Created: 4/1/1964

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TITLB: Intelligence For Defense Planning

AUTHOR: W. B. Seidel




A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol inlclliQcnce.

All siaiements or fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency ot any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.


Problems in fashioning an estimative product suitable for input to systems analysts in force planning.


ottiiigro wattugm^piMpjDg at

national level In the current Administrationood

case study In the relationship between national Intelligence and the consumer, or at least one of Its most ImportantAlthough the history of long-range estimating and quantified projections hasong and thorny one, the requirements of the new defense planners are perhaps unique in their degree ofefinement which stems from the needs of the systematic analysts techniques used In current planning. This review of the case to date proceeds from the bias that the consumer Is why wc are In business.

In the Utter part1 the Comptroller of theof Defense. Assistant Secretary Charles J. Hitch, laid down specifications for Intelligence estimates required by new DoD methods of programming and planning Initiated earlier thatearly two years later Deputy Assistantof Defense Dr. Alain Enthoven presented substantially the same requirementsecent memorandum from tbe Office of National Estimates succinctly characterizes these requirements In the following terms: "As you know, OSD has for several years been expressing the need for more detailed quantitative projections of Soviet military

' Memorandum of IT Nov. 1M1 to DIA. "Future Heed* Program tor Intelligence ErUmatea and Analyria of Intelligence" (Secret).

for Recced XSJtay IMS (RaftaedeptNotes on Long Range Intelligence Projections ot Blno-So*tetSecret).

'Memorandum for tbereacntaa*ea. "Further Reo^urement* of osd for QoantltaUvton Sorter Military CapabOlUes,-Sept. IMS (Secret).

ttm nnn 't^tim-

Below we look at lhe nature of the new requirements,the Intelligence community's efforts to satisfy them, consider some of the major problems they create, and offer some hopefully constructive suggestions. To all colleagues, known and unknown, who have grappled with the problem we acknowledge our indebtedness and regret anyin this presentation.

The /Veto Programming

What were the methods of programming and planning re-ferrc^to^by.Jtt. Isere they cannot be described In detail, but they

are of such Importance to our study that we must outline their major aspects relevant to the Intelligence problem.'

Under these methods the analysis of alternative US.forces, and weapon systems is done within the frame of reference of nine major categories or programs of defense: Strategic Retaliatory Forces Continental Air: Missile Defense Forces Ocneral Purpose Forces Airlift and fJemUft Forces Reserve and Ouard Forces ReacarcD end Development General Support am Defense

Military Assistance Program

These programs are subdivided Into more0 elements, sometimes at as many as four aggregative levels, constituting well-defined, homogeneous groupings of particular types ofsquadrons. Atlas squadrons, Polarisinfantry divisions In Europe,of which reflects quantitatively the strength requirements of any particular strategy.

abort bibliography for the reader deslrlnc more details might"Study Report on the Programming System for the Office et tbe Secretary of Defense" prepared by the OQoe of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Comptroller.ovtck. David, Pro. pram Budgeting: Long Range Planning fn the Department of Defense. Tbe Rand Corporation.ASDC. November IMS: Entboven. Alain C. "Systems Analysts and DecisionBUant Review, January IMS.


There are figured also for each element of this framework the Inputs of manpower, equipment, military construction, and other resources needed to attain the required strength. Ultimately, the resources required to constitute any given element, force structure, or strategy are gauged by the single measure of cost in dollars, the only unit of measure applicable to all the diverse elements. The total military output, the sum of all program elements. Is equal to the sum of allcategories, the total Input,

control system makes the quantitative data relevant toprogram changes promptly and fully available for decision making. AndFive-Year Force Structure and Financial Program"asic reporting format for the entire force structure through time.

Programming Is thus the determination of the specific time-phased resource inputs necessary foriven output, while planning Is the selection of the desired output. The analytical process has been described as

ycle of definition of objectives, design ot alternative systems to achieve those obJecUres. evaluaUon of the alternatives In terms of their effectiveness anduestioning of the objectivesuestioning of the other assumptions underlying the analysts, the opening ot newhe establtshment ofnd so on,"

What is new in the process, as Dr. Enthoven points out,

s that more than ever before, top defense officials are now being aided In making these judgments by the systematic avail, ability of quantitative Information on the effectiveness and costs of alternative strategies, forces, and weapon systems. Thisis producedethod sometimes called "Systems Analysis."

Alain C. Enthoven. "Systems Analysis and DecisionBL tary Review, January IMS, p. 8.

Systems analysis, the balancing of output In terms of the program elements and their operational effectiveness against input In terms of resources, thus provides for programming any given force structure through time against its

lives In pursuit of our defense objectives. The primary Input of systems analysis is quantitative data; the primaryof the method Is articulate detail.act of utmost relevance In its Implications for Intelligence. Itnified management system; and one of the Interdependent Inputs it require* for planning is Intelligence on the opposing forces.

The Intelligence Requirement

Any significant change In key operations of Jfi^^SSffifflfca^sWhi

ureaucracy Is> gration, study, and experimentation at various subordinate orn-government levels. So It waa with the newand pbinning process In the DoD. Thecommunity,art of the larger national security community, was aware of this early activity and participated In It. Intelligence responses already manifest In1 were mission-oriented Soviet militaryovietcost estimatingthe most partormat later adopted by theweapon system effectiveness evaluation methods developed from operations researchemployed bi systems analysis. These were Individual adjustments, however; the Intelligence community had not unified and systematized Its research and production Inmtelligeneehole, had not made the organizational and managerial changes necessary to create an Integrated, consumer-oriented program. It still haa not.

One of the earliest frontal attacks on the problem of getting Improved military estimates for the new defense planners was Project Lamp. Initiated In earlyA group of outsidebrought together at CIAeport entitled "Systems Analysis and the Military Estimateshich contained views and suggestions very similar to those

' By Robert W. Homer,pecial assistant to the DeputyCIA.

authors were A- W. Marshallottos 'both from the Rand Corporation) and O. r. Push. The report waa later rewritten by Marshall and Loftua and publishedand MemorandumR. August

Oefenio Planning

Issued later as reqtiirements by tbe new defense planners* Although the authors offered some suggestions fortheir recocnmendatlons. they recognized that they had not been asked, and Indeed were In no position, to weigh the merits of alternative organizational plans and theproblems associated with them. Little or no action seems to have been taken on the Project Lamp report.1*

The next development, in. was the statement from Assistant Secretary Hitch, to which we have adverted, of the requirement for Intelligence inspect -to the-rdefruseers. It waa articulate and thorough. We shall return to Its substance shortly.

The first major response to this requirement wasIAuggestingroup of senior intelligence officers from CIA and DIA preparean analysis of ten-year programs for alternative Soviet force postures and of their associated costing, and that these reports be submitted to USIB for review and then forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by the Director of CentralBy2IA/DIA Joint Analysis Group had been formed and was at workeport ofthe kind suggested. This first report, entitledTen Year Projections of Soviet Militaryas forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

Although these JAG projections were of considerable value to the defensehey had the shortcoming of being limited to the time period not covered by the corresponding national estimates. It was evident to the Office of National

rurprUOnglj. since toe tatter bad been closely associated wltband. Anticipation ol this result seems UkeJy to nave bean the reason for Komer'a InlUaUve.

" Presumably because of tha many top-level personnel changes then taking place or about to take place.

Don R. Hants. "TnleOigene* Support for Long-Term Planning of VJL Force Reoulrementa" (SI February It*).

"emorandum for Record datedr. Alain Enthoven noted that -the 4UerruifUM Ten Ttar Projections of Soviet Military Forcesreat step forward, and Is already proving to be one of the most valuable documents In tbe Pentagon."


Estimates that the data in the national estimates and the annual JAG paper did not scire to fill the planners'In Lhe summer3 the defense planners restated their needs for an adequate Intelligence support program. The requirements statement of3 essentially reiterated the needs listed on" as shown In the following parallel presentation of key passages.

November 1IM1Projection rime

In order to evaluate, specific weapon systems programs it win be necessary lo study USrequirements In various functional areas to cope with the estimated Soviet (and where re!-crant Slno-fiortrt Bloc) military posture during the neat five to tenhat estimates ol Soviet military posture need to be extended at least f> years Into Uie future la an obvious point.

uly 1M3


DoD planners and decision maker* need to have pro)eeUona of tbe Soviet forces for atears Into the future for ail major military forcesasis for decisions about force levels and procurement.


Each projection could Itself be detailed and specific. One of the problems with currant estimates is that as uncertainty Increases theyhazy, vague orterminate. Thereendency to become leasand mora literary.

The number and specificof future Sovietuantitative matter. We may be uncertain about them, but we must have an expression of what we know about them in the numerical terms.


In the lir.ii of analyals we hive In mind. esUmates of Soviet military posture In weaponterms are required. Itwould also be uMful li atimates offorces were produced Incomparable to theareas we are using for US forces: Oeneral War Offensive Forces. Oeneral War Defensive Forces. Oeneral Purpose orForces, ate.

generally, taking an over-

all programming point of view mayseful method ofrovtng estimates of tbe future Soviet military posture. Almost Invariably, projected estimate* of Soviet forces structures arrived at piece meal end up overstating Soviet. Cost Data

It would be useful if estimates of Soviet forces wereby estimates of their coat to the Soviets, preferably Inuch coat estimates would have an interest In lerms of comparing US expenditures In various functional areas with the corresponding Soviet

Treatment of Uncertainties

They [current estimates] give no notion of Uie mainln most csuea. Some more constructive treatment ofeeded both for the direct oat of the decision makers and for the use ot systematic analysis that will be undertaken of US military problem*.

I would recommend strong'? that the intelligence projections be publishedook that is as close tn format a* possible to the Department of Defense Five Tear Force Structure and Financial Program with an appendix like our Weapon System* Dictionary describing individual weapons la detail.

We need torojection of the total Soviet program, and not Just piece-meal estimates of Individual weapon system* and forces.

We need estimates of cost. It would be useful to bave this both ln terms of rublen order toeel for the Impact of the program* on the Sovietand also In dollar costs which are more familiar to us.

Heat we need to have anrtatement of the range of uncertainty associated with each proleeUon. We can live quite easily with three number*owoat likelyelieve that the use of three number* oils attenUoo to tbe whole range and ttistgesU to the user that If he absolutely mustingle number, he use the tingle most likely rather than thr pessimistic.

In tddlUon to thewe need toeeling

Imposed by projected patterns of for the recent history ofexpciuUlurcs more systematic ac- rtet program, to knowcount could be takenro- rtet force* hare been, say, for Cramming approach of known the last threeatterns of Soviet weapon system replacement and phasinglead time problems, etc.

The latest response of the Intelligence cornxnunity to these

o be produced for the first time In the springhe production procedure Is to parallel that forestimates: ONE preparation of terms of reference,by USD3 agencies, ONE preparation of the draft paper, review by USDs representatives, and finally approval by thehe record of this move brings up to date of writing the case history of the requirement.

Let us look now at some of tbe problems In the way ofthe requirement and In doing so try to offercriticism and suggest some positive measures that might assist in meeting the needs of an Important and articulate consumer of the intelligence product. The problems could be considered as lying In the realm of (a) communication, (b) Intelligence organization and bureaucracy, (c) Intelligence production and research methodology, or (d) intelligence and policy.


Project Lamp was an attempt to communicate aIt made most If not all of the specific points contained In the two later official requirement statements. Thenoise level created by personnel changes and the way the problem was presented, together with the newness of the problem and the unfamlllarlty of the new planningledailure of this communication.

The Hitch memorandum of1 was much more specific. It resulted in considerable activity within DIA (to which it was formallynd at the USD3 level It elicited some real measure of response In the formation of



the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group and changes In theIt may be that the memorandum was underpowered (or the weight of Its communication content, that thewere too busy organizing their new methods toon communicating to the Intelligence community the needs these engendered; the restatement of the requirement Ineferring expUOUy to numerous desiderata not covered in the NIE'a. at any rate shows that theresponse was still Inadequate.

'.is difficult in retrospect,,

ment. The primary problem seems to have been thedifficulty of communl^tlonomplex matter between two unfamiliar communicators; and this problem appears to bave been reduced with time, by numerous meetings between planning and Intelligence personnel, to relatively insignificant proportions.

Intelligence Organization and Bureaucracy

Problems of organization and bureaucracy seem to have had much more Influence than strictly communication problems on the Intelligence community's response throughout. We have already suggested that personnel changes at higherechelons tended to delay the Initial response, that to Project Lamp. In both this and subsequentthe requirement had also to overcome the force of bureaucratic Inertia.

A natural bias against change arises ln any organization from the fact that change Is likely to disturb currentMore often than not, ln addition, the status quo psychology tends to associate demand for change with criticism of the current regime. The Intelligence community is nofrom any other bureaucracy, government or private, in this respect Thus there was an initial tendency In tbe Intelligence community to downgrade the new requirement, to suggest that the major part of It was already being fined and the remainder could be taken care of with minorThe adjustments In question would be substantive entries in existing national Intelligence estimates.

The subsequent formation of the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group attempted to meet the long-range aspects of the

qulrcment not covered by thehe Joint Analysis Group represented an organliational adjunct of unspecified duration which permitted continuance of existingrelationships. Although the planners applauded the JAG effort and product, the over-all requirement stalla problem. Tbe dynamics of bureaucratic Interrela-tlonshlps and realities also appeared to be having some effect upon the views of the planners: In restating the requirement they not only reiterated their substantive needs but* oflfciaio the^Ucmal.toy, telllgence level

From an organizational standpoint the latest solution, the projected Intelligence Assumptions for Planning, again ac-cornmodates the requirement within the existing structure and at the same time guarantees USDS endorsement in some form. The new IAP cannot help creating an Improvement In meeting the planner's requirements. It Is suggested,that consideration of further organizational changes could enhance our responsiveness and effectiveness even more.

Briefly. It Is suggestedew staff group be established within the Office of National Esttrnates to produce tbe IAP and deal with other problems of tbe planners'ull-time basis, without becoming involved In other estimative production. This move would afford continuity of work on the many problems Inherent In the requirement.taff could prepare detailed terms of reference and formats for contributors according to their capabilities and integrate the contributions when received. Both CIA and DIA could furnish personnel for the staff. In much the same fashion that military and civilian personnel now serve In ONE and on the JAG. One might even consider eliminating, under this arrangement, the time-consuming and expensive consideration of the IAP by tbe representatives of tbe TJSIB members, personnel for the new stall being so selected aa to be themselves representative of the Intelligence agencies. The product could then be presented directly to the TJSIB principals for approval

The planners' views on tbe deficiencies of the nationalas an Input to their process suggest that new habits


amenable to the rigors of the analytical technique. Such Inputs must be derived through Intelligence's own detailedanalysis of Soviet military and related objectives,means for achieving these objectivesiven number of years, and the effectiveness and cost of the program elements under each of these alternatives- Tbe analytical cycle Is the same as that of the us military planner, but the Intelligence analyst must simulate the complex of historic, economic, political, technological, andInfluences operative In Soviet military planning and prcigrBnunlng.

Because systems analysisisciplineogic of Its own. Its requirements on the Intelligence community lnelude the demands of that logic Two areas In which It demands fundamentally different methodological treatment from that currently provided In the intelligence community areand ranges of uncertainty. Systems analysis, like the quantitative analysis practiced In the social sciences and operations research, requires that the quantification used be consistent and Inviolate within the precincts of the stated area, so that one must accept all of the explicit derivatives and Interactions which result fromuantity or series of quantities as representativeivenursory examination of the quantitative data mmtelhgcnce output would show that this criterion could not be applied to most of It These Impressionisticwere of course never meant to be subjected to thisand It could be strongly argued that the national estimates cannot be subjected to it for many reasons.


A Like problem arises In Uie treatment of uncertainty. Intelligence estimates of military capabilities have always had to contendroliferation of uncertaintiesfrom some lack of knowledge of Uie enemy compounded by Ignorance of the future. What Is required here Isprojection of ranges of uncertainty In estimates ofweapon systems and force structures, where "explicit" refers againuantitative exp-ession of which allare acceptable in terms of their logic, the factual sub-.

there^ppesuVto be an taSZanMl

Inconsistency ln criteria for Uie measurement ofevice used at times to make critical problems stand out from matters of lesser Importance. It Is true that evenquantifyingogic of Its own. which can be considered sophisticated in terms ofonsensus of conceptual understanding among users; but the point Is that It cannot be subjected to any systematic analysis Ln depth.

This Is not to say that quantification and specified ranges of uncertainty in the intelligence input will neceemrtly make the systems analysisatisfactory exclusive basis fee-decision making. The spexlfled range of uncertainty may often be so great as to produce derivatives that areambiguous, and at best the analysis can serve only as an aid In what mustrocess of human Judgment. But the man who must decide whether to start building this year,illion antimissile system around our cities In order to have It operaUonaleserves ail such aid he can get, even If It should cost some millions or hundreds of millions of dollars.

One other aspect of the question of research methodology Is its relaUonshlp to management and organization.research and economic analysis techniques are not new to Uie intelligence community; what is new Is Uie wayplanning has Integrated themnified management system toomplex systematic analysis woven of Interdependent parts. The resultant demands uponcall for Its management of research and production resourcesomparable system. Without Uie unifieddisciplines of explicit format and channels for pro-

granunlng. change control, and progress reporting, the entire fabric of the answer to the planners' requirement Isby the likelihood of Inconsistent data and uncontrolled variables.

Intelligence and Policy

The new defense planners not only plan and offerthey make defense policy. The old question of the proper proximity of the Intelligence officer and his product to the policy maker end hishe'dernands of "uB'new pTOgralT


for Intelligence input Increase the problems Inherent ln the relationship As one of the primary strategists of centralized Intelligence pointed out nearly fifteen years ago,

The only war oat ot tbe dilemma teems to rat to lie la the very com promisesually attempted: guarantee Intelligence its administrative and subatanUvs Integrltj by keeping it separate fromonsumers; keep trying every known device to make tbe users familiar with the producers' orgaplraUon. and the producers with the users" organliaUoo."

Although this advice appears to have been taken moreduring the current administration than ever before, particularly In the field of defense planning and policy, it Is sobering that the familiarization effort has not been effective enough to produceatisfactory program of intelligence support for the militarys our history of thisshows.

One trend in Intelligence estimating In the military field relevant to the problems of producing the new Intelligence Assumptions for Planning is worth noting: for some time now our udlitary-related national estimates appear to havethemselves more and more closely to currenttechniques rather than consumer problems. This hasendency to equate Information with Intelligence and confine estimating for the most part to derivatives of direct current information Instead of covering the needs of the consumer. Planning demands Intelligence Judgments. The intelligence input to the planner (be it called estimates or planning assumptions) Is the Intelligence officer's Judg-

"Kent, Strategic Intelligence,.

DW.nsa Planning

ment, based upon the best available evidence In broadest sense and the best available research and analytical techniques As defense planners have repeatedly pointed out. If inteUIPence does not provide the substantive Judgments required then the planner must do it himself on the basis of his own limited knowledge and esperienct When this happens. Intelllrenri> has failed In one of Its fundamental nusstonT

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