MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION AT LUNCHEON - SEPTEMBER 15TH SECRETARY RUSK'S DINING R

Created: 9/17/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Discussion ath Secretary Rusk's Dining Room

Attending: Secy. Rusk, Secy. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone

Reviewed the needs for photographic

I explained the neon

tnemission

discussed and recorded in USIB meeting ofh.the position thatfinite intelligence on when a

be made was not of importance to himolicy standpoint, as he knew it was inevitable and he knew of no political action he would take if finite information was given to him. Bundy seemed to agree. After extendedtatedould not conceive of our failing to take some actions if finite information was in our hands,usk might contact Gromyko or Dofarynin; the President might communicate with Khrushchev privately; we might discuss the subject with our Allies, both in Europe and the Far East; and we might take some position in the press through leaks or planted information. Certainly we should discuss the subject with Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. It was agreed that the embarrassment and consequences of failure outweighed the advantages and therefore, while the final decision was up to the President, Rusk would not recommend the mission. Bundy agreed. McNamara indicated his concurrence but was non-committal.

NOTE:0 o'clockuggested that the mission could be accomplished]

tely agreed that this planood one and should be approved. Subsequentlyeeting with the Presidentid not attend because of another appointment) the President approved the Takhli-Lop Nor plan and this was reported to me by McGeorge Bundyelephone call.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:!

2. During thisaised the question of

ana some

'his question was discussed by me with others but no actions had been taken to i

pian'. All seemed to agree that this mightood idea.

ACTION:ish appropriate people in CIA to discuss It at appropriate levels In thelt in further detail with Defense and McGeorgeif all are in agroement, to promptly take the matterappropriate people |

ana men to implement the program if all are in

agreement.

uroneg snouia bo

iiown wnen necessary to accumulate essential information and should be complementary but second in priority to flying ofhen and's were available.

4. There was an extensive discussion of proposed DCI briefings of Heads of State. McNamara raised the issueery antagonistic way, stating that he had not seen the briefing paperalf an hour before the luncheon. The Joint Chiefs had not seen it at all,tc. He said that his quick reaction was that "not moref the proposed information should be given in the briefings and his preference would be to have no briefing at all." Rusk sharply differed with McNamara. He said the subject had been under discussionumber of months, the Defense Department representatives were in on every phase and that the reasons for the briefing were important and he wished the briefings to go forward. McCone stated that in his opinion there were four important reasons: One, to further develop the confidence of our Allies in our estimates; Two, to establish the importance of the peaceful uses of satellites; Three, to show the contributions, and the limitations, of satellites in any disarmament steps; and Four, to discuss in detail the inadequacy of satellites for reconnaissance over Cuba. Rusk concurred in these objectives, in

3. The use of drones was discussed.

fact he stated and restated them during the long discussion in several different ways, but covering essentially the same points. aid that in view of theould like to call the whole briefing off and Rusk said this could not be done because of the elaboratewhich had been made. McNamara said that heew hours work on the part of the Thompson Committee and discussions with tho Joint Chiefs would clarify the problem. aid that that was all fine but if the results of such discussions were to sterilise the briefing to the pointould "advise thoseas briefing concerning the time of day and the condition of theid not think it would be advisable to go,ould not go. McNamara said be didn't thinkterile answer would come forward. greed to McNamara'seeting. of the Thompson Committee was ordered and it was agreed tho Joint Chiefs would consider the problem the following morning, early.

5. We discussed at some length the question of the Cuban overflight problem. xplained the status of SKYLARK. ointed out that the OXCART flying over Cuba would bo far less vulnerable than, but not entirely invulnerable; however it would be known because of the sonic boom in addition to radar detection. McNamara felt that the OXCART would not be vulnerable on the initial flights but if we engaged in frequent flightre-determined pattern the Cubans might put some of their SAMstate of alert which would very possibly catch an OXCART. He then said that he thought that oneonth would be all that would be necessary in order to secure complete coverage of Cuba, once everyays which was about all that was required.aid that auch coverage would meet USIB's requirements t

uulasruny oiistory oi weather over Cuba from records of the last two years of operations would indicate that with few exceptions several flights, rather than oneonth, would be roquired for substantial, though not absolutely, total coverage of the island.

It was agreed that the subject should be explored by COMOR and NPICeport prepared.ard study should be made of vulnerability.

ACTION: COMOR shouldtudy on the probability of meeting USIB's requirements of coverage

andudgment as to the n'jrr.Der o! merits per month, by month,n-.orith span, required from4 to5 in order to accomplish acceptable coverage of the Island with usable photography and second,T, collaborating to the extent necessary with NRO or Or. Fubini, shouldeport on the vulnerability of the OXCART under the SKYLARK program, using all available information on the capabilities of the Cuban radar system.

6. Question was raised by McGeorgo Bundy of the problem of forward planning. It was felt there was needresh look at our policies in very many areas of the world and ourwith such people as Sukarno, Nasser, Castro,tc. It was felt that no forward-planning activities should go forward immediately because of the implications, but probably in November and December intense studies should be made of tho whole serios of problems. There was no indication that CIA should necessarily participate as these are all policy matters although as the time for making the studies approaches, undoubtedly there willery important role for CIA to play.

hould discuss this role privately with Helms, Cline and Kent, and possibly one or two others in order that private and unofficial advance thinking might be done on this very important but sensitive subject.

7.

Discuss this with Helms and possibly others prior to departure today.

JAM(tapc):mfb:mcm

Original document.

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