Created: 6/19/1964

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The Cyprus Dispute




To examine possible lines of settlement of the Cyprus dispute, and their implications for the parties involved.


present drifte facto Greek Cypriotgo much further withoutore seriousconfrontation with the Turkish Cypriote. Anhas come to pose the dangers of provoking anTurkey to prevent the island from falling wholly undersway or of becoming heavily Communist-influenced,considerations are becoming of increasing concern tocountries most intimately involved.

early settlement based on the hope ofGreek and Turkish Cypriots is virtually precludedmutual hostility. Two remaining possibilities arewith Greece) and double enosis (division of theGreece andost Greek Cypriots favorbut all would be strongly opposed to the latter.Makarios' private view, he would find it difficult openlyenosis. Either enosis or double enosis would makeof UK bases and US facilities likely. Bothbe opposed by the USSR and the UAR, which dislikeof Western power positions in the Levant.

ettlement and to make it work wouldsupport of Athens, which strongly favors enosis, andwhich advocates the double enosis solution. It isboth governments couldombination ofyprus united to Greece, but containingunder some sort of Turkish administration. But it would

a tricky business, since both governments have limited freedom of maneuver: Ankara because of military and political pressures on Inonu's minority government, Athens because for domestic political reasons Papandreou is reluctant to exercise leadership.

D. An agreed settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result at leastime in damage to US relations with Greece, or Turkey, or both. Failing awe believe that Turkey would be moved to intervene to protect the Turkish community. In this case, Greece would be prepared to send additional forces to Cyprus. In the tension and confusion, armed clashes would be Likely, but both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities.




ong history ot Greek-Turkish animosity, dating from the Greek struggle for Independence from Turkey during the nineteenth century, the Orcek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, which came under British controlived together for many years without serious strife. Then lns. violent agitation by the Greekfor enosls (union with Greece) directly Involved Greece and Turkey with their communities on the island. The resulting disorders were finally ended by the London-Zurich Accords, which established an independent Cyprus based on the concept of administrative separation of the two communities without geographic partition. To secure the agreement of all parties it was necessary toreaty ofwhich gave Greece, Turkey, and the UK the right to intervene jointly or Individually in the Internal affairs of thc Island should this be deemed necessary to uphold the agreements.

Lack of mutual confidence prevented the two communities from cooperating in running the government. The Greekof the population) was determined to get rid of the constitutional provisions which gave thc Turkisheto power in matters of foreign affairs, defense and key domestic issues. For their part, the Turks clung rigidly to the constitutional safeguards as their bestagainst the Greek majority. Inresident Makarios presentedmendments to the constitution which would havenitary state under majority rule. Turkey quickly rejected these proposals. In this tenseinor incident sparked violence which rapidly engulfed the island. The more numerous and betterGreek communal forces quickly seized thc Initiative and Isolated the Turkish community. Thc British peace-keeping force, which went into operation in4 with the consent of the other Guarantor Powers and both Cypriot communities, incurred thc animosity of both communities and was unable to prevent new violence. The activationN peace-Keeping force ln4 has broughtradual reduction in violence, though both sides are dissatisfied with theMoreover, the continued receipt of arms by both communities has turned the Island Into an armed camp, and hatred and bitterness haveigh level.


Greek Co.'nmuput, and Afh*nt

is clearly the paramount figure on the Island. He lsbargainerlever political manipulator. Hc appears to

his position as head of an independent state. We are not certain of his private view of the enosis issue, though itopular cause among the Greek Cypriots and he cannot openly oppose It. Though hemakes the final decisions in Greek communal affairs, his control Is far from complete. Thereroup of secondary leaders who have sharp personal differences and sometimes disagree on issues and tactics, and clashes between their followers cannot be ruled out. Next to Makarios In influence ls probably General George Giivas, the former leader of EOKA, the militant Greek Cypriot organization that fought for enosis ins. Grivas has thus far not challenged Makarlos' political primacy, but heervent anti-Communist and advocate of enosis. The growing sentiment for enosis in Cyprus tends to Increase Grivas' prestige and influence. He has many supporters on the island, including Minister of Interior Georkatzis and the newly appointedof the Greek Cypriot National Guard, an organization designed to supersede the various autonomous armed bands.

Since the outbreak of violence inhe already significant influence of Communist-oriented groups in the Greekhas increased. Makarlos apparently does not regard theas an immediate threat, and has taken no action against them. The Communist Partyhich probably influences between one-fourth to one-third of the Greek Cypriots. has strongly supportedDr. Vasos Lyssarides. who is Makarios' personal physician and confidant, has emergedeaderommunist-influenced guerrilla band and as an important go-between with the Soviet Ambassador.

At the moment. Makarios is something of an embarrassment for Athens. On occasion the Greek Government has evenwithout conspicuoushold Makarios in check, particularly in discouraging his entanglements with the Bloc. However, public opinion In Greece so strongly supports the aspirations of the Greekthat it has been difficult for any Greek government openly to oppose Makarios. The Greek Government clearly favors union with Greece as the ultimate solution, andnitary Independent Cyprus as merely an intermediate stage. However. Athens feelsto some extent in voicing these viewsumber ofIn fact, the Greek Government has publicly handled the Cyprus problem in relatively low key, though it has at least tacitly condoned clandestine arms shipments and has allowed the Greek militaryto aid the Greek Cypriots.

Tho Turkish Community and Ankara

Turkish communal leadership Is neither strong norIts most able member. Haul Denktash, has beenMakarios from returning to the island sinceothVice President Kuchuk, the community's nominal leader, have been


entirely subservient to Ankara. Indeed, the Turkish community has little scope for independent action since its weaknessis the Greek Cyprlots forces it to rely directly on Turkish military andsupport for its very existence. Thus Turkey, not the Turkish community on Cyprus, calls the tune.

some time tbe Turks have been supplying men andthe beleaguered community. Some regroupment of thehas taken place, in part for reasons of security, in parta basis for partition or federation. This regroupment, thoughcomplete, has made lt possible for the Turkish Cypriotand the Turkish army contingent stationed on Cyprusa measure of protection. This protection and the threatintervention have kept hope alive among the Turkishstiffened their determination to resist. Nevertheless, theyfuture with apprehension bordering on desperation.

Oiher Oi/Wd* forces

Britain's obligationsuarantor Power and its concern for its sovereign base areas on the Island have kept the UK closely Involved in the dispute. As might be expected, this involvement has resulted in charges by each community that the British are unduly favoring the other and has led to Increasing opposition by the Greek Cypriote to the British sovereign bases. The British role has also periodically caused disappointment and anger in Athens and Ankara. Despite recentthe UK contingent is still the largest in the peace-keeping force. Moreover, London has Justillingness to make an additional financial contribution to thc support of the operation.

Both the UN Secretary General and the powers concerned recognize that the peace-keeping force will be needed on Cyprus for more than the three months authorized. The UN force has had difficulty lnorder, and the present tenuous equilibrium could be upset at any time. UN mediator Tuomloja has been unable to devise any proposalsealistic settlement. Though he seems personally toclined toward enosls, he apparently feels it Inappropriate for him Io recommend the dissolutionN state. If the recommendations of the UN mediator are not satisfactory to Makarlos, the latter may take the Cyprusto the UN General Assembly where he obviously counts onsupport from the Soviet Bloc and the nonaligned nations.

he possibility of Greek-Turkish clashes over Cyprus has aroused concern in NATO, but Secretary General Stlkker has so far been unable to move the two sides closer together. NATO Intercession is not likely to prove effective inettlement, though the psychological effect of NATO membership probably tends to inhibit an outbreak of Greek-Turkish hostilities or limit any clash that might occur.



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The Soviets see clear opportunities as well as dangers in theIts prolongation obviously weakens NATO. Moscow also desires the elimination of British sovereign bases on Cyprus, in order tothe ability of the UK to support itsn the Near and Middle East. Soviet prestige on Cyprus has risenesult of Moscow'sof Makarios. The emergence of an mcteuendent unitary Oreek Cypriot siate would Increase the prospects for greater Soviet influence an the island. However, the Soviets seem concerned lest theirgive Impetus to demands for enosis. which would lead toon the Communistseduced role lor Moevow. They are also worried about Intervention by Turkey, which wouldajor crisis and jeopardise the continued independence of Cyprus. Hence, though they feel bound to support Makarios as the leaderhey recognize the disadvantages of any seriousMakarios has sought to obtain stronger Soviet support for the Greek Cypriot cause and has given considerable publicity to his request for heavy arms. It seems likely that the Soviets will attempt to stall off any decision to supply heavy arms, though they may furnish small arms, ammunition, and thethrough llie UAR, from which some arms have already reached Makarios. The USSR has been at some pains to limit the damage to Its relations with Turkey.

The UAR seeks the elimination of British bases, which It regards as primarily designed to exert military pressure on the Arabs. The UAR also would not tike to see the absorptionormerly nonaligned stateATO member state. Thus it supports an Independent Cyprus under Makarlos. To this end the UAR has given small arms andwill continue to do so.


During tho past six months, the situation on Cyprus hasonsiderable distance toward the de facto establishmentreek Cypriot state. Tho Greek Cypriots are in complete control of theand seem determined to push ahead and achieve full control of the Island. The Turkish Cypriots are constantly threatened with shortages of food, medicine, and water. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots have substantially improved their defensive posiUon by virtue of their regroupment and the arms they have received from Turkey. We believe that Ankara would intervene militarily in the Island rather than see the Turkish Cypriot position eroded away or extinguished.

At the same time, both Athens and Ankara are coming to the conclusionully Independent Cyprus is not In their Interest, or in the Interest of the West In general. If Makarlos achieved such status, he might move to eliminate the British bases, and he would have no compunctions about accepting Soviet support for thc effort. The US special facilities on the Island would also be in serious danger. More-


over, Makarlos apparently sees little danger in cooperating with the Cypriot Communists, who are strong and well organized Thereignificant chance that an independent Cyprus would gradually fall under Increasing Communist influence and perhaps in time under Communist control.

Any early settlement based on the hope of future cooperation between the Greek and Turkish communities is virtually precluded by the bitterness and hostility that has grown up between them. This would appear to rule out Implementation of the London-Zurich Accords. Nor would the Greek Cypriotsfederation" which recognized and protected the rights of the Turkish Cypriotsommunity rather than as individual citizensreek Cypriot controlled state.establishment of two independent states on thewould be strongly opposed by the Greek community and, even if it could be brought about, would probably involve continuing hostilities between the two entities.

Present circumstances have brought two more fundamentalunder consideration. One is enosis (union withhe other Is some formula under which the island would be divided between Greece and Turkey; this has come to be known as double enosis.

Dot.Me (miui

Double enosis would be the more acceptable to the Turks. It probably would pennit continuance of the British base areas, thoughnot in their present sovereign status. It would almost certainly permit the US facilities to remain. However, even if agreement were reached on the principle of double enosis, there would be extremeover how the island was to be divided. While extensive population shifts would be necessary, we regard these as less difficult to arrange than to gain Greek Cypriot acceptance ofivision. There woulderious danger that the Oreek Cypriots would launch an all-out attack on the areas held by the Turkish community if they thought it necessary to preventettlement. Further, it is unlikely that any Oreek government could accept double enosis and remain in office. There might be considerable opposition ln the UN, with the USSReading part.

Support for double enosis by the US wouldevere Impact on US-Greek relations. Thus far US relations with Greece have not suffered any extensive damage, as the US has not pressed the Oreek Government toward any particular solution. However, the continuing threat of Turkish intervention is eroding the Greeks' confidence ln the US, which they believe has the power to prevent any Turkish move. Moreover, as proposals for solution emerge, the Greeks will be quick to resent and will strongly resist US efforts to encourage concessions.



Tht? Turks have so far refused to consider enosisolution. They would view the possession of Cyprus by Oreece as contrary to their own strategic Interests, though less threatening than If the island were in the handsommunist-influenced Oreekre also moved by considerations of prestige and byfor the welfare of the Turkish community. Those Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island would have to be compensated, and such compensation might be more acceptable to Ankara If It came, at least apparently, from the Greeks. Moreover. In view of lis distrust of the Greek Cypriot leadership, Ankara would probably insist that Cyprus not retain any significant autonomy, but be run directly from Athens like other Greek provinces. More important, any settlement probably would have to provide some sort of continuing Turkish presence on theettlementurkish base or an enclave under Turkish sovereignty might come to be regarded by Turkey assince It could provide some degree of protection for Turkish strategic Interests and an element ofleastthe Turkish Cypriots. The Turks have thus far shown little interest in territorial concessions in the Oreek islands and only slightly more in Thrace. What they wantresence on Cyprus Itself.

The Turkish Government has only limited flexibility on the Cyprus issue. Inonu himself is aware of the perils involved, concerned for Turkey's lies with the West (especially thend desirous ofa negotiated solution. But he feels that the political and military supporters on whom his minority government depends, as well asopinion, demand the protection of Turkish national prestige and Turkish interests on Cyprus, so that he must threaten unilateralwhen these are in danger. The repeated postponements of military moves against Cyprus have created an atmosphere ofand frustration which has already threatened to disrupt the delicate equilibrium of the Turkish political scene. Indeed, If another intervention crisis shouldIs likely unless some tangible progressolution ls made in the nearmight be faced with thc choice of acquiescingilitary move or being pushed aside. He would have extreme difficulty ln persuadingand the military to acceptcoupled with territorial or base concessions.

The leverage which the US or other Western powers can exert on Turkey Is limited. Turkish threats of unilateral Intervention have alreadyeries of confrontations with the US. each growing in intensity and each progressively embittering relations. The mutual confidence which previously underlay Turkish-American relations has been shaken. There wouldanger lhat If the US pressed hard for enosis, thc Turks would feel betrayed and decide to Intervene mili-


tarlly. If they reachedecision, thereood chance they would not consult or even Inform us. If they did not Intervene, they wouldajorby putting pressure on the US presence lnconvince the US that they shouldresence on Cypruscope and nature sufficient to satisfy their political needs.

Athens is coming to recognize that no Turkish Government could accept enosisuid pro quo of some significance. Athens would almost certainly be willing to provide some compensation forof Turkish Cypriots: it would almost certainly not be ready to cede any territory already Greek. Greece probably would agree to the presence of Turkish forcesATO base on the island. Whether Athens would concede the degree ofTurkishr.ess" that would beto make the proposition acceptable to Ankara would dependomplex of factors, among which would be Papandreou'sAthens' reading of Ankara's intervention intentions, and Western pressure on Greece.

Acceptance of an enclave under Turkish administration would be difficult for Greek Prime Minister Papandreou. While his parliamentary majority depends on his ability to maintain discipline among the various elements of the governing Center Union, we believe he could winforoncession. If he could be convinced that It was essential. We believe that he Is limited In his freedom of maneuver more by his personal convictions and disinclination to exercisethan by forces outside his control. If union of the whole island with Greece were involved, Papandreou could prabably count on strong support from Greek Cypriot public opinion to overcome whateverMakarios might offer, but such support might notettlementurkish presence on the island.


Settlement is most unlikely without considerable US pressure, which would result, at least for some time, in damage to US relations witb Greece, or Turkey, or both. Athens has, at least until recently, seen the tide as flowing In the direction of enosis and is not yet prepared to make many concessions in the direction of double enosis, which the Turks would probably regard as their minimum requirement. It is likelyombination of elements from both approaches holds out the best chance of an agreedIf the use oflabels can be avoided.

It may be that the parties involved will prove so intractable as to prevent any agreement. In this case, the plight of the Turkish Cypriots would gradually worsen,ontinued UN presence might afford them some protection. But the possibility of acute crisis withoutwould persist. In the eventassacre of Turkishirect attack on the Turkish contingent, or an Immediate threat of


sizable Soviet Involvement on the Island, the Turks would almostfeel the need to take military action. Moreover, as time passes without any improvement in the prospects for success, desperation may overtake elements in the Turkish community and cause them toa major crisis. Pressure to intervene is also building up in the Turkish armed forces and in various levels of the government. Thus Turkish Intervention willonstant danger.

f thc Turks Intervened, they would justify their action as designed merely lor the protection of the Turkish community. But Athens would probably feel compelled to respond by sending additional forces to Cyprus. Though both sides would be reluctant to expand hostilities, the tension and confusion would be likely to result in armed clashes. If, at this point, Greece and Turkey found themselves on the brink of war, their leaders might Anally be willing to make the compromises requiredettlement.ettlement reached under these conditions would not necessarilyinal solution; It could Just as well be another patchwork arrangement.


Organized military forces on the Island currentlyN0 UK forces not assigned to thereek Army personnel,urkish Army personnel. President Makarios isan Special Security Force or National Ouard, Probably at least some of these guardsmen will befrom the0 Greek Cypriot irregulars reported to be on the Island. The National Ouard Is designed to absorb some of the so-called private armies, some with as manyen. which are part of the current Greek Cypriot Irregular forces. The Turkish Cypriotsmaller irregular force, estimated

For the most part these personnel are well supplied with small arms. Both sides have mortars, rocket launchers, hand grenades and the like. The Greek Cypriots have affixed armor plate protection to several tractor vehicles and may also have acquired three Britishon tanks.lonaily, thc Greek Cypriots are seeking to acquire artillery, at least four light aircraft and two helicopters,et fighters, and nine fast patrol boats. Makarios has stated that he intends to acquire heavy weapons such as aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, presumably from the USSR. Greece has provided officers to assist in organizing and training the Greek Cypriot forces, as well as weapons for those forces. Turkey ls training personnel and smuggling them and weapons to the Turkish Cypriots on thc island. Thus, each side Ls In the process of supplying, organizing, and training Its forces. The adversaries are temporarily separated from each other by the UN forces.

Thc current status differs materially from tho situation3 when the disorders erupted. At that time it was reported that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots each hadrmed Irregulars, although each side probably had many more weapons hidden away. While the size and composition of the Oreek and Turkish Army contingents on Cyprus are regulated by treaty and thus were the same ln December as they are today, there had not yet occured those murders and other Incidents which have hardened the feelings of the contingents against each other. It was in thc face of the foregoing, that in early January the British0 troops to enforce the truce which had been agreed to by both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. During the three months that the British singlehandedly enforced tho peace, thereteady buildup in the numbers and types of weapons brought In either "legally" to the Greek Cypriot-controlled forces orto the Turkish Cypriot irregulars. Lacking terms of reference to curtail arms shipments, the UN forces have noted an intensification

of the arms buildup since the arrival of the UN on the island about three months ago.

This relative quiet ls in marked contrast to the period almost ten years ago when EOKA Greek Cypriot terrorism to attain ENOSIS (union with Greece) resultedritish pacification0 troops. The EOKA, while relaUvely few in number, enlisted the supportympathetic or terrorized Greek Cypriotand made good use of the Island's terrain, which is suited for guerrilla activity, inflictingasualties on the British forcesour year period. Although the British exiled Makarlos and engagedelentless and ruthless campaign, the disorders ended, as they had started, because of political factors.

Both Greece and Turkey have the capability to alter the present balance of military power on the Island. Turkey's militaryis considerably superior to that of Greece. The Turkish armed forces outnumber those of Greece and are better equipped. Moreover, in any military action concentrated on the Cyprus area, Ankara'swould be enhanced by its proximity to the Island. Both forces are deficient in logistic support, communications equipment, and combat vehicles. In particular, deficiencies in ammunition and petroleum would limit operations ln any protracted conflict.

Turkey's advantage is most pronounced In Its ground forces. The Turkish armyutnumbers the Greek by more than three to one, andays after mobilization of reserves Its effective combat strength by NATO standards would. nearly double that of Oreece. Both armies are concentrated along the borders of theirneighbors to the northh Division, however, which numbers0 men and has an excellent combat capability, Is based In the Iskenderun area. While it is oriented primarily toward thc Syrian border, it Is the parent unit ofan contingent on Cyprus. It has conducted extensive training maneuvers recently and ls generally kept ready to intervene In Cyprus on short notice. Greece has also increased its level of readiness, moving several hundred men to Crete and maintaining other forces on alert.

country has any highly developed capability inor in airborne operations, though both are increasingthrough maneuvers. Greece, despite Its generallyand greater seaborne support capability for extendedbe extremely vulnerable in mounting any action on Cyprus,of long, exposed supply lines. Both countries have amplefor any major troop movement, but Turkey's proximity togiveubstantial advantage In any deployment there.the Turksive to one advantage in submanhes.

Thc Turkish Air Force is superior to that of the Qreeks. The Turksairly proficient fighter-bomber force,et aircraft. The Greeks have only recently received their first few Century series aircraftost of the Turkish Air Force is located within striking distance of Cyprus, with tactical bombs and napalm containers are stockedase lessiles from the island. The air force is capable of close support and reconnaissance missions in the Cyprus area. The Turks could airlift one battalion to Cyprus if they were able lo seize control of an airfield on the island. The Greek Air Force, based primarily on the Greek mainlandiles from Cyprus, would experience great difficulty in operating in the area. Some operations could be mounted from Rhodes,iles of Cyprus, but additional logistic equipment would have to be moved there. The Greeks have the technical capability toattalion or two to Cyprus, but Turkish air superiority could turn anyisaster.


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