THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CONGO

Created: 6/12/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CCI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Curront Intelligence

uneLIBRA RV

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SUBJECT: The Security Situation ln tho Congo

1. The Congo, on the eve of its fifth year of independence, seems headedinimumeriod of increasing Instability andotalof governmental authority. The thorniestproblom is the two-month-old rebellion in the province of Kivu Central. elatively small tribe has defeated anduccession of Congo Army (ANC) units sent into the area and now threatens the provincial capital, Bukavu, many of whosearo openly sympathetic to the rebels. ANC detachments ln Kivu have rallied somewhat from thoir noar-collapse of two weeks ago, but their hold is shaky. The rebels are now fairly well armed with captured weapons, and potentially have easy accons to supplies from adjacent Burundi.

2. Although the rebellion is at least partly ethnic intribe hostile to tho rebelsthe provincialalso appears to have political overtones born of discontent with more general conditions. Tho rob elocal chief-tain(says he ls fighting tho "despotic" Adoula Ho has doubtless been encouraged in this view by representatives of the loft-wing anti-Adoula exile group, the "Committee of National Liberation" (CNL). The CNL has set up quasi-governmentin rebel territory which issues travel permits to Europeans and cranks out propaganda. It alsoranch office in contact with Chinesediplomats in Burundi, but so far it hasrecoived only limited material support from the Chinese.

3. The other open rebellion, in Kwilu Province, has been going on for six months. Except for sporadic skirmishing, it is relatively inactive now. forcos have rcgainod control of some of the Kwilu countryside, but many rebels, including the leader, Peiping-trainod Piorro Uulele, are still at largo. The CNL has claimed to be aiding the Mulellsts, but this seems doubtful.

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The list of areas where new outbreaks could occur is long. It includes the volatile city of Stanleyville, once the seat of Antoine Glzenga's left-wing regime; the Kasa1 region, ln which local "jeunnesse" bands are organizing; Katanga, where Tshombe ls still popular; and Leopoldville itself. At present these places are under the nominalof the ANC, but it Is not unlikely that one or more will erupt ln the coming weeks or months.

The causes of the security crisis are many, but basic to them is the widespread dissatisfaction of the people with theirand local. These governments are corrupt and Incompetent. Low-level civil servants are rarely paid on time--salarles having been siphoned off by higher officials--farmers are often unable to market crops because roads are unrepaired, and averageseldom can obtain the social services which

the Belgians provided on an extensive scale. Because the cost of corruption and maladministration is high, government budgets have been far out of balance, and inflation is rampant. The Leopoldville food price index, whose base9his month. Unemployment ls high, particularly In the larger cities, where resort to subsistencein the rest of the Congoimpossible. Furthermore, it Is likely that the Congolese see little hope of Improvement under the present setup. Therovincial governments areIndependent of the central government, which shows few signs of wanting to cope with the country's problems. In the quasi-anarchy that has prevailed ln much of the countryside since independence, tribal animosities have Intensified, with some tribesat grabbing local power and others resentful over losing it.

Is the situation that the CNL Isexploit. The CNL'8 main office ls lnthe river from Leopoldville. Thisaggleeft-wingof them at least as corrupt as presentstudents returned fromand ANC deserters. The organization's announced

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objectlve is the overthrow of Adoula, but Its nine-month history is one of factionalism and littleaction. It has sought to identify Itself with the rebellions, but the evidence ls slim that Ltthem or that It exercises any real control over them. CNL groups sent to assassinate topofficials have been apprehended by Congoleseforces. CNL saboteurs, active in the capital city in recent weeks, are out of action for the moment, probably becauseeries of arrestsight curfew. The weakness of the Congolese Government and the widespread dissatisfaction of the general Congolese population give theood deal to work on, For example, its Burundi branch, previouslywas able to pull together when theln Kivu got under way. The organization maymore aid from the Chinese If the securitydeteriorates further. adical upheaval were to occur ln Leopoldville, any left-wing government would probably contain many CNL members.

7. The central government's principalcontrol, the ANC, is noted for its pillagingand is hated and feared. Now lt is nearas an organized force. Almost entirelyin leadership, prone to mutiny, and mannedwho tend to regard their rifles as meal etS( lt has committed allandful of Itsrombatlng the Ktvu and Kwilu rebellions. ANC chief

obutu, characterized In Decenber

H as "vain andas until reeerTTT^^eWsecT^ ToTomTt his army's shortcomings and hasajor stumbling block to Western attempts to retrain lt. In the last year alone, four ofodd ANC battalions have been involved In mutinies, the latest onay in the North Katangan provincial capital of Albertville, where part of the garrison joined an abortive The ANC performance In Klvu has been shockingly bad. ay, for example, an ANC detachment laden with rifles and automatic weapons and led by the much touted area commander, Colonel Mulamba, was disarmed, beaten up, and then releasedroup of tribesmen armed mostly with machetes. Colonel Mulamba stillgovernment troops in Kivu, which now includeof seven Congolese battalLons. The progressive reinforcement of Klvu has seriously depleted ANCIn other areas, Including Stanleyville, southern Katanga, and Leopoldville. The arrivalalf dozen

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ircraft supplied by the US and some armored cars acquired from the UN may stave off disaster ln Kivu, but the ANC unaided would probably be unable to contain additional disturbances elsewhere onodest scale.

8. Attempts to retrain the ANC are being stepped up, but the immediate situation hasdeteriorated too far to bo helped by training per se. Aboutelgian,merican, andsraeli military men are ln the Congo at the moment, and more US and Belgian advisers are on the way. As trainers, these men can have little short-term effect, but as tacticalmany of them are turningare already useful. That complete collapse in Kivu has been avoided may bo attributed in large part to the arrival thereandful of Belgian officers. It is doubtful, however, that the assistance of advisers alone could enable the ANC to cope with largo new outbreaks.

9. With the UN determined to withdraw its last troops from the Congo byune, theGovernment has been casting about elsewhere for soldiers to stiffen the ANC. It has orallytroops of Nigeria and Tunisia, and has hopes that Ethiopia, Senegal, or other friendly African states will send contingents. For the moment, any substantial response to these efforts appears unlikely. Reportedly, neither Tunisia nor Ethiopia wishes to embroil itself again ininternal disorders, and other African states probably are similarly hesitant. Hope still existsigerian battalion now in the Congo under UN aegis may stay, but the number of Nigeriansisthan aLagos is showing signs of cold feet.

10. ast resort, tho Congolese Government may appeal to Belgium for troops. Belgium would dislike the prospect, and would be fearfultorm of criticism similar to the ono aroused by Howovor, Brussels might respond favorablylea from the Congo if It thoughtsubstantial--were seriously threatened, and if it were assured of firm Western

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of the Congo's problem can bethe lethargy and lndecisiveness of the Adoula'Its frequent lack of political acumen, andof political roots in the provinces.

who with UN and US help has kept the Congo in the Western camp for threemany virtues. Including the rare one of honesty, but he has no popular following, and only now ls making tepid moves to promote apolitical party. He has relied primarily on the backing of his "Blnza" group, including Congo Army Commander General Mobutu, Surete Chief Nendaka, and Justice Minister Bomboko. This support now appears to be wavering. One reason for Adoula's longevity in office has been the weakness of the opposition and the dearth of alternatives acceptable to various parties concerned, both Congolese and Western. The opposition is nowleast by comparison with thesome hitherto unacceptable alternatives may be looking more palatable.

mandate of the present parliamentonune, and President Kasavubu will appointprovisional government to governix- to period until parliamentary elections. Theof the new government Is set to follow aon the new constitution, but pressures for

new leadership may be suchhange will be made beforehand.

imminenceew government and thesecurity situation have sharply steppedmaneuvering ln Leopoldville, Untilwas almost certain that Adoula would lead thegovernment; now It Is less likely. ewgrouping calling itself the African Democratic(CDA) has formed with the Intention ofKasavubu In his choiceew government. includes among others five of Adoula's cabinetincluding Minister of Defense Anany. andsome support from Kasavubu himself. The groupto enlist Katangan support and reportedlyTshombe, who appears to be Interested In

it. The CDA has also indicated It would am-

the radical CNL. Brussels has been promoting the

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ew government of "national veconciliation,"

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role In the political grouping ls uncertain. He has often expressed his desire to become premier, buthe reportedly said he would be willing toTflhombe for the top position If permitted to keep his defense portfolio.

14. Tshombe has been maneuvering to return to power, ln Katanga at least, but preferably on thelevel almost since his self-imposed exile in Europeear ago. resi Interview ln Paris onune, he Indicated he Is ready to returnhe can obtain personal amnesty. He hinted he was ready to support the CDA, reiterated his idea that the Congoovernment of nationaland Implied that he would like to head It. The Tshombe Interview la certain to put strong pressure on the Leopoldville government. Tshombe, despite his absence, remains the strongest African leader In the economically Important southern Katanga. x-Katangan gendarmesandful of whiteamenable to Tshombe 'S control are In adjoining. These he can use to bargainole on the national level, or If denied this, to try tohimself in Katanga. Because of the ANC'S weakness there, the US consul ln EllsabethvilleTshombe's force could prevail. Althoughhas denied that it ls supporting Tshombe'sit has helped him in the past, and may do so again. Should the Congolese Government be forced to call on tbe Belgians for military assistance, the Belgians might well require Tshombe's presence ln the government, perhaps as premier,uid pro quo.

15. The outlook for the Congo ln the immediate future ls grim. To keep the security situation from deterioratingombination of circumstancesas the rejuvenation of the ANCorbearance of new dissidents frombe required. These seem unlikely at the present time. Considerable training and time will be needed to make theependable Instrument of central authority. Theof African or, more likely, of Belgian troops might retard the deterioration for the time being, but the Congolese will have to solve their own problems eventually. Politically, it seems highly unlikely that any central government such as Adoula'a with itsnarrow base and Its lack of support in thewill be able to cope with even the Immediateor long survive as presently constituted. ew government along the lines proposed by thewill be able to make better use of Ltsthan the present one remains to be seen.

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