CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW
Economic Intelligence Report
OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIET GOLD POSITION
CKNTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports
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OUTLOOK FOR THE SOVIET GOLD POSITION*
Summary and Concluaions
By the first ofoviet reserves of gold probably will have been reducedevel ofillion. ** Reserves of this amount will be the lowestnd although Khrushchev hasar more relaxed attitude than Stalin toward depletion of Soviet gold stocks, they may now beevel that thc leadership considers minimaledge against future contingencies. Sales of gold during the first half of this year will0 million and will require withdrawals from gold reservett of0 million by mid-June. Further reductions in the second half of thc year will not be significant, however, unless there is an increase in the level of Soviet foreign payment obligations that cannot be foreseen at this time.
In spite of the accelerated decline in Soviet reservesillion ot the end24 billion by4he USSR has given no evidence that it intends torash program to expand domestic production of gold. Although there have been exhortations of various kinds, there are no indications that concrete measures have been taken to raise significantly earlier production goals4resent plans call for modest increases in output and are little different from plans that were established before the need for heavy drains on
Soviet gold reserves became apparent.
Thc plan for production of gold45 is believed to9 million2 million, respectively, representing gainsillionillion above the preceding year. These increases will not exceed thc average gains achieved during theears of the Seven Yearnd in fact are smaller than the annual gains achieved several times during this period. This suggests that as yet no decision has been made to increase production drastically at lt is believed that the USSR is not instituting an all-outlo increase significantly the planned level of gold output, largely because of the continued overriding concern of Soviet planners with the high costs of production-
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the bestof this Office as
** Dollar values arc yiven in current US dollars throughout this report.Original document.