Created: 10/8/1964

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Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack


Concurred in by foe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A* indicated4

ages Copy No.

Ihc following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intel li gen cc Agency ond lhe inJelligence oraonirai^om of the Depcr'-nmnt, of Stole, Dvfertve, the Army, ihu Navy, the AirAEC, ond NSA.


Director of IntelKoeUv ond Reiearch. Department of Stale

Director. Defenm Intelligence Agency

Director of the Nalional Securily Agency

The Atomic Energy Commltslon Hepremmotive to Ihe USIB


itoii to Ihe Director, Federal Bureau of Invcitigolkm, iho (object being outside of hli

'"*infoimotion affecting Iho notionolflj

Ifii'i il iHi|of the -Mpionogo'or,. The lowos.ehir'rnCoiglion of ill contents, in any manner to on unewthoriied" any manner pratudkial lo the Mjfely or intereiir for the beivforetgn govern-mem to Ininii til "iiiii United Sia'ei No action ii to beII inighich may bo contained herein, ragordloit ol thee go.nnd, unlev. ivch action it firM opproved by opprcpriato authority.




MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of

Sensitivity of,

"Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"


In accordance with the wishes of the President, dissemination ofas been carefully limited because of the extreme sensitivity of the information therein.

In thisish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Estimate, and that noof its existence be made to unauthorized persons.












ind Development 13


K. Deployment Concept! **

Faroe Levels

of the W




of tbe

Developments 22


Ballistic Missile Submarine

Cruise Missile Submarine Forces

C Construction and Convrrttou Programs




Developments in Long Range

Trends in Bomber Forces .

G Operational Capabilities



and Control

Range Reconnaissance

Warfare and Countermeasures

ables of Weapon System Characteristics and PerformanceB; Maps of Rangefollows 49







To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet forces for strategic attack and in Soviet capabilities for such attack through


This estimate covers those Soviet military forces which arc suitable for strategic attack. Other major aspects of thc Soviet military strength are treated in separate estimates on air and missile defense, on theater forces, on the nuclear program, and on the space program. Trends In tlie USSR's overall military posture and in Soviet military policy arc examined in an annual estimate, the next issuance of which will be in the first quarter


changes in Soviet programs for tlie development ofattack forces have become apparent during the past year.certain ICBM and ballistic missile submarineto an end,ause ensued in the growth of these forces-same time, the pace of ICBM research and developmentMore recently, thc USSR has resumed ICBMa new and improved configuration, and the probable advent of awhich we believe is designed to carry ballistic missilesmarks the start of yet another deployment program. (Para. I)

military policy in recent years has been to buildoffensive and defensive capabilities, maintain andgeneral purpose forces, and pursue research and development



in advanced weapons. In our view, the primary concern of Soviet military policy for the next several years will continue to be the strengthening of the USSR's strategic deterrent. The evidence to date does not indicate thai Soviet deployment programs are directedapid numerical buildup. We do not believe lhat thc USSR aims at matching the US in numbers of intercontinental deliveryRecognition that the US would detect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this option. )

tress on qualitative factors suggests that the Soviets see technological advance in weaponseans by which they cantheir strategic position relative to the West. In the ICBM force, for example, major qualitative improvements currently being achieved include hardening and dispersal (which will sharply increase theof aimings well as better accuracy and larger payloads.)

D- By the end of thc decade. Soviet intercontinental attackwill rest primarily upon an ICBM force of same hundreds of launchers, supplementedizable missile-submarine fleetarge but reduced bomber force. These forces willarked improvement in Soviet retaliatory capabililyonsiderable strengthening of tlie Soviet deterrent. In the light of current and programmed US military capabilities, however, we do not believe that the Soviets will expect to achieve, within tlie period of this estimate, strategic attack capabilities which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war. (Para. 5)

Tha ICBM Program

E. Major developments sinceroliferation of test facilities at Tyuratam, flight-testing of two third-generation ICBM systems (thendnd the beginning of construction of hard, single-silo ICBM launchers, probably for one or both of the new systems. The deployment of second-generation ICBMs has probably ceased,ause between the second- andprograms has slowed deployment. We believe that the Soviets now haveperational ICBM launchers, and that the total number of operational launchers inill approximate the low



ofange previously estimated. These figures do notaunchers at Tyuratam.'

F. Research and development on third-generation systems hassuccessful. Theystem appears to be antheith improved accuracyarger payload. Weinformation on the characteristics of theoth newcould enter servicec believe that work isstill other ICBM systems, which we cannot as yet believe that the Soviets areery largeof deliveringWe estimate that it could enter

service in thc periodon addition, the Soviets might beew, small ICBM employing improvedIf they are. it could become operational as early)

C The Soviets are now emphasizing deployment of single-silo hard launchers for ICBMs, and we expect this emphasis to continue. We expect third-generation deployment to include the expansion of both second-generation complexes and tlie initiation of additional new complexes. (Paras.

H. The growth of the Soviet ICBM force over the next several years will be influencedumber of factors. In economic terms, the program must compete for funds with other military and space activities and with the civilian economy. In the technical field, we believe that research and development is proceeding on additional, follow-on ICBM systems, and we doubt that with these in the offing thc USSR will fix upon any one or even two existing systems for urgent deploymenlarge scale. We are also mindful that thethat marked second-generation deployment programs may recur. In strategic terms, the Soviets evidently judge that an ICBM force in lhe hundreds of launchers, together with their other strategic forces,eterrent. On the basis of the evidence nowlo us, we do not believe that they are attempting toorce capableirst-strike which would reduce the effects of US

'The Assistant Chief of Stuff, Intelligence.eitinutte ot the num-

beri of launcher*w Andnf too tow* ttttiatei

thit the Soviets now haveperational launchers, including nfeoutt Tyuratam0 percent allowance lor imloceted launchers. He believe, (he total number in mid-

ill be. See hit footnote,



rctaliatiou to an acceptablet the same time, wc expect them toffort in the hope of achieving important technological advances, in both the offensive and defensive Eelds, which would alter the present strategic relationshipajor way.

I. Weoviet ICHM forceperational launchers forn our previous estimate, wc projected tin's force level forye believe that the force will include most or all of the launchers now deployed,ingle-siloaunchers, andaunchers for very large ICBMs. Wc believe that the attainment of as manyperational launchers byould be likely only if the Soviets begina new, small ICBMapid ratehe Soviet ICBM forco which we estimate forillb-stantial increase in numbers and deliverable megatonnage. Further, the trend to single silos will Increase the number of aiming points represented by individual launch sites fromt present tonhc bulk of them hard. This will greatly improve the survivability, and hence the retaliatory capability, of the force.' )

J. ln thc past few years the Soviets have improved tlic readiness and reaction time of their ICBM force. Our evidence now indicates that from thc normal state of readiness, the soft sites which constitute the bulk of the present force wouldours to fire. Hard sites would require about half an hour origher state of alert5 minutes to fire) can be maintained at most toft sitesumber of hours and at most hard sites for days )

K. There is ample evidence that the Soviels designed their soft ICBM systems toefire capability. We have re-examined the

"The Auil'anl Chief ol Sufi, Intelligence, USAK, com id tn (hat tbo SovieU may already have directed theu intemiveBort tihwaid achievement ol an elective linf-ttriSie counter-force capability before the dote ol ihi* decade. Considering Ih* length of time covered by ihu eibreate and the number olI<n( h* believes thu apotiibdity whiche dine girded

"The Aimtanl Chief of SuS.SAF. cowideo lhe ICBM force byould range fromo el highperational launched depending oaew. until, easily deployedliodaced. (Sec his lootnotr lo lablrI An ICHM toroc of ihii tlie would increase the Dumber ol aiming point* repre-icnled by individual launch site to appro. UnaM In

factors likely to affect refire time, and conclude that it would require little longer to fire the second missile than the first. Our present estimate of refire time ishours, considerably less than previously estimated. Wc believe that, on the average, two or more missiles arc provided per soft launcher for initial firing, refire. and maintenance spares. Wc believe .that hard ICBM sites do notefire )

L, We have little evidence on the hardness of Soviet ICBM sites. Given the many uncertainties in this area,ery tenuous estimate can be made, hut our best judgment is thai Soviet hard ICBM sitesardness insi range. Thisesignin thcpsi range, somewhat higher than previously estimated.' )

M. Qualitative improvements in the force can be expected assystems enter service. Currently operational ICBMson the order. Thcill probably have. with radio assist,ithByhe Soviets could achieve accuracies. or better. Theill probablyompared ^for second-goncration ICBMs.

Wc do not believe that the Soviets have yet developed penetration aids or multiple warheads, but they may do so in the future, particularly if the US deploys antimissile defenses. )


N Deployment programs for. MRBM and. IRBM arc now ending, and almost certainly will be completed bye estimate that at that time the MRBM/IRBM force willtrength ofperationalf them hard The hulk of thc force (aboutercent) is deployed inUSSR, with the remainder in the southern and Tar eastern regions of thc USSR. This force is capable ofevastating first strikeowerful retaliatory attack against targets in Eurasia, and can attack such areas as Greenland and Alaska as well. Some of the

"The Auitdnt Chief of Staff.SAF,(hat, given (lieno meamn-ful eitmule uf the katdnru of Soviet hintoa be node, lbc oWfaf Soviet kaid Oo UUw

Hi prevtouUy otuntted


MRBM/IRBM launchers are probably intended to support ground operations. )

O. We doubt that the Soviets will expand their MRBM/IRBM force during the period of this estimate. It is possible, however, that operational capabilities will be improved by the introductionew missile system, which probably would be deployed in singlc-silos.ystem, employing improved propellants. could becomeineriod and would probably replace some of the soft launchers now operational. )

Missile Submarine Forces

P. The Soviets now have operationalallistic missile submarines,0 nuclear powered. Most of theseare equipped. missiles and must surface to fire. One or two are equipped. submerged-launch missile, and others will probably be retrofitted. The USSR also has operational aboutruise-missile submarines,powered. The majority arc equipped. missiles designed for low altitude attack, primarily against ships.. version of this missile, which probably has an improved capability to attack land targets. Current Soviet missile submarines carry relatively few missiles: the ballistic missile classes, two or three, and the cruise missile types, up to eight. The entire present forceotalallistic missile tubesruise-missile launchers. )

Q. We believe that thc Soviets have under construction awhich we estimate to be the firstew nuclear-powered, ballistic missile class. We estimate that it will employ thc. missUe. andew more missile tubes than current classes. The first unit will probably hecome operationaleyond this new class, we consider it unlikely that the Soviets will develop an entirely new follow-on ballistic missilesystem within tlie period of this estimate, although they will probably continue to improve existing systems. We believe thai they will also continue to construct cruise-missile submarines. Byhe Soviet missile submarine force will probablyhips, about half of them cruise-missile submarines and about half ballistic. )

top seese-

In the past year, limited numbers of Soviet missile submarines have engaged in patrols in the open oceans. Weradual expansion of this activity. By the end of the decade, Soviet missile submarines will probably he conducting regular patrols throughout the North Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly into the Mediterranean.)

Long-Range Bomber forces

S. We have no recent evidence of major changes in the capabilities and structure of Soviet Long-Range Aviationhc force now includeseavy bombers and tankersediums, It is being improved primarily through the continuedof Blinder supersonic dash medium bombers and through modification of older bombers for air-to-surface missile delivery, for aerial refueling, and for reconnaissance. Use of both medium and heavy bombers of tlie LRA in support of maritime operations has )

T. Considering noncombat attrition factors and thc requirements for Arctic staging and aerial refueling, wc estimate that the Sovicls could put somewhat moreeavy bombers over target areas in the US on two-way missions. Recent trends lead us to believe that medium bombers do not now figure prominently in Soviet plans for an initial bomber attack against North America. Nevertheless, should they elect to do so, we believe that at present the Soviets could put upadgers over North American target areas on two-wayWe have serious doubt about how effectively the Soviets could launch large-scale bomber operations against North America. Wc consider it probable that initial attacks would not be simultaneous, but would extendonsiderable number of hours.1

U. The Soviets will probably maintain sizable bomber forces, which will decrease gradually through attrition and retirement. Although continued Soviet work on advanced transports could he applied to military purposes, we think it unlikely that thc Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber into operational service during the period

Assistant Chid nf StaiT. IiilelIiKcnce. USAF, consider* thu paragraph seriously under-estimates thc manned aircraft threat to thc continental US. Io thc event war thouM eventuate and the USSH attacks thc US with midear weapons, hc believe, thii will be an all-out effort aimed ataximum numlwr of weapons on US target* He therefore estl-matei lliat the number of heavy and medium bombers, including BADGERS on one-way iniisiont, could. See his footnote on


of (his estimate. We believe that Blinder medium bombers, some equipped with advanced air-tosur(ace missiles, will be introduced during much of thc period of this estimate. Byong-Range Aviation will probably include someeavy bombers of present typesediums, mostly)

Space Weapons

V. Although thc USSR almost certainly is investigating (heof space systems for use as offensive and defensive weapons, we have no evidencerogram to establish an orbital bombardment capability is seriously contemplated by thc Soviet leadership. We think that orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs over Uie next six years in terms of effectiveness, reaction time,flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control, In view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that tbc Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system vWthin (lie period of this

AiiiiUnl Chief of SUIT, Intelligence, USAF, bclievet ibe Sc-ieta wiD coniinue lo

iio.i'.nli . manned illi ii^-ntir.l .i'|nii..i lo III- i. ICBM dvni II?'-:

that (he USSR -illbBow-on heavy bomber He fuither -itioiata Iholore* wiU remain atr weaewhat larger, depuxfcar. om tbe enmg ofthai byhe condnini bcoiber/Unte forca

probably TOll Inctude aboul OM-SSO alrcralt. Seefaobiotit to table on pageoUowuig



L Major changes in Soviet programs for lhc development of strategic attack forces have become apparent during the past year.. certain ICBM and ballistic missile submarine programs came to an end.ause ensued iu the growth of these forces. At the same time, the pace of ICBM research and development increased markedly. More recently, thc USSR has resumed ICBM deploymentow and improved configuration, and the probable adventW submarine which we believe is designed to carry ballistic missiles probably marks thc start of yet another deployment program.

military policy in recent years has been to build up strategic Offensive and defensive capabilities, maintain and .mprovc large general purpose forces, and pursue research and development programs in advanced weapons. Thegrowth in defense eipenditures has been accompaniedreatlydemand for scarce, high-quality resources, and this trend has contributed to the tightening economic situation, over which Khrushchev has displayedconcern.There were indications early3 that powerful pressures were being applied by some military and political leadenajor increase fa allocationsefense, and that Khrushchev successfully resisted these pres. surer. Nevertheless, the research and development programs which continued throughout ihu. period, as well as the new deployment programs now underway,ontinued Soviet wUhngness to spend substantial sums on improving theii strategic attack capabilities.

a sense, the policy dispute of3 ,epresenled the continuationebate over military policy and doctrine which has extended over the pastoais. Khrushchev has stressed the deterrent role of nuclear and missile weapons holding lhat the nature of these weapons makes general warin the present era. The military, on the other hand, have been more concerned to have forces adequate toar should it ocmr. Kluushchcv's successful reasseitiou of authority in lhe spring3 and trends In military programs since that time indicate lhat. for Uie next several years, the primary

'H COntinuetTcn8UlCT egic

ortrtoe. .ad .tr.iegyNIE

ia the USSH. ate SNIESovW. tconorruc Problem, u4ECRET.

e cannot readily tramlale thii objective into specific goals (or strategic attackTbe Soviet leaden have sought to foster the notion that parity in strategic strength exists between tho US and (lie USSIt. Wc do not believe, however, that present Soviet policy aims at matching the US in numbers ofdelivery vehicles. Recognition ihat the US would detect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this option.oviet stress on qualitative factors in the past year or two suggests that the Sovieis see technological advance ia strategic weaponseans by which they can improve their position relative to thc West. The evidence lo date does not indicate that current programs arc directedapid buildup In numerical strength, and in view of the intensity of the Soviet research and development effort, wr consider it unlikely that the Soviets have settled on any one system for urgent deploymentarge scale.

y thc end of tbe decade, Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will probably rest primarily upon an ICBM force of some hundreds ofizable missile submarine fleet,arge but reduced bomber force. Major qualitative improvements currently being achieved in the ICBM force include hardening and dispersal (which Will sharply increase the number of aimings well as better accuracy and larger payloads. These forces willarked improvement in Soviet retaliatory capabilityonsiderable strengthening of the Soviet deterrent. In the light of current and programmed US capabilities however, wc do not believe that the Soviets will expect to achieve, within the period of this estimate, strategic attackwhich would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war.


developments in the ICBM program sincenclude aof test facilities at Tyuratam. flight lesting of twosystems, probable cessation of starts of second-generation ICBMand the start of construction of hard single-silo launch sites. Somanew trends, such as the single-silo mode of deployment, wereour estimates; others, such as the early stoppage of second-generationwere not. In succeeding paragraphs, we analyze these developmentstheir probable impact upon the future size and composition of theforce.

A. Current Strength and Deployment

haveotal of moreaunchers in various stagesat Soviet ICBM deployment cocipieiej Of these, we6 sofl andard) aie operational asremaining launchers, "allre still under There arc alto

* For the view of the AaiuUnt One! of Inteliigrftce, USAF. tee hii footnote toane U-

aboulaunchers al lhe Tyuratam lesi range, and aboul IS more under construction.

ore thanCBM deployment complexes have now been identified. Eighteen are older complexes, begun1 or earlier, and Eve are newbegun in4 Deployment al lhc older complexesalmost entirely of second-generation systems, lhend then two-launcher soft sites and three-silo hard sites. Deployment of the Grst-generalionas limited to four soft launchers. We believe that new deployment of lhe second.gencration systems has also ceased, lhe2 and theew deployment resumed in3 or4 with lhe start of construction of dispersed single silos which we believe are intended for third-generation systems.

ingle silos represent an important departure in Soviet deployment concepts, indicating an intention to confront an enemy with separate aiming points.timeingle silo will probably be less thanonthstohrec-silo site,onths. We believe that some single silos could be operational by

consider it almost certain that there arc no additional,ICBM complexes, and we believe it highly unlikelylaunchers at the older complexes could have escapedAdditional launchers of new types may be under conslructioa atcomplexes or at undetected complexes of thc new type.the status of third-generation ICBM development and the apparentthird-generation deployment indicate that such additional launchersyet have readied operational slaius. In our estimate foreundetected third-generation launchers which would now be in earlyconstruction.

rends in ICBM Deploymenl

its inception. Soviet ICBM deployment has followed anIn contrastontinuing and vigorous research andoperational deployment has been marked by spurts of activity,and abrupt cutbacks of what initially appeared to be large-scaleTlie Soviets have deployed the three ICBM systems nowwith their development at lhe test range, hut concurrenthas not resultedmooth and uninterrupted buildup of ICBM capabili-

The AouiaM Chiel of Slafl.SAF, recogniw* thatn the field. He consider, the completed lynchers atavailable lor operational wartimeIn addition, he feels some allowance forof unlocated bunches tlsould be Included in the esUmate- of launchersfor wartime use. How largeector should be is uncertain, but he, figures reasonable. He therefore estimates tho current totalat about

Thi first major interruption resultedoviet decision to cut back* the planned deployment of the firu-gemeranonefore deployment of second-generation missiles badecond occurred2 when deployment of the *eeoregenerationndas halted, probably because of technical difficulties with tbcnd modifications to theystem. The Soviets apparently decided to halt theeployment program altogether. Bydeployment of theas resumed in the lule summerix-month pause, and continued forear, when this program too was apparently halted. We believe that ICBM deployment resumed in4 with single-silo launchers.

The reasons for this uneveoness are not dear. In most cases, tbecause of mterruptions was probably the pfoipective availability olsuch as better deployment configurations or new and superior missile systems. In some instances important inadequacies in existing programs were probably oontribufing factors. Whatever the specific reasons, tho record to date clearly indicates that thc USSR has accepted considerable slippage intoward whatever force goals it has set for itielf.

6 Program. Construction of four soft launchers for thend was completedur evidence indicates that thestill operational. As recently asnas fired from Tyuratam,

J We wtiroate that thcs presently3*at',CBd- With developmentew re-entry vehicle, itbe retrofitted toweer 8ucn development

unlikely. Wc believe that tne system will be phased out of the force within the period of this estimate.

rogram. Theystemumber of advantages over thehiefly, considerably smaller size, storable liquid propellants, and all-incr-fia) guidance. This system is deployedJwarheads. but missilesinventory4 have probably been equipped withf^and some of the missiles deployed earlier will probably be retrofitted. Theis deployed In IS of the complexes now identified in (he USSR and constitutes the bulk of the present force. We estimateaunchers are nowat these complexes, oft andre hard.

We previously considered that the Soviets would continue to deploy theowever, tlie apparent lack of any new launcher startsthe past year and indications of initial deployment of third-generation systems lead us to believe thateployment is ending

j developmental work on thelso drawingose.

Program. ThcCBM was developed at the same time asprobably in order to Insure the Soviets of at least one successfulsystem. Wc believe that it is somewhat smaller than thcnd


thai it Id comparison with lheow-

ever, lhc SSMTyitem has certain operaUonal disadvantages. It employs non-storable liquidandicap inrolonged condition of alert. The system also incorporates radio inertial guidance, raising theof protecting thc radio componentsardened deployment mode. These features, together with technical difficulties revealed in range tests of thend the successful development of therobably weighed in the Soviet decision to limiteployment

hcystem is deployed in four complexes ataunchers, uearly all of which are operational. Nore know to have been started since thc summerlurry of successfulest firings in3 andc expect no further deployment of this system. Moreover, theof supportingew sites deployed at four different complexes may lead tlie Soviets to phase out theystem within the period of this

C. Research and Development

here are aboutaunchers at thc Tyuratam lest range, and aboutore under construclion. Some of the new facilities arc probably used in testing of the third-generationndCBM systems. Others, however, arc probably related to future space activities or to theof other new ICBM systems which have not yet readied the stage of flight '

Theystem. Beginning inhc Sovietsest firings of thcith only one failure. Three of these were extended rangeo thc Pacific. This record indicates that development is proceeding satisfactorily.

Our evidence indicates that theroduct of the same design team that produced theystem; il appears to represent an intent toore accurate missilearger payload.

^jitwojtagc. tandem missile, somewhat heavier than thcstorable liquid propellants. Thc guidance system, which appearsan improved version of that on thconsists of an inertial systema radio link. The inertial system alone can probably guide thc missile,somewhat reduced accuracy. Re-entry data indicate that thc SS-9is considerably larger than that of IheC estimate thatarheadaximum yieldWe estimate that

it could become operational early

"Although die Director. Din. una" the Autitant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believehe weight of the intelligence mailable male,ore likely lhat thes lo then payload delivery capability, they note an anomalyP

"jwhieh does not correlate with lhe indicatorsela lively'smalltude th* poiribility that theosecone could weigh aboutor lomewhat more,ield


heyslem. Wc have little information on the characteristics oi the other new system being tested al Tyuratam. The Erst flight tesl of then4ailure. but_si* subsequent firings to the Kamchatka im-pact area have been successful. r

u rD'hCas an ICBM. It was probably de-

igned by ffic same team that produced thcnd SS-8. Like thet

- -uu jj-o. RC tne oa-o, it

a two-stage, tandem vehicle employing liquid fuels and radio-inertia!We have insufficient evidence to determine the size of theI fa deve^pment follows the normal cycle, it could be operational in the latter half

uture ICBM Systems

eal "Par-s'o" of launch facilities at Tyuratam, cannot all bewith known systems. Ine estimated three future lines Of development: standardollow-on ICBMs, very large ICBMs. and smaller ICBMs cmployuig improved propellants. The first of these types has now appeared in thcnd possibly the

Large ICBM. Wc continue to believe (hat Uie Soviets area very large vehicleillion or more pounds of thrust) whichusedlobalarrier forwarhead, or as a We behove that test firingsery large ICBM could begin, by the

Dilialcapability could be achieved in the periodohis isea, later than estimated in. The initial deployment sitesery largo ICBM system would probably be soft, but wc continue to believe that the Soviets might find it feasible toegree of hardening at some stage in the program.

Small ICBM. We continue to believe that it would be advantageous for tbc Soviets to develop an economical ICBM system with high survivability and very fast reaction time. These requirements might be metmall missile cm-ploying cither solid or improved storable liquid propellants. The evidence of such development remains tenuous, andissile would run counter to the Soviet emphasis on relatively large systems with multimegaton payloads. How-ever, since our last estimate, we have acquired evidenceizable solid-propellant program which could have application in the strategic missile

We cannot estimate with confidencemaller ICBM system is under active development, but we take account of this possibility in cslimatini-tho future composition of the Soviet ICBM force.ystem would almost certainly be deployedard configuration. If testingew. small ICBM should begin aboutn initial operational capability could be acheived

!" ^0 ,he eBriic* estimated

b.. There is no evidence that the Soviets are seeking to develop

a mobile ICBM system, and we considerevelopment unlikely.




We doubt that the USSR will resume any substantia! program ot soft site ICBM deployment Deployment of thendoft con figuration probably ceased moreear ago. Third-generation systems may be deployed in new soft sites, but we consider such deployment unlikely. The recent trend to single-silos indicates that tbe Soviets recognize thc strategic advantages of hardened and dispersed ICBM deployment

Single-silo deployment will probably involve both the expansion of other old complexes and tha inauguration of additional newhird generation system is probably being deployed in the new single-silo complexes, but wc are unable to determine whether it is ther thee believe that one or both of these systems will be deployed in such complexes.

We believe thatill also be deployed in the uncompleted three.,iIo hard sites atomplexes. It is also possible that the Soviets will retrofit some presently operationalaunchers for theut In view of Uie ooh-tlnucd utility of thegainst many types of targets, wo consider it unlikely that they would undertakerogram at an earlye do not know whetheraunch facilities can be retrofitted for the

Force levels

The growth of the Soviet ICBM force over tbc next several years will be influencedumber of factors. In economic terms, the program must corn, pete for funds with other military and space activities and with the civilian economy, and we note that the deployment mode currentlyliquid-fueled missiles in singlemore expensiveer launcher basis than previous configurations. In the technical field, we believe lhatand development is piweoding on additional follow-on ICBM systems, -nd we doubt that, with these in the offing, the USSR will fix upon any one or even two existing systems for urgent deploymentarge scale. In strate-gic torins, the Soviets evidently judgeorce of some hundreds of ICBM launcherseterrent On (lie basis of the evidence now available to us. we do not believe that they are attempting toorce capableirst strike atiack which would reduce the effects of US retaliation tohoy will, of course, expect the deterrent effect of an ICBM force of moderate, size to he enhanced by qualitative improvements In weapons sys-terns. At the same time, we expect them toffort In thc hope of achieving important technological advances, in both the offensive and defensive fields, which would alter the present strategic relationshipajor way.

In, weoviet ICBM force level forperational launchers, including those at Tyuratam. It now appears

- For the view of the Asuttut Chief of Staff.SAF. M. h. lm*mA, oa paf*oeetaiMo H.


thai lhe number of ICBM launchers operational inill approximate the lower ride of this range.'* This conclusion stems directly from tho limited deployment activity3 and the pace thus farhese figures do notauuchers at Tyuratam."

hc growth of the Soviet ICBM force willupon the rales of deployment of thend SS-IO Wesubstantia' deployment of these thudsystems, both in oldcomplexes, but notevel exceeding lhe second-generation total.rests in pari upon consideialioo of Ihe economic, technical,factors previously noted. Further, we think the pace ofbe affected by thc probable Soviet decision to deploy tbendexclusively in hard sites, which take longer to build than the softcomprised lhc major part of the second-generation program. Wcmindful that the Inlcrruptioiis which marked the second-generationmay recur.

to futureery huge ICBM could become operationalperiodon doubt that the oovieU wouldnumbers of this missile, since it would probably be useful primarilyintimidation and for special military purposes. We hadestimated that the USSR would deployaunchers foeICBMs. but the costliness ofystem plus the advent of0 SS_9

system now lead us to conclude that

launcherswttcr estimate.

A small ICBM could alio become operational as earlynd. if developed, would probably be deployed io substantial numbers. Its advent wouldignificant effect on the scale and pace of ICBM deployment In the later years of Ihe decade. In particular, thc ounslruction of additionalnd SS-IO sites would probably be terminated in7maller follow-on system weir brought In, but would probably continue beyond that time if It were not.

In, wooviet ICBM forceperational launchers of all types inn addition to the various technical and ecooomic factors taken into account in arriving al this range, we reasoned that when rhe Soviets had acquiredCBMonsiderableof them hard silos, they might consider the resulting foice in conjunction with other strategic weapon systems an adequate deterrent. As to lhe high side of the0e reasoned that construction oforce might reflect notoviel concern foe deterrence, but also an effort

"Tba Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, eatluiatri tbal the number ol launched In intd-ldfiS will liether dun lhe low side o(. See his footnote to table,

" We are no longer uxixtcg facilities at Tyuratam ia our couat of operationalWe fudge that they are not normally available for, but varying numbers of them could be fnepaicd to fire ICBMs at the US, depending on the amount of advance nolle".

to put the better position toreemptive attackestern strike appeared imminent and unavoidable. We still eon-side, this reasoning to be valid, bul our present evidence and analysis leads us to believe that the Soviets are Dot tikeh/ to acquire as manyICBM launchers" Indeed, it now appears that theoforce level at (hat time would be likely only if the USSRa small ICBM and deploys itapid rate beginning

n the table on the following page, we present our estimates of thetypes of Soviet ICBM launchers at mid-yearst shouldlhat other force compositions and force levels within these ranees

G. Capabilities of fhe Force

Whether faffing toward the high or low side of the estimated range, tbeorce willubstantial mcxease in numbers of launchers and in deliverable inegatonnage over the force now deployed. Further, its suitability, and hence its retaliatory capability will be markedly improved Both (he low and the high sides of tbe estimatereatha number of aiming points represented by individual launch sites, fromt present tonncludingard sites. Unless wc arc grossly incorrect in these estimates, however, the sire and com-posiiion of the Soviet ICBM force inlearly will fall short of that requiredirst-strike attack which might reduce devastation of thc USSR lo au acceptable IcveL"

fiedcfion Time. We believe that the Soviet ICBM units at soft sites arc normally maintained in readiness Condition. launch crews fn launch area and on alert, missile and re-entry vehicle mated and checked out in ready building. Considering the evidence of Soviet efforts to reduce reaction time and the experience probably gained over the past few years, we dow estimate that theodan be launched from readinessithin one to three noun, as compared with our previous estimate of three to four raours. Ready missiles in hard sites probablyeaction time of about half an hour or less under normal readiness conditions, depending upon whether or not the missilefueled.

iom Conditionhe highest state of readiness, with missiles erected and fueled,oinutes would probably be required to launch fromoftard site. For stotable-fuel systems, such as thend tliehis state ol readiness can be maintainedumber of hours at soft silcs depending on weather and other factors, and for days in hard sites. Readiness

" Foe the vww of the Ajiiilaol CW ol SUA. InwUimnl> footnote to luMe pap li

" For (he mew of the Aoktaot CW ol Sufl.USAF.hi, footnea. on

page 1IL




















Hard Launch*'i



146 M





(11 hiy

ellmay be retrofitted wiihiiillei. bul w. think thl* talo occui at an early data.

Initial deployment wiU probably be left, but the Soviet* may End I.rxu.po.ata* nurderUug at ioene lUge in ihu piogram.

'auuchen becommgffl probably bowt* the. add non.of the hard Uuacfcen already ope..tic-ialthe SS-7bew.ihraiVi. but wt (hie*hkery to occura*.

' Tbe fracrtpMboe of Ifiei in iktt Lr*7 .eflrct. our view thatndew. mile-eloped and eMer. Hnn.

total* do not include MJ> Uucchm at Tysrataro. There are abouton ph-led RIDad we bebeve thii number will increase to roughlyr. the neat yea. or *o. We fudge lhat the. launcben are not normally available fo operational uie. but varymg number! of them could be pier-red to Ere ICBM. at th. US. depending on Uv.of advance notice


Chim' SAF, would protect the mimbere..llonal ICDM laumheit a. follow, r

He that foi the near term thc majority eitimate make* IroulBcicnl allowance Toritenee of tlmi far unobierved launchers. Duringime period,ation ICHM .yitemi could become operational, and he estimate, that one of. imal ICBMmW Iu the US Mlnuteman. wJI probably be deployed leumber* by

and reaction time will improve markedly with the continued deployment of hard launcher!.

imultaneity. Theoretically, the entire force could be brought simul-taneouily to readinessnd thereafter firedo IS minute period. Lack of direct evidence as to the reliability of Soviet deployed missiles

inakes it impossible to estimate with confidence what portion of the totalforce actually could participate in tin's salvo. We believe, however,under the most favorable conditions, andime to 6re givenin advance, Ihc resulting salvo would be ragged, with initial firingssome IS toinutes from launch of the Erst missile. Wc believeSoviets are working to improve coordination of operations, not onlyICDM force but also between it and the-other elements of Soviet

There is ample evidence that soft ICBM systemsefireelief that they could keep secret thetheir ICBM sites probably contributed to thc Soviet decision to pursueWc consider it extremely unlikely that hard ICBM sites have a

the light of our revised estimates of reaction time, wc haveestimates on the closely related question of time required to refire fromICBM site. Thc only essential difference in procedures for refire. isto cool the launch pad and to refurbish thc launch facilitieslaunching the next missUe. Assuming that thcnd thtapid refire capability in mind, the time required forwould probably be minimal. We now conclude that if noarc needed, retire time for thcndould beis, little longer than reaction time from Condition 3. _

possible that actual refire times would be"

hat tho total number of ICBMs deployed forin the Geld is on the order. Such an inventoryon the average, two or more missiles to each soft ICBM launcherfiring, retires, and maintenance spares. Since some ofultiple refire capability, the low side of this estimateothers have no refire missiles. Adding ICBMs deployed athree-silo hard sites, which we believe do notefire capability,that thc Soviet operational ICBM inventory asissiles.

and Accuracy.

Jthe effects of Sovielconcepls and troop training standards arc at least as important as technical characteristics in determination of system reliability, and we have no good basis for determining these effects. Wc believe that reliability would be degraded under operational conditions. Overall reliability of thc force will probably improve, particularlyew, small ICBM with improved propellant is deployed in sizable numbers.

estimate lhat currently operational ICBM systems have CEPs. Tbchen it becomes operational, will probably have

"For performance characteristics of ICBMs. see Aooe, A, Table 1.

an accuiucy. with radio assist,ith all-inertialOur evidence indicates that the Soviets are concerned with Improving ICBM accuracy, and wc believe that byliey could achieve accuracies on the order ofun. or less.

Multiple Warhead* and Penetration Aids. The large payloads of Soviet ICBMs present an obvious opportunity for trade-ofls between nuclear yield aad such modifications as multiple warheads and penetration aids. We believe that the Soviet leadersigh value to maximum nuclear yields, but they may in Ihe future reduce yields In order to incorporate such devices.

Fenefrationecoys, jammers, and shielding would be particularly likely il the US deploys antimissile defenses. Relatively unsophisticated types of penetration aids are within Soviet technical capabilities at present Multiple warheads could be developed as penetration aids or lo increase the efficiencyiven number of deployed missiles. Forissile could be equipped with several warheads designed loinglemight produce enhanced weapons effects on the target even though the total yield of thowere less than tlie missile's maximum deliverableoremultiple warhead system, could be designed to direct several warheads carriedingle missile against separate targets, although this would involve complex problems of system accuracy and reliability. These problems would be particularly acute if tbc SovieU shouldapability to attack bardWhile achievement ofapability wouldubstantial improvement in the Soviet strategic posture, and is technically feasible, we do not believe that ihey can attain such an objcctlvo by tho end of tho period of this estimate."

c fee! confident that, to date, neither decoys nor multiple warlieads have been tested. We believe that flight testing would precede the iricoiporatJon of these devices in deployed systems, aad tbe dunces are good that we would detect such testing^

ard Sties. We have undertaken exhaustive studies of thc faclois likely to affect ihr ability of Soviet hard sites to withstand nuclear attack, and we arcthat they were designed to withstand overpressures of some hundreds of pounds per square inch. Beyond this generalization, however, our studies have

"TW AirMul Chief of Staff.SAK. tabmi lhat pwteiinhonpaeani the attalegtt: attack leapfealion*onet multiple warheadronanleci the Soviets might nark to offset any US nuawiical superiority by convertingpart ol ihcir large payload capability Into muliiph warheads in an effort to achieveloumber of separate targets with each launch vehicle, tn hiipayjoaJ0 pounds, lor riample, could equate to at leasteentry vehiclesBy the uie of such lyttems tho Soviets could tniVe more cfle

- lyiterm the Soviets could make more effective

use eT their heavy paylood capability against soft military targets than would be tlie case If they were to continue to concentrate on single reentry vehicles with very high yieldHe estimates tlm, with extensive development effort, the Soviets could achieve operational statusultiple warhead system apprOxiinately two yeax after the Grit Sight and quite possibly within the period of thb estimate. He believe* thatrogram could leadignificant counter torn capability.

shown that the assessment of lhc hardnessiteery uncertain matter. Wc estimate that the design overpressures of Soviet three-sUo ICBM hard sites falls insi range,omewhat higher range than tliat estimated innd that their hardness is insihisenuous estimate; additional studies and collection efforts are underway in an attempt to provide higher confidence figures.

e have no direct information on which to baseenuous estimate of the vulnerability of single-silo sites, but it seems reasonable to assume that they will be at least as hard as the three-silo sites.


The deployment programs for. MRBMnd, IRBM (SS-S) are now ending and almost certainly will be completed bylthoughoard MRBM/IRBM launchers are stiff underthere have been no known construclion starts for primary'MRBM sites since2 and few if any for IRBMs sincen. we estimated that MRBM/IRBM deployment would be'virtuallyuiowever, an interruption of several months hi deployment activity3 delayed completion of the program.

Wc estimate that byhe Soviet MRBM/IRBM force, deployed atites, willtrength ofperational launchers,f them hard. The higher number of MRBM/IRBM launchers that we now estimate reflects our conclusion that MRBM hard sices consist of four launchers and IRBM hard sites, of three. In. we estimated that MRBM and IRBM hard sites had two launchers each.










of the Force

The bulk of the MRBM/IRBM force is deployed in the western half of Europeanhin range of targets in Western Europe and parts of North

"For the view of lhe Awfctaotof Staff. tnteUie-oee, USAF, see bis footnote or, pageond asno L.


and the Middle East The remainder ol (he force,roughly tmof the launchers, is deployed in thc Caucasian, southern Asiatic, and Far Eastern regions of the USSR. Thc Soviets MRBM/IRBM force is capable ofevastating first strikerful retaliatory attack againsttargets. Some sites can attack important targets outside of Eurasia, such as those in Greenland and Alaska. Some of the MRBM/IRBM launchersare intended to support Soviet theater operations."

The evidence indicates that the production of MRBMs and IRBMs is slowing. We estimate that the Soviets have now produced, enough missiles to provide all soft MRBM/IRBM launchersefire capability. Wc believe refire time for current systems is probablyours. The warheadsby the MRBM force probably vary from kUotonwe believe that some warheads with yields off*be available now to IRBMs. J

The evidence is not adequate toirm judgment as to the hardness of MRBM/IRBM launchers or as to the manner of launch,ilo-lift or fly-out. Nevertheless, wc think it likely that these launchers were designed foi acomparable to that of hard ICBM sites (sec

C. Future Developments

, we noted the testingrobable new MRBMYar during the first half3 and estimated that the Sovietsa follow-on MRBM into the force byndewyear after that. However!""

Jit seems likely that this tesl program was cancelled. If the Soviets arcew missile, it would probably employ improved storable liquid or solid propellants and be deployed in hard single-silos. On thc basis of Soviet teclinical capabilities, we believe thatystem could become operational ineriod.

Assuming lhat thc target system remains essentially unchanged, we believe the Soviets would feel under no pressure to expand their total MRBM/IRBM lorce beyond that estimated forf Ihey shouldorefollow-on syslem, tbey probably would phaseumber of soft launchers. We have acquired no evidence to indicate that the Soviets arc developing or intend toobile MRBM/IRBM system during the period of this estimate, and we consider this unbkely.

It is possible that political and military developments in NATO and tlie Warsaw Pact will at some point lead the Soviets to move some MRBMs into the Satellites, but wc believe Ihe Soviets arc highly unlikely to turn any nuclear

"For performance cJuuttrrisucj of MllBMs and IRBMs, see Anoei A, Table 2.


missiles over lo Satellite control. Further, as was demonstrated in Cubahe Soviets could deploy present MRBM/IRBM systems to distant areas.

have also considered the possibility that thc Soviets will come loChinesehreat requiring ihem to target some MRBM/IRBMsThe adventhinese nuclear capability might bring thisgeneral, however, wc think (hat worsening Sino-Soviet relations over awould be more likely lo influence Soviet ground force deploymentnear China, and perhaps to persuade the Soviets to retain moreas Badgers, capable of employing conventional as well as nuclear weapons.


Current Soviet rrussile submarine forces arc the outgrowth of decisions taken ino develop quickly an extensive but unsophisticated capability, evidently in response to demands from the Soviel leadership lhat the Soviet Navy modernize. Initially, long-range conventional-submarines were converted to carry ballistic missiles. This efiort was followed by theof two new classes of ballistic missile submarines, the first conventionally-powered and thc second nuclear."

The decision to develop cruise missile submarines, probably made. ledimilar pattern. The conversion of conventional submarines by the installation of cruise missile launchers topside was followed by two new classes of submarines, thc first nuclear and thc second conventionally-powered, configured to employ the new weapon system. Although the present missile submarine force consists largely of ballistic types, cruise missile types have been entering servicerowing rale during the past two years.

Both public and classified Soviet statements indicate that thc original mission of the ballistic missile submarines was to "carry out strikes deep in enemy territory and to support ground forcey the. Sovicl planners probably recognized that this mission couldbetter performed by ground launched missiles, then entering service in significant numbers. They also probably concluded that the relatively unsophisticated ballistic missilewere of little value in carrying out thc Soviet Navy's primary mission of defenseeaborne attack. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on cruise missile submarines,rimary mission of countering Western naval nuclear strike forces, particularly carrier task forces. Both ballistic and cruise missile submarinesapability to attack land targets. However,from Soviet classified military writings, as well as the operational practices of the force, indicate that they are not now assigned ihe mission of participating in initial nuclear attacks on land targets.

" for performance chamcieriitic* of mUflSc mbounnet, wc Annex A, Table 5.



most, issiles aresome could now have"^

Thearhead probablyieldHowever, the

operational capability of the force is limitedumber otfactors: (a) the small number of missiles per submarine; (b) the short range of theissiles and the need for the submarines equipped with Ihis system to surface before launching: (c) the operational limitations of the diasel-powered units which comprise the bulk of the force; (d) the absence of operational training cruises to likely launch areas off US coasts.

B. Current Cruiw Missile Submarine Forces

n addition to ballistic missile submarines, tho Soviets have operationalruise missile submarines. Twelve arelassof which hall are equipped io carry four missiles each and five to carry two missiles each; one.rototype, has only one UuncfacT. Nuclear,as* submarines, which entered serviceake up morehird of the force. Six of these aie of the HI type which carries six missiles,re of theI type, which carries eight missiles. The remainder of theomprised of the newlass, equipped with (our missile launchers, which was first identified inix units uf this class are believed to be operational.

oviel cruise missile submarines are equipped with Iwo versions of thoissile system. The first of these,.A, was probably developed primarily as an anti-shipping weapon. For attacking ship targets beyond tbe radar hoiixon, effectiveness is limited by the requirement for a

-For obaractetirtioi of nbrurliw-launcbod rauUlea. see Aonea A. Table 3.


forward observer to provide target data. Soviet documents indicate thatand aircraft will pet form this function, the missile itself contains terminal homing guidance for use against ship targets. We bcli'ivc that theould also be used against land targets, thc low altitude Sight0 feet) of thb missile would complicate Western defensive problems.

n improved version of this system,.U, probably became operationalhis missile cruises at supersonic speed at0 feet and then descends fo aneet for the terminal approach to theow-altitude, leduced-speed Right profile, similar to that of therobably available as an option TbeW class andlass nuclear submarines are probably equipped with theystem;f class and thelassprobably carry tbeeUssile. Soviet cruise missile submarines can probably launch the first missile five minutes alter surfacuig. and the othersew minutes.

ecent developments In the cruise inutile submarine force indicateSoviets are improving its capabilities to attack land targets. Althoughin thb role would be less than against ships, the increased rangeof theissile, its low altitude terminal flight profile, and itscross section would renderifficult target. Its use againstparticularly In conjunctionallistic missile attack, woulddefensive problems. Tbe submarine-launched cruise missilea warheadaximum yieldFor use against ships,

lower yield nuclear or non-nuclear warheads could be employed.

C. Construction and Conversion Programs

ion oflass and probably tbelass ballistic missilehas terminated. We believe that (he Soviets will retrofit all offorce of II class submarines and at leastlassubmerged-launchallistic missile system. ConversionIf class probably began, and we have recently acquiredthat coo version oflass submarines is under way.that conversion programs forlasslass submarinescompleted.

of cruise missileontinuing. Wclass submarino was deliveredonstruction of the Eprobably now under way at two yardsombined delivery rate ofunits per year. Construction ofass diesei-powered,probably beganZ at two shipyards. The Gist unit wasthe Baltiche involvement of more than one shipyardlass program than previously estimated, andnits per year will be built over tho next several years.


e believe that thc Soviets abo have underubmarine winch we estimate to be tlie firstew. nuclear-powered ballistic missile class. Since we have no evidence that new submarine-launched missiles are under development, wc believe thai il will employ.c feel sure that the new class will cany more missies than thc three carried bylasses,. Tlie first unit of this new class probably will enter service

e have no evidence of Soviet work on more advanced missile submarines,

oviet writings show awareness of the advantages of thesystem. There is evidenceizable solid-propellant program inbut it has no known naval associations. Based solely ontechnical capabilities, we think that during this decade the. submarine-launched ballistic missile employingimproved liquid propellants,ollow-on nuclear submarinecarrying considerable numbers ofissile. If developmentalalready well under way,eapon system could be operational as

c have estimated above that the Soviets are about to bring intoew nuclear-powered submarine class carrying. submerged-launch ballistic missile.ubmarine would go far to meet what we judge to be Soviet stralegic: requirements in this Geld. We therefore think it unlikely that the Soviets will bring an entirely new follow-on system into service during the period of this estimate. Present systems will continue to be improved, however, and longer range missiles could be developed for employment with them.

D. Estimated Force Levels

he-USSR will continue to expand and impiove its missile submarine forces, but there is much unceitainty at present as to the future scope and direction of Soviet missile submarine programs. Our estimate of the future lorce is heavily influenced by recent trends in Soviet construction of nuclear submarines, wliich has remained relatively constant at thc estimated ratenits per year. Wc believe that construction will continue at appioximately this rale during thc period of the estimate, and that it will continue to be divided among ballistic mLvzile. cruise missile, and torpedo attack classes. We believe that construction of torpedo attack nuclear powered submarines will continue at about the current rate of about three per year, although ihu growingof thc Soviet fleet of diescl-powcred torpedo attack submarines and the Soviet requirement for ASW submarines may bring some increase In this rate. As to missile submarines, our estimate takes account of the cessationndlass production, retrofitnd II class submarines with thc longer rangeroduction of thc probable new class of ballistic missile submarine, and continued production of cruise missile submarines.




H dan New cla






Oct- 5






1 4

: ilt


Operational Capabilities

be failure of the SovieU to conduct patroL lo potential launch areas,ey llmihog factor in tbe development of operational capabilities. Until very recently, Soviet rnisslle submarines operated almost exclusively within local waters, and we do not beUeve that they have yet conducted patrols off US coasts. However, they haveery limited number of out-of-arca patiuhlow,ensionii OpWaaMM by Soviel Northern and Pacific Fleet submarines can be expeclod. Byoviet missile submarines will probably be conducting patrols tliroughout the North Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly into the Mediterranean.

Tlie Soviets are building up tlie logistic structure for their missile submarine forces. Several new types of submarine auxiliaries, including one designed specifically to support missile submarines, have appeared at major bases. In addition, the Soviets axe improving existing base facibues.

Tho Soviets have been seeking to improve the operational characteristics of their submarines, both diesel- and nuclear-powered. Early Soviet nuclearexperienced difficulties in the operation of their engineering plants, but many of these problems have probably been overcome in submarines builtome of the earlier nuclear submarines have probably been modified. With existing hull designs and currently operational engineering plants, Soviet nuclear



submaiuies canaximum sp*cd ol aboutnots; Vernal cruising speeds an probably on the order of4 knots. Ti* maximum speed ncorcUcally attainable with existing Soviet hull designs could be as5 knots. Improvements in engineering plant and hull design coulduclear submarine capable of even greater speeds. Utilizing present steels and technology, new Soviet submarines could achieve maximum operating depthseet in Ihc period of this estimate.

radiated noise levels of existing Soviet nuclear submarinesto those of early US nuclear submarines. These levels canbut we have insufficient evidence to determine the extent to whichtechniques may have been applied lo existing operational SovietIncremental improvements could be made at any time; however,noise reduction program for existing submarines would probablymodification of the engineering plant. The Soviets could developquiet new class of submarine, but we do not believe that they willnumbers ofew type within the period of this estimate.


During the past year, we love acquired no evidence of major change in the capabilities and structure of Soviet Long Range Aviationhe foice is being improved through introduction of new supersonic-dash medium bombers and modification of older modelse of LRA medium and heavy bombersaritime reconnaissance role continues. Soviet military writmgs during the past year have included some spirited defenses of the utility of manned aircraftide spectrum of military operations- this is in contrast to thc denigration of manned bombers whichrevalent Sovietew years ago. Wc believe that the Soviets will maintain sizable but declining bomber forces.

Tlie heavy bomber force stillignificant portion of the current Soviet capability for intercontinental strategic attack, but Soviet LRA. by reason of .ts equipment, basing, and deployment, is in general much better suited for Eurasian operations. The bulk of the force is deployed in thc Wei(Um USSR, the Ukraine, ami ihc southern poiliun of the Soviet Ear East. Wc estimate lhat there areediumeavy bombers inunits in Long Range Aviation, some of which are utilized as tankers.

A. Recent Developments in Long Range Aviation

eavy bomber training in thc Arctic has emphasized extendedflights into thc Polar basin. Bison training is oriented towards those activities normally associatedtrike bomber role, and Bear training has the added feature of reconnaissance specifically oriented against surface shipsthc Atlantic and Pacific. The (raining of the medium bomber has been

Tor pe.fomj.nee chM.Me.wne* of Anne, A. Table 6


increasingly oriented toward continental or naval rather than intercontinental operations.*'

The heavy bomber force ofircraft contains aboul equal numbers of turboprop Bears and jet Bisons. The primary improvement in heavy bomber capabihues in recent yean has resultedodification program foe the Bear. Three variants of this aircraft have been identified Theomber, not equipped for aerial refueling. Thes an air-to-surfacc missile carrier. Some Bear Bs have been equipped for aerial refueling, and we believe that this modification program will continue. Theissile carrier which is equipped liolh for aerial refueling and reconnaissance. We beUeve lhat the current operational Bear force consistss,s.

Tbe provision of an aerial refueling capability fornables the aircraft to reach important targets In the US directly from home bases with heavy loads such as the Kangaroond permits extendedmissions. However, this modification of the Bear imposes newfor conversion of Bisons to tanker use. thereby (educing thc Bison bomber force. The Kangarooissileange of. It was designed for use against land targets, but it could be used against naval formations, although it would have limited effectiveness because of greatlyaccuracy andifferent guidance system would improve its accuracy against ships.

There is firm evidence lhat Bear production extendednd ihere has been con suitable activity aince then at the Bear production facility. At least part of this activity ts accounted (or by the Bear inodificatiooand by production of the Cleat heavy transport, but we cannot exclude the possibilityew new Bears are being produced.

In the medium bomberradual reduction in the number of Badgers and introduction of thc supersonic-dash Blinder have continued. New information indicates that fewer Blinders have been delivered to LRA than previously estimated; wc believe (hat there aren operational units of LRA. There are two versions of this aircraft: Blinderomber, and Blinderissile carrier which may bo equipped for aerial refueling. We believeew ASM (designated Kitchen, AS-t) could become operational next year for use with the Blindrtr B.

uture Trends in Bomber Foices

Soviets would probably plan to employ bomber forces inafter missile strikes had been delivered. Aircraft equipped with pene-

"The Annual Chief of Staff.SAF. Wirm that tbe UtdVgenee anZabfe on nedwm bomber Arctic training indicatesSoviet tarfnrai in inlrr murine neil tne of the medium brother.

" Fe* performance chantde/litfc* of LHA alr-to-surface Buuilea, toe Anoei A. Table 4.


(ration aids and nuclear weapon* would probably be used for increasingly spe-cialiird millions, such mi armed reconnaissance (including maritime) and attacks on selected bard targets as well as on targets of uncertain location.

f the USSR actively pursues RAD work and commits fundi forand deployment, new types of large military aircraft could be brought to operational use ineriod. The Soviets are technically capable of developing long-endurance subsonic aircraft (for reconnaissance and/or low altitude penetration) and medium-range high-altitude aircraft with maximum speeds of aboutn this time period.

e have no evidence that the Soviets are developing follow-on bomber aircraft. Currentork in large aircraft seems directed primarily towaid the development of new transports. Continuation of this work willthe Soviets' state-of-the-art and willechnological and production base which they could apply to military purposes. However, considering their likely missile capabilities toward the end of the decade as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think it unlikely that the SovieU willollow-on heavy bomber into operational service during the period of this estimate.'* If they should, US* intelbgencc Is likely to obtain indications of its development and production one to three years prior to entry into operational units.

hc increasing age of the Bison and Boar and continued phase-out of Badger will reduce both the heavy and medium bomber components of Long Range Aviation. The output of Blinders will prohabiy continue to be shared between Long Range and Naval Aviation, and we believe that0 there will bef these bombers in LRA. On the basis of present trends we estimate LRA strength as indicated on the following page"

C. Opeialionol Capabilities

ajor restriction on LRA intercontinental attack capabilities lias been the limited range of thc jel bombers which make up the bulk of Iheerial refueling and Arctic Iraining in fhe past several years reflect Soviet eflmfs to overcome this limitation The USSR has not developed aircraft specifically for tanker use. instead. Bisons and Badgers are converted for use as tankers. Even with aerial refueling, the capabilities of LRA for intercontinental attack

"The Aiuilant Chid of Stuff, Intelligence, USAF, consider! that the SovieU will coniinue to ernphailic improvement of their manned strategic aircraft capability as aa important nd|unct to (bed initnlr- force, lie believe* that much olf) work on larger aircraft {reflected In Pan.n directed toward development of new tranrporuj) represents workollow-on strategic bomber He bebevei it likely that Ihe SovieU willew heavy bomber4ew medium bomber0

" For the varws. of tbe AaibtaM Chart of Stal. brtriifenot. USAF. as to the future .lie*eU. of LRA. see hu footnote to the table on

" New technical information on tha Badger aoquired Inas decrcaaedjoale of the minimum combat ladiui of thu aircraft by ove>ercent











TOTAL Medium Bomben and Tanken

. Blinder





Md>9 0


Tbe Assistant Chief of Suuf. ffaUg^uce. USAF'. crbnutae (bat tbe mtrodoetioQoum.-oahe.vy bomber, (be cootinoed reteodoo of stable number, of Badger. (hr con-





tinued prodtactloo of Bunder, .nd tbe ^traductionoUow-e* nmlnun waioca poo bo- of Soviet Loog Range Avia-no ai fellow*:

1 Oct


l'Ol!oW-OQ .


. Blinder ollow-oo






Wide tbe evidence lootn; to enable idenbaoauoo of (be speoScoviet. -JI concentrate, (be Aaantant Chief of SUfl.

InteC.rence. USAF. conaldenh* foUow-oo bomber couldong endurancebetter capabjitie. than ihnae of the Bear bybombernuclear powered bomberWre(

remain limited, and wo do not believe that they are likely to improve within Ut8 period of this estimate.H

n addition to itsermanent home bases, LHA alsoumber of Arctic aiifieltls that could be used as staging base, for attacks on North America. Arctic training activity has centered around the four or Eve of these airfields, which are capable of supporting bomber operations throughout the year. Toarge bomber force in an initial mtereontinental attack, the



Soviets would have to utilize otbei Arctic airfields as well There arc ahther fields in the Arctic which have runways long enough for LHA bomb Some of these have natural surface runways usable only in winter; some are occupied by otheraval Aviation; some have little POL storage and servicing facilities; and most are too distant from targets in the continental US to allow for two-way missions with medium bombers- We believe that the Soviets would have great difficulty in utilising these bases effectively toimultaneous initial attack, although tbey could be used for recovery operations.10

Badgers could reach targets in the extreme northwesternof the continental US on two-way missions from Arctic bases in thebut they would have little flexibility of routing and tactics.would require both Arctic staging and inflight refueling to covor theUS targets on two-way missions. Unrefueled Bear bombers could reachtargets directly from home bases, but, when equipped with0 lbs. or more, unrefueled Bean would probably need tothe Arctic Refueled Bears carrying theould reach mostdirectly from their home bases.

patterns and range capabilities of Soviet bombers indicateattack againsi the US (except Alaska) would involve heavyexclusively. Wc have previously estimated that the Soviets wouldentire heavy bomber force to this mission as weapons carriers andthc requirements for Arctic staging, refueling, and noncombatfactors, we estimate that at present the Soviets could put somewhatheavy bombers over target areas in the US on two-way missions.use of Soviet heavy bombers in maritime reconnaissance roles leadsew of these aircraft might be diverted to this mission"

ur evidence leads us to conclude that Badgers do not now figuretn Soviet plans for an initial bomber attack against North Aroetica. Nevertheless. considering the rcquirernenU for Arctic staging and refueling, as well as noncombat attrition factors, we believe lhat at present upadgers could arrive over North American target areas on two-way rnissaoni. The combat tadius of these lumbers would limit such attacks to targets in Groenland, Canada,

"The Auulaot Chief elMrlbgcace, USAF, rccognirei the diScuItSci oi staging through Soviet Alette bum. but hr brlievrs thai available1 facihlJei are luSctent to enable the Soviets to launch enough bomben and tankers to put atorabeii over the continental US.

"The Assistant Chief ot Staff Intelligence, USAF, considers thate-tfously underestimate the manned aucralt threat to the contmcatal US In the event war should eventuate tbe USSR attacks the USnucleare believed this wifj be an atl-cul effort aimed ntinimum number ol weapons on US largeu. In any such attack, he believe* that the Soviets would augrcent their ICBM lotot with itrategk bombers. Censadwuig al (actors ricept combat attntioa. (be Soviets could, by Ming Ar.ti. bates,ombcii over North America on two way mlsikini and stdl leave several hundred medium bombenttack Eurasian targets. If tha USSR were to employ Badgers eatenir-ely in one-way tnttsions as part of the attack, the number of bombers reaching the US.



and the extreme northwestern US. As for Blinders, we have no evidence lhat they have engaged in Arctic training and. because this aircraft, when flying its designed mission, has even less range than thc Badger, we believe that few if any would be assigned to North American targets.

The Soviets could further increase the number of bombers arriving over North America should they resort fo one-way unrefueled attacks with medium bombers. With the growing Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces, this use of the medium bomber force becomes increasingly unlikely.

In view of the limitations of the Soviet Arctic base structure, we have serious doubt about how effectively the Soviets could launch large scale bomber operations against North America.


vailable evidence does not of itself indicate whether or not the Soviets now have programs for the military use of space, apart from tlie military .support capability provided by the Cosmos reconnaissancen particular, we have no evidencerogram to establish an orbital bombardmentis seriously contemplated at present hy the Soviet leadership. However, the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems few use as offensive and defensive weapons and to provide other types of military support.

ince the publication of, thc Soviets have launched and de-orbited an increasing number of satellites in00 pound classes, using theooster with suitable upper st3ges. Thc Sovietsapability touclear-armed satellite in orbit, but we consider ii unlikely that thev will do so.atellite would have limited military effectiveness, and the decision to orbit it would be based primarily on political and psychological considerations. The Soviet leadership probably would recognize that this would be an act of major international import which would intensify greatly East-West hostility, prejudice the option of detente tactics, andtrong new stimulus to Western military programs.

We lielieve that the attainment of reliability and accuracy, particularly for out-of-orbit detonation near the earths surface, woulderies of tests extending over atear after an initial launching. After suchthc USSR probably couldmall number of bombardment satellites with CEP's on the order. against targets located up to several hundred nautical miles from its earth track and with orbital lifetimes ranging up to several months. With thcooster, the nuclear payload could bethere were no requirement that the payload be recoverable.

For an orbital bombing system of military significance, thereide range of delivery techniques and types of orbital bombardment forces which might be sought by the Soviets, with considerable differences in developmental requirements, costs, and effectiveness. Tohreat of retaliation against


centers, they mighlelatively small force of limitedcomposed ofeapons in orbit. For large-scale use against smaller or harder military targets,uch larger, sophisticated force with short times to target, near-simultaneity of delivery, and an accuracythat ofould be necessary. Even the lesser of these forces would be extremely complex and expensive, and wouldajor Soviet efforterfect new hardware and to develop advanced techniques. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should beto us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.

For accomplishing military missions, we think that onbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs over the next six years in terms ofreaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerabuity. avenge life, and positive control. In view of these considers lions, the much grealer cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of tlie UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system within tlie petiod of this estimate,

Even without any special efforts, however. Soviet technology applicable to this Held will improve in the normal course of continued development of nuclear technology, ICBMs. and space projects. We recognize that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cost aad effectiveness, and that altered political considerations in some future phasc of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even in these circumstances, we believe that tliey would regard space weapons primarily as means of supplementing existing forces, of introducing additional complications Into US defense planning, arid of supporting Soviet claims to strategic parity or even superiority.


inal authority for the use of strategic strike forces rests firmly with the top political leadership. Such information as we have suggests that steps have been taken in recent years to designate membership in the Supreme Highand lo develop procedures to permit the quick assumption by this body of top level control of miliUiy operations should events SO dictate This action together with Khrushchev's assumption of (he title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of thc Armed Forces provides in peacetime lhe framework of the command structure which historically has existed only in wartime.

he several elements of the Soviet long range striking forces arcto different major commands: Long Range Aviation, the Soviet Navy, and the Strategic Rocket Forces. Coordination of operations among thc three long range striking forces is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, whose Ceneral Staff is responsible for planning and probably targeting foi the entire military establishment. The Soviets continue their efforts to improve their com-



maud and control system for strategic attack forces. The genera! picture remains one of considerably less sophistication and precision than in comparable US command and conlrol systems.

Range Aviation has existedeparate commandpost-war period, and missile submarines have been assigned toWhile strategic bombers and missile submarines are attached towith weUdcvclopcd and rc6ned communications and controlthc Strategic Rocket Forces were established0 as aof Ihe Soviet military establishment. These forces had newrequirements in the Geld of command and control, which wereclassified Soviel military writingsL Wc believe that thesein communications, control, and data-processing have been

B. Long Range Reconnaissance

We believe that.the USSR has devoted considerable effort*to ptopomting potential targets for strategic attack in thc US and elsewhere. Highin geodetic mapping provides the USSR with an excellent base; we currently estimate that thc Soviet geodetic erTor in location of US missile launch sites is on the ordereet Wc believe that, by using all avail-able means, including reconnaissance satellites, the USSR will be able to reduce geodetic enor toeet by the end of the decade.

Continuous and up-to-date information on the location and movement of key Western forcesigh priority Soviet requirement. In peacetime, this requirement is met in large part by thc extensive Soviet radio ducction-Gnding effort, which' permits location of Western communications circuits and the units employing them. The Soviet direction-finding effort couldigh degree of effectiveness under wartime or alert conditions in the absence of strict Western communications security measures and electronic emission control. Tlie USSR supplements this effort by such means as the exploitation of open sources, clandestine observation, and signal interceptariety of meanstrawlers.

'lhc Soviet reconnaissance satellite program probably provides support to long-range striking forces. Thc program uses recoverable vehicles launched from Tyuratam under thc mantle of thc Cosmosequirement for precise largeting information on US targets, not obtainable through othermeans, seems to be the primary reason for tlie program.

In conducting any long-range attack, thc Soviets would desire to learn as rapidly as possible which targets had survived their initial strikes. High-frequency back-scatter antennas in the USSR could determine general areas and yields of large nuclear explosions in the US. but probably not precisely enough for retargeting ICBMs. These devices might assist in piogiamming post-attack reconnaissance.


precise post-attack rcconnaisssncc, the USSR could use mannedto seek out and strike at surviving targets or targets of uncertainSoviets haveigh-altitude, reconnaissance aircraftto, wluch has an operating radius suitable for usetargets. Unmanned reconnaissance of targets in Eurasia mightby surface-to-surface aerodynamic vehicles. Such vehiclesoperational within thc next two years. Damage assessment ofcould be achieved lry employing reconnaissance satellites.

C. Eleclronic Warfare and Countcrmcasurcs

'lhe Soviets have considerable capabilities to disrupt or degrade Western strategic and tactical communicalions. They haveubstantial range of active and passive ECM equipment including improved chaff and ja miners for use primarily against radar and communications. Tlic Soviets have thc capability to greatly expand the limited use they have made ofdeception techniques. Soviet counter/measures capability presentlyinto all the significant frequency bands used by the West, from low frequencies0 Mc/s, and probably higher, but the capability is not uniform tluoughout this range. Existing Soviet countcrmcasurcshowever, are not likely to be effective against some of the less susceptible US communications systems, such as those employing ionospheric or tropo-spheric scatter techniques. The Soviets are continuing lo enhance theirwarfare capabilily, and equipment expected to become available will include such improvements as greater power and more sophistication.

Airborne systems. Soviet Long Range Aviation has placed heavyon thc role of electronicts overall mission. All bombers are probably equipped with basic mechanical and electronic ECM devices, and the Soviets would probably employ some bombers primarily in an ECM role. They have demonstrated capabilities for employment of ECMide variety of operational conditions- Long Range Aviation aircraft arc capable of conducting active and passive ECM (jammers and chafl) against enemy air ( electronic systems within most of thc frequency spectrum from0 Mc/s, and of conducting electronic intercept operations lo cover the frequency spectrum from0 Mc/s. Development of electronic warfare capabilities in the frequency spectrum0an be expected. Future improvements could include broader band jammers, higher powered and more automatic equipment, and increased use of deceptionAlthough there is no evidence of such systems as air-to-surface missiles designed to home on radar transmitters, air-launched decoys to simulate bomber radar returns, and infrared decoy flares to counter heat-sccking air-to-airthese could also he made available provided thc Sovietsequirement for them

Countermeasures for Nooal Use. In recent years, the Soviels have given increased emphasis to development of shipboard ECM equipment, bul such



Tableoviet ICBM Systems

Tableoviet MltBM ami IHBM Systems

Tableoviet Subrxiarinc-launched Missile Systems

Table A:ng Range Aviation Air-to-Surfacc Miiiile Syst

Tableoviet Missile Submarines

Tableoviet Strategic Bomber Weapon Systems




Initial Operational Capabilitythe first operational unil is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.

Maximum Operational Range

Air-to-Surfaccrange between launching aircraft and target at thc instant of missile launch.

Surfacc-to-Suffacerange under operational conditions with warhead weight indicated. For long-range ballistic missiles, tbcrange figures disregard the effect of thc earths rotation. In general, ballistic missiles can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third thc maximum operational range without serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

Circular Error Probableradiusircle in which, statistically, one-half of thc impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies arc somewhat better Ihan thc accuracy specified in the tables, which take Into consideration average operational factors. For naval systems firing on coastal targets, an accurate determination of the launching ship's position is necessary to achieve CEP's of tlie order indicated in the tables.

JWnirypartissile designed to re-enter the earth's atmosphere in thc terminal portion of its trajectory. Reentry vehicle weight includes that of the warhead, necessary shielding and structure, any penetration aids that may be present and any other necessary or desired components.

Warheadweight of thc explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism.


Heady Missilepercentage of the operational missUc force that will be available to immediately initiate launch preparationormal readiness condition. Thc Ready Missile Rate may vary with international condilions and will probably be somewhat higher during periods of tension and strategic alert.

Countdown Reliability: The percentage of the missile force that after initiation of launch preparation will be successfully launched with no more than IS toinutes delay in their normal preparation time.

Inflight Reliability: Thc percentage of thc missiles successfully launched that will detonate as planned in the target areaithin three CEP's of the aiming point).


Overall Reliability: The percentage of the operational missile forcesuccessfully detonate in the target area. (Overall Reliability is theof the Ready Missile Rate. Countdown Reliability and Inflight

Reactionrequired to proceedeadiness condition to launch.

Refirerequired toecond missile from the same pad or launcher.

Readinessfollowing conditions of readiness apply to all ground launched ballistic missiles having maximum operational rangesum. or greater.

Conditionaunch crews not on alert Re-entry vehicle and missile checked but not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted fortarget and missile no! erected or fueled.

aunch crews in bunch area and on alert Missile and re-entry vehicle mated and checked but in ready building.

Conditionaunch crews at launch stations. Missile with re-entry velucle erected on launch pad Propellant facilities in position, attached and ready to start propellant leading. Subsystems checkout complete and guidance aligned.

Conditionaunch crews at launch stations. Missile propellant loading completed. All systems ready for final checks.

"top 5ccrct-

Table i

soviet icbm systems estimated character 1stics and performance


Ranee (NRE)



Radio Inertial







a.ooor. ;








Ml&eilo Rate '

Countdown '

proved rTear)

Reliability '





5 nun.

Time in


Time at leastra.

(Soft eilea)

6eoon 'oUcwIna


1M2 (neJt)





Inertial *




















1 hr.






TOP OCCRCT lawufftoeol lou. to uM aaof0 chajaetafWUc. sodnertMl,KP of I IS

a-Uod*ut oot

thr introduction of beer rMoanorloype, of ICBM.

'rortraUoo aid. .ad -arneed abieldine. could

ht.hKi, couldrd .libit, lha total re-eou, .eb.rJe

idenur.ed eelidtnl that abould auch devices be used, the, would he deie-eu-i

We believeo ba maximum yield.. Warhead yield6 Could be inoreaaedir

a newehloleli developed, buttc. Ihi. unlikely. Mealrobablyarhead.. Hoe-ever.

- dc. no^con*,robably available for* euUrioriIhi. rear, and aome portion of Ibe

S^ sss

'The* reliability rale, may beel doc they may outlick ntly lake.tooum ibe eflect of Sovietand ttuop training, which are atmportanthar.cteN.Uca In rletermlnm.err.have Utile banUmaUnB thrae

. believed to be lhe normal re.dinea. condition lor ICHM. deploredoft aitee andor haid aitea.

h D* WUWhoW P' io

. hardened II ujonger hold Ume than iu eofl counterpart We believe lb0 ervotenio proper Ike ofHiprobably limitlaaile.old time of .bout ooe

I. .ppUeabb to .oft die. only. EaUmated rear, time* area iho waumpUoe, lhal lhe f cround aupport equipment

tha Dkaatet. DIA, and lb- AardMaat Chief of Staff.SAF. beJIev Ua. taa - fUW. make. Il. lhal theocparabl. to the. paylcdhey "hicb doe. oot eocrel-ic with tb. iodic tor.vcIt .ib.I1 rauasOe.

^ " ouad. or Meaewbat more.





Mai. Range (am)



Radio Inertial





Vebirle "

Warhead Weight tlfaa)




Oiow Lift-OfT Wt. (lbs)



Ready Missile Rale-


Single Blase

Non-atornble liquid


Single atage Storable

ingle stage Storable




Reaction Time from *

Rcadinesa Condition 3


Hold Time Condition 1

sot Whan!





5 min.

Many bi]'liv:i


5 min. Many bra/days



robablypbaaed mil of operational service.

Jammers, other pcoetratlon aid* and warhead shielding could bo tiioorporated at aome ancrtnen In nuclearweight whleh could be carried within Uila total re-entry vehicle weight. (J

o dale uo decoya or penetratioo aida bave beeo identified. We feel canhdent that iilioukl auch deviceahey would be detected.

eliability ralea moj be too high, aince Ibey may not turScieatly take into account tbeof Sovielemeepla and troop training, which ore al leaat oa important a* Won lealn dturnwmog ayatetn reliability We have no good baus for rod mating lame effecto.

a believad In be Ihe normal reodineaa eoodiUoo for MRBM/IRBM* deployed at aofl oliea andar bard aia Tbeae tinea are apehaaMa only to operaliooa at porcaanaol Band eitea and rnigbt be appreciably -oacrr when opciaUng from alternate. Acid lype ntea

An unfavorable environment could aertouaty degrade Iheae hold Umea Becauae of the protectionardened alte, it Iaonger hold lime lhan itaaolt couoMrpail. We believe the cryogenic properUce or nonatorable propellanla probably limit theold nine ol about one hour.

1 Kenfe capabtUlleaaroapplicabU) loaoftaltOMOaly. Intimated refire thm* are baaed on ibe assumption lhal Ibo. launchere deulgnod apecifioatly for an eflteiml refire capability and lhal no major refurbishment of ground auppott oquip-nenl nr lauueh aland ia Dccraoarv.









S0 or0



' This interrelated range and accuracy aaiumc an offset bombing technique lo which the location of thc land target i* precu-eiy known with reepecteference point.

first Gnu res In these entries areoost-glide vehicle, aod lie second forbooat-


- Wiih this guidance, Ihe CEP againat ships wouldo. The Inclusion of aaoeker toore effective anti-ship capability Id feasible technically. We have do evidence that this ban occurred; auch readily could be accompliabed within Ibe period of Ihis estimate.

Yields shown ore maximum*. Smaller yields might be employed againat (hips.

reliability rales may be high because Ibe etfecte of Soviet operational concept* and troop tiatnini; standards ate at least is important aa technical characteristics ioof system reliability. We have no reliable basin for estimating these effect*.

' The terminal phase of tbclight profile would be at low aupcrsonlo speed.







D Efl II

- "







M .

o '


8 ..






Fuel Fuel
















. i-urubN 10






Power J










tool COMOD loltowlrii pain




(Calculated la -teordanee WU USOMA Spec rietpt Hast fad ibwwj arcermitmaalmum ol JO minute* kale* at sea Uvei. and aiimil operate al altitudes pr'roillioc man mam nauVrw)

Baaoaa tlna * HmMi

Ocose Weight

Erupt) Welghl i-

Combat Radius/Ita






b bombload


With ASM


raseei (BEAR



Speed Altitude (ala/IO

Speed al Optimum 0 0

Specd/Taieol 0 0

o. Ijurteb Speed/Launch Altitude 0

Combat Celling (tt) 0 0

System Aocuraoy (CEP)

Aeeuraey *




n. .

land targata lacd target*


arget Area* lo North


reUahllily On Unnebri.'Ia flight' adalt-unrrfueJed/reiueled..



range aii') radius figures Riven in this table are maximum figures. They are applicable tu tlie moat up-lo-date modeli ofaircraft, Hying optimum mission profiles on direct roulca. The in* of older model aircraft, other mission profiles, indirectow-level penetration or other tactic* designed to delay or evade detection and interception would reduce Uie effective range. The calculation or degradation in range and radius resulting from sophisticated penetration tacticsomplex process which can be best accomplished for individual inbaiooa.ule-ol-thumb for low-level operations of heavy bombers, the radius nt optimum altitude will be decreasediles for every mile flown at sea level. been equipped to carry one0 nmANGAROO, ratherombload. Theissile is estimated to weigh0 lbs.aa been equipped to carry onend also to conduct reconnaissancerobe-and-drogue refueling system has been provided. Io addition, oneaa been observed equipped for such refueling.

Aomber not known to bo equipped for refueling.arries one KITCHEN ASM which is expected to become operationale believe that BLINDER was designedupersonic dssb mission. Our estimates of combat.. in. out) al. II BLINDER were Sown Buboonic all lhe way. combat radius would be increased by.

' Associated combat load0 Iba. for BISON and BEARbs. fornd BLINDER A; oneor; and oneor BLINDER B.

accuracies indicated are tor visual bombing or radar bombing against wcU-defioed targets with free-fall bombs. These figures are not applicable to drogue-retarded bombs, which would be muchccurate.

' These reliability rate* may bo high, since the effects of Soviet operational concept* and troop training standards arc at least as important as technical characteristics iu determination of system reliability, and we have no reliable basis for estimating these cReclo.

Ibe following operatlonol altrilion rates, excluding combat attrition:f aircraft at home Usee would be in commission0 dny maintenance standdown prior to Initial operations;f aircraft in commission at home bases would be launched from staging bases;f aircraft launched from staging; bBsca or directly from home bases on unrefueled missions would strive in target areas;f aircraft launched on refueled missions would arrive in target areas. Calculations for BEAR wiih ASM are based on refueled ITigbts direct from home bases. ALL others assume Arolia staging, and refueling of BADGER and BISON aircraft. It should be noted that without prior maintenance Standdown, the in-commissioo rate of heavy bombers at home bases would bond for medium bombers




Soviet llotnuer Capabilities against lhe Continentalof Bitoa Soviet Bomber Capabilities against the Continentalof Bear Soviel Missile Capabilities against the ContinentalMissiles

Soviet Missile Capabilities against tlie NorthernMedium andIlangc Hal lis tic Missiles Soviet Bomber Capabilities against the Northern Hemisphere -Range* of Badger Soviet Bomber Capabilities against the Northern Hemisphereof Blinder




- --


-A- %



I. Tho aotumani wot duMninarccJ by Ihue-ieyorwond o'creed to know uoiu. Additiono! encntial diiiem-noton moy bo authorired by th* following offlocil* williin Ihcii ratpec'ivc department*!

a OtoOOf olond *cMO>ch. feeot Saota

(orBsj o'

Defense- and ihe organization ol the Joint ChieK ol Slo.lT

C-f SaoN lor InleUraecee.l me Army. *o- lha

Dvpcrtmanl ol lha Army

Chief ol Norol Operation*or lhe Department ol Ihe


A.ioMei CWrl. feislligetvre. ITSAF. fo. wMo* A* Force

I, Director of Inteltigenco, AEC. for ihe Atomic Energy Commitiion g. Aiiitiaii D'ec'or, Hi. tor the Federall

D-ecor ol NSA. for rhe Sai-xsal Securer Agency i. AuiKant Duct lor lor Control Reference. CIA. lor ony olher Deportment or Agency

his doevmee* way beor devoyed by beexAO, indonee wall oppli<oble ir.urtyo-n. or returned lo lhc Control Intelligence Agency by arrangement with ihe CHFico o' Central Reference. CIA.

1 WHeei wvtnwntne^vd owe* too i.n iteriod not in taceit of one year. Al lhe end of ihu period, lha document ihould either be dnit'nyed, relwned to the 'orwording ogoncy. or per-miuMn ihould be requeued of tho for>ord<cg ogtncy ton*2

a. Tho tiller nf thli documont when mod leporotoly I'om thehould be (loii'f'td;


While Houte

Notional Security Council

Departl Stole

Deportment o' Defense

Atomic Energy Commiuion

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Original document.

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