SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITS RESPECT TO CUBA
Accepting as valid tho Attorney General*athere is no point ln discussing courses ol*respect to Cuba until tho fundamental decisionaa to whether or not It la possible for theto live with Castro, tho followingof action are listed under the headingswith Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." tbooo headings is absoluto; the courses ofundor each are indicative of degrees ofof the Castro reglmo or conversely theoverthrow
A. Can Live with Castro
etento with Fldol lookingull recognition ofe.iiDo and unlimited trade bef oon the Dnito'd "Statos ond tuba. Tho negotiator of too dotinte would endeavor to secure from Castro con-Eltracnts not to engage in subversive activities in Latin Araorica and not to engage In polemics against the United States. Ee would alao endeavor to reduce or eliminate,esult of our concessions, Soviet presence ln Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to ono compatible with tbe requirementseaceful Latin American islandt.V
No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would beaturewith our relationseutral power
the plan works, this vould represent asolution of the Cuban problem, especiallyif tne Soviet prosonce could thereby bo eliminated,
plan almost sure not
to work, It would have grave .'consequences throughout
Latin America as well as .
eerioue domestic political
if plan ultimatelythere
be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening. position in Latin America.
po_ nothing. No specific efforts will be made toapprochement with Fidol but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing tho good faith and good will of the new Administration, would coke his own advances leading towards adetento.
As inbove but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.
less chance of success.
. The present lcyol of intelligence operations,overflights vould bo continued.
le, would be "keepingon" Fidolwould bo making
no effort to hindor his internal dovolopnent.
Maximum effort would be madecapabilities of
Va would bolean bands attitude towards Castro and our policy would bo more compatible with that of our major, allies.
vidence of Inaction would bo :
domestically.. would be quickly; . by Latin Americanand would further
demoralize the exile,
We would be in effect
helping Castro to con- hishomo and establishimago
*' . ". In addition to Intelligence collection ase would engagepersuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and. corporations.
We will remain at odds with' our allies on Cuba trade.We may delay but not prevent CastroTs progress, v ^
denlal program withsubtle sabotage isof at least disrupting the timing ofconomic efforts. It nay y.
onono domestic source of economic strength -
5, In addition to actions lnn surveillance- of suspected vessels orCuban arms shipments by meanswith Individual countries in Latinsurveillance to be accomplished without tho usoin international waters and the uoo of forceV
Does not attackproblem of Castro's subversion In Latin
Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.'- .
will notapprohonding arms
6. In addition to actions.n soft sabotage operations bygroups and'co'ntlnuo toacts' of sabVtage by means of radio, press
economicand limited encouragement to anti-Castro
Deniabliity.. soil and porsonnel not used.
v*t" hough fact. supportuarded, Castro will. anyway.
Some nolso lovol.
7. In addition to actionsvandbove, engage in soft sabotage operations employing Cuban groups against selected targots and at 'spaced intervals.
More professional operations that are targetted and
Constant danger of proof. Involvement.
b. Inprovecent of morale among Internal anti-Castro elements. Better domesticposition asof increased noise level.
b. Continuedf Castro without chanco ofortal blow.
In addition to actions. andrelax the present policy banning independentmaritiae raids and air strikes agaTHst Cuba
Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.
General ineffectiveness against targets. x
Obvious employment. soil.
Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.
B. Can't Live with Castro
(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)
covert sabotage actions against larger economic^ Impact but hi*
essentiallyevolved Junenevor permittedhavingto
Measurable economic Impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.
2. Institute an economic denial program basedestablishmentProclaimed List" under thethe Enemy Act together with all other feasibleand covert, to deny to Cuba Items critical to
Cuba's difficultykey imports.
problems with major allies including possible- loss of allies' support. dollar.
Engage In cnbotage operations as, above
Improved operations and greater economic damago.
a. Technical denlabllity only and very nigh noise level.
Vlll not assureof Castro.
more effectiveand real economic damage. -
high noise level.
,If docs not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of
S. . unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for tho purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of.and degrading Castro,
advantages Proof. intention
to stop Castro.
Will probably not catch contraband.
If vigorously pursued
against all Cuban : shipping, nay provoke Soviet response,
c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.
6, Cutoff of all ccniaunicationg (except radio)out"'
Will at leasteriod disruptiplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.
' ' from Europe and Latin America.
fatal to Fidel.
residential public declaration making clearconsiders the continued presence of
Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging antl-Castro/comnunist dissident elements within the Cuban armed for cos to carryoup,
Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin_ %
Must be followed by -some form of effective action.
8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions. will in each. Instanceajor installation inside Cuba (the "Rostov
Uay force Castro to stop his subversive actions.
Whether retaliation by. is required ort will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.
May provolco Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.
Difficulty ln pinning down clear-cutby Castro.
Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.
Announco publicly and Inform the SovieVUnion through high level diplomatic channels that further sub-version by Castro in Latin America Is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer fool bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A, .:
Proper basis for future actions.
Possible deterrence of Castro.
Difficulty of clear proof.';
b. 'Possible Soviet reactions.
Best method of mini-
fter having established the appropriate basis for such action,otal blockade of Cuba.
The most effective method of bringing down Castro.
Disadvantages Possible Soviet reactions.
fter having established tho appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.
bring down Castro.
b. Probable heavy
casualties on both sides.
o. Increased difficulties In post-Castro Cuba.
This doctrine is based on the proposition.
the decision has boon reached that. cannot liveastro/conmuniat regime in Cuba which contiauoa its present course of subversion and.aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.
.In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold outblank check" resolution. Settle3 vote majority regardless ofrazilian, or Chilean
If, despitebove, OAS waters downvote against the watered-down version.
If "blank check" resolution passed, procood toelow. Vf ';
If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents -an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declareelow).
Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, ln the eventew act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of tho Vcnozuelan
upon the typo of action on the part
of Castro which would trigger action on tho part of. ule of tbuab could be: such action as vould represent serious, realized or potential, danger to tho stabilityatin Americany this criterionastro-trained nen and four tons of arms introduced Into northeast Brazil might notrigger, whereas the samo effort by Castroentral American country might. Tbe Judgment can be unilateral and subjective on tha part of.
a programost-Castrofull weight to the real changes which havothere during the past five years and fullto the nood for channeling Castro'ainto constructive lines.^*
Tho above scenario should not be commenced unless it is rocognlzed that, although these actions are primarily designed to doter Castro from hla present courso ho may vory well porsevere in his'policy. Under such circumstancesaving publicly embarked on'the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.-Original document.