ORR CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-14-64 CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES

Created: 10/6/1964

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Pages opy. No.f 60

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ORR CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 4

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MP5 (ORR Project No-

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports

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This contribution to NIEresents the evidence regarding Soviet theater forces that has been acquired since the preparation of the General Purpose Forces section of the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning (lAP). Specifically this contribution brings up to date our knowledge of (l) Soviet policy and doctrine for ground, naval, and air theaterhe Soviet Tactical Air Force and the Satellite Airhe Soviet Haval Surface, Submarine, and Air Forces; and (It) the Soviet tactical missile systems. In addition, thereviews briefly the evidence pertinent to Soviet development of an antltactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system and the effects of the low wartime birth rate on the manpower available for rsilitarv conscription

No attempt has been made to review soviet ground force capabilities as this subject remains under consideration by the Joint CIA/DIA Panel Study Group. Also, there is no consideration herein of the airlift or sealift forces, because little could be added to the material contained in the IAF.

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I- Recent Trends In Soviet Policy and Doctrine Regarding

General-Purpose Forces

II. Military

A- Effects of Low Birth Kates on Military Conscription Effects of Low Birth Rates on the Civilian Labor

III. Tactical Missile Systems

System

1. Current

P.. Tactical Missiles Under

3- Levels of Deployment Through

System

3- Requirementow-Altitude Capability

h. Antitactical Ballistic Missile DeveLopmente

IV. Soviet Tactical Air Force and Satellite national Air

Tactical Air

Mission ar.d

Developments Through

Air

V. Sovieteneral-Purpose

A. Current Site and

Submarine

Surface

Naval

Page

B.

Against Surface kl

Against

Tables

Soviet Males Reaching Conscription

Number of Soviet Conscripts Implied by the Estimated

Force Levels,

Requirements for Soviet Conscripts Implied

by Estimated Force Levels,

ii- Estimated Number of Soviet Tactical Missile Launchers,

5- Estimated Air Order of Battle of the Soviet Tactical

Air Force,o

6. Estimated Air Order of Battle Of the Suropean Satellite

Hational Air Force,o

7- Estimated Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment Excluding Ballistic-Missile Submarines, Selected Periods,

to

8. Estimated Annual Construction of Selected Soviet Haval

Ships, FiscalTO

9- Estimated Air Order of Battle of the Soviet Naval Air

Force,o

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CAPABILITIES OF SOVliT GENERAL-PURPOSE

I- Recent. Trends in Soviet Policy, ana Doctrine Regarding Gcr.eral-Purposc Forces

Soviet doctrine for the employment of general-purpose forces has been changing In recent years an the focus of Soviet strategic thinking has shifted from its traditional preoccupation with continental land warfare to the problems of Intercontinental warfare waged with advanced weapons systems. Thus far this process has affected mainly theaspects of the employment doctrinequestions concerning the utilization or weapons, the composition of forces in theater operations, command and control, and so forth. Broader questions affecting thebetween theater campaigns and global operations or the role of theater warfareeneral nuclear war have been scarcely touched. On these questions, Soviet doctrineumed until recently anosition, holding, on the one hand, that general naclcertay be decided in its initial moments by njclcar missile strikes, UkX, on the other, thatinal" victory inar will require tbe coordinated action of all branches of the armed forcesat Is, the action of general-purpose forces In theater operation*.

mbivalence of Soviet doctrine on these questionsontroversy on the level of practical policy that has been agitating the Soviet leadership for tev-ral years. jrlng UttM yearsaimed at focusing the Soviet defense effort cr.

the strategic forces at the expense of the traditional armshave encountered persistent opposition from the military leadership. Public contention has arisen over questions of the allocation of resources, the structure of the armed forces, and the kind of war for vhich the Soviet armed forces should be equipped and trained to fight- The result has been something of an impasse in defense policy: Khrushchev's efforts at reform have been deflected, modified, and even blocked. ilitary establishment adapted to the requirements for large-scale theater warfare on tho European continent hus continued to coexistilitary doctrine increasingly oriented toward the threat of nuclear warfareransoceanic enemy.

breaking. ew phase of controversy has beep underway that appears to reflect pressures for change at th* policy level. The character of the controversy, the circumstances in which lt has developed, and the trends that It. has exhibited suggestew step is being taken

strategic and theater warfare.

to resolve the inconsistencies in the existing doctrines concerning

Ihe latest phase In the controversy opened at the endhen an announcement by Khrushchevilitary manpower cut was being contemplatedisible negative reaction from military leaders. It is now known that this announcement cameiteew program of strategic missile deploynerit wasetting underway. This coincidence, plus the initiation in the military press at the same

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ew discussion of military doctrineecalling theinitiated by Khrushchev in connection with his earlier reform programuggestedew effort was getting underway to bring Soviet military policy into line with Khrushchev's strategic con-

cepts .

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initial course of discussion in the military press during the early months of this year, however, indicated little progress for Although most of the articles in the new doctrinal seriesa veneer of modernist verbiage, many of thorn reiteratedarguments tending to support the need for maintaining theater warfare capabilities in contemporary conditions. irtual resurgence of traditionalist agitation occurred at one stage in the discussionluster or articles appeared openly extoLling the "older" anns and even questioning the validity of newer "official" concepts. On the practical level, also, reform appeared to be faring poorly. Khrj-sbchev's proposal for tbe reduction of manpower rectal ned officially in force, but there waa very little evidence thai any eubatantial force reductions were actually taking place. In the meantime, the military leadershiponspicuous oilencc on the measure. ^

In spite of these unfavorable auspLces, however, the discussionurn in Khrushchev's favor and has now resultedajor new doctrinal formulation that strongly reinforces his campaign for rcfora-Tne principal contribution of the new formulation Is to remove the ambiguity that heretofore surrounded the Soviet concept of the

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of theater forces in nuclear waramely, the ambivalent position that the outcome ofar might be decided in its initial moments and yet require the coordinated action of all arms to insure final victory. According to the new formulationpresented in an authoritative article written by Marshal SokolovsRiythe outcomeuture nuclear war will be decided in "minutes, hours, and days" and cannot be protracted.

Other Soviet spokesmen. Including Khrushchev, haveuclear war might be short, but none has previously asserted categorically that it could not be long. The importance of the new formulation lies in the fact that Itonceptual premise on which the advocates ofnrgc theater foreeii have heretofore pressed their casenanely, the viewuclear war could not be successfully broughtonclusion without tbe destruction of the enemy's forces on the ground and the seizure of his territory. The new formulation does not ruleole for theute: forcesuture nuclear war, but it appears to clear the groundore precise definition of that role andifferentiation or that role from that of the strategic forces.

Other aspects of the Sokolovskiy article bear out this general assess-aent. The picture that it projects of theater operationseneral nuclear war suggests greater flexibility in the employment of forces than has heretofore been evident in similar discussions of this subject. The possibility that ground troopn may not be required In

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theaters is allowed, and an element of contingency is introduced into the question of whether nuclear exchanges will beeneral offensive by the ground forces.in Europe. Moreover, in differentiating the lengthonnuclear waruclear war, the article appears to beoctrine and policy for limited wax contingencies.

It would be premature, however, to regard the Sokolovskiy article asinal turning point In the internal Soviet debate over military doctrine. Already In the few weeks that have elapsed since Its publication, writings have appeared that contradict its spirit and some of its specific postulates, nevertheless, the reputation of Sokolovskiy gives grounds for believing that the article is intended toew consensus on the subjects under discussion- As such, it may be interpreted as reflecting the views that ure now likely to predominate In the formulation of military policy.

The question of the size of the Soviet armed forces has been at the center of the debate over military policy in theince Khrushchev announced Me programrastic reduction of military manpower in Both the economics and the politics of Soviet defence policy have been bo intimately interwoven with this question In the intervening years that it can scarcely be regardedere technical issue concerning the availability of eligible manpower or the competing demands of the civilian economy. Hrvertheless,factor*irth

rates and labor supplyaveanifest bearing on Soviet policy affecting military manpower, and they are likely toontinuing influence in the future. The effects of the low wartime birth rates on the manpower available for military service and the probable effects of the increasingly keen competition for skilled manpower that Is being generated by the civilian economy are analyzed below.

A. Effects of Low Birth Hates on Military Conscription

The low point in birth rates during World War II occurredhen the level of births fell to about 1j5 percent of thathe effect of this drop on the numbers of males becoming eligible for military service is shown in Although the decline in the number of men is considerable, it is not as serious as was previously believed, and the pattern of decline is different- The low point was reachedi3 rather thanI45 as had been estimated. The decline in the number of men available for military service is still of importance, however, ia view of the fact that in thes annual conscript classes totaledillionillion men.

Normally the maximum proportion of men available forfrom an age group is aboutoercent. The remainder are unavailable because of exemption, deferment, and such other factors as labor commitment? and influence. As shown ir. Tablefter deductions for those unavailable, the supply of potential conscripts2 may have been as small as one-half of the requirements of thes.

* P.elow.

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Table 1

Soviet Males Reaching Conscription Age

Thousand Person;;

Males19Con-

the Year

0

to to

oviet males became liable for conscrlp-tion atxcept for general secondary school graduates who could be taken at In2 the law was amended to make all males eligible for induction ats yet, however, the USSR has continued to rely on menears of age for the largest part of its conscript classes.ndears of age continue to comprise theas in the past.

unpublished data compiled by the ForeignBureau of the Census, aaU.

owever, the number of men In the military and security forces had been reduced by successive cuts since The Korean War period to the estimated level shown in At the level estimated for6 million conscriptB would have been in service. Becauseother than those in the Navy, normally serve termsears, P.elow.

oercent of an age group is estimated tofor

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Table 2

Number of Soviet Conscripts Implied by the Estimated Force Levels

Thousand Persons

Midyear

Level

v

Conscripts normally comprisef the combined Soviet military and security forces. onstant relationship ofercent conscripts andercent cadre is assumed in this contribution, although during periods of variation in force levels the ratios may be altered temporarily.

major class sizes cfen are implied by the figure6 million. However, the USSR uses varying sizes of conscript classes as one xeans of changing the level of the military and security forces. In view of the reductions probably accomplished7he numbers of men in the conscript clashes inere approximately as follows:

Year of Service Class Year Thousand Persona

rst

Third rth

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shown In Tableurther reductions in tbe force levels are estimated to have taken place byndith an increase by lateau at theevel is estimated fornd. Given the distribution of conscript classes that existed inhe estimated force levels would have required conscription of classes in the numbers shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Annual Requirements for Soviet Conscripts Implied by Estimated Force4

Persons

760

680

760

600

Host Soviet conscripts are Inducted at As shown ir. Tablehe number of men aged1 and2 probablynsufficient to satisfy the requirements for conscripts al the estimated force levels and may be insufficientf no reduction has beer, initiated. The total shortage1^ as uhown by our data probably was the range of. The number of men available0 greatly exceeded the requirements estimated for those years, however, and the deficit12 could have

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overcome easily by conscripting men agedndho hadbeen In service. Tn fact, the surpluses overthe90 could have provided conscripts into have maintained the military and security forces atevels through the yearso Intherefore, the Impact on the conscription system of thebirth rates during World War II was not sufficient reason aloneUSSR to have reduced Its military rorce level below that or

Some pressure on the conscription system was noted inhen the USSR appeared ready to induct menears of age during the following year. Evidence shows that, althou*di begun. Induction of this group3 was stopped before the processing was complete. Instead, requirements evidently were met by reducing the number of men deferred fronyear-old group. Assuring that our estimates of the force levels are approximately correct, these move* would have beerunless the number of men available for conscription was leBS than that shown In Table |

Should the USSR wish to reduce thp level of military manpower,b is believed toost advantageous year. The ratios between the nvecber of men In the conscript classes now In service are quite uneven. Hore than kO percent of the conscripts are In the classhich Is being replaced. The USSR Is believed to prefer that, aboutof the conscripts be In each of the three

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military forcesource of civilian manpower, although desirable, were not "mandatory." f ]

Nevertheless, the requirement for civilian laboractor contributing to the decision to reduce the military forceSoviet officials could not have been certain of the ultimate level of success to be achieved in their cumpalgn tolaborrates,eductionillion men in tho military forces would have provided an Important annual increment during eachritical Also of importance is the fact that men of the age for military conscription are "prime" labor, higher in quality than the marginal workers acquired by government "persuasion."

In sheer numbers, military manpowerery small part of the

total labor force. Total civilian employment in the USSR3 is estimated to have been moreillion persons. The primary impact of the military manpower requirements is not so much the number of men included ir. the armed forces as it is the growing number of skilled workers and technicians necessary to the military establishment to operate Its rapidly growing Inventory of complex weapons systems. The nature of the equipment being operated and maintained by the Soviet armed forces has changed drastically over the lastoears- Rot only have totally new weapons systems like guided missiles and nuclear submarines beer, introduced In large numbers, but also much of the equipment of the "conventional forcen" has increased markedly in developments have increased the military demands for

trained men, who also are sorely needed in the civilian economy. The reductions in military manpower made Ins were largely at the expense of infantry units. Cuts ins are likely to affect skilled manpower as well.

Thus reductions in the military forces nay be of even greater value to the labor force The Soviet government has achieved about the maximum labor participation rate possible through present measures. Additional measures are likely to be of little assistance; future increases, therefore, will beunction of population growth. Of more importance is the difficulty caused to industry by the present emphasis on agricultural production and the accompanyingprovided agricultural labor. 3oviet industry traditionally haa tapped agricultureource of additional workers. This supply is being reducedime when military requirements for technically trainedncreasingly conflict with the Interests of

III. Tactical Missile Synt^-wr.

Since the end of World War IX the USSR has developed, produced, andumber of short-rar.ge ballistic and cruise guidedsystem* aa well as free-rocket -ower-ground (FROG) systems for the tactical support of ground force operations. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the ground forces has been one of the major factors affecting the development of Soviet theater warfarever the past few years. Soviet military publications make it clear that nuclear

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weapons and tactical missiles now constitute the "main firepower" of the ground forces.

A. Offensive Gyii tern

Tactical missile system currently deployed in the Soviet

operational Inventory include several models of the short-range, solid-propellant FROG; two models of tho Scud ballistic missile (GOauticalndm-range cruise missile Shaddock. Information acquired since the publication of3 Indicatesew model of the FROG has begun to appear with Soviet forces in Kant Germany andew ISO-nm ballistic missile may be under ossible decline in the deployment of the Scud system indicated by the lower rate of training firings over the past year may behia development. The Scud missiles are expected toin the inventory throughowever,ollow-on system could not be ready for operational deployment6 at the earliest, (jor 'he estimated deployment, of Soviet tactical mis-

1. Current Kodele

Initial deployment of the first Scud missile tourlear warheadm) ir believed to have taken pLacehe ultimate level of deployment ofnm miBslie probably was reached by the endhenoaunchers, organizedoistile brigades, could hove been in ihe field. hurr-irfi!jri was expected Un* level of training

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indicated by test-range data suggests that the level ofreached0 was maintained at least through

Ar. improved Scud missileangean and equipped touclear warhead (SS-lc) was first deployedl. After normal program growtheat-range training launchings attributable to the SS-lc appear to have almost stopped In the first half Indeed, all launchings onm range of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range fell off very sharply, although other activities remained at normal levels. As yet, only about half of the expected number of training launches have occurred this year. Most ofI1 autumn training period remains, however, and theoaunchings required to maintain the SS-lc program at itsevel could be performed before the and of the year. Alternatively the launchers that were operationalould be kept, in the fit Id withoutfor the launch crcwF. The efficiency of tlie launch crewe would decline, however, because fxcerien^ed crew members would bewith conscrlptr and young officer? who had not participated in live firings. J

The USSR hae allocated to the Shaddockhc long-range tact'eal missile mission. m cruise missile was first deployed by the ertdnd* it was apparent that the Shaddock was to be tbe sole current replacement foranlesile Siblinghich is no longer In the operational inventory. Uunthlngs indicate that by the end3 fromo 65

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launchers could have been deployed. The estimated rate of deployment probably will be maintainedystem comparable to that of the US Pershing hes been developed.

Soviet line divisions in East Germanyew FROG

system3 thatruck-mounted rail launcherissile somewhat smaller than the FROG 3A- Technical evaluation of thishas not been completed, but the range of the new FROG might be lens than the5 nm estimated for the Because of the pattern of deployment in the Group.of Soviet Forces, Germanyhe new FROG probablyupplement to theather than a[

2. Tactical Missiles Undert

Current systems of Soviet tactical ballistic missiles do

not represent satisfactory solutions to the requirements of the ground forces when measured against the level of current missile technology. Soviet military writings indicate that response times are too long, and the mobility of the support systems le unsatisfactory. Therefore, the developmenteplacement for the Scud-type systems har been expected. It now appearsan system is being tested. eries of six launchings in June and* resembles the group of feasibility tests conducted for (he SS-lc missile front9 tof general systess tests are detected in the springeavy training schedule cf launchings would be expectedith

The programs ussuraed for tactical missiles and FROG's for

the0 In the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning (IAP)

appear to be valid- The uncertainties as to the meaning of thepatterns of evidence relative to the Scud-type systems would make changes in the estimated programs premature at this time. of the status of the Scuds is not expected before the end of the year, at the conclusion of the second regular training period formissile crews. As stated above, if general systems testsallow-on to the Scud-lype systems occur in tho springuy resultyear earlier than forecast in the IAP- [

The outcome of the reorganization of the FHOC units in the

Soviet line divisions in similarly uncertain at this time. The ZAP provldnn Tor an increase to three launchers per division, the probable minimum to be expected. The capabilities of the new truck-mounted launcher seen In East Germany arcnown. Information Indicating the incorporation of 1Mb launcher into line divisions that oIeo have received additional'e could Indicate that the number of launchers assigned to line division* could be raised to six. Further evidence must be ocouired, however, before estimates of more than three

launchcrt per divisione warranted.

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B. Defensive

SA-2

ystem continues to be the only surface-to-air

missile (SAM) system known to he deployed with the Soviet Ground Forces.

ApproximatelyAM sites are located near important Sovietinstallations in Eastern Europe. In the event of war, however, the unitH (battalions) occupying these sites probably would remain with rear-area, semifixed installations, as they lack the mobility to keep upoving army. Because of this system deficiency, theof many additionalnits with the tactical forces is not anticipated.

GANE?

A probable surface-to-air missile (GANEF) mounted on a

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tracked gun chassis war photographed at tie Moscow May Say Paradeu. Analysisij photography indicates that ihe Klerile has aaltitude capabilityangec JO ins. The system's low-altitude capability, however,et been established. If the missile capabilities are in fact 'hose suggested, and the radar components of The system have been made equally compact, the GANEF couldobile SAM system wit* capabilities comparable to theyf%em. , however, no evidence whichhat this system Id now deployed, and no basis is available for estimating the

3- Requirementow-Altitude Capability

Tbe USSR, as indicated in its military documents,the requirementobile, low-altitude SAM system that can be deployed with front-line troops. Nevertheless, the only SAM system to which technical analysis permitsow-altitudethehose components (although mounted on wheels) are large and cumbersome (particularly the radar). esult, rapid movement of the system is probably impossible. This immobility may account for its having been observed only at fixed sites in the USSR. Therefore, if the GAKSF, as technical analysis suggests, isow-altitudeeries deficiency exists in the SAM defenseof their ground forces. It follows that the USSR could bo developingystem, but thereo basis for predicting when it might become available. |

k- Actitajticai ile LVvelcpner.ta

Statements in classified Soviet documents end attempts to intercept abouthort-range missiles fired into the Sary Shagan Anti-ballistic Missile ?est Center (SSATC)01 suggested an early interest in the development of an antltactical ballistic missile (ATRM) system. In addition, analysis of photography3 covering Launcht the SSATC suggested that Sites,nd It might, be ATIXfacilitiesprimarily because, unlike the Leningrad prototypes atndhey lacked large structures,

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ueber of unidentified objects were noticed to have moved about on the launch positions.

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assessment that these sites might be ATBM launchhas, however, always been tenuousimited primarily to the area of mobility previously noted and an assumption lhat the antimissile missile {AMM) launches01 (very possibly conducted fromndere ATBM-related rather than the beginnings or on ABM HAD program. In any cose, the AMM'3 could not have been fired fromnd U, because these sites were still under construction Inhe last month In which short-range missile firings into the SSATC were detected. Moreover,auncht SIas enlarged and revetted, causing it to resemble in size und appearance the revetted launch positions at the probable long-runge SAM sites located at Talinn and Cherepovets.

evidence regarding the status of any Sovietffort, therefore, remains highly tenuous. Some sort of ATBM program could be underway at Sites '. andnd the activity atndcouldixed AThV/long-range SAM effort. ppears at least as possible, however, that the observed activity at LaunchA (and at Sury Shaganhole) hasteadyof events in an ABM development program which evolved Into the Leningrad and Moscow systems. Finally, considering the difficulties that the USSR appears to have encountered in developing moblLe SAM fiyntens and considering the more difficult packaging problems Involved

inM system (particularly that ofthe site of the electronics cceponents to manageablet is doubted that an ATM system will be developed in the near future that would warrant wide deployment during the period of this estimate.

If the foregoing reservations are valid, tho only present

Soviet AIT DM capability is represented by theystem, which istoimited, inherent capability againstran or less) tactical missiles. The system's lack of mobility, however, its Inability to engage more than two targets simultaneously, its radar range limitations (versus targetnd its slow system-reaction time

rule outombat role exceptortuitous basis.*

In sim, tbe USSR docs not have any capability to defend Its field forces against attack by tactical ballistic missiles, and It Is not anticipated that the USSR will soon acquireapability. IV. Soviet Tactical Air Force and Satellite national Air Forces

nalytic of the latest observed ay*ten modiricstlonshe radar and alfslle does not suggest thatM capability has been improved.

rastic, reduction of Soviet aircraft strength inwith Khrushchev'r. cutback of conventional military forceshe size or the Soviet -radical Air Force (TAP) hus leveled off atQ aircraft. Current replacementnd an assessment of Soviet requireiw-nts suggestthe site cf tbe air forcev relatively stable (mm Tableid that It will decline only moderately during the course of this estimate. Although newer

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aircraft are now replacing older modelsatio of almost one-for-one, deficiencies in the composition and quality of the force continue to be evident. odern multipurpose attack plane for close support of ground troops is still missing from the inventory, all-weatherstill constitutemall part of the fighter force, and reconnaissance capabilities appear to fall below Soviet requirements. The nationaL air forces of the European Satellites add0ircraft of all types to the airpowcr potentially available to the USSR, although the capabilities of these forces vary widely and in no case measure up to Soviet standards. The replacement of older by newer models of aircraft is proceeding slowly in the Satellite air forces, and it is expected that these forces will consist largely or older generation aircraft throutfiout Uic course of this estimate (see. I

A. Soviet Tactical Air Force

1. MJcsion Biid Organ; 7fttion

Although the Soviet Tactical AirF) appears to

hoveSame ol its functions to Tie tactical missile forces as a

result of the weapon? revolution of recent years, the role or tactical aviation In theater warfare operations ii Still broad and varied. This role includes bonblng and air-tc-ourface missile strides against enemy theater force targets, close support of ground and airborne

ir intercept missions,reconnaissance. A= indicated

* elow.

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Table 6

Estimated Air Order of Battle or the European Satellite National Air Force

o

Ir.tarceptora

Fanwr Freeeo

1Ll: V- '. FltUr Pltnpot mj

TP-6T

to

0

oo

M

too

Total aircraft

to

to 60 o 75 o 85 o o

OOJo^fcCO O0 -cL'.-OC CO tc I'.-OC

Tfce Hotpot nay enter the Satellite forces by mis time. ItBore probable, hovever, that in order to the ?VC AOS through

r die USSR chnooea to begin phasing It out Of lta PVO forcei at that hole The iv" forcei relativelytbe USSB vill retain that* aircraft In

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above, Soviet nilitory publications have been giving Increased Cephasis to the potential contribution of tactical aviation to theater warfare operations.

The Soviet Tactical Air Force is adrainistrativelyto Headquarters Soviet Air Forces, Moscow, and operationallyto the commanders of military districts (MD's) and tactical air armies. In wartime, operational control would be vested in the theater commander.

TA? units are located throughout the USSR, in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. In the forward areas (the groups or forcesthe USSR and the peripheral military districts in the USSH) the TAF units are known as tactical air armiesn the Interior areas of the USSR, where there la no requirementull tactical air army, there are smaller elements known as air forces of military districts.

reexamination of

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the tactical air order of battle undertaken over therastic reduction and reorganization of theAir Force took place from April through organizational structurethut the

tactical air organizations In both Ihe Northern and the Leningrad MD's were placed under the operational control ofh TAA and that elements ofd TAA were transferred or deactivated. It appeara also that at least some tactical fighter elements in the interior and

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in the Far Eastern military diotrlcta were resubordlnuted to the air

defense forces (iapv0).

In general, the reorganization reduced the strength of the

TAA's in the Far Eastern and interior military districts out possibly increased the strength of the TAA's located in the eastern peripheral military districts and in eastern Europe. Since the reorganization, however, there have been no significant changes in the organizational structure of the Tactical Air Force or in the relationships among the force levels of the TAA's*

Together with these sweeping organizational changes, there

rastic reduction in the number of aircraft subordinated to the Tactical Air Force. onth period,actical air elements were decreased by almostercentreducing the force from aboutaircraft toircraft. sharp reductions were madethe number of Fagot-et fighter* andight Jet bombers. i

Betweenndactical air elements were

again reduced, although far less drastically than had been thethe second quarter In the period betweenery slight decrease ofircraft wastotal tactical aviation.

l, many of the older aircraft (Fagot, Fresco, Far-er, Flashlight, and BcagLe) have been replaced by current types (Flshbed C, Fitter, Flashlight D, andnd2 this

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Because

replacement prograa has been proceeding atne-for-one ratio.

Indicate that there

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has been little change in the force in the last year, lt is believed that the total number of aircraft In the TAF has remainediCO sinceeriod-2. Developments Through

The relative stability that has been observed in Soviet Tactical Air Force strength over the past several years suggests that the current air order of battle corresponds closely to Sovietfor tactical aviation. Because no radical changes in Sovietover the next several years are foreseen, lt is expected that current force trends will continue, andoderate decline in over-all strength is anticipated during the course of this estimate. The estimated production rates of new aircraft appear compatible with this forecast. It is therefore estimated that the total strength of the Soviet Tocticol Air Force inill rangeircraft. These figures could be somewhat higher If, as seems possible, the USSRequirementarger reconnaissance force than projected in this estimate.

With respect to the composition of the force, it isthat the replacement of older aircraft in each component withtypes will continue. Sincedvanced model fighters and bombers (Flshbed D, Fitter, and Brewer) have entered Soviet units, and, based on estimated production rates, it is believed

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that these aircraft vili continue to enter the force at approximately the same rate through Beginning inime period, it Is anticipatedew, multipurpose (ground support/interceptor)

tactical aircraft will be deployed. [

As noted above, current Soviet aircraft assignedround-support role were designed primarily for air intercept missions andhave poor load-carrying and range capabi lltlce. They are, however, supersonic and therefore capable of toes-bombing and delivering nuclear weapons at low levels.

As regards the secondary mission of tactical aviationair defensethes equipped with SPIN SCAN Airborne Intercept (AI) equipment. As such, lt la an all-weather Tighter ratherlear-air-naaa Interceptor. The vast majority of older model interceptors in the Tactical Air Force are of the latter type. The deployment to operational units of theua enhanced the all-weather air defense capabilities of Soviet tactical elements and byill greatly enhance that capability. (TSD)

During the past yearj^

PVO

aircraft have beer, conducting what appear to be ground support This observation, coupled with the atove-noted enhancement of the TAF's all-weather intercept capabilities, suggests an increasing development of dual capabilities In both force components. At any rote, it is clear that tbe TAF and PVO perform overlapping functions, and that they arconsiderable defiree complcmertary. (TSD)

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B. Satellite Air Forces

The primary mission of the Satellite air forces is air defense, but because they alsoactical support capability, they must be considered in assessing over-all Soviet capabilities for theater Those forces are subject to the unified military commandby the Warsaw Pact and In wartime would be under the ultimate control of the Soviet High Command. | |

A reexamination of all the evidence available concerningor aircraft in the Satellite air forces confirms thethe over-all force level* Tort estimated In NIKIs believed that these over-all force levels will declineby

Indicates that the number of new-generation aircraft added to the operational inventory during the past year Is considerably smaller than anticipated. Although the Fitter has been received recently by the national air forces of Poland and Czechoslovakia, it is believed that as of midyear this aircraft probably was still in training units and had not entered operational service. The Mangrove and theave been deployed only in very limited numbers. Thes the only new-generationthat has entered the operational inventories of the Satellite ulr forces in any appreciable numbers. These observations suggest that the replacement rate will continue to be slow, given the priorities enjoyed by the Soviet air force. It is now estimated that bypproximately

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toercent of the total number of aircraft in the Satellite air

forces will still consist of older generation models and that only from one-third to one-half of the total will consist of all-weather aircraft. Nevertheless, this total will significantly enhance the all-weather air defense capabilities of these forces. Moreover, this increment of new models throughhich it Is estimated will totalircraft, will add substantially to over-all Soviet capabilities

for theater warfare.

mm

Soviet Havai General-Purpose Forces

Traditional missions such as interdicting Western sea lines ofdefending the littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support for the seaward flanks of ground forces have been retained by

the Soviet Navy, as Its missions have been expanded during recent years

to Include operations against Western carrier and Polaris forces. thend the effectiveness with which the Soviet naval forces could counter this Western threat has re suited ir. aof naval forces.

In spite of the recent establishment In the Balticrigade-size Soviet "marinehere is little evidence oflgnificant amphibious capability. Few specially designed amphibious assault ships are available, and there is no knownprogram for then. Although the USSRcdem, and rapidly growiitg mercnaathe use of eerehtat ships for support opcratienn woulo.od harbor facilities. The ability of the

Soviet Navy to protect the sea lines of cammunication so vital to amphibious operations is severely limited and extends for only short distances. Bear Admiral Bogolepov, writing inl,lassified Soviet Journal, comments or. acphiblous operations as follows:

Surface transport is entirely feasible butthe support of forces that are superior to those or the enemy. What kind of forces? At present, with the inadequate range of aircraftmainly surface means. Calculations show that if we wanted to we could create such forces no earlier thanoears from now, and this is clearly useless.

The creationmall "marine corps" seems tooviet requirement for forces specially trained for limited beach assault or sabotage activities rather than on Intention to expand sealift and amphibious operationsignificant degree. (TSD)

Current naval programs reflect the continuing emphasis on themission of defense against carrier task forces and missile These proRrams portray the effort to extend and improve operational capabilities ineyond Soviet coastal waters. |

A. Current*Site and Production 1. Submarine Force

The Soviet submarine force is currently estimated athips (see. It consists ofouclearirst-line diesel submarines, andecond-line diesel P. 3k, below.

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Table T

EeT.ir.ated Soviet Naval Strength and Deployment Excluding BaUistlc-Ml aaile Submarines aj Selected'* to

jam

Dm Law

w* it (cw*>;

I Tor^eca

flirlHit 'utor)

Cruise) Loci-in'-cel rollc.-et) (Ttrpaao)Torpedo)I'Torpedo)

'fr II

--o

w

to

to

to

>

to

ta

ta

la 11

ta

to

u

ta

W

nine uerlarc.arIiiii tili>.u, nnnupj'i'tliv craft.

d. Themanerln: cottier) Ittt* tnU* ftun tc if yean old aorahe,lect unitereletatcd to aeeand-llatu* acrened eerlUr tlieiin aidir to BBlntalR uh perier.nrlhef< eveicr. aay Be retained

onerktlaftel ctatot* BMalBtVHalt. larlvBC alilp* uijiitjo year* old mr* carried'-eiii* until thereiMeote

e!o>al frot theor *ntll the/ err (iwll; so^iiJird k- ^itn t5 year* old. c - tie SltrJ Is* flUee Tor nselle BID.

It is estimated that the force will consist of0 unitsthe period of this estimate.

The construction of new submarines is divided between

cruise-missile and torpedo-attack types In roughly equal portions (see. Cruise-missile submarines probably are being built at three or four shipyards: thelass (Mod II) at Komsonol'ak in the Far East and Severodvinsk in the Northern Fleet area for adelivery rateo If units per year during the next several years and thelass at Sudomekh In Leningrad andat the shipyard in Gor'kiyombined delivery rate of I*nits per year. The estimated production oflass submarines at Gor'kiy is based on sightings ofLaas units in the Black See in There also is tenuous, evidence that in2 or3 Komsomol'ok may have begun productionie Pel submarine,lasslass. The involvement of mre than one shipyardonsiderablylaas program than was previously

about three units per year of thelass, built at Severodvinsk, and thelas? program is expected to taper off. In Tablestimates for both of these classes areto include possible lolLow-or, models.

elow.

2. Surfuce Forces

HqvoI Burface forces are and will remainarge extent heavily dependent on land-based logistic and air support during the period of this estimate. Honsissile equipped major surface units now includeight cruisers,estroyers, andestroyer escorts. The USSR now hasperational destroyers armed with cruise-type surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, lt Is estimated that there are five SAM destroyers and two to three SAM escorts In an operational status. It is estimated that the numbers of these latter two classes of ships will increase threefold during the period of this estimate.rowth will contribute to an Improvement in the effective range at which Soviet naval forces can operate from their home bases. i

lor antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air defenses are being emphasized. The Kynda class appean* to have been replaced by the Kashin class, with double the SAM firepower. Expanded production of the Hashin class to an estimated rate of two to four units per year should improve gradually the Soviet capabilities to conduct ASWbeyond the range of shore-based olr cover. In addition to the Kashin-class program, lt Is estimatedew SAM-equipped ocean escort is being built. The evidence concerning this Utter class is inconclusive, but it could correspond to "Projectt the Ni/toloyev

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class programs also are of importance to Soviet ASW capabilities. Construction of the Potl-class subchaser is continuing at an estiaated rateonits per year, butof the larger Petya-class subchaser probably has been terminated. The programs for guided-missile motorboats, both the Osft and Komar claooeo, apparently have continuedU, although construction of both classes probably will terminate in the near future.

The large ship currently under construction at Nikolsyev may contribute to on improvement In Soviet ASW capabilities. TheIs unlike that of any other Soviet naval ship. The large expanse of deck ?pace aftossible fast helicopter carrier. Such an addition to the ASW fleet would improve its submarine kill capability. Although 3one dertrcyers have beer, observed with helicopter platforms on the aft deck, the use of he}iccpterr, in ASW operations has been restricted to these based on Chore. Limited evidence penultsirm categorizatior of tMi; project nor an estimation of Itsschedule.

Ir. addition to the programs for line oh'po mentioned ubove, there are cent.ruing prcgracv for minesweepers and auxiliaries. The auxiliaries being cor it rue ted are .ighly ^pecloliaed watte, many cf which are to serve a> mobile basing units to support the submarine forces.

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3. Naval Aviation

The Soviet Haval Aviation Force (SNAF) is composed largely or Jot medium bombers tut also includes Jet light bombers, patroland helicopters (see. About three-fourths ofo UO Badgers in the SNAF have an air-to-surface missile (ASM) capability.

in

is estimated that the medium-bomber component ofwill decline only slightly throughnd that theof the new Blinder willeduction In the Badgerforce and the total phasing out of then need and on at least one exercise suggestive of an ASMio estimated that most if not all or the Blinder aircrafton ASM capability. Lock of evidence that the ASM for thebeen placed in operational use suggests that it In still underpossibly at the Vladimirovka Missile Test Range. Blinder has beer, deployed with SNAF units sinceit wasin the CRB contribution tohat an ASM for Itdeployed by It is now estimated that this weaponby If lt does -not, lt would have to be assumedASM development program is In difficulty, that the missile maydeployed without our knowledge, or that the Blinder will notASH.

liC, below.

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Table 9

Estimated Air Order of Df the Soviet Naval Air Force a/o

Itolta.

to

to

to

o 0

220

o

2*0

LO

o

0

to

to

to

to

0

o

5<

o

50

to

to

to

o

15

too

So

too

uo

to

to 1UC

0

0

o

30

too

6c

bo

to

to

Anticarriertoo

Attack aircraft

AS-2)

Blinder B o 10 o 30 o 50 o 60 o to

Badger o 90 o 80 o to 60

Blinderto 50 o 50 o 50 o 50 o $0 o to 50

Antisubmarine force

to 75 o 70 o 65 o 60 o 50 o to o ;

ASWto 15 o 60 o It

o lhC o

tototo to to to t

to to tc to 9

Total force in AOB

totototo

a- The flguroa in this table agree for the most part with those found In the LAP paper. The majorare caused by our determination that some Beagle aircraft can usefully be held in the general-purpose force andumber of Brewer aircraft can usefully be added to that force as noted In the text; vt do not bcllovfl now that the Mellow will be placed in opersticr.nl service and have amalgamated the Mall and land^

based ASW aircraft figure under the heading "Mew ASW aircraft."

their use is primarily in reconnaissance and utility roles, but other known missions Include mine-laying and bombing elusions. They also could be employed In strikes against coastal installations. Theew light Jet bomber, may replace some of the Beagles. Even though the Brewer's combat radius is0t Is still sufficient to allow operations in the mentioned areas, and this aircraft has the advajixage of being much faster than the Beagle. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that the USS3 may elect to deploy longer range aircraft in place of the Beagles. i

B. Wins ion

l. Against Surface Forces

Several classes of submarines arc available for long-range operations, the most important of which arc equipped with theruise mlsalle. Two versions of this missile are operational, thend them. (TSD)

Theanuclear warheadaximum yieldegatons. Itow flight profileeet and uses terminal homing guidance against surface targets. It is carried onubmarines,lass hod I

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aunchers each) andodifiedlassofaunchersaunchers each,rototypeauncher.

The Improved version of theruises at supersonic speed at an altitude of0 feet and descends to aneet for the approach to the target. ossible low-altitude, reduced-speed missile similar to theA also may be available. Thes carried byof the newer submarines, whichlass Mod IIaunchers each) andlasslaunchers each). Targetbeyond the radarurrent limitation on all cruise-missile submarines, depends on other submarines or aircraft acting as forward observers. All cruise-missile submarines are equipped to fire torpedos, and nuclear warheads probably are available for use against surface forces.

In addition to the cruise-misailc submarine force, there areong-range torpedo-attack submarines of which the majority are olderlass units. Although these units areto barrier-type defensive operations in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific,uclear-poweredlass) andicsel-poweredlassclass) submarines are capable of operations ranging to the mld-Atlantlc and mid-Pacific.

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The capabilities of the Submarine Force are augmented by the Soviet Naval Air Forces (SNAP). Currently available for operations against surface forces are approximately UOeconnaissance/ tanker aircraft,SM-carriers, andtolinder aircraft. Judging from the exercises they have conducted, these forces generally are well trained and well equipped, although their effectiveness io limited by problems of targetand aircraft range. { j

Target acquisition for SNAF aircraft usually is achieved through radio direction finding supplemented by occasional reports from such sources as merchant or fishing vessels. When US surface units have moved under conditions of maximum communications security, the Soviet defenses have had great difficulty in locating them at sea. (TSD)

The limited range of naval aircraft restricts theirand strike capability. To overcome this handicap. Long(LRA) bomber units have beenecondary missionthe SNAF In carrying out strikes against surface unitsdistances from the Against Submarines

Soviet naval authorities havearkedin their writings and statements of the threat arising from US Polaris-missile submarines, and the evolving force structure has been heavily oriented toward ASW operations. Two major problems lie at the root or effective Soviet ASW operationsthe detection of attacking

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submarines and the great and growing distances at which ASW operations must be conducted. Soviet ASW capability varies widely with the theater of operation. It appears to be effective in local sea theaters off Soviet-controlled coastlines where surface and submarine ASW forces, heavily supported and protected by aircraft, operate jointly. Asfrom the coastline increases, Soviet capabilities diminish

The surface forces available for ASW operations consist of moreestroyers of older classes and about Uo new0 and equipped with the latest Soviet ASW gear. This latter group includes aboutf the seagoing Fetya and Poti classes of ASW ships andf the Kaohln and Kynda classes of guidedfrigates. The newer Kashln class Is believed to beroostship in the ASW program.

Increased use of mobile acoustic platforms, Including

sonobuoya, is evident. Faced with the difficult problem of detecting today's high-performance submarines, the USSR is forced to rely largely on barrier-type submarine patrols carried out by the lurge fleet of diesel submarines oflasses. Search patrols made up of the growing fleet oflass andlass submarines range farther to sea than the large fleetlass and thelass conversions. ortion oflasses,function ob forward obnervcrs for target acquisition for

cruise-missile submarines operating against ene^iy surface forces and

will not be available for ASW operations. There is sone evidence thatlass nay be equipped to fire ASW torpedoes,ual role for these vessels.

Complementing the Soviet surface and submarine ASWthe SNAF antisubmarine forces currently consist ofadge flying boats and someight helicopters.* Althoughis capable of conducting ASW operations at ranges in excessno, the demonstrated ASW capability of the SNAF has beento coastal waters. Two new long-range ASWariety of sources, to be under developmenthetwin-turboprop flying boat, and an ASW variant of the Coot, atransport. The Mail flying boat suffers from thelimitations as the Madge, which is grounded during themost areas because Of its need for ice-free water bases. Itthe Coot variant would be the best aircraft for the ASWof the SNAF. The SNAF havereference forhowever, and there are indicationsan amphibious

version of the Hail aircraft. In this estimate, therefore, theare shownnew ASWhich includes an"mix" of both Mail and Coot aircraft. The existence oflow Ivin-je- flyir.,- li;r',:iv" :j ^ of forco

levels.

it is now estimated that

* For the estimated order Of battle of helicopters and transports, see the IAP.

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about ho of these aircraft were producedut there is still noevidence that any are currently operational.et-powered flying boat has cany inherently undesir-

able characteristics (suchhort combat radius) that arcvery difficult to overcome, it is doubtful that any of these aircraft will become operational. Nevertheless, up toallowcould be placed in service, probably in the Black Sea area where the operating environment might be compatible with their limited range and need for water bases.

The use of helicopters in Soviet ASW operations has been

restricted to operations from land bases. Under construction at tbe Kikolayev Shipyard, however,arge shipeet longeet acrousbeam. It is believed toaval 3hip and nay possiblyelicopter carrier. If this evaluation should prove to be correct, it would be the first shiphe Soviet Navy from which helicopters could operate effectively at long distances from the Soviet coastline.

Original document.

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