Created: 9/17/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



SUBJECT: Memorandum of Discussion ateptember ISth Secretary Rusk's Dining Room

Attending: Secy. Rusk, Secy. McNamara, McCcorgc Sundy, Mr. McConc

A_eviewed the needs ission /

as discussed and recorded in USIB meeting ofh.

took the position tbatfinite intelligence on when

be madet of importance to hima UcysTardpoinT. as he knew it was inevitable and heo political action he would take if finite information was given to him. Bundy seemed to agree, After extendedtatedould not conceive of our failing to take soma actions if finite informationn ourusk might contact Gromyko orhe President might communicate with Khrushchev privately; we might (iiscuss the subject with our Allies, both in Europe and the Far East; and we might take some position in the press through leaks or planted information. Certainly we should discuss the subject with Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. It was agreed that the embarrassment and consequences of failure outweighed the advantages and therefore, while the final decision was up to the President, Rusk would not recommend the mission. Bundy agreed. McNamora indicated hl6 concurrence out was non-committal.

2. During thiiaised the question of's. This question was discussed by me withsome others but no actions had been taker, to imniemen the plan. All seemed to agree that this mightocd idea.

ish appropriate people in CIA to colder :hls, discuss it a: appropriate levels in the Decartment, discuss ii in further detail with Defense and McOeorger- agreement, to promptly take the matter up and appropriate peopleHH land then to implement the program if ai: are in agreement.

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4. There was 3r. extensive discussion of proooscd DC! brief-.nga of Heads of State. McNamara raised the issueery ar.Lagomstic way. stating that he had not seen the briefing paperalf an hour before the luncheon. The Joint Chiefs hadn It at He said that his quick reaction was tha; "not more, of the proposed information should be given in the briefingsreferencee to haveriefing at all. " Rusk sharply catered with McNamara. He said the subject had been under discus,ioumber of months, the Defense Department representative* were in on every phase and th*treasons for the briefing were important and he wished the briefings to go forward. McCene atatsd that'in his opinionre four important reasons: One, to furtheriop the confidence of our Allies in our estimates; Two, to establish the importance of the peaceful uses of satellites; Three, to show the contributions, and the limitations, of satellites in any disarmament steps; and Four, to discuss in detail the inadequacy o: satellites for reconnaissance over Cuba. Rusk concurred in these objectives, In

fact he stated and restated them during the long discus'siort in several different ways, but covering essentially the same points. aid that in view of theould like to call the whole briefing off and Rusk said this could not be cone because of the elaboratewhich had been made. McNamara said that heew hours work on the part of tha Thompson Committee and discussions with the Joint Chiefs would clarify the problem. aid that that was all fine but if the results of such discussions were to sterilize the srisfing to the pointouldhoseas briefing concerning the time of day and the condition of theid not thirut it would be advisable to go,ould not go. McNamara said he didn't thinkterile answer would corns forward. greed to McNamara'seeting. of the Thompson Committee was ordered and it was agreed the Joint Chiefs would consider the problem the following morning, early,

5. We discussed at some length the question of the Cuban overflight problom. xplained the status of SKYXARK. ointed out that the OXCART flying over Cuba would be far less vulnerable than. but not entirely invulnerable: however it would be known because of the sonic boom in addition to radar detection. McNamara felt that the OXCART would not be vulnerable on the initial Sights but if we engaged in frequent flightre-determined pattern the Cubans might put some of their SAMstate of alert which would very possibly catch an OXCART. He then said that he thought that oneonth would be all that would be necessary in order to secure complete coverage of Cuba, once everyays which was about all that was required. aid that such coverage would meet C'SIB's requirements^*

Jbutastudy of the history of weather over Cuba from records of the last two years of operations would indicate that with few exceptions several-lights, rather than oneonth, would be required for substantial, though not absolutely, total coverage of the Island.

It was agreed that the subject should be explored by COMOR and NPICeport prepared.ard study should be made of vulnerability.

ACTION: COMOR shouldtudy or. the probability of meeting USIB's requirements of coverage

extent necessary with NRO or Dr. Fubini, shouldeport on the vulnerability of the OXCART under the SKYLARK program, using all available information cn the capabilities of the Cuban radar system.

6. Question waa raised by McGeorge Bundy of the problem of forward planning. It was felt there was needresh look at our policies in very many areas of the world and ourwith such people as Sukarno, Nasser, Castro,tc. It was felt that no forward-planning activities should go forward immediately because of tha implications, but probably in November and December intense studies should be made of the whole series of problems. There was no indication that CIA should necessarily participate as these are all policy matters although as the timeho studies approaches, undoubtedly there willery important role for CIA to play.

ACTION: Discuss this with Helms and possibly others prior to departure today.


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