CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE XhTt
X96h
RECTAL MENStASm*
araJECT: Ralazar's Current
ItortugBl'i fortune* bm lanroved ueaaurahlj over the last two jearw. The rortnensee sdlltary du reduced the Angolan war to amnageable proportions against present levels of terrorist activity. Thmeconomy has shown the capacity toa rapid Increase la defense expenditures without seriously sieving domestic growth. By establishing direct military ties vita France and vita Vestater baa dcMonstrated that he Is not wholly dependent on the US la thin field and has broken the political Isolation that has loos hobbled Bnrtaaal's dlploisatlo efforts. Consequently, US efforts to serve Bslaaerublic acceptancelf-fl etornlce-tlonormal agreement on base facilities will prove sore difficult than ever.
There are, of course, weak points In the Portuguese amor. Per capita Inocvae la still the lowest la Europe. Portuguese Guineaestering sore. Opposition elements led by Bunberto DeLgado bare forced an alliance with Otsamluto and, have established themselves In Algeria, which raises the possibility of aa Increased subversive threat to the reejlae. stervertfaeleas, shortajor colonial disaster, which might novo tbaelSBMnts in Portuanl to remove Sslazar, there Is little prospecthange in Fortjugueee pollclss. Even.then, any likely successor rescues, though It night follow aprogressive course at honecre flexible policy In Africa, would be as determined ae Salaser to retain Angola and Mazaablaue.
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1. last oooth Portugal observed both theh birthday of Antonio de oUvetra Salcxar endh year as Tale country's BtroDgaan. Although ha has indicated that be would like to step aside if it were not for the African crisis, there la every reason to believe that, barring divine intervention, the good doctor will renin in office for at Least oneround of eel-bretlona.
S. Two years ago the outlook for Portugal seemed dim indeed. It vau beset vtth many difficulties in tho defense of its colonialeteriorating military situation in Portuguese vQinea, the genes isuerrilla vox in toxaablcjua, and the possibility of an economic buywtt spearheaded by lrwrsastucly aggressive Am can nations. The obvious displeasure of-the US over Portuguese colonial policies, comblnsd with the political Isolation incposed on Portugal Toy most of Europe, raised farther question as to the durability of the Belssar rsgiaa.
3- Since that tine, however, the short-tent outlook aeseseursbiy. The nllitary situation in Angola hasharp rise ln Angola's export earnings (especially from coffee)
and increasing foreign Imreaterat* in Portugal have Drought Balszar's exchange reserves to record nigha and have permitted him to more than double his defense expanoitures since the Angolan Insurrection beganl*. At tbe aarse time, he has continued to fulfill his economic development plans without serious budgetary strain.
a- There ire veaa points, of course, in the PoxtugQese condition'. The per capita income is still the lowest in Europe, ftirtuguese Guineaestering sore, and the future of Portuguese Timor depends on the whins of Indonesian president Sukarno, art, on balance, Solnzar's actions have been, at least for the moment, reoBrkably successful.
* loans to Portugal from foreign sources over the last two years includes
5. In these clreuinstonceB, the US is finding it increasingly difficult to convince Portugal that Its African policies are The US has anxiously prodded Sale tor to recognize publicly
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the principle of self-determination for Its territories, arguing that, short ofesture, the a', clonal 1st movements will be-ccare nore violent, racist, and less disposed to allow JVartogal to retain its presence and influence inverseas Provinces. The US hart urged that moderate leaders on the African scene like Secgbor and Dcuphouet Boijuy could influence other Africans If only theyeclaration of good intentions from Salazar. We have also told the Portuguese that Chinese Ccmnuniet interest In Africa, the uprisings in East Africa, and general African political instability, all underscore the necessity for Portugal to move faster in satisfying nationaliste have repeatedlyfc African pressure against Portugalhe UM can be diverted onlylear statement of Its approvallf-determination.
a his present nood. Premier Salazar has been singularly unmoved, and it is less likely than ever that any government be heeds will ever publicly agree to genuine self-determination for the overseas territories. Be believesledge of self-determination,ublic acceptance of the principle, would be regarded by cost Africansirtual concession of early In response to repeated US re queststatement on self-determination, however, Salazar has agreed that Portugal does
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believe' in tbe principle, but defines itight only for those Vho are properly civilizedand the decision as to who Is civilized rests exclusively with Lisbon. Mxreover, he questions bow much Influence Hcapfaouet Bcdgny and Sengbor have with the likes of Ben Bella, Babu, and HDlden Roberto. Further, he wonders how the US logically can force self-determination on Africa but deny It to Kashmir, pursue one policy for Coa, another for Cyprus. As for the UN assembly, ha considers that it has only one purpose with regard to Portugalto eliminate Portuguese sovereignty in the overseas territories.
t* ore positive note, Salazar believes that recent events ln Africa have demonstrated his contention that at this time an African "cation" is another name for chaos. He holds that the Portuguese provinces will soon become an enclave of stabilitylack sea of rrerairrlrmand that the "correctness" of the Portuguese position will sooner or later be evident even to the US. Moreover, in contrast to the OS position, Sslaaar is not convinced that the tide of African nationalism, is irresistible. Indeed, be feels that the Portuguese conceptnlti-racial society Is the only morally right and economically feasible solution of benefit both for the people of the particular areas and for the free world, and that time will prove him right.
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Toe Base Rifihta Question
US difficultly In coping with. Salazar have long been
complicated by our Interest In retaining base rights Inew factor has been introduced by thenow attach to the Installation, not only In the Azores butand the Portuguese mainland, of 1CRA9-C Salazar believesrump card in dealingUS is the value to the US of these facilities. As ifthe nature of thishe Portuguesefar been unwilling to renew1 base agreementsat the end The US is now in the Azores onfacto basis, subject onlyix-month notice ofPortuguese are moving very slowly In responding toacilities and say use thisoint of pressurethe US to ease off on the colonial
* recise long-range navigational aid used by ships and aircraft to establish their positions. For purely geographic reasons, establishmentortuguese chain of threetations (Azores, Madeira, thespecially the Azores location. Is particularly Important to cover areas of the Atlantic which cannot be covered by stations In other locations.
9* In the last analysis, however, Salazar will probably not go beyond protests, warning, and foot-dragging on the question
ct base facilities. Holding only one trump card, tne Frostier vill beucinnt to play It. In certainortuguese decision to ask tbe DO to withdraw Isutright OS support of African nationalist attacks against Portuguase territory, or US participctlon In an embargo.
the NATO <kicstloo
10. certain developments In bilateral relations withmembers have given Salaaar new opportunities toIndependence of tbe US. He has recently ceded toissile tracking station la tbe Azores, WhileGovernment has officially denied the politicalof such en agreement, the state-controlled Portuguesebeen heavy-banded In stressing that France, ln contrast tohas supported Portugal in the UH. In recent months, thehave been granted the right to establish extensivelo Portugal. Portugal has made substantialmilitary equipment from West Oersany and has sought otherties with Bonn, unlikehe Vest Germane
appear to have placed no restrictions on the nee of the weapons or aircraft Portugal may receive as part of the military facilities deal.
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11- elated front, the Portuguese seen to hare gone out of their vay to Indicate theirita NATO. Heretofore, Portugal had clung to Its hato role, In part because this relationship gavesolatedertainof respectability and acceptance la Europe. Ocesaeoucntly, the US was able to bring, or threaten to being, pressure on Portugal through HATO councils. Recently, however, the Portuguese have begun to downgrade the importance of HATO. Balaiar haseed toasic reorganisation of HATOeorientation of Its objectives. What Portugal apparently wants Is aa extension of HATO cooperation and support to areas outside of Europe (that is, to Africa). We believe 8slassr any upon occasion follow- the French lead In steps distasteful to the US. One gesture in this direction could be early Portuguese recognition of Red China, we do not believe that they will seek actively to disrupt SATO.
Policies of eny Successor Regime
12. uccessor regis* to Salazar might follow more flexible policies In the overseas territories or be more responsive within HATO, but the current state of the opposition In Portugal does not suggest that this Is likely* The Portuguese population
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retains basically apathetic and organized opposition to flalarnr ls fragmented. Inept, and unimpressive.
13* Tne only significant new development within the Portuguese Opposition Is tne effort of Bnmberto Delgado to form an alliance with the Portuguese Conn mints. These various groups have found refuge Inhich the government believes will be usedase of operations against Bsrtropolitan Portugal.
1*. Delgado's move further weakens the democratic opposition to Salasar and increases the threat from the extreme left. It Is possible that this could lead rightist elements tooup attempt. These men, who are or have bean key figures in the regime, agree with Salazar's policy objective of maintaining the Overseas Provinces as part of Portugal, but fear bis Inflexibility as to means may defeat these ends. Some, like General Santos-Costa, are at least as authoritarian as Salazar. Those among thanliberals'"Generals Botelho Ifccds and Cravelro Lopes,Minister Adrisno korvira and former Rector of Lisbon University Morcslo CBsrtsnoare not friends of the political democracy as that tern Is understood In most of the Beat. They advocate, rather, economic, social, and administrative reforms which they hope could reconcile Africans In the Overseas Provinces to continued membership in the Portuguese nation.
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dinantlaf action of these ben vitlicombined with considerable personalat times led to various combinations among them in efforts
to overthrow Salazar. She effectiveness of the security apparatus, rivalry among the various contenders for power,eneral lack ot political courage, have voided these efforts,
one dcrtolcnjaent which might embolden these manaction couldilitary disaster In one of theor feareftist coup In Portugal. TheLopes Actions are believed to have aome support
In the military. They are seeking support from Portuguese business leaders, who are concerned about higher taxes in the netropole to finance colonial wars, and worried that Salazar'a overseas policies ultimately will lead to their being forced out of Africa "altogether.
The Future
17. The foregoing io not Intended to suggest that Salazar is In process of winning his battle against the forces of change. as Africa's "freedom fighters" may be today, tbe long-range prognosis for Portugal's African territories remains ques-tlonable. But the present Indications are that Br. Salazar will
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Original document.
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