SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMB

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Short-Term Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique

SubmMed by Ihc DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred In by fh* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai4

d:

CONTJ^Tled"

MAR 0

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The Central IntelUgenee Agency and tha intelligence orgoniioHom of the Deport' menu of State, Defame, and NSA.

Concurring.'

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER

Short-Term Prospects for the African Nationalist Movements in Angola and Mozambique

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM 1

CONCLUSIONS X

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PORTUGUESE AFRICA

U. ANGOLA

ORAE: Its Policies and Backing

Current Situation.

Political

The Outlook Within Angola

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0

11

External Developments AffectingCongo (Leopoldville)

DL MOZAMBIQUE

A The Nationalist Movement

Portuguese Position and Settler Attitudes

12

The Outlook Within MozambiqueIS

Probable Reactions ol Neighboring States12

TV. LONGER RANGE PROSPECTS13

T

SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

THE PROBLEM

in^na^nVa?ovements in Angola and Mozambique over the next year or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A The guerrilla activities of Angolan nationalists have been

iStl^S

sporadic fightingestricted northern area. There faBttle evidence of active dissidence elsewhere in Angola. The Cavern

x116

he GRAE isrfv Si*controlled by Holden Roberto;torn by mterruU dissension and tribal rivalries andby its lack of progress. Roberto will probably seekarms, from the USSR and Communist China andsome increase ln Communist Influence in the nextso. (Paras.

yheto shareand direction, but probably not for some months at least

The Angolan nationalist movement will be able to keep thealive at the present level if. as seems likely, it retains access to the Congo sanctuary, but we do not believe it will seriously

oMltet movement in Mozambiqueondlanes FreUmo. The movement has not yet progressed to the point of open fighting,ew raids andirons in the north, based on Tanganyika, are likely during the next year or so. The Portuguese military and security services appear

have control of the situation and the Mozambique nationalist movement is more important in terms of African politics thanhysical threat.)

D.ew steps to liberalize their colonial policy, the Portuguese have not taken, and are not likely to take, anysteps to meet the pressures brought on them to move towards self-determination or Independence for their African territories. Portugal may be able to preserve its present control of Angola and Mozambiqueood many years. But, we believe that the growing political and military costs ofcontrol of the African provinces will almost certainly force Portugal eventually to accommodate to nationalistfor seU-determination and

' The longer term Portuguese position wul be discussed in an NIE on Portugal scheduled lot

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DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON PORTUGUESE AFRICA

L Angola and Mozambique have been Portuguese possession* since the lflth century. Many Portuguese, and particularly Dr. Salaxar, believe that Portugaloral responsibility to bring Christianity and civilization to Its territories and consider that any surrender of this civilizing mission would be dishonorable. They hold that Africanshole are not yet capable of managing their own affairs and claim that events in the newly independent African countrieslhat premature Independenceerious mistake for theThere are, in addition, economic reasons why the Portuguese want to retain their African colonies. Angola is on Important source of foreign exchange; both Angola and Mozambique provide protected markets and investment opportunities.

ngola and Mozambique, as well as all other Portuguese territories, were redesignated overseas provinces and are claimed by Lisbon to be integral parts of the homeland. Theyew deputies to the Portuguese National Assembly. Nevertheless, their admlnlstra-tlon and many cf the laws governing them are very different from those obtaining In mainland Portugal. They are governed directly by Lisbonovernor General responsible to the Minister of Overseas Territories and such limited local autonomy as they possess Is exercised largely by the overseas whitehere Is little or no prospect that Saiazar or any likely successor will make significant moves towards independence for Angola and Mozambique In thefuture.

The growth of nationalist sentiment and political organization in Angola and Mozambique has been slow. Historically, the Africans ln these areas have been insulated from contact with the outside world, and even the most Innocuous African organizations have beenMoreover, the virtual lack of educational opportunities for Africans either In the territories or in Portugal, particularly at the secondary and university levels, has precluded the growth of politically conscious groups comparable to those in the former British and French colonies.

In the recent past, the Portuguese have been attempting totheir standing with the Africans. In both Angola andcertain onerous aspects of the treatment of Africans have been alleviated or eliminated, including widespread compulsory labor, forced cotton cultivation, and the designation of indigenato (native ward of

aretUWs in Angola andn Mozambique

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thearticularly In Angola civic action programs to improve basic health and housing, and stepped up educational projects, mainly at the primary level, have been introduced. Moreover, Lisbon has made some gestures towards increasing African participation in poUtical affairs ln the provinces by reforms which make lt possibleew additional Africans to vote. However, these moves are unlikely to prove any more effective In meeting African nationalist demands than were earlier modest attempts to improve Africans' juridical and social status. They reveal no chnnge In Dr. Salazar's basic determination to preserve the centralized authority of the Portuguese state. Lisbon Is aware that theretrain of separatism among the Portuguese settlers both In Angola and Mozambique, but also knows that the threat of rebellion has increased their sense of dependence on Portugal.

n the absence of any permitted political activity Inside theAngolan and Mozambique nationalists in exile have formed organizations dedicated to achieving independence. The development of such organizations has been impeded by strong tribal rivalries as well as the distrust between black Africans and mulattoes. None has enlisted any significant support from the white Portuguese community. None hadignificant capability to accomplish anything1 when, under the leadership of Holden Roberto's Union of theof Angolaidespread violence erupted in northwestern Angola. This caught the Portuguese by surprise and provided new hope for the nationalist cause. More fundamentally. It revealed that Portugal's attempt to insulate its possessions against the general trend of African political awakening bad failed.

he ability of the Angolan nationalists touerrilla force in the territory opened the way to new sources of material and diplomatic support in Africa.he Organization of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee designated Portuguese Africa as one of Its prime targets and thereby added to African agitation and pressure for independence for Angola and Mozambique.

II. ANGOLA

A. The GRAE: Its Policies and Backing

he Leopoldville-based ORAE, formed inertain standing in3 when the foreign ministers of the OAU recommended that all states extend diplomatic recognition. (About half the African statesew Middle Eastern states have doneffldaUy ItoUtical coalition, but for aU practical purposes the UPA is the GRAE.

oth the GRAE and the UPA have been dominated by Holden Roberto who has exercised virtually sole control over the nationalists' policies, finances, administration, and broad military strategy. In

practice, his authority represents the primary unifying element in the ORAE, whose ministers distrust each other, and frequently divide along tribal or party lines.

policies and long-range intentions aree favored nonviolence, and even now he probablyhis primitive forces cannot achieve military supremacy overHe now probably hopesampaign of militaryattrition will prove so costly to the Portuguese thatwill negotiate Angolan Independence. Politically, his longassociation with the Congolese Premier, Cynlie Adoula,support he has received from such countries as Nigeria andgiveneputation for moderation. He Is regardedAfricaolitician who wishes to preserve his connections withRobertoeputation for being stubborn and authoritarian.

GRAE draws most of Its strength and leadership fromeducated Bakongo tribe In northern Angola (and theof the Lowerhey compose aboutercent ofmillion black Africans. It has also received some backing fromcohesive, northern Klmbundu tribal group which includespercent of the black Africans. The GRAE's predominantlyforce receives the active supportubstantialthe populace in these tribalome havefighters, others serve as porters to carry supplies from

e have no reliable evidence that the GRAE, or any othermovement for that matter, has enlisted significant supportamong Angola's melange ofribes. While African nationalist sentiment may exist, there have been no signs of organized revolt among the southern or eastern tribes. There is strong tribal enmity between the Bakongo-Kimbundu tribes and the powerful Ovlm-bundu peoples of central Angola, who account for more than one-third of the Angolan blacks. Also, Roberto's high-handed treatment of non-Bakongo In the GRAE has vitiated his occasional attempts to offset charges of tribal favoritism byew representatives of other tribes to nominally Important positions. Finally, the GRAE is still almostlack African organization and Roberto, like many Angolan blacks, remains suspicious of the mulattoes in and out of Angola. esult, mulatto dissidents have mostly supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angolahich has been the UPA's only significant rival among Angolan nationalist groups.

espite the trappings of an organized revolutionary movement, the GRAE functionsow order of efficiency and remainsmall band of exiles in Leopoldvliie who derive uncertain political powerimited tribal base, andegree of acceptance by the

world of their claims to be the revolutionary government. Nev-ertheless, the GRAEoing nationalist movement and if it persists and has some modicum of success, it could have an appeal beyond its presently restricted tribal base.

he UPA'SPLA' sPUttwo competing factionsnd its fortunes have seriously declined since the OAUthe. GRAE. It never demonstrated any significant following in Angola, but its leadership is politically sophisticated and enjoyedwide international contacts Several of the MPLA's well-educated leaders have had long time Communist associations and3 the MPLA received Bloc financial and material aid. After an internal power struggle, one faction came under the sway of militant pro-Communists, led by former Secretary General Viriato da Cmz. The remainder of the organization, ledlack African, Agostinho Neto. has been reorganizedrontumber of tiny Angolan' African parties, including some sponsored by the Portuguese. For the Portuguese, this grouping is probably less unacceptable than the GRAB even though Neto has had contacts with the anti-Salazar followers ofDelgado.

B. The Current Situation

he military situation in Angola has dragged on with little chance during the past two years. Fighting is confined largely to sporadic guerrilla warfare, with operations centered in pockets (amounting to about four percent of Angolan territory) In rugged country near Car-mona. in the northwest, and Insee map attached). Support for the guerrillas In Angola is largely by overland trail from the Congo. The size of the guerrilla force varies from time to time. The GRAE claims to have trained several thousands, but the number active at any one time is probably in the hundreds. Nevertheless, the guerrillas tie downuarter of0 Portuguese troops deployed throughout Angola. The Portuguese are also using civiLian auxiliary units on the ground and In the air. The guerrillas are able to harrass small Portuguese patrols, and cut road communications but Portuguese combat casualties are small. The Portuguese have improved their counter-guerrilla operations and have placed strong pressure on the

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nationalists' makeshift communications and supply lines. The nature of the guerrilla supply system ls suchumber of refugees hare been victims of Portuguese attacks on supply trails. In presentthe Portuguese seem unable to stamp out the revolt, but the guerrillas can do little beyond continuing their present level of activity.

Poliitcoi

he nationalists' lagging military effort has caused widespread disappointment with the leadership of Holden Roberto In many quarters of his movement and among ita sympathizers His critics contend that despite someons of Algerian-supplied war material and more, better-trained guerrillas in the field, the nationalists have failed to show any significant progress. Annoyed by their Inability to expand operations, and resentful of continuing deficiencies of food andthe military commanders have become increasingly critical of Roberto's autocratic administration and his Inability to secure additional assistance for them and their men. Meanwhile, some Africanigeria, have indicated concern over the GRAE's bumbling and have cut oft aid until they see an improvement. The OAU's Liberationwhich has giveno the ORAE. has delayed further assistance. To some extent, Roberto is the victim of the expectations stirred by the OAU's decision to support the GRAE exclusively. Most of these expectations have remained unfulfilled. Partly because Roberto has concentrated responsibilities in his own hands for so long, he has now become the chief whipping boy.

the chief causes of dissension ln the ORAE Lsto delegate authority and even to consult hisa degree the conflict also reflects personal ambitions andbut the grievances which threaten his power in theas keenly felt ln Roberto's own UPA Although criticism andare focused against Roberto, tbey are not always intendedhim from power, but ratherough consensus thatsomehow be divestedignificant share of his power, andsubstantial changes are required in the Angolan

an effort to preserve his control, Roberto has sought tosupport and assistance abroad. In4 hehis willingness to accept support from Communistsubsequently Indicated his intention to send arms-seekingPeiping and Moscow. More recently, apparently at the behestAlgerians and possibly to facilitate aid from theagreed to accept into the ORAE the Communist-backed daof the MPLA. Roberto probably hoped that these movesstimulate assistance from the OAU and the Watt. Thehave given some low-key political praise to Roberto and the

GRAE (or the first time, but no ORAE rlik^allnn has yet departed for the Bloc and substantial Communist assistance does not seem close at hand. Nor has da Cruz come to Leopoldville to Join the GRAE.

C. Proipects

The Outlook Wilhin Angola

e believe Roberto has about an even chance to retain his present monopoly of power in the GRAE over the next few months. Probably the decisive consideration is the inability of the dissidents to agreeourse of actionuccessor. Even though his prestige is tarnished, no other personality associated with the GRAE is so widely known ln independent Africa or In Angola. Also, his opponents are still aware that he commands the loyalty of the Bakongos who dominate the nationalist forces, and It is questionableon-Bakongo could obtain their support

time, however, and perhaps during the period ofood chance of an alliance between military leaderspolitical elements either to dilute substantiallypowers or to depose him. Even though Roberto willcourt Peiping and Moscow, we think that it la unlikelywill be able to obtain assistance abroad sufficient to stave offof his power.

If Roberto receives some windfall to see him throughadditionalexample, the forthcoming African HeadsConference ln Cairo may provide some new backing as aof African antlcoloniallstdoubt that he hasor flexibility to make voluntarily adjustments whichhis more Important critics, or to Improve significantly theRoberto's departure, however, would not In itselfa stepped-up war effort or administrative improvement Inwhich remains woefully ahort of well-trained political andcadres. Indeed, it might lead to deterioration In thethe organization or even fragmentation.

eanwhile, the outlook is for continued political squabbling Inside the GRAE, with Roberto hanging on while hoping for some event on which he can capitalize. Both the USSR and Communist China arc interested in probing the opportunities presented by the ORAE'sand we foresee some growth of Communist influence during the period of this estimate. The likelihood of such growth would be Increased by the entrance of da Cruz' radical MPLA faction Into the ORAE. Da Cruz, whouban-type revolution, and has probably received funds from Peiping, is capable of organizing dangerous factions within the coalition. However, as mulattoes. he and hia foi-

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lowers will be suspect. Furthermore, Roberto is unlikely to accent mililary advisors from Communist states in Angola or at hisor his training camps In the Congo. Adoula and any likelynamed by Congo President Kasavubu would probably take the same position. In any case. It seems certain that internal bickering will occupy much of the ORAE's energy and. arms deficiencies and logistics difficulties apart, prospects for an expansion of the conflict or improved military effectiveness of the nationalists are dim.

wt believe the nationalists can continue to keep'alive at something approaching the present low level ofif they have continued access to sanctuary in thebelieve this to be true whether or not the nationalists obtainnew equipment (and lt seems reasonable to assume thatobtain some supplies).

the other hand, there appears little likelihood that duringyear or so the rebellion will spread widely or flare up in newAngola, although sporadic acts of violence may occur. Theare not likely to persuade the hitherto unaffected tribes Inand southern regions to join the struggle except ln the noweventlear success for the nationalist cause or. at theunless these now passive tribes can be provided withmore arms and direction than appears feasible. Indeedthreat to Portugal's overall position in Angola willbecome serious until they can open other fronts,romunless military requirementsn Mozambique orGuinea, should drain away the currently vastly superiorforces and air power. In sum, we believe the ORAE willchallenge Portugal's hold In Angola over the next year or so.

D. Probable External Development* Afte-cring Angola

The Congo (Leopoldvilte)

he course of Angolan events will depend in part upon events In the neighboring Congo. Adoula has provided the training camps from which the guerrillas also are supplied, and considerable freedom of action in conducting political and military activities. The UN militaryin the Congo ended onune and Adoula's mandate as Prime Minister expired. Kasavubu must appoint an interim government to hold office until there can be elections under the new constitution which itself cannot be adopted beforeuly. In these circumstances, the com--posiUon and political orientation of the Leopoldville government will be uncertain, to say the least It will be faced with staggering security and political problems of Its own, and the net effect mayecline in its ability and willingness to give aid and comfort to the Angolanmovement.

government in Leopoldville will remain aware that the'acuities from Katanga through Angola are of greatto the marketing of Katanga's minerals. Hence, Leopoldville

SBheo' the Angola rebelUon and wiU probably continue to Insist on some control over ORAE policies with regard tosecond front" from Katanga or Kaaai

apart, most Congolese leaders have shown little interestHowever, In the event that Adoula Is not renamed Primea successor regime, unless it were clearly radical and leftistallow the ORAE to use present facilities, thus showingupporter of African nationalism. But it might be less helpful

ore SS. leftist regime, it would probably be anxious to help the Angolan cause more vigorously. But it is doubtful that the regime could be of much practical help, as it would probably have its hands full at home

OAU

hatever Roberto's personal fortunes or the obstacles facingforces .the ORAE Is probably here to stay. To athe prestige of the OAU became involved when lt adoptedas its chosen Instrument in the Angolan Insurrectionlimited capability of the African states toilitary decisionissue will likely cause OAU members to rely hearily onboth ln the OAU and in the UN, to preaahange

III- MOZAMBIQUE

A. The Nationalist Movement

The nationalist movement of Mozambique is still in the formative stage, heavily dependent upon sympathetic African and otherfor hospitality and assistance. VlrtuaUy all nationalist activity is earned on outside Mozambique, mainly in Dar es Salaam Tanganyika Portugal's pervasive security measures and the poUtical Inertia of the African populace, have so far kept the poverty-stricken Africans in Mozambique nearly free of nationalist agitation. Aboutercent ofillion Africans are illiterate.

The principal nationalist organization is the MozambiqueFront, often known as Freltmo. which Is led by Dr. EduardoS-educated former professor whose nationalism Iselatively moderate. Weatem-orlented cast. Frelimo was formed2erger of two small exile naUcnallst groups. In Frelimo Mondlane is the main unifying element as well as being the only Important leader Frelimo hasoUtical stance in accord with hia views

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During its brief existence Frclimo has been beset by dissension which has diverted its attention and has caused the breakaway of two small factions which have formed rival organizations. There are other small exile Mozambique nationalist organizations but none of these has any sizable political following inside Mozambique.

Mondlane has sought to build up his fledgling organization and to increase Frelimo membership and capabilities inside Mozambique. Grievances against the Portuguese exist among Mozambique Africans, but they are difficult to mobilize. Moreover, the Portuguese security apparatus,etwork of African informants, is such that all political activities must be carried out clandestinely. However, there is evidence that Frelimo has established some cells lnew far to the south. In addition, the nationalistsapability to smuggle money and messages into Mozambique, and to exfil irate individuals. Although we do not have figures on Frelimo's followers, we believe Its numbers within Mozambique are small.

Mondlane has secured substantial assistance In recent months. The African Liberation Committee haa pledged, and Frelimo has received funds, guerrilla warfare and educational training, and scholarshipsariety of source* including: Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the UAR, and Israel. US individuals and organizations have also made educational grants to members of Frelimo. In January. Algeria provided an arms shipment now held by the Tangan-yikan Government andrelimo men trained In Algeria ln guerrilla warfare have returned to Tanganyika The Dar es Salaam Government will probably soon make available some of the armsite for military training.

Oro wing pressure both from inside the nationalist movement and from other Africans seems to have convinced Mondlane that be must attempt organized violence on some scale. Nevertheless. Frelimo roust overcome many grave obstacles before it can launch any sizable guerrilla campaign, which would have to be based on Tanganyika. Therereat shortage of arms and of organizational skills. There Isigh degree of apathy among primitive Mozambique Africans who appear unwilling to risk personal security for uncertain political goals, and who are divided by ethnic and linguistic differences (there arethnic andinguistiche terrain in northern Mozambique does not lend itself to guerrilla operations. Finally,Tanganyika headquarters isiles from such centers of power as Belra and Lourenco

he Portuguese Position ond Settler Attitudes

ince the troubles began In Angola, the Portuguese have moved steadily to reinforce their military position In Mozambique, and have expanded the garrison In addition, they have embarked on

military airfield and road construction program to facilitate rapid troop deployment, and established nev outposts In the northern and border areas. Even though the Portuguese cannot prevent Incursions by small groups along exposed frontiers, lt is unlikely that an uprising would take them as much by surprise as was the case in northern Angola. Although Mozambique's whites hold long standing grievances against Dr. Salaxar's policies, the vast majority of them would beto envisage the disappearance of European control.

C. Prospects

Ihe Ovffoofc Within Mozambique

he Mozambique nationalist movement has gained some new international recognition during the past year but still lacks anpolitical following, and is confronted by well-prepared and greatly superior securitye believe that this situation isto change soon, and that the tempo of nationalist activities Inside backward Mozambique Is unlikely to accelerate much tn the next year.

owever, the return to Tanganyika of Frelimo's trainees from Algeria has provided the organization with Its first operational capability. Thus, we look for Frelimo toew forays across the border or to carry out minor terrorist or sabotage incidents In urban areas. It is unlikely that these events will cause the authorities very much difficulty, although they would have an unsettling effect on the white community.

relimo can look ahead to an increasing trickle of adherents with rudimentary guerrilla training, but its top command has evidenced little promise of the ability to cope with the problems of military and political organization. Moreover, the degree to which Frelimo can tum latent African hostility to Portuguese rule into militant resistance remains an open question. On the whole, we believe that while manifestations of African unrest will probably emerge in due course, Portuguese forces will probably retain the capability to repress such outbreaks for atime.

Probabl* Reactions of Neighboring Stores

the course of events Ln the neighboring states, particularly Tanganyika and Nyasaland. President Nyerere hasole roughly analagous to that of Adoula hi relation to Angola. While generally supporting the nationalists, he has limited both their activities and the amounts of military equipment to reach them. Although he will probably permit sufficient freedom of action to Frelimo to forestall serious criticism from more militant Africans, he is genuinely fearful of retaliatory action by the Portuguese, and he will seek to avoid becoming deeply involved.

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Should Nyerere be replacedore radicalxternalMinister Karabona, the Mozambique nationalists could count on much greater support and encouragement.

In Nyasaland (scheduled to become independentulv) President Banda is well aware of the potential stranglehold Portugal has on Nyasaland's only access to tbe sea via toe rail link to Beira Preoccupied with events in Nyasaland. Banda is likely to permit some low-level nationalist subversive and propaganda activities against Mozambique to take place, but he has gone to great lengths to avoid offending Lisbon.

When Northern Rhodesia achieves Independence in October moderate Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda will need to retain some degree of Portuguese friendship in order to ship his country's copper through either Beira or Lobito in Angolahird alternative-the Congo's Routecostly and highly uncertain) In these circumstances, Kaunda is likely to be chary of deep involvement in Mozambique or Angolan affairs.

IV. LONGER RANGE PROSPECTS

we do notignificant buildup In themilitary capabilities of the Angolan and Mozambiquethe next year or so, in the long run time is almost certainlyside. Aside from the eventual fate of Roberto or Mondlane,of their movements will continue. As education andthe outside world, Including other Africans, increase, politicalthroughout the Portuguese areas is almost certain toerupt into active opposition. Portugal may be able topresent control of Angola and Mozambiqueood manywe believe that the growing political and military costs ofcontrol of the African provinces will almost certainlyeventually to accommodate to nationalist aspirations forandn the interim. Communistto the nationalists may permit serious inroads into theorganizations and thereby pose additional difficultthe West.

The longer term Portuguese poslUon will be discussed In an NIE on Portuita' scheduled forl4.

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ANGOLA and MOZAMBIQUE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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