OXCART UTILIZATION OVER CUBA

Created: 8/3/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: OXCART Utilization Over Cuba

In response to your recent comments exploring the useeconnaissance vehicle other thanver Cuba we must disqualify ourselves regarding Air Force aircraft such ass's without time consuming research. ogical successor to, we have examined the OXCART vehicle as to its availability and probability of survival. The review considers two speed regimes, mach5 and mach. Related considerations are briefly outlined below.

Mach5 Capability:

a. imited capability has been demonstrated at this speed regime. Performance data has been validated which would provideon-refueled range of0 NM and an average penetration altitudeeet.

Hardware: Five aircraft presently availabl possess this capability. Eight Project

this speed regime. Payload systems have been qualified, c. Restrictions:

(1) Unacceptable performance of theendezvous system. Qualification is expected by Theof air tactics and training for the Project pilots and tanker aircraft crews should be completed byerial refuelings could be accomplished using ground control vectoring and radio navigation aids with attendent increase in operational risk.

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d. Vulnerability:

n essential element of OXCART vulnerability estimates are computer simulations of the vehicle against theeapon system. Intelligence information recently acquired from the

Ihas brought forth two major differences in the

guidance equations for GUIDELINE as contrasted to earlier estimates. These two terms give theystem improved capability and modify previously recommended operational procedures.

n order to guarantee survivability with the OXCART vehicle at mach5 It is necessary toath no closer than aboutM to anyite, to use launch detection equipment to determine GUIDELINE launch, and to turn away from the siteg level. If, however, theM offset or the maneuver fails.the vehicle is very susceptible. Miss distances become of the order ofeet under these conditions. When noise jammers become available iniss distances increase but notafe level. In any event, launch must be detected. Either the signal intercept package or the Red Dog System (both available inillaunch signal even thoughisk of false alarms. The missile launch indicator radar which should drastically reduce the false alarm rate is scheduled for use by The Fan Song RF Direction Finder, which is to be available ins also necessary for determining the proper.turn direction. However, If the locations of all theites are known.and with appropriate mission planning, the correct turn direction can be determined without the Direction Finder.

3. Machapability:

a. Status: All assigned Detachment aircraft are presentlyariable bypass modification which will permit sustained flight to machnd above. The estimated non-refueled range at this speed regime should be approximatelyM; average penetration altitude should0 feet. An operational capability at this speed regime without aerial refuelings should be attained

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during the period fromctober

Priority for the variable bypassbeen established for four Detachment aircraft and shouldduring Project pilot training in thisshould be completed during Thecapability, though not expected toroblem, willduring this period.

In order to guarantee survivability with the machehicle it is necessary toath no closeroM to anyite, to use launch detection equipment to detect GUIDELINE launch, and to turn away from the siteg level.

IfoM path ia not maintained or no turn is taken, the miss distance becomes very low without noise jamming. Whan the noise jammer becomesn January he combination of jamming and velocity increase (over the mach5 vehicle) will appreciably increase the miss distance but not, in all cases,ompletely safe level.

4. Concept of Operation:

Until an aerial refueling capability has beenwould launch and recoverlorida base,Air Force Base.

Once an aerial refueling capability hasmissions would launch and

would be planned, directed and controlled byand executed in the field by Agency personnel.

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5. Recommendation:

a. Overflight missions against Cuba at mach5 are not recommended because of the following reasons:

The machapability should be attained almost simultaneously with the availability of minimum necessary defensive systems.

The one-third increase in range at machould provide more operational flexibility and greater target coverage.

The reducedvoidance path would permit higher photographic quality.

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OXCART

Distribution:

- DCI

- DCI

- DDCI

-

-usrt

A/OSA

ech/OSA

XC/OSA

S/OSA

- RB/OSA

- Holdback

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ARC-50

Signal Intercept Package

Refueling Rendezvous Equipment

Intercept and record signals of interest to determinelight the extent to which it was tracked

OF TEST

4

4

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4 all aircraft equipped

4 with four units and ground processing gear

DOG

missile lift-off indicator using missile guid ance commands as the indication. Also optional active transmission of false commands to the missile

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ith two units using flight test gear.

SONG RF Direction Finder

F signal. Locate and position radar site in range and azimuth within vulnerable zone. Also provides reference signals for correlation with RED DOG

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ith two unite using flight test gear

and C- Band Noise Jammer

Missile Launch Indicator Radar

target range from FAN-4

to force missile into three-point guidance mode.

Detect missile approximately-5

seconds after launch while

missile io In boost phase.

Identify by doppler frequency

shift.

ith two units using flight test gear

5 with two units using flight test gear

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Original document.

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