(UNTITLED) RE ENCLOSED REPORT ON ALLEGED SOVIET INCARCERATION OF US VIETNAM PRI

Created: 11/10/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

2

Honorable John F. Kerry Chairman

Select Cccsnittee on POW/MIA Affairs United states Senate.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Enclosedeclassified copy of the2 report on alleged Soviet incarceration of US Vietnam prisoners of war per your request.

An original of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairaan Smith. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

UH

i mm

^OWiT CONTfaX7

REPORT ClASS

COUNTRY 2

Soviet Incarceration of REFERENCES

U.S. Vietnan Prisoners of War:

SOURCE

SUMMARY; According to KGB Lieutenant General Peer Ivanovich Grigoriyev, specially. prisoners of war vere being received into che Soviet Union0 for long cerm or lifeciae incarceration and "ideological retraining." He laplied che number involved to be. The goal of che program was indefinite, but involved intensive psychological invesciga-tion of che prisoners and retraining to sake then available as required co serve che needs of che Soviec Union. Crigoriyev made theuring one of many personal conversations heldolleague whose father-in-lsvRU Ceneral and vho shared many common acquaintances with Crigoriyev among top level KG8 and GRU officers. END SUMMARY.

1. (Headquarters Comment: This report should be read CIA records contain no confirmation of tha allegedof che subsource deed btlov, despite the source'sGrigoriyeveading posicion in che KGB. Severalnamed in che text likewise cannot be identified. Webefore encountered even vague rumors among Soviet dissidentsinformants that. POW's from Vietnam are incarcerated in .

the USSR, much lessuch individuals ara leading "reasonably normal lives" in Che same region vhere numerous Soviet political prisoners have resided in exile. Ia short, while tht sourci may be reporting hia recollection of an actual conversation, we strongly believe char, this report merits licde If any credence from analyses. However, ln light of continuing high interest ln the question. personnel still listed as missing in action In Southeast Asia, this report is being disseminated vita appropriate caveati to concerned members of. Intelligence Community.)

2. rivate conversation which was heldGeneral Pctreated. prisoners of war were being received fromfor long term or lifetime custody and "Ideologicalche Soviet Union. (Source Commenc: Grigoriyev did nocche number of prisoners involved. The term he used poryadke naskol'kitchas tozha yesc" which"on tha order of severalmplying the number to be The prisoners were descined for confinementacility Crigoriyev, who learned of Che program from an unnased highcolleague, undtrscood that Soviets rather Chan NorthInvolved in che initial selection process and thatto be continually assessed for suicabilley. He Implieddetermined co be unsuitable would jt eliminated andocher candidates. Grigoriyev made his conmenc

while servingolitical ideologist ead personnel officer at the All-Ualoo Scientific-Technical Information Canter of tha State Cooaltcet for Science and Technology In Jtoscow. He had previously served as Chief of tht KGB's Personnel Directorate and In thac capacity would have very likely made contacts among KGB officials subsequently responsible for organizing any such prisoner program.)

3. According to Grigoriyev, the goals ofart indefinite but involved intensive psychologicaltht Individuals and utilization of them as raqulrad co strvtof cht Soviet Union. Grigoriyev understood thac chewastandard prisoo, but rather one in whichlaad reasonably normal lives. During tha conversationthac precedents existed forrogram ia che Sovietclcad similar previous efforts with Spanish, Japanese, and Ht scared chat in past programs, participantsco marry Soviet women.

f*> '

4. Source described Crigoriyevery

professional and security-conscious person

. Crigoriyev, In his capacity as an institute personnel officer, was the first Individual to interview source upon his transfer to the information canter, Crigoriyev requested basic biographic data and -acknowledged being acquainted with several Individuals listed by source, particularly

General Feodorkrynoik)), whoRU officer serve as Deputy Chief of Iacelligence for the Far Eastern Military District In thes. Slrynnik and Grigoriyav owned dachas near each other and while not close friends, held each other in high respect. In addition to Skrynnik, Crigoriyev was acquainted with (FNU) rudnikov))'who was active in Western Europe and Germany for the RGB, (FNU) ho had servedGB official in Poland and Geraany, and (FHTJ) ho served as KGB Deputy Chief for Administration and Supply. eose of trust hadbean developed over many years of mutual association with top level KGB and CRUHeadquarters Comment: Ptudnikov may be identical with Mikhail Sidorovich Prudnikov, dobenior Soviet intelligence official whose memoirs of operations during and after World War Two have been published ia the USSR. CIA records do not identify any individual named Crodoselskiy or Cridniyev as having served ia Soviet intelligence.)

5. Crigoriyev volunteered cheregarding the Vietnam prisoners during one of nany private conversations during thes ands. His duties ware aot particularlyyears as an administrator in che KCB. He was often finished with his work in the early afternoon and, rather than go hose or engaged in oucsida interests, held informal discussions in his office. (Field Comment: Source stated that he was the person cose frequently chosen by Grigoriyav for private conversations.) Topics primarily involved Grigoriyev's personal affairs and health, but also included political topics. During one of these sessions tbe subject of prison camps arose. In particular chose which furnished labor for Siberian economic development. The conversation then shifted to Vietnam and the apparent increase in strength of South Vietnam at the time and the apparent instability in the Sorth. Crigoriyev agreed, citing the. committment to the South, but added that the Soviets were also making gains. He then described the program. prisoners.

6. Crigoriyev was trainedrofessional military officer and served in the tank troops during World War II. After th* war ha was assigned to che Party Central Committee as ao amy representative, la th*e became KGB Deputy Chief for Personnel. Ha subsequently became critical of the recruitment, policies of KGB head Vladimirad was transferred from his position to that of KGB Security Chief for Soviet Bloc nations. Sooo thereafter haeart ailaaat and retired. In thes he accepted the position at the Information Canter.

7. General Skrynnik joined th* Russian cavalry7 and subsequently eatered the Odessa artillery school. Upon graduation he was assigned to tha Zhitomir military district. 1 ha entered the Frunze Military Academy. He advanced rapidly and ineriod was sent to China as Deputy Military Attache. He joined Mao's long march and began to estahllsh intelligence agent networks for the Soviet Union. Be remained in China2 exceptrief return9 to establish an intelligence school in Moscow for China operations. In the spring2 he was recalled from China to becoae chief of intelligence on the northwestern front, wher* he remained for the duration of che var. After tha war he was assigned as Soviet representative to the Berlin Joint Cooaission for Repatriation. After serving ia Berlin59 he returned to Moscow as altber chief or deputy chief for intelligence at the Frunze Academy. He than served as Deputy Intelligence Chief of the Far Eastern Military District. H* retired from the military Skrynnik was subsequently recalled to duty to re-establish agent networks in China after the Chlna-OSSR split but refused to leave retirement. (Headquarters Coanent: CIA records contain no independent confirmation of tha details of Skrynnik's career provided here.)

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA