Created: 9/13/1964

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SUBJECT: Discussion with Rusk in hisSaturday,.

1. old Rusk of my increasing concern over the evidences of dynamic military effort on the part of the Soviets, the appearance of more single silos, the continuation of tho testing of new and larger missiles, evidences that they are engaged in an extensive radar development which may mean ABM deployment or an anti-satellite efforte could not tell, continuing Improvement of their nuclear submarine program, etc. aidas so concerned about all of thiselt immediately upon the completion83 that the President, Rusk, McNaraara, Bundyust sit down and review those estimates and concern ourselves with theaid that it was apparent to me that the Soviets were saying one thing in Geneva and publicly and doing quite another thing privately, from the standpoint of the arms race. Rusk agreed and said the mooting was necessary. He hoped that the issue might not get into public print prior to the election.

the reasons for

tusk is opposed to this and will oppose it with the HiTposition Is that the political consequences of the losslane outweigh the advantages of the intelligence gained. aid it was not possible for me to do anything but advance the arguments favorable to the flight from an intelligence point of view and let the President, after hearing me and receiving the advice of others, make the policy judgment. Similar problem arises in connection with the


1. Rusk Questioned me concerning the ChiCom nuclear

jAusk said tnat iJoorynm naa toia inumpHua at lunch that the Chi Corns "would getest at any time. " Thiseparture from Gromyko's position with Rusjyind Khrushchev's position /withew monthsear ago.


Rusk felt the French should probably not risk tne dangers ot getting"caught. However, he could see the validity of the argument and did not dismiss the possibility. (Note:o not wish to put this forward in any formal way. however, it is, in myossibility worth noting. )

6. Rusk queried mc concerning the reportrom Saigon of military presence and military personnel wandering around in armored cars, jeeps, etc. At this point Bill Bundy came in. aid that we hadlood of coup rumors, that they came from factors that were

dissatified wiih Khanh't recent concessions, that they were reprcscntativ of the deepening schisms between factions in Vietnam,idn't think there was enough of an organization toormidable opposition to Khanh or get awayoup.

7. Rusk askedhought was going on in the Communist world. He noted the growing indicaaons of independence on the part of satellite leaders, deepening rift between Russo and Communist China, and he wondered just what Khrushchev had in mind in trying to organize an International conference. aid that we too had observed the indicators. as particularly interested in Tito's trip to Hungaryidn't think Tito was trying to mend Khrushchev's fenceB, that on the contrary, he was trying to increase hie own Independentlso said that we agreed that the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening, wo had noted the deployment of tlie Soviet division to the Chinese border and also the differing positions of local Communist parties, such as North Korean castigation of the Russians and their apparent cooperation with the Chi Com b.

8. Rusk questioned the publication of the Togliatti letter in Moscowould not explain. greed that our demonologiats wouldresh look at the situation and report from time to time on our analysis as the situation evolved and unfolded.

9. Rusk asked if he should order Taylor to go immediately from Honolulu to Saigon, stating it would look bad if the American Ambassador was in Honoluluolitical disruption in Saigon. Both Bill Bundyelt that while the situation was unstable, there was no urgent reason for issuing such an order for Ambassador Taylor.

Original document.

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