NASSER'S POLICY AND PROSPECTS IN BLACK AFRICA

Created: 1/9/1964

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NASSER'S POLICY AND PROSPECTS IN BLACK AFRICA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of National Estimates

CENTRA)' IMTELMOKWCR

9 Jeauexy

SrKCTAL KKMfJttAtltajM KO.

SUBJECT; Kasser'o I'oltcy ocd Prospects Jo Block Africa

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i. Unacerking to expand his influence lo VlncX Africa. At tfco Addis Aboon Conference Kesocr recognlaed toot bo carried comparatively iKtlo vclght vith his confreres, nod be sot about Cxpuodlng and ptrengthcnlog Ma African relationships. loying hoot to numerous visiting Afrlcers to baa sought to inpiove his dlplceatlo aad political tlco. Ve bos also ilayp bio brend of natlcoloalallua; striving thus togar rolo in1 Ion fight* against tbo Portuguese and the South African govern-pcntsi. However, Kasscr regard* bio African policiesxons not atozcly to gala prestige for bin cn tho continent but (tleo to enhance bis rplo on tbo vorld scene, rartleulorly naoog tho nooall&ncd stfttcs, Tho cbaocos uro situ, however, that Haaser vill Achieve tho stature atd political Efineuvcrobly be desires in Elack Africa, particularly If strains bitveen the Areb and tbe African vorlds grew.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Bssser's Continental Ales

1, ervent revolutionary, vents to prod tho African continentharp break vith Its colonial, pant.

Be regards Ms ownuitcble BoOel for nil Africa.ypt'n historical end geographic rolftticnsMp to the Co:it' et, Kaseei holds th/.tteelnlrally advanced state eepablo cf offering guidance to the wiseent nations ofatural lecder in the struggle agMost Itperlnllssi nod Coloolnliba.

C. Io addition, Kiieserconscious of vbat he regards tu* on Inracll "threat" to the VAIt on the African continent. To Ms consternation, end to that of such of the Aroh Vo:Id,as eatebllohed an effectivo diplomatic presencetnjor part of newly itvjepeadent Black Africa. In response, Cairo haj developed its ovn extensive prog tea of cultural, technical, nody assistance. If there were no other Motive, rtosser vould probably cootlnus his activities Id Africa elaply out of eeerpeti-tloa vlth Israel.

3. By end large, hoveror, his primary Interest on the African scene la probably norc gceerel. Bo regards his Afr'caa policiesa ceans cot only to gain prestige for bio on the continent. Kit also to cohanc* hie rolo on the world sceno, particularly ecoog the lionalipr.ed states. Passer's pureutt of

LYNDON 3AIHES JOHNSON I.

these brood objectives Is essentially unplanned, endonsists of reaction to situations or opportunities that present tbeoselves froa tine to tluo.

B. The UAfl'o African "JSstabllshcent" and ita Assets

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5, Ceo readily available asset for tho UAH Is the heterogeneous collection of African exiles and dissidents vbo have sought refuge In Cairo. Currently, there ore noreozen African territories

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representedoveraiwnt-controlled tut loosely knit organisation Known as too Afrlcn Association. In returneasonably generous subsidy, these expatriates provide the UAK vith courjentory and criticism about the problems lo their henelonds. Tbcy nlaooint of contact with the African nationalist novemontsthe continent.

6*> oslem ties also provide valuable openings In sub-Sabaraa Afrlcn. There Is an ennual Influx of students to Al-Azhnr Eblversit^r, and Egyptian religious teachers nro found inpnrtn of Africa's Koslea belt. These provideof Influence Kosser has sought to expsxd and control.

7* Ibe UAH'stabllehveat also boa nt Its disposal sow) moful econcuiio end propoganda tools. Cairo's powerful radio. The Vol co of Africe, and Its clandestine counterpart, Tbo Voice of Free Africa, flood tha continentontinuous streaa of Vituperative entlcolontallet props good a. 'ibe Presidential Council, vbich establishes policy for Cairo's entire brccdcaaticg syetco,otted seven hours per day for African broadceats. Material for these broadcasts is frequently garnered from the subsidised refugees ond exiles residing in Cairo.

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0. Cairo'* Feat Wmeurrrins la Africa

9. ffbus far, Kasser'a effortso influence InprorM to bo failures. e eo ertful debutAfftxvAAian Vwlu at Pan Iuj$followed this by

uccessful first meeting of tho Afro-Aslan Peoples

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COPY-LYNDON dAINES JOHNSON 1

BoUOnrlty(AAISGj lu Duosahll ljy,'. Subsequently, however, tbooth Koscov v4 Pelpleg totbo organization leftoom for Cairo.

10. Tbe IV Ji vni also deeply lev Dived lu the intrigues whichosbo'eIn tbo I

11. Tbo GAS's taneuTeriog In tbo Congo sea alio clcsrly related to tbe eatabllsbKent of tbo Casablanca Group Inl, Cairo provided 1 ii of tbe inltiotlv* for tbo forratlon oSxo-LuEiasba African nationalist policy vas tbe couaon link between tbo unlikely political allies included In it. However, tbe Casnbliwocor become tbe significant African voice its leaders boped it would bee cue, and In tbo long run UAR affiliation with it probably proved soreiability than an asset.

ii- cnmvf siTUATion

A- baba Coofercnco of African 1'cods of State, June ly6J

12. At tbo outuet, tbe Add la Couference convened to establish an all-African political organization, flatly rejected the Egyptian cuggoatton to use Arobto as ono of tbo essoebly'r. Official languages. Although cone prcolncnt Hack Afrlccn lenders personally urged Kaascr to attend the Conference In support of

"Africanhis, setback servedirealy realcder totbe division between the Arab and African worlds. conducted, hbrnelf quietly end circumspectly ond succeededa generally favorable lnon-sslon oa his fellow rTevertboless, be corrected privately that howith tho neetlng; in part because theto takeaction against rcrcainicg colonialtho overall iapreeslon Kasser galucd from closefellow chief indiiivu at Addle, bo returned dctt mined

rovitallte bis African relations. Vo suEvoned hie African envoys to Cairo and exhorted then toore vigorous African policy.

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RrvlTcd /fricaa Fadev/ors

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first ri-aponoe lo flasscr'e new look In tilings African, was a. surge of AfrlCBn vlottoro to Cairo. Innth of July alone. Hosier played Lest to four African heeds of state, plus two ivporlont parliamentary delegations. isouphouet-Bolgny, probablyat notable visitor of tho Booth, ves given royel treatment. Tbe Presidents of Slger ond Mauritania, both state* of strongersanelon, vera also vcrmly velceaed. Thlarend continued,ilently slower pace, tlircurjA tbe awswr ood fall. Cairo, Vith Itsoffers, bna alvaysopular stop for travel ling Arrleens, but even for Cairo this vos heavy trnfflo.

Xasser's principal nl* in extending invitations to these

African leaders was to encourage tbe cstabllebcent of dlplcaatlc

ties. Currently, tha UAH 1ms Rnbaasndora In onlyf tho 30

Week African states, and only seven ef these states have rrciprc-

coted by sending their emissaries to Cairo. Tha attention Knasor

has patd to* states oleo auggesta thnt ho hopes to establish

* oo African and Malcgasy Union lo tbe assoolatlon of tho forcer French Territories of rcderate or conservative persuasion vhlch have In tho past revealed llttlo Interest in closer tic* vith tho "radically" oriented DAB.

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brMReheedB In tho co-called "neocoloMalist" fomer Ircnch

territories. Hla rfforto to Influence ths court* of events in tbe UAH region vill be pr agnatic. Eo vill conduct noiral rtlnlo-nntlc relations vlth thoao states which respond to Ms ovorturer but ho will also employ clandestine nxasures against those states vbiehary of tbo UAR.

oocer's deep Interest In tho newly establishedat ion for African Unityb soother nanlfestatlon of bis Intercut In enhancing his Influence In Africa. At tbe Addis Conference, the Egyptian delegation laaecuvrred its way on la tbe two rain bodies within the fledgling QtVJhe Ccerntarlat end tbo African Liberation Cecal it eolgniflatlyd FMo, vas selected as Egypt's rcpresentetlro to tbe ALC, end the UAR

this slxcoble contribution cay nenn nothing aors than that Fgypt Is following tbo OAU suggested guidelinesercent of each state's notional lnccxo, this still reproseots roughly one-fifth of the total that the ALC has thus for collected. Moreover, Insofar as it Is able, the UAH has Boved to expand Its Influence In tho functioning of thesesrd to stocr their policies Into line with these bached

by Cairo.

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16. Klscvherc in Africa, the I'AR has recently taken other new init. tep calculated to Jrprove the I'AR's stiure uiiocg most African statos, Cairo reluctantly granted forcal recognition to Balden Roberto'a Angolan governeent-ln-exlle. Ecvalia, where Kosser baa long sought toosition of 1'iC i nee, vas given four Yanplrn Jots nod vaadltloonl military and technical assistance. Kasoor la one of tho few African leaders to take sides in tho split of tbe Southern !ationalist Publicly, via tedlo Free Africa, ond privately vith floanclol support, Cairo has thrown its weight behind tbe front-ruoniDg faction of Joshua, Karoo. Elsewhere, Pgypt oeens to tore respooded to the Initiative* of Saoslbar Prise Minister, Kubaazad fJbasrte. Dnboppy vith tbe prospects of United UK develop-rent assistance, Zanzibarelegation to Cairooa varnly receive! and given aasuranccs of econonlo aid, trade egrec-uents, and tecboteal assistance. Such assistance would give the UAH an oxcallcut openingtate vhlen is considered African

but Is ruled by an Arab nlnorlty.

0. Cpportonlties for tha UAR

A*f. African oaieoeUy toward the Portuguess nnd the southern Afrlctn terrltorle* provldos 1'gyptallor-Bade opportunity

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to goto new credit In Tropical Africa. In accordance with the. Addle Conference icsoluticn, Fgypt roved quickly to proclatu

otal boycott of both South Africa and Portugal. Ck.su-

currently, tho UAlt delegation to tbe Juno ILQ Conference lo Geneva, took tbe lendiolent attack on South Africa, and helped guldo tho African caucus ublch attempted unsuccessfully to expel South Africa frent tho 1LO. Subsequently, Cairoonferenco of African Labor Ministers toew effort to achieve this cod. Io another move against Portugal, In October Coire'o rabble rousing Voice of AfricalilrtH doily broadcast beeued in Portuguese -to our brothers in Angola and Mozambique."

XII. PROSPECTS

10. In its efforts to ochlsve greoter Influence onscene, ths VAB Vatt almost certainly continue the arraydiscussed above. Recent

Egyptisn activities have given coasldcrsblo emphasis to dlplomntio relationships. Jn recent sooths there has been some reduction in tbo anti-Israeli lino, thus ollowtcg African visitors with well established Israeli tics to be welccied cordially in Solro. Thus, frccto tlmo there are likely to be chenges in nuances or approaches in tho UAH's African policy.

gyptlnn policy vill strive to eppeer nore Africvn thtui tonore zealous, iioro nlllteotly nationalist, and rore not i- Jepcrialibt. Ry these net pi Cairo hopes to obtainlending rolo In the innerof African liberation coTCCcntt, end eventually on the continenthole. Tixa time to tine,olicy could place Egypt at odds vlth tbe U3 preference for iful ocd store gradual cb&ngo.

A. Continuing Impediments

20. Atime, eeverol factors vill vork toto enhscce his position la Africa. In general,

Arabs remain somewhat suspect In tba eyes of Black Africans, who stillhem as the slave traders of past generations. In tho case of the UAR, that fear Is Increased even more because of en ituarcneso that Egypt lo seeking to extend ita politicalla Africa. In these circumstances, Isreol often appears toefer source of aid and technical assistance to many African states. This, in turn, bos in tbe past tended to counteract Egyptian propaganda about Israeli Imperialist designs. Moreover, Coiro'o Hoslcst ties oreiability la ports of East Africa vhcro considerable unfavorable attention has been given to tho persecution of tho Christian minority by Sudnreoo Moslems. In many

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st African elates,r division exists between the" KofllcB population In the northern sectors and tbe Chrletlon end pagen el<io?Dta in the south. Hence, najor cegacnts of tbocontinue to bo voiy of the UAH's Koalas influences.

&k. Koskor's own Interests -I' i, nt tines, conflict vith tbe pursuit of his African policy. Ccraituonts to Algcrluo 1'riec Minister Ben Bella recently necessitatedvolveaent in the Aln/>Viroccen border dispute. Ifeavyhandcdn behair of the Algerians in this oriole provoked much unfavorable content Id Black Africa. Finally, Kauser hascade unwise choices in those individuals Le has backed to nchlcve external political objectives even in the Middlo Fast. Tn the shifting political tides of Week Africa, thorn are few fmiliar

B. Snail Dividends Likely

Kasser has equated tho problca of the whites in Couth Africa vith that vhlch tha Arab world faceo in Israel. He consldero both grocpa alien Intruders vith no rights to tho land they occupy.llittnt linnopular one In Africa, ond the UAH will truopet tblo Una in hopes of exalting its leadership rola thero.

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Rasscr cay begin to bach up his words vith deeds by shipping stcall Quantities of anrj to tho nationalist noveneats So southern Africa.for rebel forces, which Is already occurringinor eeolo, will probably Increase hot is unlikely to reach theof, say, Ben Bella's or likrtwsh's efforts. Host guerrilla training will fall under tho tacit sponsorship of tho AXC, hut Koscer will alisost certainly sponsor scae of Me own chosen nationalists.

23. Jt Is difficult to Judge whether or not Nasscf'e uuny ventures in Africa eaount to sweh. For exsnplc, it lo virtually impossible to Rieaaure the impact of tha Voice of Free Africa or the lasting effect of the Egyptian religious teachers nbroed. To the extent that Knccer continues to subsidize theeo Activities, at least he is Apparently convinced of their effectiveness. On balance, ve> believe that Knsser is unlikely toigh degree Of political Influence la Black Africa. Indeed, should strains between tho Arab and African vorlds grow over the next few years, suvh Jnflu*Dco as Rasser now has In Tropical Africa would also vans.

sbssffl xetit chalrztnn

FOR TIB BOARD OF RAMCtfAL FSTXIIATESj

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