fighters in Tactical Aviation has increased fromercent of the total inventory toercent over the past year.

tactical missiles, particularly the FROGs andhave good mobility and appear rugged and simple insome classified Soviet articles have criticized the inabilitymissile units to maintain continuous fire support becausetime required to displace them to new firing positions. Thesethe desire of Soviet theater ground force officers toallocated to their operational control, but their proposalsrejected.

Theater Force Air Defense Capabilities

increasing numbers of surface-to-air missiles.force air defenses still rely primarily onm and smaller) and tactical aircraft.ewnterceptors Into Soviet tacticaln East Germany) has significantly increasedcapabilities.issile units are now believed to bearmies and higher echelons, but because ot displacement tuneof low attitude capabilities, this system has onlyapidly moving situation The automatic antiaircraftconstitute the only defenses mobile enough to provideair defense for troops when fighter cover is not available,effectiveness of these weapons against modern highis minimal.

Tacficol Nuclear Capabilities

mittee of State

of nuclear weapons, not only in storage, but also during transportation to firing units. Once their use was authorized by national leadership,

'Sec Annexor estimated close support capabiliUes of tactical aircraft



weapons appear not to be physically located within peacetime. As far as we can determine, they are storedof Defense depots located within the USSR, althoughsome evidence, which we have not been able to corinrm,

tactical nuclear weapons would be delivered to firing units by the special KGB units.

Command and allocation lines of authority for the use of nuclear weapons run from the High Command to commanders of fronts and, in some cases, armies. These procedures give the national leadershipcontrol over the numbers and yields of weapons employed in major theaters. Allocations within the theater are governed byguidelines which limit the freedom of field commanders to select targets. The entire system of command and control appears wellto reserve to the national leadership the decision to initiate use of nuclear weapons.

The broad range of nuclear tests12 points to an effort to Improve the nuclear capabilities of all arms of the Soviet rnihtary establishment. The numbers of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet theater forces have probably been limited by higher priorities afforded the strategic attack forces. Nevertheless, we believeariety ofnuclear weapons is now available, virtually all of them with yields in the kiloton range, but possibly including some in the low megaton range. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton warheads, but there is no present evidence that they are developing delivery systems specifically for such weapons.

Classified documents indicate that Soviet military planners for the past few years have beenosition to think in terms of committing upew hundred nuclear weaponsront operation. Initialstrikes are considered crucial to anigh volume of concentrated nuclear strikes is called for prior to offensive thrusts by ground forces, with theater forcesarge percentage of their nuclear weapons allocations in these strikes. The primary targets in all phases of theater operations remain enemy nuclear deliveryTo the extent of weapons availability, nuclear strikes would also be directed at command and control complexes, air defense facilities, logistical installations, and major troop formations. We believe,that existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logisticwould hamper the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response in their employment of tactical nuclear weapons. We have no doubt that the Soviets are working to overcome these deficiencies, although we have no evidence on their progress.

Other Supporting Capabilities

e possess good technical data on thecapability of Soviet theater forces to employ tactical cruisemissiles and FROGs with toxic chemical warheads. In addi-

a fuller discussion, seeSoviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to ChemicalatedECRET.


lion, chemical bombs and projectiles are available for use with other delivery systems such as lactica: aircraft. artiUery, mortars, and barrage rockets. Spray systems and land mines have also been developed. Whereas our evidence indicates thai missile warheads are bulk-filled exclusively with one of the extremely toxic "V" agents, all otherare apparently filled with less toxic nerve agents of the "G" type (sarin or soman) or with agents of older types which first saw use in World War l.

Our evidence indicates that Soviet organization, equipment,and research and development can support substantial toxicwarfare operations. Although some CW munitions are probablyavailable to Soviet tactical units, logistical problems might affect the Soviet's ability to bring their stored CW stocks into play against NATO forces in Europe. Aboutercent of the probable toxicdepot storage we have Identified ts in western and central USSR and aboutercent in the Far East. Nearly all that in the western and central USSR Is located in the Volga and Turkestan Military Districts. It is therefore not well sited for usear in the West which began with short warning times and involved heavy interdiction of transportation faculties.

We believe that iniinking the same constraints which apply to tbe use of nuclear weapons apply also to toxic CW, and that the use of either wouldecision at the highest political level. The present Soviet emphasis on CW munitions for theater operations probably results In part from restricted availability of tactical nuclear weapons due to the longstanding nuclear priority assigned strategic forces. Considering this and other factors, we believe that the Soviet leaders almost certainly would authorize tbe use of toxic chemical agents by their theater fieldeneral nuclear war.on-nuclear war, the Soviets probably would not Initiate the use Of toxic chemicals.

Blclogical Warfare. Intelligence derived from Soviet scientific publications Indicates continued Interest and research In the field of biological warfare. We have no evidence of current Soviet military capabilities for appbcation to theater operations, however, and weSoviet tactical use of BW highly unlikely

Biological, and Radiological Defense. Sovietevidently assume that the West would use chemicalas well as nuclear weapons In the event of general war.of the Soviet forces stress training for chemical well as most Items ofdefense equipment, Isalso for defense against radiation and biological warfareand automatic radiation and chemical detection devicesbut sensitivity of the latter to nerve agents is inadequatehuman safety. An armored personnel carrier has been mod:-



fled for mobile chemical and radiation reconnaissance, but ve do not know tbe sensitivity of the detection systems. The chemical defense equipment supplied the individual combat soldier Is adequate to protect himoxic environment forhort time.

econnaissance. While there Is little current information onbattlefield surveillance techniques, intelligence available does no: suggest that substantial progress has been made in overcomingSoviet deficiencies in this field Most Soviet aircraft designated for this mission are obsolescent, although the FLASHLIGHTew tactical reconnaissance aircraft, Is now available. In the theater ground forces'there are apparently no longer any nondlvislonal armoredunits; divisions themselves are expected to perform required ground reconnaissance missions, but their specialized reconnaissance elements are minimal. The reconnaissance equipment in operation Is apparently, for the most part, Incapable of rapidly providing the ground missile units with accurate fire-adjustment data, automatically processed and transmitted. There are probably still serious organizationalin the way of exploitation of collected intelligence. Some Soviet authors have strongly criticized the system of battlefieldavailable, at least upa incapable of fully meeting the requirements of nuclear warfare.

trlift.ight transport aircraft of the CAB, COACH and CRATE types andedium turboprop transports of the CAT. CAMP and CUB types are assigned by Soviet MilitaryAviation to support of airbornehe assigned transport aircraft of the airborne troops are sufficient toingle airborne division in one sortie. The range of the Soviet troop transport aircraft would limit the radius of airborne assault to. from assembly airfields. The probable addition In the near future of more transports will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas. We believe that in several years transportsto support of airborne troops may have twice the present lift capacity, but still to limited ranges.

AVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES A. Pan Trends in Development

ntil recent years the Soviet Navy was equipped and trainedrimarily defensive role. An intensive postwar shipbuildingwhich reached its peakurface fleet including

"For estimated characteristics and performance or these and other Soviet transport aircraft, see Annex B, Table 4.


cruisers, destroyers, and escort ships, which was limited for effective operations to the range of shore-based aircraft The large Sovietforce has been composed, for the most part, of types limited to operations in the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific waters. However, in the past few years the Soviets have developed an increasingly diversified naval forceew emphasis on ships, weapons, andof greater range and effectiveness.

uch of the impetus for technological change in the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by US carrier task forces and missile submarines. To counter these forces at sea. the Soviets have introduced medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles, submarines equipped with cruise missiles, new classes ofwarfare (ASW) ships, and improved weapons and electronic systems. They bave also Introduced improved attack submarines, both nuclear and dlesel. Soviet surface forces have been strengthened by the addition of missile armament to two cruisers and several classes of destroyer and patrol craft, and by the introduction of new mine-warfare ships."

B. Current Size and Composition

Submarine force K

Soviet capabilities for conducting operations at long distances from the Soviet coast derive primarily from the submarine force. The total strength of the Soviet submarine force has changed Uttle in the past few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate it willto Includeirst line units. However, with theemphasis on missile armament and nuclear propulsion, Itsare changing significantly. For example,he USSR bad only aboutlesel-powered, torpedo-attack; submarines capable of conducting patrols off North American coasts. It now hasuclear and dlesel submarines with thh endurance, about half ot them armed with missiles.

Tbe bulk of the Soviet torpedo-attack submarine force consists of dlesel submarines, built for the most part in. These includelass,lass,lass, andlass submarines.8 the Soviets have producedlass diesel submarines andlass nuclear submarines; both of these classes have sufficientto conduct long-range patrols."

"Sea Annex B.or characteristics of Soviet naval mlssUes.

" See Annex A,or strength and composition.

- See Annex B,or submarine characteristics and armament.


Surface Forces "

aval surface forces, which are still heavily dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive operations in waters adjacent to the USSR. Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseight cruisers,estroyers,scorts. In recent years, however, the Soviet Navy hasincreased the firepower of its surface forces by the addition of missile armament, including surface-to-air missiles, which has extended the potential scope of effective operations. The only known majorcombatant ships now being built in the USSR are guided missile destroyer types. The Soviets now have operationalestroyers armed with cruise-type missiles for use against surface targets. In addition to their missile armament, most of these ships also carry ASW weapons systems. They are probably intended primarily for operations against both naval striking forces and submarines, either in defense of the sea approaches to the USSR or in coastalupport of theater field forces.

he Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed primarily of older ships, is being augmented by new tankers and cargo ships, and logistic support for submarines is being reinforced by the addition or submarine tenders, rescue ships, repair ships, and missile support ships. Additional logistic support could be provided by the growing Soviet merchant marine The widespread Soviet fishing fleets could also provide limited support to submarines, and they have considerable utility for training, mine warfare, and collection of intelligence.

Nenrol Aviation m

oviet Naval Aviationrastic reorganisation0 with the deactivation or transfer of all naval fighter units. Navalis now composed largely of Jet medium bombers, but also includes Jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters. Its capabilities are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strike missions againsttargets, and to some extent on antisubmarine warfare. Defensive air cover for naval operations would have to be provided by fighternot subordinate to Naval Aviation

f NavalADGER jet medium bombers are equipped to deliver antiship alr-to-surface missiles. These missiles are of two types: the subsonic AS-I. whichange ofnd then.oth are estimated toEPeet against single, well-defined ship targets and some of these mis-

* See Annex A,or strength ind compoalUoa. "See Annex A, Tableor composition and distribution.


sties probably carry nuclear warheads Missile-launching BADGERS are either configured to carry two AS-l's or one AS-2.

aval medium bomber strength will probably increase slightly over the next five years. We believe that Naval Aviation has received some supersonic-dash BLINDER medium bombers, and they will probablyIn greater strength within the next few years. Some of these may be equipped with air-to-surface missiles.

of the naval BADGERs which are not equipped withassigned to reconnaissance or support roles. Recent evidencean increasing use of medium and heavy bombers of Longon maritime reconnaissance missions; overflights of USforces also suggest an attack training mission for thesebelieve that the naval requirement for long-range aerialIs growing, and that it will be met either by the continued useRange Aviationhis role, or by the assignment ofaircraft to Naval Aviation.

C Current Strengths and Weaknesses

recent years, the missions of the Soviet Navy have beento encompass strategic missile attack against foreignoperations against Western naval forces, while retaining theroles of interdicting Western sea lines ofthe littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support forflanks of ground forces. Soviet surface forces operatingwaters would lack air cover, although in certainships may operate beyond the range of land-based

A gain if Carrier fail: Forcei

capabilities against carrier task forces have beencontinued conversion of jet medium bombers to carry antishlpand by the introduction of submarines equipped withIn the European area, BADGERs with antishlp missilesagainst surface ships in the northeastern Athurtic, theand Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranemn Theseare, of course, subject to problems of target detection andIn tbe past year or so, reconnaissance of open ocean-Long Range and Naval Aviation has increased. Submarineagainst carrier task forces could extend to US coastal waters.

ea Linei of Communication

threat of the Soviet submarine fleet to Free World seagreatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. Theof Soviet submarines to interdict these supply lines would depend


umber of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and theof opposition. Interdiction operations against North Atlanticroutes would be undertaken largely by suhmarines of the Northern Fleet We estimate that this force Includes someorpedo attack submarines whose endurance would limit operations to the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic, as well as eight diesel submarines equipped with antiship cruise missiles.

ot considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleetcould be maintained on station continuously in the easternapproaches to the UK and Europe, this number might be augmented slightly by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior to hostilities. The Soviets could also maintain0 nuclear and diesel torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping in the western Atlantic and in the approaches to the Mediterranean The number ln the western Atlantic could be more than doubled if thewere able to provide logistic support during patrolsorward base such as Cuba.

the Pacific, the Soviets are estimated to haveubmarines which they could use against sea lines ofas well as six nuclear und three diesel submarinesantiship missiles. While only one?-third of this force hasto operate off the US west coast, the remainder canin those areas through which US shipping must pass toisland bases and Asian allies. The Pacific Fleet now includesand three diesei-powered cniise-rrussile-launchingbelieve the Soviets would employ these submarines primarily inrote, but they could also be employed against landSoviets could probably mam tainubmarines onthe ocean area between Hawaii and Japan, as well as about fiveUS Pacific Coast.

ASW CapobtfifiM

the, the Soviets haveajor effort inof ASW ships, particularly small coastal types, andnew hebcopters and modified seaplanes. An ASW rote mayassigned tolass submarines, as well as toN class Detection equipment and weapons nowinclude air-hmnched passive sonobuoys. airborne magneticdetection (MAD) equipment, depth charges, multiple tubelaunchers, and passive horning torpedoes. ASW exercisesin scope, and training doctrine has become morebelieve that the USSR now has the capability to conduct fairlyASW operations withinilesajor Soviet naval base against

a conventional submarine operatedoderately well-trained crew.onventional submarinerew experienced in evasive techniques this capability would be materially degraded, anduclear subrnarine it would be very poor. Soviet ASW capabilitiesrapidly as the distance from their naval basesiles and beyond that distance must still be regarded as negligible.


The amphibious assault capability of the Soviet Navy is extremely limited. We have re-examined the numbers and characteristics of the ships and craft available to the USSR for shore-to-shore operations; we conclude that very few can be used for assault landings across open beaches, and that these are suitable only for short-distance operations. We now believe that only In the Baltic are there sufficient numbers of appropriately designed ships and craft to lift balanced forces in anassault. In thisaximum of two regiments can be lifted. Token numbers of amphibious ships and craft in other fleet areas could, of course, be used ship-to-shore for logistic support or for small binding operations not requiring assault by balanced forces.

The Sovietsotal merchant ship Lift in all seas which is theoretically sufficient to transport approximatelyotorized nfle divisions; however,ft would require port or other extensive ofT-loading facilities in the landing area. Assuming ail Soviet merchant ships were available for use in their respective areas of registry, their approximate lift capability would be:

North2Vt motorized rifle divisions

Baltic Sea motorized nfle divisions

Black Sea 6 motorized rifle divisions

motorized rifle divisions


Sinceoviet and European Satellite forces have been partnified military command established under the Warsaw Pact. The headquarters of this command ts In Moscow, and itsin Chiefarshal of the Soviet Union as wellirst Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR- Satellite defense rninlsters are designated Deputyhief, but there is no evidence that they regularly participate in the functions of the unifiedwhich are evidently handled almost exclusively by Soviet staff officers,

In wartime. European Satellite military forces would be under the ultimate control of the Soviet High Command, and we believe that



the Warsaw Pact command as such would have little or no operational role. The manner and extent to which the Soviets plan to employ Satellite forces is probably determined by the Soviet estimate of their reliability and effectiveness, and by the availability of supportingSelected Satellite divisions, corps, and field armies would be integrated directly Into Soviet field armies or fronts. Others would be retained under national command for offensive missions on secondary fronts, as well as defense against NATO air attack and sabotage, theater reserve, andecurity.

round Force*

he total personnel strength of the East European ground forces is estimated toexcludingf this total, more than half are in theatellite finehe remainder are in combat and service support units and home air defense forces, as well as general support for the Satellite military establishments As in the case of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, our evidence as to the existence of Satellite divisions Is relatively good However, our evidence onand equipment, peacetime manning levels, and equipment status varies from good In the case of some divisions to poor in the case of others.

he divisions are organized generally aiong Soviet lines. Some of the equipment for these ground forces Is manufactured by the Satellite armaments industries, but the bulk of it is supplied by the Soviets. Those models of ground force equipment which are In widespread use with Soviet units are also on current Issue in the Satellites. Items of latest model Soviet equipment have been observed in some East European armies, but these are certainly in even shorter supply in the Satellites than In the USSR In general, the equipment available to East German divisions and to many Polish and Czechoslovak divisions appears to be nearly comparable to that of GSFG in quality. We believe thatf the Satellite divisions are sufficiently manned and equipped to beto combat on short notice in conjunction with Soviet forces. Of these divisions we estimatereastulgarian,umanian.

C. Tactical Air and Minile Support

hile the primary mission of Satellite air forces is air defense, fighter units are being trained and equipped to perform ground attack missions as well. These air forces arc made up largely of obsolescent aircraft.*1 However, more advanced fighters are being furnished to

Tor details or location and type, see Annex A. Tableor details of type and location, see Aancx A, Table 6.


the Satellites and ve believe this trend will continue. Certain key cities of East Europe are defended by SAMs of theype, but thestill depend heavily on their fighter aircraft for air defense. The Satellites have dual capable weapons of various types, but the Soviets are almost certainly unwilling to provide them with nuclear bombs and warheads. There is evidence that SCUD and FROG missiles are being provided Ui some of the Satellites.

D. Reliability

he political reliability of the Satellite forces Isritical consideration in Soviet planning for their employment. Their utility would vary among units and nationalities, and would further depend on the circumstances, including the cause and nature of the hostilities, and the nationality of the opposing forces. By careful selection of courses of action and missions, the USSR could make effective use of Satellite forces, but it could not count upon them for the full range of operations against NATO.


A. Current Operational Doctrine

The Soviets are preparing their theater forces against theof general nuclear war. Soviet rnihtary doctrine does not address itself in any depth to the variety of circumstances In which general nuclear war might begin. Although there is increasinggiven to general war resulting from escalation, most Soviet military writings assume thatar would be initiatedestern attempt to launch strategic attacks against the Soviet Bloc. In thisrimary Soviet concern is to ensure that the theater forces would be able to survive the massive employment of nuclear weapons by the enemy and to fight effectively In conjunction with the USSR's own air and missile strikes.

During an initial nuclear exchange, the role of theater Deld forces would be secondary to that of strategic attack and air defense forces, but theater forces would be expected to contribute to initial Soviet offensive and defensive action by engaging the enemyroad front and by neutralizing nuclear weapons and bases where possible. The ultimate strategic objectives of Soviet theater operations in general war would be to defeat enemy ground forces and to occupy strategicallyterritory. The principal operations of Soviet theater forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. Sovietevidently calls for moving massive forces rapidly toward thecoast in the initial days ofar.

oviet operational doctrine recognizes that in the event of general war. NATO's nuclear delivery capabilityeed for dispersal, mobility, and flexibility in deployment and control of Soviet theater forces. To meet these needs. Soviet operational doctrine calls for the use of armored units as the key element of maneuver, and tactical missiles and rockets with nuclear and CW warheads as the chief elements ofSoviet doctrine also callsapid and continuous rate of advance for ground forces (upm perithout the traditional degree of concern for open flanks or by-passed enemy forces.

orces Available for Employment

reat many variable factors have decisive bearing on the size of the forces which the Soviets could and would employ in operations against NATO. Some of the most important of these are: (a) thein which the conflicthether suddenly or more(b) the number of units which would be retained as aand training base; (c) the extent of employment and the combat effectiveness of Satellite divisions; and (d) force requirements in other areas. We are not certain as to the quantities of weapons andavailable for mobilization purposes. However, we believe that shortages of some types of combat and support equipment, as well as of trained specialists for support units, would impair the effectiveness of an expanded force.

Ground Forces

oviet theater ground forces are disposed lnanner that the bulk of their strength is available for use against NATO. Of1 divisions whose identlncation is considered firm, highly probable, orre located west of the Urals." of these are believed to be incombatnd have probably been given the highest level -of support within Soviet ground forces. Our detailed assessment of the types and locations of combat strength Soviet divisions available for employment against NATO is as follows:

of Soviet Forces, Germany (QSFO)

Group of Porces, Poland (NOD


Group of Porces. Hungary (SGr>





iscussion of the validity of these numbers "Excludes four divisions opposite eastern Iran and Afghanistan.


Air and Miiiife Support

e estimate that Soviet tactical air strength now in EastPoland, and Hungary consists oret light bombers andightersThe Satellites (excluding Albania) haveombers andighters, the latter serving primarily air defense functions In the entire European USSR, there are in Tactical Aviation anight bombers and about

ighters In addition to the tactical delivery systems available

to the Soviet forces in East Europe and those organic to reinforcing Soviet formations, some medium and intermediate range missiles and

medium bombers would almost certainly be directed against targets

of urtrnediate interest to the theater forces.

Naval Support

he units assigned to thefleets In theare estimated as follows:



Cs erases urn Escoers


Of the forces in the Northern Fleet, with unrestricted access to the open seas, we estimate that there are someorpedo-attackwhose armament and endurance makes them best suited for antishlp operations In the northeastern Atlantic. The eight cruisesubs are also available for such missions. The surface ships of the Northern Fleet are capable of operations in the northeasternbut their operations would probably be confined to the North. Norwegian, and Barents Seas within the radius of land-based air cover.ADGER medium bombers, the bulk of them equipped with AS Ms. and aboutADGE seaplanes are assigned to the threefleets.

C. Capabilities to Launch Campaigns Against Central Region

a if able Forces

he size of the ground and tactical air forces the Soviets could employ initially against the Central Region of NATO would depend in part on whether operations were begun on short notice oreriod of preparation. The Soviets currently haveine divisions andactical aircraft stationed in East Germany and Poland. Without

" The Bpires in thin paragraph Include reconnaissance aircraft.

prior buildup, tbe Soviets couldimited objective attack against Western Europe designed to maximize the chance of surprise Such an action, however, would conflict with Soviet doctrine concerning the necessity for numerical superiority in the area of engagement.


Soviet military doctrine and training exercises indicate that, if circumstances permitted, the USSR would seek to assemble alarger striking force for any campaign into Western Europe.current Soviet doctrine for combat organization and echelon-ment, as well as the geography of the area, we believeinking force forampaign would probably comprise three frontsotalround divisions and air support totallingactical aircraft. Soviet doctrine would also call for some theater reserve forces in Poland and eastern Czechoslovakia

The ground and tactical air forces to accomplish the reinforcement could be drawn from the western military distnets of the USSR and from tbe Satellite forces of East Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Theombat-strength divisions andactical aircraft in western USSR, as well asf the Satellite divisions, would be the earliestreinforcements. After some delay, additional divisions could be drawn from lower strength divisions in western USSR, or fromsouthwestern, or southern USSR

In arriving at an estimate of Soviet capabilities to augment forcesampaign into Western Europe, we haveumber of factors, including tbe capacity of the East European rail and roadthe time required to prepare transportation systems to operate at peak efficiency, the confusion factors common to all large military movements, and the problems of organizing divisions and supporting elements into effective armies and fronts. Considering all factors, we continue to estimate that, under noncombat conditions, adivision striking force could be assembled in East Germany and westernand organised for operations against Western Europe wit run aboutaysoviet decision to do so.orce couldtheoviet divisions normally stationed In East Germany and Poland, plusombat strength Soviet divisions from the western USSR,5 Satellite divisiona" Inheater reserve of Czech,

In terms of manpower, these divisions and their support wouldground troops normally stationed In Eastandaround troops from vresteraaround



Polish, and Soviet Category II divisions could be assembled in eastern Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Soviets would not expect to reinforce oncale without detection.

for Naval Operations Against NATO

torpedo-attack and cruise missile submarines,and diesel-powered, could be deployed In the North Atlanticagainst NATO naval forces, and this would probably beSoviet objective in the initial periodeneral war.of Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation which oreantiship missiles could operate against surface ships in theAtlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much ofThe Soviet ballistic and cruise missile submarinesin the initial period,ampaign against westernattacks against Important coastal targets. Attacks could alsoagainst some inland targets, depending on their location Into sea approaches and on the depth and effectiveness ofASW defenses. Following the initial phaseampaign,the Soviet submarine fleet could be deployed for operations againstof communication from North America.

to Louncb Campaigns in Other Areas

A major drive across central Europe would probably beby lesser thrusts in other military theaters, employing the ground divisions adjacent to them arid the limited numbers of tactical aircraft not committed to the main westward thrust. In the followingwe canvass Soviet strength available for such campaigns, on tbe basis of the breakdown of divisions by number, category, and location used in earlier sections of the paper If the actual number of divisions is toward the low side of our estimate5 inoviet forces available for simultaneous campaigns in theaters other than NATO Central Region would be smaller thanbelow.

For an Initial campaign against Scandinavia, the USSR could use the four combat strength and four understrength divisions facing Finland and northern Norway. The four Soviet divisions in Hungary might form the initial echelonront moving toward Italy.ampaign Into Greece and Turkish Thrace, the USSR has available seven combat strength divisions in the southwestern USSR and up to Ave Bulgarian and five Rumanian divisions. Some of the seven Soviet combat strength divisions in the Carpathian Military District, if not sent westward, could also be used in this theater. The position of Yugoslavia as neutral, ally, or enemy wouldey factor influencing the strategy of Sovietagainst Italy or Oreece and western Turkey.

In the initial stageenera) war. limited operations might be launched against Iran and eastern Turkey. Eight combat strengthare stationed in southern USSR lacing eastern Turkey and Iran; because of logistic limitations, not all of these divisions could be employed against eastern Turkey.

Soviet forces In the Far East number six combat strength and ten understrength divisions, including one airborne division. The Far East-em forces have no significant capability for amphibious assault, although thereapability to sealift forces in merchant ships against such areas as Japan, provided that adequate port faculties could be secured. The theater forces in the Soviet Far East have been substantially reduced in recent years, and It is doubtful that ln the initial phaseeneral war the Soviets wouldheater campaign in the Far Eastern area. It is possible that additional Soviet theater forces will be moved to the Far East because of an exacerbated Sino-Soviet dispute.


Soviets have been especially concerned with developingand capabilities for waging nuclear theater have been ln responseATO policy whichesort to nuclear weapons from the beginning ofrecently, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat theirthat any major conflict ln Europe would either bethe start or would inevitably escalate. Recent Soviet writingsthat some thought has been given to the possibility ofwarfare in Europe, in view of the US interest in buildinghe Soviets recognize the advantages toan engagement in the European theater could be kepthave statedoviet objective Inonflict would beescalation. But they also recognize that the risk ofbe very great.

hile current Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remain formidable, efforts to gear the theater forces for nuclearhave had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities,in terms of firepower. The sharp decreases of past years in tactical aviation and tube artillery would hamper the Soviet forces in theof large-scale non-nuclear operations. Further, while we believe that the austerity of combat and service support at all echelons of the ground forces might suffice in the "quick-or-never" context of general nuclear war, It is doubtful that It couldore protractedconflict without considerable augmentation.

B. limited Nuclear Warfare

he Soviets have been even more reluctant to admit the possibility that tactical nuclear weapons could be introduced into local war without precipitating escalation to general war. They have evidently notany doctrine for limited warfare involving the tactical use of nuclear weapons. Inowever, this possible use of nuclear weapons was mentioned for the first time in open Soviet literature. Limited nuclear warfare against NATO would pose acute problems to the Soviets in that their most significant nuclear delivery capability against European theater targets rests with MRBM.TRBM and medium bomber forces whose bases are inside the USSR,

C. Distant Limited Military Operations

Soviet theater forces are primarily designed for operations in areas contiguous to the Bloc. In recent years, the USSR has increased its concern with areas remote from its borders, and the Cuban venture shows that it can deploy small ground and air contingents to distant areas and maintain them once deployed. However, the USSR would face many disadvantages in any present attempt to initiate and sustainoperationsistant area, or toarge force to such an area. It is severely limited in airlift, sealift, and naval support suitable for distant military operations. Moreover, in many areas it lacks political arrangements to insure that it could provide adequate logistic support.

There is no evidence that the USSR has established any special military component trained and equipped specifically for independent small-scale operations, although of course It can employ portions of its existing forces. It is possible that over the next few years the Soviets will seek to improve their capabilities for distant, limited militarythrough the designation and training of appropriate forces, and the development of equipment specifically for their use and logistic support. They may attempt to overcome their geographic disadvantage for applying such forces by negotiating with neutralist countries to utilize available faculties for refueling and maintenance of Sovietaircraft or naval ships.


A. Ground Forces

e believe that debate regarding the proper size of the Soviet ground forces will continue within Soviet ruling circles over the next few years. This debate will be shaped by the conflicting views which are already evident on the appropriate role of these forces in general war. Economic factors will alsoajor consideration: even nowis evidently pressing anew the case for reducing military manpower

in order Co free resources for higher civilian allocations. Those who support the conceptarge standing army will probably contend, in addition to their customary arguments, that the contingency of non-nuclear war raised by current NATO discussions and the hostility of Communist China are new factors reinforcing their propositions. Within the contextossible force reduction, or Independent of It, thereossibility that Soviet forces in East Europe will be scaled down, primarily for political effect

Much will depend on the evolution of NATO Itself. The Soviets will observe the Western Alliance notrder to respond to changes In Its military capabilities, but also to assess its cohesiveness andNATO's ability to agree upon and implement significantin forces would probably increase the deterrence to Soviet resort to arms, but it would also add to the arguments that tbe USSR should not reduce its ground forces and should concentrate upon raising their quality.

The interaction of these factors over the next six years cannot be wholly foreseen. In our view, however, the chances are good that the number of personnel in theater ground forces will decline over the period. The decline might come aboutesult of economic pressures and of repealed compromises in the debate over military doctrine. This process could lead,heater ground force of about one and one-half million men, thateduction ofrom present estimated strength.educed force might haveine divisions, about half of them at combat strength.

On the other hand, we do not exclude the possibility of reductions along the lines of0 proposals, whichheater ground force strength of about one-million men. perhaps backed uperritorial rnllitla system.rastic reduction would involve basic strategic decisions which the Soviets thus far do not appear willing or ready to make. Considering current indications from Soviet military budgeting, and from the status of tbe military debate, we believe that current plans for tbe size of theater ground forces would call for more moderate reductions, such as outlined in the preceding paragraph.

Modernization will continue to improve the quality of Soviet ground forces. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends in total size; the larger the forces which the USSR elects to retain, the more lt will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages. If the Soviets decide that they must seriously respond to the contingency of non-nuclear warfare, they will probably provide increased combat support as well as increased service support Such efforts would reinforce the pressureseduction in the number of line divisions.

Present trends In the ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of

concentration probably will include Improved, more mobile missile weapons lo defend against tactical aircraft, increased quantities of the better armored personnel carriers,2 medium tanks withguns, and of guided missile antitank weapons. The Soviets mayew light reconnaissance tank to replace thehich several Soviet military authors have criticized as being undergunned and vulnerable as wellew medium tank replacing the main gun with missile weaponry. More and belter general purpose vehicles andreliance on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence on rail lines for logistic supper:.

B. Tacticol Aviation and Missiles

III. We believe that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical Aviation, improving its ground attack capabilities in particular. We expect the rate of modernization to increase over the next few years, and we believe that tactical aircraft with much improved range and pay load characteristics will be introduced Weradual decline In total numbers of tactical aircraft. The numbers of guided missiles in Soviet theater forces will probably remain about constant, but new andsystems will probably be introduced. It appears likely thatfree rocket launchers will be assigned to divisions.

and Missile Defense

force air defense capabilities will improve over the nextthrough the modernization of Tactical Aviation andthe introduction of ther follow-on SAM systemsformations. There Is considerable evidence that thebeen developing transportable ABM defenses for their fieldwe believe that such defenses could be operational. Webasis for deternuning the extent to which they may be deployed,seems likely that considerable Improvement of defenses againstwouldrerequisite to deploying an ABM vulnerable toattack


believe that the numerical strength of Soviet surfacewill remain fairly stable over the next five years. Sovietguided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft willat about present levels. Modernization of destroyers willand additional surface ships will probably be retrofittedarmament. The aircraft strength of Naval Aviation isremain fairly stable with an increased proportion of new modelsBUNDER. MALLOW, and MAIL. As regards missiles, we expect some



extension of range, either through improvement In missile fuels or design, or by unproved target acquisition means, or both.

The USSR will continue to improve ASW and anticarrierprimarily through the application of improved submarines and long-range aircraft to these missions The effectiveness of surface units at distances beyond the range of land-based fighter cover will probably be strengthened through the addition of SAM armament. Despite these improvements, however, we believe that the capabilities of the Soviet Navy to conduct surface operations in open ocean areas will remain severely limited. In particular, it probably will haveimited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance onoperating In open seas.

There Is little evidence of the development within the Soviet Navyapability to replenish ships on the high seas. However, we believe the Soviets areystem for emergency mobile basing ofships and submarines In their coastal waters Mobile bases probably will consist of several small ships for repair, refueling, and replenish-ment of weapons and supplies. As the period advances, we think aof such bases will be deployed in protected coves and fiords to provide wider dispersal and thus enhance the survivability of the Soviet base for naval operations.

The Soviets may seek to develop their amphibious lift capability, but significant improvement will depend upon their acquisition ofamphibious craft, extensive training, and developmenteliable logistic support system. There are few current indications of efforts along these lines.

E. Nuclear Weapons

of nuclear weapons for support of theater forcesbe alleviatedven If the Sonets allocate priority tomissile defense warheads. If no such priorities Interfered,could probably have the numbers of tactical nuclearthey would consider requisite for theater forces within twoyears. Soviet procedures for control and use of tacticalwell as reconnaissance and target acquisition, are likely toover the next year or so, particularly should theto give more credence to the possibility of limited nuclear warfare.
















Table 1


Tha Uble it baaedivtaion lore* withombat strength. It acoouela foroatimated Soviet mililAi.i lew tbotr assigned tomaasiOQ* aori to air defeoar of tbe feomciaad (PV'Ol The Ubie representsof aaaoow poettble breakdowns ol military personnel ateength which vouldconsistent wlUt the limited evidence General Purpose Ground


Categorynd Ul

Combat Support

Service Support

Pjrpose Naval

Forte*. .

Supporting Shore Establishment

Coaatal Defect*..

Naval Aviation

Purpose Air Force*

TaeUeal Aviation

MiUury Tranaport Aviation


Command aod Service

lviaioaaf authorised wartirn* atrengtb-

Assumingivisionsf authorised wbjiub*

atio of pereooaei ia aondlriatooal combat support oarta lo peraoaacl iaatio cooaiateot with evidence oa OSFG.

A rwdaal baaedaneral purpoae ground force total ofillion men, tb*In our estimateociudaa element* up ibrougb military diatncu aod group* of force*.

aUo of military peraonnal in tbe thore eeUbllibmeoC to personnel lo foreaa aloai. ladudea eleraenU up through Beet headquarters.

appropriate headqoartov air aanlca detaehmenta. aad traaeport aircraft uaiU

headquarter* and air service dMacfameata. HeUeopters, basaoa, aod utility arraraft, not ia olbar (uaeUoaal elements, an alao included.

1 This entry preaenla aeparately ganaral ooininaad aad service support peraoenrl, many of whom have bean Included in previoua estimate*art of operational gi'ntiat purpoa* forces. General command aod amir* aupport elemanu back up atrataglo aad air d'fenaa (orcaa aa well aaeral purpoa* forces Thea* Hement* include aUliUrr per-sotuxl performiag such fuaeboo* aa tiUMatry of Deftaaa ruff, service schools aad pre-operatiooal Sight traialag: aooe of iaunor supply, medical. transport* uoo. aaduction troopa; research, development, van aad evaluation penaaaeJ; aad mobuiaatioa and

Tank 2




Artillery rnvtolon



Amphrt>loH> hrvpant




Tan* Division*

Mixed Artillery Brimitt*

Antitank Artillery Rcgimeou

MiwU* Brigade*


k-Aa*auit Cod Celt*""


AmptubUH* Eofr BaOabon

Engr CoMtfurtioo BaUa&va*


Chemical Battalion*

Motor Truieport

nd Serviro 3up|xirt







i aannvr.

1 phut


Germany. . .














USSn .


bastern USSR


Tfc* ataaJ numnr- <rfmnvind kthtainty falfa mk-alw in Irang"1t-divtsiot. Bduf- seed heronno man- likely than anyn thai rangr.he mult of in- only inaJyticel aphichletailrd fcr-okdown of iBladlHI hf

Includesivision* manned nr mon-|tli.tha highest pmbahl- number of division* in thilt will, our retim.ili* thatctualrobably .oincwher- in the range. The figure* th.refor. probably lii'iunV wene but not all Category IIanned atercent, of authorised atrenfflh.

Includes Catngorv III divisions manned Aterconl or leas of authorised strength, and such Categoryivisions as are not Included under "corobat strength."

Tsbt. 4


, i




' *





strength of SalHbvO divmoo* ia estimstrd to rang- fromoercent of wartimeepl for the East German divisions which are atercent strength and Uie Pohih airborne division which is probehly underercent.

all nondiiineoal combat aod service support units, home air defense forces, and command aad general sup-







B, C


irr a

' 1










Ahaougaa* not becadcMiard Id these eouauias. we believe uai ibe airetrdt is oo= ri.Kr.-ig


a, a, o

0. B


Ltairt a


t.iaar r>






till nil lilt

itii iii

ii.iii irs iiii

n II




s g


> j



ill H

r. t



5 3


P -S

i si


1 1-



iiiif filij






Toole 8

line submarines amf modern construction. Tb* second line category lists units Jrorooears old which, by virtue of age and desf en are considered useful only for trainr perhaps coastal defense. Some of the second hoe ships will probably b* retired from service earlier than on an age criterion.

D Surface ships which are at leastearn old arcecond line status until there is evidence of their removal from the fleet or until they are finally considered removed (in the absence of contrary evidence) whenears old.

Totals for future years include submarine* of follow-on classes which may be built during the period. An annualrate0 nucltar-powered submarines of all types has been estimated.

We have previously estimated that constructionlass submarines would terminate by the endow-ever, the possibility exists that tola program may still he active. While we are unable to predict the future number? ol this class with certainty, our estimate reflects both the past evidence and the possibility that construction wQl continue for about another year. The sit* ollass construction program will probably be influenced By Soviet decisions regarding construction of otlier classes of missile submarines.

-ONGWIN CYLINDER,INGLE CYLINDER- It Is estimated that theprogram has probably been terminated.

' Recently sighted eriting the Baltic, evaluated as probably new construction, dlesel-powered SSG. Future estimate* reflect construction capabilities and trends ratherirm estimate of numbers programmed.

lass (CANVAS BAG) radar picket suBiaarines.lass are in the Northern Fleet aad three in the Black Sea.

nits fitted for missile Research and Development








SB a




Maaile {Bl..



or sucrcsior)













Torpedo (Q) .

Toepedo IM)..









annex b

technical characteristics Of soviet general purpose

missiles, aircraft, and submarines












Mission sllowaocra ars

a 3 numrta* at aorsaal raiadtl Outbound mf altitude: Climb on course at military powerat spaad and altitude (or maslmnm rang-Descento dHlanee credit! Low altjtado: (SD

Fir at military power, or It applicable, penineat limited spaed, (e> Combat lor five minute* at military powerevel (do dtxlance. cradltl

Ulgh altitude

Climb on count at military power.

Cnas* to bass at speed aad altitude (orraag* Low altitude -

Fly at military power or. if applicable, al structural limit spec*).

tree reserve allowance ofinutes maximum at *ra level.

















f- - c



4 2

SB R 2 2 i

l| =3 it 5



















Table 3



Thi. table is based primarily on our informationn Ihe current composition of the Soviet combined arms armies in East Germany. The table also reflect* Judgments derived from So"lot document* as to likely wartime compositions of combined arms araues. which oould vary eowiderohly depeoding upon the muviioo of lbs army. Ihe terrain in tho area of

operations aod other (acton.

Motorised Rifle Division

Task Diveston

Army Combat Support loiU.

Art-Urry sod SS MiatU-



Antitank Artillery

Heavy Tank aad Assault Gun

Air Defense




Ponton Bridge ReBmaat

Aaasalt Crcamng



Radio Relay Battalioo

Line Cona-trwtioo

Cbermeal Battalioo


Headquarters and Service

Total CAA Strength



Thai table Is bated primarily on our Information oocfceetEOg tbe curreal oompoaitioc of tbe Soviet tank arrsuea in East Germany Tb* table also reflect* judgment* derived from Soviet documents as to likely wartime romposiuoos of tank armies, which could varydepending upon toe mission of the army, the terrain in the area of operation, and other factors.

Tank Division

Army Combat Supportrtsllsry


AS Define*


Ponton Bridge TOO

Assault Croaaing



Radio Relay

Un* Construction



Headquarters and Service Element*.

Totei Tana




Thia table ia baaed primarily on our Information concern tin tbe Croup of Soviet Force. Germany (GSFG) which is the nearest equivalentartime Soviet front currently in existence. However, GSFG is tailored to meet the requirements of Its particular miawoo in East Germany and thus does not correspond in detail to our lUuetraUve/roel seen position, which has considerably more pound troops and leas tactical air support. Sovwt wartime i'tmu would vary widely In ooro position and strength depending upon the mission, tieand other factors. Thia table is Intendedough guide to understanding of Soviet

theater force structure rntfier thanource of detail.

Combined-Anns Armies

Tana Armies

Teetseel Air000

Front Combat Support Carts:

Artillery and S8


SCUD Brigades

Air Delecae



Pootoo Bridge RegtmentaOO

Aaaault Crossing




Signal Intercept Reajmenta

Radio Relay BallaUoee W0



Headquarters and Service


Original document.

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