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*
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Short-Term Prospects for South Africa
Svfemitttd bf DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A.rUaf4
APPROVED TOR RaEASE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimatei
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligent*l theol Siote. Defeme, and
Concurring/
Director of Intelligenee and Research, Deportment of State Director, Defenve Intelligence Agency Director of the Notional Security Agency
Abstaining!
The Atomic Energy Cemmiiiion Repreientatlve to thend the AulrtanlFederal bureauvei rogation, the ivbjeet being outride of ihelr jorhdlcWoa
warning
matenol eontolni Information oflecllng iho Nottonol Defense of (he United Stalet within the meaning of the eipionoge laws. Title IB. USC,, theor revelation of which in any manner to on imouthoriied penon li prohibited.
oeour- I
'..ft Itf1 i
SfiffRET
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
CONCLUSIONS
Nationalist government Is firmly entrenched insome internal differences on specific applications ofpolicies. The white opposition is divided. Virtually allpopulation supports white supremacy. The nonwhitehas virtually no political rights and is disorganized.are well armed and highly efficient and will ruthlesslyany outbreaks of violence. We do not believe thatalone willignificant change in basicpolicies for the next year or two and probably forlonger. (Paras.
for more severe international action, particularlysanctions, may come in response to the bloodyrioting,esult of various discussions in the UK, orouth African refusal to comply with UNfrom the final ruling of the International Court ofon South West Africa. )
consider it unlikely that any outside pressuresbear on South Africa would cause the government to alterdomestichey might only harden thein their determination to go their own way. However,some flexibility and possibility of accommodation withSouth West Africa. South Africans regard the USinternational pressures as Important and almostthat the US and UK would be likely totrongin respectinal ICJ decision on South
Dir-ctor of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, believes (hat there la an even chanceill tartly enforced blockade against South Africa wouldealignment of forces within the white communityhift away from present apartheid policies.
DISCUSSION
L THE PRESENT SITUATION
South Africa's Nationalist government today la probably more firmly established In power and more firmly committedigorous application of the doctrine of apartheid than at any time since It took officehe opposition iz badly divided; the United Party (UP) draws most of Its support from the English-speaking element1ercent ol the vote In1 parliamentary elections. It has continued to criticise the government's apartheid policies, primarily on the ground that they are high-handed and brutal and ultimatelyto the economy and the nation, rather than because of any objection to the basic goal of preserving white supremacy The UP also suffers from the general poLitlcal apathy of the English-speaking Europe.'n population. The Progressive Party, which Is more liberal In its poUU;ai philosophy and favors political representation for allof the population, received aboutercent of the vote but has only one member In parliament. The political opposition received together aboutercent or the vote but has onlyhird of the members in parliament.
Another factor increasing the strength and confidence of the government has been the renewed vigor of the economy and the progress toward the government's goal of self-sufficiency. Thj concern over possible racial strife and the fearecession felt Inave since given wayew boom which promises to continue for at least another year. Duringrecords were set In virtually every economic sector Including gold production and domestic and foreign Investment. White immigration exceeded white emigration0the supply of skilled labor, under current restrictions on Jobs available to Africans, continues to lag behind demand.
In recent years. South Africa has encountered Increasedopposition to Its racial policies, notably on the part of the Black African countries, but It has defiantly shrugged off verbal criticism and has escaped any serious threats to Its material well-being. South African economic relations with Black Africa have never been of much consequence. While virtually all other African countries and some Asian and Communist states have boycotted trade with South Africa pursuant to the resolutions of the UN and Organization for African Unityhe economic results have been slight. The OAU call for secondary boycotts against companies doing business with South
ercent of the white population Isg; abouterctnt speak* Afrlkaana,
discussed in African circles.
South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth1 has not resulted in any noticeable diminution of economic ties with th* UK and other major Western trading partners. While this moveSouth Africa's International Isolation, by the same token it helped bring home to the English-speaking elements of South Africa's white population the extent to which their destinies are bound up with those of their Afrikaner
There are differences of view within Prime Minister Verwoerd's National Party over the regime's policy of creating self-governing African states (sometimes referred to asnd some criticism of the way the government has handled tho matter of South West Africa. Inmall but growing number of intellectuals and Dutch Reformed Church ministers question the long accepted dogma that segregation and white supremacy are divinely ordained. However, the government hasstrong support of the overwhelming majority of Afrikaners in resisting International or internal pressureshange in racial policies. The UP has criticized the Nationalists on these and other points but has failed to attract to itself any significantly Increased support.
Internal security has been Improved substantially and nothreat to the government is likely. The national police forcebout half of whom (including all commissionedare white. Itighly moUic. well-trained, and efficient body which could suppress even major disturbances by itself and Is backed up by South Africa's well-equipped defense forces.1
The fears of widespread racial conflict posed by the Sharpevllle riots of0 and succeeding outbreaks have, at least for the present, largely subsided. This Is In part because of continuing apathy and disunity among large segments of the nor.white population, but even more because of the ruthless efficiency with which the security forces have discouraged and disrupted any attempt at organizedamong Africans. The substantial Coloredulatto) and Asian minorities are bewildered and divided, and increasingly Isolated from ttie white community and from the African masses, whom they
'South African armed forces Include:
la)0lOO trainees serving nine months compulsory militaryn administrative and training duties;n two Permanent Force tacticalhere iseserve of0 men who have finished their training and can be called to active dutyew hours notice.
all Permanent Force personnel manning two destroyers, two destroyer escorts, and various shore Installations].
<c> Airall Permanent
7*
as their social inferiors. The black African majority Isand politically Ineffectual, with many too preoccupied with day-to-day personal and economic problems to attempt any political role and too cowed by official repression to do sa
Political activists among the Africans have remained split between two competing organizations: the old established African National Congresshichultiracial society, and the newer Pan Airicanlst Congresshichore militant program of black naUonailsm. Outlawedoth parties have been forced to go underground and have Increasingly turned to violence. However. Cielr ability to operate even on this level has been cripplederies of well-planned police raids and arrestsarge number of their leaders are in jail and most of the others have either fled the country or been Immobilized by continuing close policeand knowledge that their ranks are penetrated by police informers. Although exile groups have been actively seeking arms and funds in Dar es Salaam and other African capitals, we have no evidence that they haveignificant subversive capability within the country.
Similar setbacks have been experienced by tho small, multiracial South African Communist Party, which has opera teojinder
^0ict Its formal proscription as an overt party In
'The Communists as well as many Bcir collaborators have beenj&fd hit by police action r
Comrn!
y have been the prime movers In forming local Commu
In the High Commission Territories of Basutoland an id fey have been the ortme movers hi forming local Commu rust groups.
II. PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL CHANGE
e do not believe that Internal developments alone willignificant change In basic domestic policies for the next year or two and probably for considerably longer. It will take time and painstaking effort for nor.whlte opposition elements to re-establish any significant capability for asserting themselves. White South Africans, almost without exception, remain determined to maintain and defend their comfortable way of life. There Is an Internal conflict between the Republic's racial policies, which close many categories of employment to nonwhltea, and the mounting need for skilled labor. While this problem may eventually become serious, it Is highly Improbable that domestic economic causes will bring any change In racial policies In the short run. South Africa's economy continues to prosper, and
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though the situation poses some inflationary threats the government appears capable of taking care of them. The capable and confident Nationalist government Is highly unlikely to lose power at least up through the expiration of the present parliamentary term6 and probably for considerably longer.
Sporadic outbreaks, disorders, and acts of violence will almost certainly take place. Some will be organized, some will be spontaneous. Many may well be bloody. However, we believe that the government will not hesitate to take all measures within its power to suppress such disorders, and will be able to do so.
We consider It unlikely that any outside pressures brought to bear on South Africa would cause the government to a'ter Its basic domestiche standoff between South Africaargely disapproving outside world Is likely to continue with South AfricaIncreasingly Isolated. Indeed, insofar as these pressures are brought to bear on Internal Republic policies, they may well only serve to stiffen the backs of the leaders and make them even more determined to carry out their policies ol white supremacy. South African actions with respect to South West Africa areittle more flexible. The government recognizes that thereegitimate international Interest in the area by reason of the League of Nations mandate under which South Africa originally was charged with adrninistratlon of the territory; this recognition Is manifest by the South African Appearance before the International Court of Justice In the South West Africa case. Thus, while we believe that South Africa would wish to1 the Republic's racial policies in South West Africa, the scope and pace of Its actions are tempered by the Internal and international pressures against doing so.
Any proposal to Impose economic sanctions on South Africa would be very difficult to carry out It Is at least problematical whether tbe countries having the most extensive economic relations with Southhe UK, would try to impose them. South African trade and Investments are of considerable economic importance to some of Its trading partners. The flow of South African goldignificant element in the international monetary setup of the Free World.Is about the only major Import whose denial would causeeconomic dislocation. In view of tht multiplicity of countries which do or could export oil and the relative ease of transshipment, it would be extremely difficult to stop the flow of oil to South Africa. While the loss of its markets and regular sources of supply would be a
'The Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of Btate, believes that there Is an even chanceilitarily enforced blockade against South Africa wouldealignment of forces within the wnite communityhift any from present apartheid policies.
severe blow to South Africa, It hasonsiderable way on Its road to self-aumclency and in most respects could maintain an austere existence in isolation. It would be extremely difficult, however, to convince other African states that the US could not force South Africa to make basic changes. While leaders might recognize the facts, they would not feel able, politically, to so admit openly.
Experience with the arms embargo Illustrates some of theThe Security Council urged an arms embargohortly after the US had declared It would stop all shipments of arms to South Africa. The UK has declared an embargo applicable only to "those arms which could be used to further the policy ofnd In the past few months the French have done likewise- However, South Africa still has little difficulty In obtaining adequate supplies of arms of all sorts. For example, arrangements have recently been made to produce small arms under license from various Western FAiropean Arms.
The South African Oovemment Is reluctant, however, to alienate the US or the UK. Both the government and the white opposition tend to view the attitude of the US as one of the most important factors Influencing International action. They almost certainly believe that both the US and UK would be likely totrong positionatter involving South West Africa, especially In support of an International Court of Justice judgment. Hence the South Africans are Inclined to delay or temper their actions In South West Africa to the extent they deem necessary tohowdown. This attitude Influenced therecent decision to postpone the application of strict apartheid measures recommended in the Report of the Odcndaaiowever, they are likely to be stubborn In defense of what theyatter of principle on any issue involving the domestic policy of the Republic
he South African Oovemment almost certainly regards Itsto permit US missile and space vehicle tracking facilities and US use of other Installations on Itswell as the presence of0 million US private Investment In Southa source of considerable leverage upon the US. Furthermore, the government argues both domestically and abroad that the furnishing oi facilities to the US and other Western countries Is tans.ble evidence of South Africa's contribution to the "preservation of Westernon."
"Theommlnloo wu appointed by the Sooth Africanstake recommendations retarding poller In South West AJrtca. Itsaa extennve development program together with Imposition ofpolicies comparable to those recentl* Instituted In the Republic.April. Venrocrdhile Paper In Parliament stating that Weaccepts the Report "la broad principle" but wul postpone carryingrecoBuaenoaUooa on radii policyecision of the ICJ oobefore
Therefore, the South African Government will be reluctant to lose this leverage by demanding withdrawal of the tracking; stations, and the Introduction of limited sanctions by the US would not necessarilysuch retaliatory action by South Africa.
III. CONTINGENCIES
There are several contingencies which can be envisaged in which there would be considerable pressure on the US to take some action against South Africa. The first case is thatloody repression of an outbreak of protest by South African blacks. As has been said, we believe that the South African Oovemment would take swift and ruthless action to quell the outbreak.
Another set of contingencies arises out of likely discussions In the UN Security Council or General Assembly of three separate but converging demands for action against South African apartheid, any one of which would probablyemand for US action.
A Committee of Experts on Apartheid appointed by UN Secretaryhantesult of Scandinavian Initiative hasnational convention" of all races In South Africa to chart the future course of South African society. The Committee's report recommends that the UN issue what is virtually an ultimatum to South Africa. This proposal stands no chance of being favorably received by any white party In South Africa, even the Progressives.
An International Conference on Sanctions, organizedhite South African exile, financed by various African governments, and attended by delegates, mostly unofficial, from someountries, was recently held In London. Itumber of scholarly papers, most of them claiming that sanctions, if stringently applied by the US and UK, would force South Africa Intoecommendation was forwarded to the UN requesting consideration of such action.
Thereising wave of protest abroad against the possible Imposition of death sentences or long prison terms on the defendants (Communist Party and ANC leaders) in the "Rlvonla" trial now being held in Pretoria. Though the accused who have taken the stand to date have admitted engaging in sabotage and planning further violence to bring down the government, they claim that apartheid has left them no alternative. Harsh sentenceseaderies of protests from foreign governments, and would poison the atmosphere of UN deliberation on South Africa.
more serious contingency may arise out of the situationWest Africa. The ICJ Is expected to rule5 onby Ethiopia and Liberia0 that South Africa Is violating Its
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responsibilities under the mandate. Should the Verwoerd government fall to ccmpiy with the UK actions arising from the final ICJ ruling, the Security Council would probably be seized with the problem.
n any of these cases, there wouldumber of proposals for action against South Africa, ranging from condemnatory resolutions to armed Intervention. The pressure for strong sanctions would be greatest In the event of South Africa's refusal to conformlear Judgment in the ICJ case. The threat of expulsion from the UN would probably carry relatively little weight In South Africa. There are already diwnisajons, probably officially Inspired. In tbe South African press on the desirability of resigning from the UN. South Africa has already resignedumber of International organizationsCA, UNESCO) when its delegations have been refused the right toin meetings and other activities. The Imposition of economic sanctions by the US alone, or even in company with other countries whose trade with South Africa Is important would not. we believe, cause South Africa to change Its Internal racial policies, much as suchmight be regretted by the South Africans. We believe this would be true, even In the remote caseilitarily enforcediplomatic pressures, economic sanctions or the threat of them might Induce South Africa to make some temporizing or conciliatory move with respect to south West Africa.
Director or Intelligence and Research, Department of BtaU, bellevee thai there is an even chanceallltaxUv enforced blockade against South Africa wouldealignment of forces within the white communityhift away from present apartheid poll dee.
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