NRO EXCOM MEETING AT 3:30 P.M., ON THURSDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER

Created: 9/11/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting0n Thursday,eptember

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance,cMillan, and General Carter

The meeting opened with distribution to each memberopy of "SKYLARK Status Report for Week Endingach member read the entire report thoroughly and questions were asked and answered by those present. Great interest was shown in tho report. Mr. McCone proposed and it was agreed to concentrate on getting BIRD WATCHER installed on two of the four aircraftinimum, if at all possible priorovember. It was also agreed that Kelly Johnson should be informed that the Executive Committee of NRO laid great stress on this project and was following it closelyeekly basis through the SKYLARK weekly reports. Action:o follow up on the above two requirements nd report results.

Therogram was then discussed and it was generally agreed that tho best solution to the problem would be to modify existing SAC aircrafteasonable turn-in basis withoutrash production line say on the basis of modifying four per year. It was also agreed that we should see whether or not some other contractor wasosition to do the workuch cheaper basis than Lockheed. Both of these agreements are to be consideredlan to be submitted by Colonel Ledford. This plan is tochedule ofand estimated completion dates and toisting of the actual modifications required. The general consensus was that modifyingH was probably as far as we should go.

Action: Colonel Ledford to preparelan and show it to )

General Carter prior to any further action with the NRO Executive Committee. Action: The charts used by Colonel Ledford at the prior briefing were supposed to have been reproduced, at my direction,0 sheets and provided all members of the Executive Committee. Mr. Vance was provided some sort of photographic copy about 3x4 inches, and these were notave him the book0 reproductions provided me bynd he retained that book, ant to know why my instructions were not complied with, and soon.

3. iUanthenbriefed on the problems causingin the

around command and control instructions being reliablyelectrical malfunctions of some sort. The latestset ateptember.

4. Secretary Vance then brought uplight towas under tho impression that it would be donerequired either an I

ic flight had previously been

aw no reason why we could not follow this routine again. Certainly thisuch better procedure than trying to do it out of"

Or. McMillan reported that he did not yet haveof all members of the Land Committee on the Land report but that it was generally encouraging as to the prospects foi Certainly he was all ready to proceedype of oj ation, and it was agreed that when the final Land report wasDr. McMillan would review it and report to the Executive Committee prior to going ahead with any big program.

Mr. McCone then reported that in following up onmade at previous meetings of the Executivelan had been developed tomall CIA element to assist General Greer by having this element co-located with General Greer and conduct CIA CORONA activities on the West

Coast, Mr. McCone said he contemplatedin several weeks to be in charge of the CIA

operations.ssVVaeaanaVn addition to being the head ofCoast CIA activities, would alsoinglecontact for Greer and for Washington on CIA He would provide advice and guidance towould be responsible for all CIA contracting andsecurity responsibilities. In addition, he would controlof :his was designed toingle

cohesive input to the CORONA programon^in^that program. fg*| Hsseaenr* uGerieral Gr e<

Washington so that he could obtain additional advice,assistance from our Headquarters competence as might Wessignment of

a couple of additional technical peopleater date. Mr. McCone pointed out that the successful operation of this planlear-cut understanding of the Executive Committee as well as clear-cut instructions to Greer. tated that these instructions should include participation of the CIA in all contractor/supplieratisfactory working relationship with Aerospace Corporation who nowystems engineering role,irm position in the Configuration Control Board or whatever new coordination mechanism is established for the system. Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone agreed that the veto concept of the Configuration Control Board was not working properly and that.the Control Board,an nntshouldonV.Ic.Mig s to General ureer Hie evenfrhese^are majormight have iu be-made book, at the Washington levcLA All of these points seemed to be agreed by everyone present but it was decidedouldemo for Dr. McMillan establishing the working relationships as we see them and proposing the type of guidance General Greer should receive from Dr. McMillan. emo is being preparedill furnish the Executive Committee copies of it. Action: General Carter to prepare appropriate memo.

7. Mr. McCone then brought up the problem of competing contracts being negotiated by General Greer along the' concept. He specifically mentioned Itek, Ferkan-Elrnj Fairchild along the lines of the Wheelon memo. 'Dr. McMillan indicated that he may have been responsible for Greer's actions and that Greer may have misunderstood his instructions. Mr. McCone saidenior executive of Fairchild, whom he know personally, had telephoned him inquiring asroposedwith Greer which appeared to be in direct competition with

a x. entrant tn rlisprnve the feaoibUity-eJM^BMtf DrT^cMillan said he was not aware of this fa-cat of-tl^"contractand would look into it right away. Mr. McCone pointed out that we had already contractedackup study by Perkin-Elmer in the event Itek proposals proved infeasiblc and that while he was always one to encourage the greatest diversity in think projects in order to ensure success, he thought it-put' Hit

position whan two separate agenciesd>viii.ffr>prirrM itfvy He said he would like to have this gone into thoroughly by Dr. McMillan and reported back to the next Executive Committee meeting. Action: None required by CIA until McMillan reports back.

8. There was general discussion of the USlB actions at the morning meeting same date, particularly with regard to the crisis satellite. Nothing new was added that had not already been discussed at USIB. Both Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance thought that perhaps we were looking at the same target too often in the Soviet Union and Dr. McMillan confirmed that he had the same impression. In other words, we should be careful that COMOR was not gettingepetitive rut, doing the same thing over and over again with inadequate imagination as to new areas, new targets, and frequency of observation. Action: Mr. Reber, pleaseook at this and give me an informal memo.

*

Marshall S. Carter Lieutenant General, USA Deputy Director

Original document.

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