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"Maodaiory RetfeW Document
THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CONGO4fSf'SgS?.
APPROVED FOB
DIRECTORATE OF
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MEMORANDUM:
S UMMARY
The Congo seema headederiod ofinstability andotal breakdown oiauthority. The government is already faced with open rebellions in Kwilu and Kivu. Given the generally high level of discontent, new outbreaks could occur at any ol several other places at almost any time. With the last of the UN troops leaving byune, the maintenance of order devolves for the time being on the notoriously incompetent CongoArmy (ANC). Grossly deficient in leadership, low in morale, and with reserves all but exhausted, this force offers little hope as an instrument fororder. To shore up the ANC, the Congolese Government is trying to get troops from friendly African states, but prospects are dim. If thecrisis worsens and the Congo ls unable to obtain substantial African military support, the government may be forced to appeal to the Belgians for military assistance. The immediately pressing problem is military, but long-term solutions for the security problem must be political. Some Congolese and Lhe Belgians are trying toovernment of "national reconciliation" by including ex-Katangan leader Tshombe and left-wing exiles now in However, it is far from certain that anybeing contemplated will be more successful than Lhe present government in keeping order.
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THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE CONGO
Security Throats
Congo, on the eve of its fifth yearseems headedinimum for aincreasing instability andotalof governmental authority. At the heart ofis the continued weakening of theunity and its authorityisprocess which has been going onend of colonial rule.*
thorniest immediate problem is therebellion in the province of Kivurelatively small tribe has defeated andsuccession of Congo Army (ANC) units sent intoand now threatens the provincial capital,of whose inhabitants are openly sympatheticrebels. ANC detachments in Kivu havefrom their near-collapse of two weekstheir hold is shaky. The rebels arewell armed with captured weapons, andadditional support from sympatheticin adjacent Burundi or from Communistthere.
3. Although the Kivu rebellion is at least partly ethnic intribe hostile to the rebels dominates the provincialalso appears to have political overtones born of discontent with more general conditions. The rebelocal chieftain, says he is fighting the "despotic" Adoula government. He has doubtless been encouraged in this view by representatives of the left-wing anti-Adoula exile group, the "Committee of Nationalhich has its head office in Brazzaville, across the river from Leopoldville. The CNL has setuasi-government "administration" in rebel territory which Issues travel permits to Europeans and cranks out propaganda, it alsoranch office in contact with Chinese Communist diplomats in Burundi, but so far it has probably received only limited material support from the Chinese.
CIA Memorandum, The Political Situation and Prospects in the Congo, dated
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other open rebellion, in Ewllubeen going on for six months. Thisis compoundedigh degree ofthe central and provincial governmentrivalry between "ins" and "outs." Except
for sporadic skirmishing, it is relatively Inactive now. Government forcos hava regained control of some of the Kwilu countryside, but many rebels, including the leader, Peiping-trained Pierre Mulelo, are still at large. The CNL has claimed to be aiding the Muleliats, but tbis seems doubtful.
disturbances could break out ln anyother areas. Already there areinsurrectionary outbreaks ln the area southnear Lake Tanganyika. Other potentialinclude the volatile city oftho seat of Antolne Glzonga's left-wingKasai region, in which localbands--known asactive;Tshombe is still popular; and even While these places are now under nominal
ANC control, trouble in one or more of them could easily erupt at almost any time.
the many causes of the securitythe pervasive dissatisfaction of the peopleprovincial, andgovernments are corrupt and incompetent. civil sorvants are rarely paid onbeen siphoned off by higheroften unable to market crops because roadsand average citizens seldom cansocial services which the Belgians provided on
an extensive scale. Because the cost of corruption and maladministration is high, government budgets have been far out of balance, and inflation is The Leopoldville food price index, whose baseast Novemberbis month. Unemployment is high, particularly in the larger cities, where resort to subsistenceln the rest of theImpossible. Therovincial governments are almost Independent of the central government, which shows few signs of wanting to cope with the country's problems. In tbe quasi-anarchy that has prevailed in much of the countryside since independence, tribal animosities
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have Intensified, with some tribes successful at grabbing local power and others resentful over losing it.
7. This is the situation that the CNL is trying to exploit froa its main office ln The CNLotley collection ofelf-exiled left-wing politicians, Congolese students returned from the USSR, and deserters from the ANC. Its announced objective ls the overthrow of Adoula, but its nine-month history is one of factionalism and only sporadic effectiveness. It has sought to identify itself vith the rebellions, but the evidence is slim that it Instigated them or that it exercises any real control over thorn. CNL groups sent to assassinate top Leopoldville officials have been apprehended by Congolese security forces. CNL saboteurs, active ln the capital city in recent weeks, are out of action for the momont, probably becauseeries of arrestsight curfew. The weakness of the Congolese Government and the widespread dissatisfaction of the general Congolese population give theood deal to work on, however. For example, its Burundi branch,faction-ridden, was able to pull together when the rebellion In Kivu got under way. Themay obtain more aid from the Chinese if tbe security situation deteriorates further. adical upheaval were to occur in Leopoldville, any left-wing government would probably contain many CNL members.
Efforts to Meet the Threats
8. The central government's principal mechanism of control, the ANC, is noted for its pillaging and raping and is bated and feared. Now it ls nearas an organized force. Woefully lacking in leadership, prone to mutiny, and manned by soldiers who tend to regard their rifles as meal tickets, it has committed allandful of its reserves to combating the Kivu and Kwilu rebellions. ANC chief General Mobutu, characterized ini
characterized in December aml lazV'" has until^eTeTxiy
hl3hortcomings and has been it attempts to retrainalone, four ofodd ANC battalions have been involved in mutinies, the latest
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onay in tho North Katangan provincial capital of Albertvillo, where part of the garrison Joined an abortive rebellion. The ANC performance in Kivu has been shockingly bad. ay, foran ANC detachment laden with rifles and automatic weapons and led by the much touted area commandor. Colonel Mulamba, was disarmed, beaten up, and then releasedroup of tribesmen armed mostly with machetes. Colonel Mularba stillgovernment troops in Kivu, which now Include elements of seven Congolese battalions. Thereinforcement of Kivu has seriously depleted ANC garrisons in other areas, including Stanleyville, southern Katanga, and Leopoldville. The arrivalalf8 aircraft supplied by the US and some armored cars acquired from the UN may stave off disaster in Kivu, but tbe ANC unaided would probably be unable to contain additional disturbancesonodest scale.
9. Attempts to retrain the ANC are being stepped up; aboutelgian,merican, andsraeli military men are in the Congo now and more USelgian advisers are on the way. While tbe immediatehas probably deteriorated too far to be corrected by training in tho shortrun, these foreignre already proving useful as tactical advisers and technical specialists. The arrival in Kivuandful of Belgian officers, for example, was probably responsible for avoiding the complete collapse of the ANC there early this month. It is doubtful, however, that the assistance of advisers alone could enable the ANC to cope with large new outbreaks.
10. With theN troops leaving the Congo byune, and the UN unlikely to extend Its military operations, the Congolese Government has been casting about elsewhere for soldiers to stiffen the ANC. It has orally requested troops of Nigeria and Tunisia, and has hopes that Ethiopia, Senegal, or other friendly African states will send contingents. No substantial response to these requests now appears likely. Both Tunisia and Ethiopia are disinclined to embroil themselves again in Congolese Internaland otber African states probably are similarly hesitant. Hope still existsigerian battalion, now in the Congo under UN aegis, might stay under
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bilateral agreement, but the number of Nigerians Involved Isthan atheir twE^I showlnecold feet. An appeal hSt tl0?Afrlcan Dnity is conceivable,as long as Adoula is in power, owing
iopernlttlne the Intrusion of radical African influence into the scene.
11. ast resort, the Congolese Govern-
Boleiu=troops. dislike the prospect, and would be fearfulstorm of criticism similar to the one arousedintervention However, Brusselsin protection of Belgian interests,it were assured of firm
Political Outlook
^he nandatethe Present parliament runs out onune, and President Kasavubu will appoint
*overmaen* to govern until projected parliamentary elections. Until recentlv it appeared almost certain that Kasavubu would choose Adoula to
, ransitional government; this choice is now loss sure.
r-ll' AdouJa--who with UN and US help has kept the Congo in the Western camp forncluding the rare one of honesty, but
p 8Popular following, and only now is makinga national political party.
<elJed, Prinarily on the backing of hisGeneral Mobutu,
t 1G!ustice Minister ?OWto be wavering. One'B longevity in office has blen the weakness
and tneof alternativesto valJous Parties concerned, bothWestern. The opposition is now oiaParlson with themay be looking more
14. The imminenceew government and thesecurity situation have sharply stepped up political maneuvering in Leopoldville. ew
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political grouping calling itself the African Democratic Committee (CDA) has formed vith tbe intention of influencing Kasavubu in bis choiceew government. The CDAfive of Adoula's cabinet ministers, including Minister of Defense Anany, and may have somefrom Kasavubu himself. The group has tried to enlist Katangan support and reportedly has approachedho appoars to be interested in heading It. The CDA has also indicated it would permit the return of tbe radical CNL. Brussels bas been promoting the ideaew government of "nationalncluding elements from both left _and right.
rs (CI
He has often expressed his desire to become premier, but recently he reportedly said he would be willing to support Tshombe for tbe top position if permitted) to keep his defense portfolio.
15. Tshombe has been maneuvering to return to power, in Katanga at least, but preferably on the national level, almost since his self-imposed exile in Europeear ago. ress interview ln Paris onune, be indicated he ls ready to return provided he can obtain personal amnesty. Be hinted he was ready to support the CDA, reiterated his idea that tbe Congoovernment of nationaland implied that he would like to head It. Tbe Tshombe Interview Is certain to put strong pressure on the Leopoldville government. Tshombe', despite his absence, remains the strongest African leador in tbe economically Important southern Katanga. x-Katangan gendarmesandful of whiteamenable toontrol are ln adjoining Angoln. Those he can use to bargainole on the national level, or if denied this, to try tohimself in Katanga. Because of the ANC's weakness there, the DS consul ln EllsabethvilleTshombe's force could prevail. Althoughhas denied that It is supporting Tshombe*'s it has helped him in the past, and may do so again. Should the Congolese Government be forced to call on tbe Belgians for military assistance, the Belgians might well require Tshombe's presence in the government, perhaps as premier,uid pro quo.
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16. To keep the security situationombination ofas tho rejuvenation of the ANCorbearance of new dissidents frombe required. These seen unlikely at the present tine. Considerable training and tine will be needed to make theependable instrument of central authority. Theof African or of Belgian troops might retard the deterioration for the time being, but any improvement, to bo lasting, would require greater Congolese Any government as narrowly based as Adoula's can have little promise of bringing this about.
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Original document.
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