THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON M, DtG
MEMORANDUM FOR! Tho Honorable Dean Ruak Tho Secretary of State
The Honorable Mc George Bundy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Honorable W. Averell Harrtmaa The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Attachedopyernorandnm from Mr. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, summarizing certain aspects of U. S. relations with tho Republic of China. Ae you will recall, Cline went to Taipei at the request of State Department to endeavor to persuade President Chiang Kai-shek not to act precipitously In breaking relations with France over the recognition Issue. Cline's efforte gained two weeks' time and this, la Itself, probablyumber of countries not to follow de Gaulle's course too precipitously.
Since Cline's presence In Taipei was recognised by President Chiang Kai-shek as thatpecial emissary of President Johnson, and since Ray observed aa abnormally dismal state of morale of the CRC officials, itppropriate that ashould go to President Chiang Kai-shek as promptly as possible, warmly phrased. In tbe interests of rekindling confidence.
- i Ili-T.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence -
. Relations with Republic of China
trip to Taipei last month succeeded inGovernment of the Republic of China (GRC) to postpone
elati^ Wlth France fov tw0 weeks* thus forcing
Jo Hrnn fJc^rf ^ "ak0 ClC&r that Fr3nCeObliged
to drop its diplomatic support of the GRC in Taiwan as the price of establishing relations with Poiping. This was a
f5XI!u *I ?'S"y nations would recognize Peiping
f?uld "aintnin diplomatic relations with
Two Chinas. Few nations have followed the French lead because it became clear that any nation recognizing Peiping had to go all the way and recognize its right to take over Taiwan and its twelve million non-Communist people.
Chiang Kai-shek agreed to this delayrespect for President Johnson's direct request to dopointed out (correctly) that the French had sold outand wouldreak between Paris and Taipei. also said this wouldhattering blow to moraleparticularly among tho Mainland Chinese elementArmed Forces and Government.
. Chiang requested that his views be conveyed
to Washington, along with his recommendations for actionsmorale in Taiwan and build. prestige inAsia. ummarized these views in the form of anfor Prcsident Johnson and provided it toUnder Secretary Harriman and McGeorge Bundy aboutago. opy is
4. This memorandum Is intended to call to your attentionormatlon onrally briefed Governor Harriman and McGeorge Bundy. It is thatound the morale of GRC Officials exceptionally and dismally low; enior Chinese General had attempted on4 to lead tho crack
QUICK Cr '
Armored Division against Taipei to overthrow the Govt-rnmenl (ol* course, he failed).; (c) President Chiang told me personally in highly emotional tones that aof. policy in Asia, which he foels will end in Chinese Communist control or domination of all East and Southeast Asia, willituation in which the GRC cannot survive; (d) many officials in addition to President Chiang felt that present trends wouldilitary coup In Taipei against the present Government within two years because of frustration with inability to return to the Mainlandeeling. military, economic and political support was weak and waning.
5. In view of the seriousness with which theseimpressed uponeel that'they should beby. Government. My own feeling. initiative in Vietnam would buck uphink it would be dangerous to assume thatalways take stability and friendly cooperation onof the GRC for
RAY SL CLINE Deputy Director (Intelligence)Original document.