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Haiti Over the
Next Few Months
A viable and enduring negotiated settlement between deposed Presi-dam AmtxJeon the one side and the dc factoegime and itsand civdian backers on the other it uniikdy in the absence ofand continuing external pressure or inducement* Both sides prc^biyould want an> agreement to include peacekeeping forcesUS invoSemeni to preserve stability aad to protect each side from ihe other:
Aristidc insists on his early return to Haiti with minimal rcstriaions on his power. He belie.es that ihe new US adminiiirniton will take tougher actions to restore him.
settlement, some coalition of anti-Aristidc forces will retain power. But Bacn's relation* with Ihc military are lacreas-ir.gly sira.ned. andood chance that he will be replaced by more repressive hardliners less amenable to US influence Whether underruccessor rcf.me. wc believe the exonomy wfc contract further and ihat emigrants will have increased incentrre to leave for the United Slates
Ending the embargo in ihe absence of progressegoiiaied seitlement would strengthen Baiin.ardline takeover, and improve prospects Tor Ihc economy. However, that would remove virlually every incentive for the regime ioettlement with Ariiltdc.f)
Conversely, neither tougher sanctionslockade alone -ouid lead the de facto regime to capitulate to demands foe Anstide'slockade would further devastate the economy, threaten stability and increase the flow of emigrants.
recently, there has been little international pressure on Arlstidc to compromise. We believe, however, that there wouldootj chance be would agreeettlement similar to the2 Washington Protocol if he believed the United States were about lo withdraw from the crnbarto. (siyrl
The credible threat of force to restore him could persuade the miliury to reach an agreement. However, Aristidc would exploit the threat of intervention lo avoid compromise. In addition, many enlisted personnel would most likely desert, and the Army and police would probably be unable to uphold law and order,ff
credible international military force would face hlltc or no organized opposition from the Haitian military or the populace bul probably would meet isolated resistance and small-scaleeacekeeping force would probably have lo remain It least as long as Aristidc were in power fytff)
The recent appointmentN envoy io Haili and change of US administrations have heightened expectation* thai thecommunity will broker andesolution ofonth-oW political impasseiable negotiated settle-ment would encompass the followingiuuei:
Amnwiy for miliury personrel involved irt the coup tbat toppled Aristide inIWl and for the depoted Presicfcni because of the abuse* be commuted while ia office
Security both for ArnJrde. who justifiably fears assassination if he were to return to Haiti, and hts opponent* who fear he would inspire mob violence against them
tkmlat arrangements under which Aristide would accept an independent prime minister and the limited presidential powers that apply under Ihe Constitution.
Peacekeeping forctl would be desired by all of Ihe principal parties in order lo preserve order and broker disputes
Timing for Aristide't return, which his opponent want deferred indefinitely,f)
POOR QUALITY PAGE
Ant tide's Support
To the impoverished, mostly illiterate mines. Aristide, who became the country's firil freely electedabout two-thirds of the voteessianic symbol of hope and change. Me also enjoys strong support among the suable Hainan exile communities In the United States and Canada- He would be likely again totrong majority if permitted lo runresidential election even though hU backers jre poorly organized Small groups of them hat engaged in isolated viotcrtce against the de lacto regime, and additional incidents are
likely. But there ismall chance that an organizedcositton movement will coalesce as long as the military remains viable, lytr)
Aristide's reluctaacc to resume negotiations has been reinforced by his reliance for advice on figures assoemted wiih "lavatas" (del. ugc),loosely knit, predominantly rural grassroots movement be created to avoid dependence on the prcrfcssiorial pohncians he despises. These figures -leideisof pennant associations, activist priests, and community support groups- have little experience in politics, view technocrats and academics with suspicion, and reinforce Aristide'slo view the world in terms of moral absolutes. His reliance on tuck individuals increased following Ibe failure of the OAS-bfokcicd Washington Protocol.
The pro-Aristide National Froa! for Change and Democracyoalition ofleftist and socialist parties in thehas no significant independent base of support Ittrong showing in the0 elections only because Aristide was al ihe top of Its ticket.however, he dissociated himself from the FNCD and at one pom: inspired mob* to gut its headquarters. Some FNCD leaders continue to counsel him toAnstidcs internationalFrance, Canada, snd someremain convinced that hisey to defending Haitianand they have taken aa active rok OB his behalf in international efforts to resolve the crisis,rf
cell for Cedras' removal and prosecution and as the opposition of enlisted military grew. The legislature was inclined to approve the agreement, but failed toa quorum despite various attempts throughue to bothby elements af the miliiary and bribery by civilian opponents of Aristide. Onarch, the rightist-dominated Haitian Supreme Court ruled the accords unconstitutional and issued thinly veiled threats to legislators not to question tht ruling,
Subsequent weak efforts on the part of the legislature to vote approval of thewere met with coup rumors and threats to diuotve the legislature. Onpril, the legislature agreedripartite Commission with the former de facto Prime Minister and tke Army toegotiated settlement. The Tripartite Commission proposal,by the legislature in May. declared the presidency want and called for the resignation of the de facto Prime Minister and the tamingew owe io beby the legislature. Marc Basin assumed that position in June, (vf
regular (applies of fuel have been received Shippinglose to isormal loth due io indiftcreni Latin American obiervance of the sanctions and continued trade withThe embargo hu created opportunities for some in the military and the elite to enrich themselves through (raft and smugi.ir.g. it Ihe expense of legitimate businessmen,f)
But it has had severe consequences for the remainder of the population, especially the poor, while also increasing ihe pool ofseaborne emigrants. An0 jobs in indusiry and services have been lost, and the assembly sector hasbeen damaged beyond revival for at least theew yean. Cash crop farmer* have been hurt, and many in the countryside have felled trees to produce charcoal, contributing to deforestation. Inflation is running at aboutercent due to deficit financing and the downward slide of the currency. Remittances from Haitians abtoad haveey role in keeping the economy afloat.
Intimidating Aristide'* Supporters
Since consolidating its authority in the weeks following the coup, the militaryupporters with infrequent resort to violence. Disscni is tolerated in the press and legislature, bul antigovernmcnt demonstrations arc generally prohibited and few have been attempted. Key Aristideoperate freely in the capital. The military would use whatever force necessary to suppress protests or mob violence, bui, withersonnel, it could beby large and widespread popular uprisings. To preventossibility,forces have hounded most of Aristide's grassroots organizers into hiding or have frighlened them into silence, (syfl
Wc have scant information about politically motivated murders of other extreme human rights violations of Aristide supporters and can onlymall number of cases. Sporadic reporting about corpses left Inplaces in Port-au-Prince suggests lhai military personnel or rightwingsome apparently associated with police chief
Michelmurdered Aristide supporterseans of terrorizing others. Despite concerted efforts, the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince has been unable toclaims of reprisals against repatriated emigrants (jjjffl
Seeking To Consolidate Po*er
De facto Prime Minister Marc Bazin and other politicians hope to nullifynremaiioiial legitimacy and arelo impeach him with ihe intention ofew presidential election ihatbis candidacy. It is unlikely, however, that any impeachment process over the next few months would provide Bazin or ansuccessor with substantially greaterlegilimacy. Impeachment probably could be achieved only through the intimida-lion of Aristide's supporters in the legislature and conspicuous constitutional chicanery.
Negotiating Positions Military AtlrWdcs
Moderate armed forces chief Raoul Cedras and other top military leaders, fearing the new US administration may be less tolerant of their intransigence, recently have shown greater interest inegotiated settlement. They prefer to concedeigurehead role for Aristide as president in absentia, bul continue to oppose his returnaiti. Cedras and moderate associates arcy sirong opposition inompromise. Cedras' authority over such senior officers as chief of staff Philippe Biamby and police chief Michel Francois is
limited. He has been able to rein in the person il imbiiioBi am! competing intercsis of hb subordinates by playing them off against etch other aad presenting himself as the officer most capable of dealing with the United Sialcs. But he would be increasingly vulnerable tn such rightist subordinates If he were to show signs of agreeing to Aristide's ie*unt. tt>-rf
Although wc hivt no recent information iton the altitudes of no enlisted and noncommissioned personnel, wt believe they remain antagonistic to and fearful of lhe deposed President. Agiuted enlistedinitiated1 coup without high command connivar.ee. and limited command and control over them was only reecublist-ed after Cedras and other leaders belatedly joined the rebch. Quaff
Althouga the authority of coninanders has tncrcased sorrewhat sicce then, we believe thereubstantial danger that enlisted personnel would again resort to extremeif they believed their leadersrepared lo accept Arisiide's return. There is some chance that their fears could be assuaged if their security were guaranteed by an international peacekeeping force.miliury leaders have stated that they would hue confidence only in forces in which tbt United Statesajor role
Hardline attitudes in tbe military willto be reinforced by some lightwiag civilian pdilKiarts aad wealthy bwsinessmer Anstidc'i intransigence aod the de facto government'* inability to get the embargo lifted have raited the hopes of rightists and former Ouvailierists and have eroded the credibility of Barin. ais foreign minister, and other regime moderates, fix-President Leslie Mamgal ind Mobilization for National Development leader Hubert de Roaceray in particular hope io enlist the support ofmiliiary figures to advance their own presidential ambitions. Right wing civilians have bribed enlisted personnel in keymill to support their interests, aad will continue to do so ti^rlf
Aristide'f Approach to Nttotutioa.
Aristide has recently shown some flexibility, staling publicly lhat he wouldrime minister from (he "opposition" to run the government, gram general amnesty to the Army exceptsmallf coop leaders who would be removed, and welcome observers fiom the OAS and UN. These
Implications for Ihc United Slates
Under the Status Quo
Wc believeiable and enduringsettlement is unlikely in the absence of substaniial and continuing external pressure or inducements alTccling one or more of the parlies.egotiated settlement, we believe thai some coalition of anti-Aristide forces will remain in power ihrough the period of this Estimate. Bazin hopes he can shore up his position in mid-January whenlections arc scheduled, but ihey will not improve his legitimacy at home or abroad.fl
His relations with Ihc military arestrained, however, and thereood chance ihat he will leave office voluntarily or be forced oul. In either event, weuccessor regime would be less amenable to US influence and more repressive. Thewould continue to contract, andwould have greater incentive to leave fc* ihe United States, (sift
If the Embargo Were Terminated
Barn's position would be strengthened if ihe OAS embargo were terminated without progressegotiated settlement, and ihe threatightist takeover would at least temporarily be postponed. Such awould remove much of ihe pressure on ihc economy and would slow inflation,radual recovery. Kvcn so. iurfc-seale international food programs would Mill be required, (tjscf)
Ending the embargo would also removeall incentive Toe the dc facto regimeeach an accord with Aristide. whose popular :ippcat would remain high and wane onlyHis supporters would sec the United
lockade Were Imposed
Neither tightened sanctionslockade alone would lead to the quick capitulation of the de facto regime to demands foreturn. UN-mandated sanctions would make circumvention more difficult but notsince many Third World governments lack the resources to enforce compliance, and rogue suppliers of oil could be found.fuel deliveries would create more severe hardships within three to four months, strangling what is left of the mcdrrnworsening food Shortages, and crippling the distribution of humanitarian aid outside of port cities. Nevertheless, elites andfearful of Arisiide's restoration would at first believe they could beat the blockade, changing their minds only as rapid economic decline began to threaten widespreadincreasing the flow of seabornelo the United Slates,vf)
If Pressure on Arhtioc I* Increased
Until recently, few pressures or inducements have been employed by Ihe international community to persuade Aristide toBy themselves, impeachmeni o* denial
of access to official Haitian funds heldwould probably not cause him toIf tbe United States and other couati.es were about to withdraw from the embargo and reeogrire the de facto regime or if he believed US patience with his irttransigenee were about to expire, thereood charace he would again agreeettlement like the Washington Protocol. &rit)
tfthf Miliiary Is Threatened
The credible threat of force to restore Aristide could persuade Cedras and other military officers toeal that would preserve their own interests They would also continue, nonetheless, toigh priority CM lhe viability ofliiary and the safety of its personnel. Aristide would exploit the ihreai of iiitctveaiio* to avoad eomr*omw. It he relumed to Haiti through the use of force, many eolisied personnel would likely desert rearing reprisals, and the ArmyIhe police! wouM probably then be unablelay any significant role inlaw and order, pfff)
What Wotdd a. lalernalional Peacekeeping Force Enco meet!
An, credible international military force would face little or no orgamred opposition from Haitian mihttry personnel If anoccurred in tbe absence of asettlement supported by militarywc believe Haitian units would dissolve or retreat (seen theettlement were negotiated that did not provide formminent return, the military would probably remain in place and couldseful role in preserving public order
Many officers are US trained, and mostositive view of the United States.
ny event, wt believe the general staff would be unlikely to order resistance.
Enlisted personnel are poorly trained aad equipped, moraleenerally low and many are corrupt.
The primary ground units lhe Heavy Weapons Company and lhe Headquarters' Defensenot exercised together in years and would have difficultyresisiance even if ordered to do so.
Nonetheless, individuals and small groups of military personnel would probably engage in sporadic rung on foreign forces. Casualties would mosi likely be infectedew competert and wri: trained officers and nom-coiausiissioned personnel stationed in rural areas where they would have belter prospects of conducting small unit ambushes oractions. Such retaliation would probably be short lived, however, aswould have no access lo logistics or communications. lyf)
Once consolidated, an internationalforce would confront formidable challenges that would bt greatly magnified after Arisiide were restored to power. Haitian miliury leaders and their civilian allies probably would demand lhat foretgn forces remain as long as Aiistrdc o- an ally were in office. (His presidential term endsMjj**)
Foreign forcesorl-au-Prince and coastal towns would probably have little difficulty mainlinrnng order, bui Ihe densely populated countryside isinaccessible Violence between Aristide's supporters and enemies there would be likely