SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

Created: 10/8/1964

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S:(

THE OJPECTOS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

washington jj.

84

of

Extreme Sensitivity of, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"

In accordance with the wishes of :he President, dissemination ofas been carefully limited because of the extreme sensitivity of Ihe information therein.

In thisish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Estimate, and that no reve lac ion of its existence be made to unauthorised persons.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ft*

THE PROBLEM *

SCOPE NOTE I

SUMMARY AND I

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATECIC ATTACK FORCES 9

II. THE SOVIET ICBMW

10

in ICBM Deployment

and Development 13

ICBM Syitera

Concept* IS

Force Leveli IS

C. Capabilities of the ForceI7

III MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANCE BALLISTIC MISSILE

FORCESSl

A. Force Levels

B Capabilities of the Force

C. Future

rv. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE FORCES 23

A Current Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces24

S. Current Cruiie Missile Submarine Forces24

and Conversion Programs25

Force Levels26

Capabilities 27

V. LONC-RANCE BOMBER28

A. Receot Developments ia Loog Range Aviation 28

B Future Trends in Bomber Forces 29

C Operational Capabilities

VI. SPACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS 33

VII. COMMAND AND SUPPORT

and 34

Range Rcconnausance 35

Warfare and

ANNEX A: Tables of Weapon System Characteristics and PerformanceII: Maps of Range Capabilities 49

ELEASE CIA HISTORICfiL-REViEVV PROGRAM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet forces for strategic attack and in Soviet capabilities for such attack through

SCOPE NOTE

This estimate covers those Soviet military forces which are suitable for strategic attack. Other major aspects of the Soviet military strength are treated in separate estimates on air and missile defense, oo theater forces, on the ouclear program, and on the space program. Trends in the USSR's overall military posture and in Soviet military policy are examined in an annual estimate, the next issuance of which will be in the Erst quarter

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Major changes in Soviet programs for the development ofattack forces have become apparent during the past year., certain ICBM and ballistic missile submarine programs came to an end,ause ensued in the growth of these forces. At the same time, the pace of ICBM research and development increased markedly. More recently, the USSR has resumed ICBM deploymentew and improved configuration, and the probable adventew submarine which we believe is designed to cany ballistic missilesmarks the star* of yet another deployment program. (Para. I)

oviet military policy in recent years has been to build up strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, maintain and improve large general purpose forces, and pursue research and development

ptogtams in advanced weapons. In our view, the primary concern of Soviet military policy for the next several years will continue to be the strengthening of the USSR's strategic deterrent. The evidence to date does not indicate that Soviet deployment programs are directedapid numerical buildup. We do not believe that the USSR aims at matching the US in numbers of intercontinental deliveryRecognition that the US would delect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this option. )

stress on qualitative factors suggests that the Sovietsadvance in weaponseans by which they cantheir strategic position relative to the West. In the ICBMexample, major qualitative improvements currently beinghardening and dispersal (which will sharply increase theof aimings well as better accuracy and

the end of the decade. Soviet inter continental attackwill rest primarily upon an ICBM force of some hundredssupplementedizable missile-submarine Beet andbut reduced bomber force These forces will represent ain Soviet retaliatory capability and aof the Soviet deterrent. In the light of currentUS military capabilities, however, we do not believeSoviets will expect to achieve, within the period of thisattack capabilities which would make rational theof general war. (Para. 5)

The ICBM Program

developments sinceroliferationfacilities at Tyuratam. Bight-testing of two third-generation(thendnd the beginning of constructionsingle-silo ICBM launchers, probably for one or both ofsystems. The deployment of second-generation ICBMsceased,ause between the second- andprograms has slowed deployment. Wc believe that thehaveperational ICBM launchers, and that theof operationalill appcoiimate the low

setter-

side ofange previously estimated. These figures do notaunchers at Tyuratam.1

F. Research and development on third-generab'on systems hassuccessful. TheSystem appears to bc antheith improved accuracyarger payload. Weinformation on the characteristics of theoth newcould enter servicee believe that work isstill other ICBM systems, which we cannot as yet identify.to believe that the Soviets areery largeof deliveringWe estimate that it could enter

service in the periodon addition, the Soviets might bcew, small ICBM employing improvedIf they are. it could become operational as early)

C. The. Soviets are now emphasizing deployment of single-silo hard launchers for ICBMs. and we expect this emphasis to continue. We expect third-generation deployment to include the expansion of both second-generation complexes and the initiation of additional new complexes. (Paras.

H. The growth* of the Soviet ICBM force over the next several years will be influencedumber of factors. In economic terms, the program must compete for funds with other military and space activities and with the civilian economy. In the technical field, we believe that research and development is proceeding on additional, follow-on ICBM systems, and we doubt that with these in the offing the USSR will fix upon any one or even two existing systems for urgent deploymentarge scale. We are also mindful that thethat marked second-generation deployment programs may recur. In strategic terms, the Soviets evidently judge that an ICBM force in the hundreds of launchers, together with their other strategic forces,eterrent. On the basis of the evidence nowto us. wc do not believe that they arc attempting toorce capablerst-strike which would reduce the effects of US

The Aim:ant Chief o( Stjff, Intelligence, USAF. cansidcti ihehe num-ben of launcher* opautiftaalitid eiucctcd inone wtimiie* that the So>icU now hiveperational launchers, includingt Tyutaiam0 petcent illo-iiee (orUunchen. He bchoci the total numbecill be. See bis looUioie. pie* lI-

retaliation to an acceptablet the same time, we expect them toffort in the hope of achieving important technological advances, in both the offensive and defensive fields, which would alter the present strategic relationshipajor way.

I. Weoviet ICBM forceperational launchers forn our previous estimate, we projected this force level forye believe that the force will include most or all of the launchers now deployed,ingle-siloaunchers,aunchers for very large ICBMs. We believe that the attainment of as manyperational launchers byould be. likely only if the Soviets begina new. small ICBMapid ratehe Soviet ICBM force which we estimate forill represent aincrease in numbers and deliverable megatonnage.Further, the trend to single silos will increase the number of aiming points represented by individual launch sites fromt present tonhe bulk of them hard. This will greatly improve the survivability, and hence the retaliatory capability, of the force.' )

J. In the past few years the Soviets have improved the readiness and reaction time of their ICBM force. Our evidence now indicates that from the normal state of readiness, the soft sites which constitute the bulk of the present force wouldours to fire. Hard sites would require about half an hour origher state ofinutes to fire) can be maintained at most soft sitesumber of hours and at most hard sites for days.

' Tk* AutiUnl CWuB. Inlellj'ne*. USAF. itn ihil the Soviet! miy al-eld,

thetr intensive muiUry RID v'vr. wvird achievement ofeffectivecounicr-fofct opibdity before the clow of ihu decade. Cc-iuidenog the lenjlh ol timeby lMi estimate and the numbet olinvolved, he believes this iipombilit* wlnsK ihould not be

ai Chief of Sue. Intelligence.midefiOW farce byfjnjv fioir.peniional liuitcheri dependingtmatl. tudy deployed -ptem ti introduced (See hi, footnote to laNe A* tCSM force of tho kme' of limingby lidivtduil<.tolat? :

K. There is ample evidence that the Soviets designed their soft ICBM systems toefire capability. We have re-examined the

factors likely to afreet reSre time, and conclude that it would require little longer to tire the second missile than tlic first. Our present estimate of rente timeours, considerably less than previously estimated. We believe that, on the average, two or more missiles are provided per soft launcher for initial firing, refire, and maintenance spares. We believe .that hard ICBM sites do notefire )

L. We have little evidence on the hardness of Soviet ICBM sites. Given the many uncertainties in this area,ery tenuous estimate can be made, but our best judgment is that Soviet hard ICBM sitesardness insi range. Thisesigninsi range, somewhat higher than previously estimated.' )

M. Qualitative improvements in the force can be expected assystems, enter service. Cunendy operational ICBMson the order. Theill probably have. with radio assist,ithByhe Soviets could achieve accuracies. or better. Theill probably carry acompared with^ ^for second-generation ICBMs.

We do not believe that the Soviets have yet developed penetration aids or multiple warheads, but they may do so in the future, particularly if the US deploys antimissile defenses. )

MRBMs andlRoMs

N. Deployment programs for. MRBM and. IRBM are now ending, and almost certainly will be completed bye estimate that at that time the MRBM/IRBM force willtrength ofperationalf them hard. The bulk of the force (aboutercent) is deployed in west-em USSR, with the remainder in the southern and far eastern regions of the USSR. This force is capable ofevastating 6rst strikeowerful retaliatory attack against targets in Eurasia, and can attack such areas as Crcenland and Alaska as well. Some of the

'The Anbtanl Chitf of Sufi. Intelligence. USAF. considersive"ee ruinInvolved, no mean toitimue of die hirdneit o' Soviet hard uia ein be nude.ever, be believe, that the dciignuure of So-tes hird litoi ii no psilerthe

ICO-OCQ pil previo-jilv el Sues tod.

MRBM/IRBM launchers are probably intended to support ground operations. )

O. We doubt that the Soviets wdl expand their MRBM/IRBM force during the period of this estimate It is possible, however, that operational capabilities will be improved by the introductionew missile system, which probably would be deployed in single-silos.ystem, employing improved propellants. could becomeineriod and would probably replace some of the soft launchers now operational. )

Mini's Submarine Forcer

P. The Soviets now have operationalallistic missile submarines,0 nuclear powered. Most of theseare equipped. missiles and must surface to fire. One or two are equipped. submerged-launch missile, and others will probably be retrofitted. The USSR also has operational aboutruise-missile submarines,powered. The majority are equipped. missiles designed for low altitude attack, primarily against ships.. version of this missile, which probably has an improved capability to attack land targets. Current Soviet missile submarines carry relatively few missiles: the ballistic missile classes, two or three, and the cruise missile types, up to eight. The entire present forceotalallistic missile tubesruise-miss lie launchers. )

Q.We believe that the Soviets have under construction awhich we estimate to be the firstew nuclear-powered, ballistic missile class. We estimate that it will employ them missile, andew more missile tubes than current classes. The fitst unit will probably become operational5 Beyond this new class, we consider it unlikely that the Soviets will develop an entirely new follow-on ballistic missilesystem within the period of this estimate, although they will probably continue to improve existing systems. Wc believe that they will also continue to construct cruise-missile submarines. Byhe Soviet missile submarine force will probablyhips, about half of them cruise-missile submarines and about half ballistic )

r In the past year, limited numbers of Soviet missile submarines have engaged in patrols in the open oceans. Wcradual expansion of this activity. By the end of the decade, Soviet missile submarines will probably be conducting regular patrols throughout the North Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly into the Mediterranean.

Long-Rang* Bt/nbcr Fo/cti

S. We have no recent evidence of major changes in the capabilities and structure of Soviet Long-Range Aviationhe force now includeseavy bombers and tankersediums. It is being improved primarily through the continuedof Blinder supersonic dash medium bombers and through modification of older bombers for air-to-surfacc missile delivery, for aerial refueling, and for reconnaissance. Use of both medium and heavy bombers of the LRA in support of mari&rne operations has )

T. Considering noncombat attrition factors and the requirements for Arctic staging and aerial refueling, we estimate that the Soviets could put somewhat moreeavy bombers over target areas in the US on two-way missions. Recent trends lead us to believe that medium bombers do not now figure prominently in Soviet plans for an initial bomber attack against North America. Nevertheless, should they elect to do so, we believe that at present the Soviets could put upadgers over North American target areas on two-wayWe have serious doubt about how effectively the Soviets could launch large-scale bomber operations against North America. We consider it probable that initial attacks would not be simultaneous, but would extendonsiderable number of hours.' )

U. The Soviets will probably maintain sizable bomber forces, which will decrease gradually through attrition and retirement. Although continued Soviet work on advanced transports could be applied to military purposes, we think it unlikely that the Soviets will bring any follow-on heavy bomber into operational service during the period

'The Asiisiam Chief of Stiff, Intelligence, USAF. corjiden thli pang'inK tcrtouilvthe manned aircraft th'eil to the continental US. In the centihould eventuate and che USSR ittieki the US with nuclearhe bulie-et ihli wit) he in stl-out etlart limed ita'Unum number a! weapon! on US ii'g-n. He thereforeaiei that the number of heavy and medium bombei. including DaOCERSone.wjy miiiianj. could See hi* footnote onan. W.

B

SECRH-

this estimate. We believe that Blinder medium bombers, some equipped with advanced air-to-surface missiles, will bc introduced during much of the period of this estimate. Byong-Range Aviation will probably includeeavy bombers of present typesediums, mostly)

Spoee Weapont

V. Although the USSR almost certainly is investigating theof space systems for use as offensive and defensive weapons, we have no evidencerogram lo establish an orbital bombardment capability is seriously contemplated by the Soviet leadership. We tiiink that orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs over the next six years in terms of effectiveness, reaction time,flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. In view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapoQ system within the period of this

" TKct Out! of SuS.ee. USaF. beLe-ei lie So-ieu williuocd mtcricnporualnc(* icbm force, lit eicunatei that the USSfl wdlolio, onomber. He further citamaiea thebomber force will remain atr lomewhat larger. depending on tbe tim lag of the effected follow-on bomber, and thatmid-lQTO the medium bomber/Unfcc force "Jl probably isill includeSO aUcriit. Sec Lit footnoteble on pageafJewing

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DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES*

ajor changes in Soviet programs for the development of strategic attack forces have become apparent during the pas! year,. certain ICBM and ballistic missile submarine programs came to an end.ause ensued in the growth of these forces. At the same time, the pace of ICBM research and development increased markedly. More recently, the USSR has resumed ICBM deploymentew and improved configuration, and the probable adventew submarine which we believe is designed to carry ballistic missiles probably marks the start of yet another deployment program.

oviet military policy in recent years has been .to build up strategic eEensive and defensive capabilities, maintain and improve large generat purpose force* and pursue research and development programs in advanced weapons: Thegrowth in defense expenditures has been accompaniedreatlydemand for scarce, high-quality resources..and this trend has contributed to the tightening economic situation, over which Khrushchev has displayed in-creasinghere were indications early0 that powerful pressures were being applied by some military andeadersajor increase in allocationsefense, and that Khrushchev successfully resisted these pres. sores. Nevertheless, the research and development programs which continued throughout this period, as well as the new deployment programs now underway,ontinued Soviet willingness to spend substantial sums on Improving their strategic attack capabilities.

mo"dueuuion of Soviet mditary pellcy; doctrine. and itntejy ice NIE"Main Trends in Sovie! MilitaryitedECRETDISSEM.

*uller disunion of theuiooo in ac USSft. see SNIEC 'So^et Economy Problems aadrl. SECHET.

ense, the policy dispute of3 represented the continuationebate over military policy and doctrine which has extended Over (he past several years. Khrushchev has stressed the deterrent role of nuclear and missile weapons, holding (hat the nature of these weapons makes general warin the present era. Tbe military, on the other hand, have been more concerned to have forces adequate toar should it occur. Khrushchev's successful reajsertion of authority in the spring ofnd trends in military programs since that time indicate that, for the next several years, the primary concern of Sovie: military policy will be to continue to strengthen their strategic deterrent.

ethis objective into specific goals for strategic

attack forces. The Soviet leaden have sought lo foster the notion lhat parity in strategic strength exists between the US and the US5H. We do not believe, however, (hat present Soviet policy aimi at matching the US in number* ol inter-continental delivery vehicles. Recognition that the US would detect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constrainU, appears to have ruled out this option.oviet stress on qualitative factors in the put year or two suggests that the Soviets see technological advance in strategic weaponseans by which they can improve their position relative to the West. The evidence to date does not indicate that current programs arc directedapid buildup in numerical strength, and in view ol the intensity ofSoviet research and development effort,onsider it unlikely that the Soviets have settled on any one system for urgent deploymentarge scale.

y the end of the decade, Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will probably rest primarily upon an ICBM force ot some hundreds ofizable missile submarine fleet,arge but reduced bomber force. Major qualitative improvements curreotly being achieved in the ICBM force include hardening and dispersal (which Will sharply increase the number of aimings well as better accuracy and larger payloads. These forces willarked improvement in Soviet retaliatory capability aodcomiderable strengthening of the Soviet deterrent, la the light of current and proparnrned US capabilities however, we do not believe that the Soviets will expect to achieve, within the period of this estimate, strategic attackwhich would make rational the deliberate initiation o! general war.

II. THE SOVIETORCE

ajor developments in the ICBM program sincenclude aof test facilities at Tyuratam, flight testing of two third-generation ICBM systems, probable cessation of starts of second-generation ICBM launch sites, and the start of eorotruetion of hard single-silo launch sites. Some of these new trends, such as the single lilo mode of deployment, were foreseen in our estimates; others, such as the early stoppage of second-generationwere oot In rueceediag paragraphs, we analyse these developments and ancss their probable impact upon the future size and composition of the Soviet ICBM force.

A. Current Slrenglb ond Deployment

e haveotal of moreaunchers in various stages of conieruction at Soviet ICBM deployment completes. Of these. wC believeaunchers (US soft andard) are operational ashile the remaining launchers, "allre ittll under construction * There arc also

' Fe* theol thevet afSAF. ace nu> pin

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aboutompleted RiO launchers at (be Tyuratam test range, and abou: IS mote under construction.

More thaneployment complexes bave now been identified. Eighteen are older complexes, begun1 or earlier, and Eve arc newbegun ineployment at the older complexes con-sisted almost entirely of second-generation systems, thend then two-launcher soft sites and three-silo hard rites. Deployment of the Erst-generationas limited to four soft launchers. We believe that new deployment of the second-generation systems bas also ceased, the2 and theew deployment resumed in3 or4 with the start of construcbon of dispersed single silos which we believe are intended for third-generation systems.

Single silos represent an important departure ia Soviet deployment concepts, indicating an intention to confront an enemy with separate aiming points..timeingle silo will probably be less thanonthstohree-silo site,onths. We believe that some single silos could'be operational by .. .

consider it almost certain that there are no additional,ICBM complexes, and we believe it highly unlikelylaunchers at the older complexes could have escapedAdditional launchers of new types may be under construction atcomplexes or at undetected completes of the new type.the status of third-generation ICBM development and the apparenttiird-generation deployment mrLcate that such additional launchersyet have reached operational status. In our estimate foreundetected third-generation launchers which would now be in earlyconstruction.

B. Trends in ICBM Deployment

its inception. Soviet ICBM deployment has followed anIn contrastontinuing and vigorous research andoperational deployment has been marked by spurts of activity,and abrupt cutbacks of what initially appeared to be large-scaleThe Soviets have deployed the three ICBM systems nowwith their development at the test range, but concurrenthas not resultedmooth and uninterrupted buildup of ICBM

"The Ajjuunt Chief of Staff. InielLjeoee. USAF. reoojf.iK, that ihere1ST ident.Sed operational launchers in the Geld. He corsiden the eonoleted launcheri at Tvuntim ire alio available for ope: mortal wartime ore. la addition.'he feel, .ome allowance lotil it nee of uiilocaied launchers iHodd be included in the estimate of launched cunenUy available Tor -attl-ne use. How larBe luehfactor ihouldncertain, but he coniidenigure of lOr. ii reaionable. He thereforetbe current total operational launches at.

Th* first major ioterrupbon resultedoviet decision lo cut back the planned deployment of Ihe first-generationefore deploymenl of second-ceneiation missiles hadecond occurred2 when deployment ol the second-generatioandas halted, probably because of technical difficulties with thend modifications to theystem. The Soviets apparently decided to halt the SS-fl deployment program altogether. Bydeployment of theas resumed in the late summerixmonth pause, and continued forear, when this program BOW apparently halted We believe that ICBM deployment resumed in4 with single-silo launchers.

The reasons for this unevenness are not dear. In most cases, thecause of interruptions was probably the prospective availability ofsuch as better deployment con6guialions or new and superior missile systems. In some instances important inadequacies in existing programs were probably contributing factors. Whatever the specific reasons, the record to date clearly indicates that the USSR has accepted considerable slippage intoward whatever force goals if his set for.itself

Program. ConstrueQon of four soft launchers for thend wis competed Our evidence indicates that the systemKill operational. As recently as Julynas 6red from Tyuratam.

We estimate lhat thei presently"ynAtjxi. With devetoptneatew re-cotry vehicle, itbe leBoStted toconsider such development

unlikely. We believe that tEe system will be phased out of the force within the period o! this estimate.

rogram. Tbeystemumber of advantages over thehiefiy. considerably smaller siie. notable liquid propellanu. and all-iner-rial guidance. This system is deployedj-arheads. but missilesinventory4 have probably been equippedJwarheads. and some of the missiles deployed earlier will probably be retrofitted Thes deptoyed inf the complexes now identified in the USSR and constitutesbulk of the present force.estimateaunchers are nowat these complexes, ofre sat: andre hard.

We previously considered that the Sovtets would continue to deploy theo-evcr. the apparent lack of any ne- launcher startsthe past year and indication! of initial deployment of third'generation systems lead us la believe thateployment is ending.

developmental work on thes alio drawinglose.

rVog.em TheCQM was developed at the same time asprobably in order to insure the Soviets of at least one successfulsystem. We believe that it is iorrwr-.hu smaller than thene

that itn comparison wilt: theeystem has certain operationalt employs non-storablc b'quidandicap inrolonged condition of alert. The system also incorporates radio inertia! guidance, raising theof protecting the radio componentsardened deployment mode. These features, together with technical difficulties revealed in isnge tests of thend the successful development of therobably weighed in the Soviet decision to limit deployment.

IS. Theystem Is deployed in four complexes ataunchers, nearly all of. which are operaQooaJ. Nore know to have been started since the summerlurry of successfulest firings in3 and. we expect do further deployment of this system. Moreover, the in-cSciency of supportingew sites deployed at four different complexes may lead the Soviets to phase out theystem within the period of this

C. Research and Development

There are aboutaunchers at the Tyuratam test range, and about IS more under construction. Some of the new facilities are probably used in toting of the third-generationndCBM systems. Others, however, are probably related to future space activities or to theof other new ICBM systems which have not yet reached the stage of flight testing.

Theystem. Beginning inhe Sovietsest firings of theith only one failure. Three of these were extended rangeo tbe Pacific This record indicates that development is proceeding satisfactorily.

Our evidence indicates that theroduct of the same design team that produced theystem; it appears to reocesent an intent toore accurate missilearger payload.

^Jitwo-stage, tandem missile, somewhat heavier than thestorable liquid propellants. The guidance system, which appearsan improved version of that on theonsists of an inertia! systema radio link. The inerticl system alone can probably guide the missile,somewhat reduced accuracy. Re-entry data indicate that the SS-9is considerably larger than that of thec estimate thatarheadaximumWcn3t

it could become operational early

- Although the Director. DlA. end the Auurani Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF,hai tho -eight of the Intelligence aviibble malt, iicly thai ihea comearable lo then payload delivery capability, they not* in anoma!y[

H-hion. doer noth ihef amuiile. They, therefore. Tannoi eiclude the poi.ibility that she SS-8could weigh0

ftOundi Or unv-Ki! more,ield

14

ystem. Wc have little information oa the characteristicsother new system being tested at Tyuratam. The Srst Bight test ofailure, but six subsequent firings to the Kamchatkaarea have been successful. f_

Jthes being developed as an ICBM. It was probablyby (He same team that produced thend SS-S. Like the SS-S, itwo-stage, tandem vehicle employing liquid fuels aad radio-inertia]We have insufficient evidence to determine the siae of thef its development follows the norma! cycle, it could bc operational in the latter half

D. Future ICBM Systems

The great expansion of launch facilities at Tyuratam. cannot all bcwith known systems. Ine estimated three future lines of development: standard size fal!ow-oa ICBMs, very large ICBMs, and smaller ICBMs employing unproved propellants. The first of these types has now appeared in thend possibly the

Large ICBM. We continue to believe that the Soviets area very large vehicleillion or more pounds of thrust) which could be usedglobalarrier forwarhead, orpace booster. We believe that test firingsery large ICBM could begin, by the cod of the year, and an initial operational capability could be achieved in the periodohis isear later than estimated in NIEhe initial deployment sitesery large ICBM system would probably be soft, but wc continue to believe that the Soviets might find it feasible toegree of hardening at some stage in tbe program.

Smell ICBM, We continue to believe that it would bo advantageous for the Soviets to develop an economical ICBM system with high survivability and very fast reaction time. These requirements might be metmall missileeither solid or improved storable liquid propellants. The evidence of such development remains tenuous, andisiilc would run counter to the Soviet emphasis oo relatively large systems with multimegaton payloads. How. ever, since our last estimate, we have acquired evidenceizable sol id-pro pel la nt program which could have application in the strategic missile field.

We cannot estimate with confidencemaller ICBM system is under active development, but we take account of this possibility in estimating the future composition of the Soviet ICBM force.ystem would almost certainly be deployedard configuration. It testingew. small ICBM should begin aboutn initial operational capability could be acheived as early athis isear later than the earliest date estimated in NIEThere is no evidence that the Soviets are seeking toobile ICBM system, and wc considerevelopment unlikely.

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E. Deployment Concepfs

e doubt that the USSR will resume any substantial program of soft-site ICBM deployment. Deployment of thend theoftprobably ceased moreear ago. Third-geoeratjan systems may be deployed int tires, but we consider such deployment unlikely. The recent trend to single-silos indicates that the Soviets recognize the strategic advantages of hardened and dispersedeploymer.t.

ingle-silo deployment wJJ probably involve both the expansion of other old complexes and thef additional newhird generation system is piobably being deployed in the new single-silo complexes, but we are unable to determine whether it is ther the SSe believe that one or both of these systems will be deployed in such complexes.

believe thatill also be deployed ia the uncompletedsites atomplexes. It is also possible that the Soviets willpresently operationalaunchers for" theut in view of theutility of thegainst many types of targets, we consider itthey would undertakerogram at an early date.'. We doaunch facilities can be retrofitted for the

f. Future Force Levels

growth of the Soviet ICBM force over the next several yearsumber of factors. lr. economic terms, the program mustfor funds with other military and space activities and with theand we note that the deployment mode currentlymissiles in singlemore expcoiiveerthan previous configurations, in the technical field, we believe thatand development is proceeding on additional follow-on ICBMwe doubt that, with these in the offing, the USSR will fix upon anyeven two existing systems for urgent deploymentuge scale. Interms, the Soviets evidently judgeorce of some hundredseterrent On the basis of the evidence nowus, we do not believe that they axe attempting toorce capable ofstrike attack which would reduce the eSeets of US retaliation to anlevel" They will, of course, expect the deterrent effect at an ICBMmoderate sire to be enhanced by qualitative improvements in weaponsAt (he same time, we expect them tondin the hope of achieving important technological advances, in bothand defensive fields, which would alter the present strategica major way.

n, wcoviet ICBM force level forperational launchers, including those it Tyuratam. It now appears

"For the view of ihe Auiium Chief ofSAF. lee nil foomote on pageonciution H.

that the number of ICBM launchers operational laill approximate the lower side of thishis condusion stems directly from the Umited deployment activity3 and the pace thus farhese figures do notaunchers at Tyxiratam."

hroughhe growth ei the Soviet ICBM force will depend primarily upon the rates of deployment of thendeubstantial deployment of these third-geoeratioo systems, both in old and new complexes, but notevel exceeding the second-generation totaL This judgment rests in part uponon of the economic, technical, and strategic factors previously noted. Further, wc thiok tbe pace of deployment will be affected by tee probable Soviet decision to deploy thendystems exclusively ia bard sites, which take longer to build than the soft sites which comprised the major part of tie lecoodgeoeraoon program. We are also mmdfu! that the interruptions which marked the secoad-generatioomay recur.

As .to futureery largeould become operational in. the periodoe doubt that the Soviets would require large numbers of this missile, since it would probably be useful pnmarily' for psychological intimidation and for spedil military purposes. We hadestimated that tbe USSR would deployaunchers for very large ICBMs, but the costliness ofystem plus the advent of high yieldin tbeystem now lead us to concludeaunchersetter estimate

A small ICBM could also become operational as earlynd. if developed, would probably be deployed in substantial numbers. Its advent wouldignificant cSect on the scale and pace of ICBM deployment in the later years of.the decade. In particular, the construction of additionalndites would probably be terminated in7maller follow-on system were brought in, but would probably continue beyond that time if it were not.

lo. weoviet ICBM foreeperational launchers of all types inn addition to the various technical and economic factors taken into account ia arriving at this range, we reasoned that

he Soviets had acquiredCBMonsiderableof them hard silos, they might consider the resulting force inother strategic weapon systems an adequate deterrent. As to theof the estimate (TOO launchers J. we reasoned that coostsuction of suchmight reflect not only adeterrence, but also an effort

- The AaiuUr* Owe* o! SseS. ietaJigance. USAF. estoaalci Utat the nwnberv'J -ill It between ITS ;iS rather than iheME It I See

hit footnoteable, pate IB.

o longer including facilities at Tyurauca in our eouni of ooerat^nal tauneherijudgi lhat (heynot normally aval.We (o> operational use. but varying number of Ihem could be prepared to See ICOMi il the US. depending on the amour! at advance notice

flcf-

17

pul the USSRomewhat belter position tore-emptive attackestern strike appeared imminent and unavoidable. We stillibis reasoning to be valid, but our present evidence and analysis leads ui to believe that the Soviets are not likely to acquire as many as TOOICBM launchers" Indeed, it now appears that theoforce level at that time would be likely only ii the USSRa small ICBM and deploys itapid rate beginning

tbe table on the following page, we present our estimates of chetypes of Soviet ICBM launchers at mid-ycaist shouldthat other force compositions and force levels within these ranges

G. Capabilities of the Force

falling toward the high or low side of theorce willubstantia! increase in numbers ofin deliverable megatoonage over the forcedeployed. Further,and hence its retaliatory capability will be markedlythe low and the high sides of the estimatereat increase inof aiming points represeoted by individual launch sites, fromat present tonciudingardwe are grossly irtcorrect in these estimates, however, the size andof the Soviet ICBM force inearly will fail shortrst-strike attack which might reduce devistaboa of thean acceptable leveL"

eaction Time. We believe tha: the Soviet ICBM unics at soft sites are normally maintained in readiness Condition, launch crews in launch area and on alert, missile and re-entry vehicle mated and checked out in ready building. Considering the evidence of Soviet eSorts to reduce reaction time and the erperier.ee probably gamed over the past few years, we now estimate that thendan be launched from readinessithin one to three hours, as compared with our previous estimate of three to four hours. Ready missiles in hard sites probablyeaction time of about half in hour or less

under normal tea dm ess conditions,pon wfaeiher or not the missile is

fueled.

rom Conditionhe highest state of readiness, with mimics erected and fueled,oinutes would piobably be required to launch fromoftard site. For storable-fuel systems, such as thend thehis state of readiness can be maintainedumber of hours at soft sites depending on weather and other factors, and for days in hard sites. Readiness

t view ufcle.

pile IS

'Tor ihc view of the Aitisuat Chief of SuS.L'SAf.hu footnote on pig>onclusion H.

Someollmay be nsSroSllcd wilhaiJei. but we think UMi &to occur it in early diK.

Initial deployment -dl pmbabty be refr. but t* Sects miyeafable to Incorporatedecree o( hlndeiung ir tor* Kijc incofrin.

pc-.UxiilH peobibly bc equipped with then iddnion. rom* ot ihe bird Uunchen ilreifiy opeiitiorudtheniy be reeontted withUiilei. but we think din ii unlikely to occur atily date.

bunjpoiiUon of figure. In thii line7 reSeeU our view lhatnde-clopment -ill b.aialle-rleped and enter, nrv.ee.

recall de aot includecncbci it Tywnuam- There are nowunchcn. indbelief thii nwr.be;lo roughlyn the neit year or to. We Judge that theae liuaeben ire net normally avafliNceralionil uae. but varying numbert of them could be prepared WICBM* it the US, depending on theof ad'incc notice.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. INTEUJCENCE. USAF. FOOTNOTE:

The AsstriaM CW ofeacILgencc. USAF. -coldausbef ofICBM launcher? ai

14 5

240

He ce-uiden thai fo. th. near ternn-.tciarie-ance for

the eattence of thu. firaocnert. Durtag thenoc peced. fourth-gcneraUon ICBM ivitemi could become opeiauonal. and he eit.maia lhat one ofCBM perhipi itmilar to the US Minuleman. will probably be deployed In lubiiantiil numbers by

and reaaion lime will improve markedly with die continued deployment of hard launchers.

imu/fencify. Theoretically, the entire force could be brought simul* taneouily to readinessnd thereafter Srcdoinute period. Lack of direct evidence as to the reliability of Soviet deployed missiles

ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM

iLaunch*m

ss-6

4

4

0-1

0-4

0-4

t

0

.

SS-3

SS-Larre*

.. M

0-5

* Mc a*

Ward Low^iii Tawe-Suo

ss-8

S

t

i

9

0-9

0-4

0-9

md

0

a

0

au

(rounded)"

-fep-sccszT

il impossible to estimate with cor-fideow what portion of the totalforce actually could participate in this salvo. We beh'eve. however, that even under the most favorable conditions, andune to Ere givenin advance, the resulting salvo would be ragged, with initial firingssomeoinutes from launch of the first missile. We believe that the Soviets are working to improve coordination of operations, not only within the ICBM force but also between it and the-other elements of Soviet strategic attack forces.

There is ample evidence that soft ICBM systemsefireelief that they could keep secret thetheir ICBM sites probably contributed to the Soviet decision to pursueWe consider it extremely unlikely that hard ICBM sites have a

the light of our revised estimates of reaction time, we haveestimates on the closely related question of time required to refire fromICBM site. The only essential difference in procedures for refire. isto cool the launch pad and to refurbish the launch facilitieslaunching the next missile. Assuming .that thend theapid refire capability in mind, the time required forwould probably bc minimal. We now conclude that if noare needed, reore time for thendould beis. little longer than reaction time from Condition 3.

is

. possible that actual refire times would be longer.

hat the total number of IC3Ms deployed forin the field is on the order. Such an inventoryon the average, two or more missiles to each soft ICBM launcherfiring, refircs. and maintenance spares. Since some ofultiple retire capability, the low side of this estimateothers have no refire missiles. Adding ICBMs deployed athree-silo hard sites, which we believe do notefire capability,that the Soviet operational ICBM inventory asissiles.

and Accuracy.

eEects of So vice opera* tional concepts and troop training standards are at least as important as technical characteristics in determination of system reliability, and we have no good basis for determining these effects. We believe that reliability would be degraded under operational conditions. Overall reliability of the force will probably improve, particularlyew, small ICBM with improved pcopellant is deployed in sizable numbers.

"For perforcuncsot ICSMi. tee Anne. A, Table 1.

estimate that currently operational ICBM systems hive CEPs. Thehen it becomes operational, will probably have

OCCRlT

aa accuracy. with radio assist, and LA-L9 with au-inertsalOur evidence indicates chat the Soviets are concerned with improving ICBM accuracy, and we believe that byhey could achieve accuracies on the Order of. or less.

Wcrhecds and Penetration Aids. The large paybads ofpresent an obvious opportunity for trade-cets between nuclear yieldmodicauoni as multiple warheads and penetration aids. We believeSoviet leadersigh value to maximum nuclear yields, but theythe future reduce yields in order to incorporate such devices.

aids.ecoys, jammers, and shielding would beil the US deploys antimissile defenses. Relatively unsophisticatedpenetration aids are within Soviet technical capabilities at present.could be developed as penetration aids or to increase the efficiencygiven number of deployed missiles. Forissile could boseveral warheads designed toinglemightweapons eSeets on the target even though the foul yield of thewere less than the missile's maximum deliverableoremultiple warhead system, could be designed to directingle missile against separate targets, although this wouldproblems of system accuracy and reliability. These problemsparticularly acute ii the Soviets shouldapability to attack hardWhile achievement ofapability wc*iid represent ain the Soviet strategic posture, and is technically feasible, webelieve that they can attain such an objective by the end of tbe periodestimate.1*

"Th* AituUnt Chief il Staff. UteUirencc.oupiescftt CM iCitegie itueko*NI rjoi-consider.ra sightffset any USrupenoory by omiui(put ol* par-sad capibJ.ty into multiplem an eSort

capability toueiber of Mpa/>tc Urfrueach launch -etude. In hitpi*[osd0 mubCj, for cample, could equite to at leasteentry vehtdeiBy theof inch svitcm the Sovieu eould nuke more affective

ute o. their heavy payGad eapibJity ifaiwtiLuy taipu thaibe iheloh paid

he.dl He eateiiUJith aaajajfciSart. thacouldope rationalystemcr the lint flight and quiteUiin ute period ofl Unite. He bclicei lhatrojjtam could lead lo icounter force capability.

We feel confident that, to date, neither decoys nor multiple warheads have been tested We believe that tight testing would precede the in corporaf these devices in deployed systems, and the chances are good that we would detect such testing.^

Hard Sires. We have undertaken exhaustive studies of the factors likely to affect the ability of Soviet hard sites to withstand nudear attack, and we arcthat they were designed to withstand overpressures of some hundreds of pounds per square inch. Beyond this generalization, however, our studies have

ror sccftth-

(hat the assessment of the bard-iessery uncertain matter. we estimate that the design overpressures of sonet threc-silo icbm hard sites falls insi range,omewhat higher range than that estimated innd that their hardness is insihisenuous estimate; additional studies and collection efforts are underway in an attempt to provide higher confidence figures.

have no direct information on which to baseenuousthe vulnerability of single-silo sites, but it seems reasonable to assumewill be at least as hard as the three-silo sites.

ih. medium and intermediate range ballistic missile forces a. force levels

deployment programs for, mrbmnd theirbmre now ending and almost certainly will be completed by

lthoughoard mrbm/irbm launchers are still under coo-struetion. there have been no known construction starts for primary mrbm sites since2 and few if any for irbms sincen niee estimated that mrbm/irbm deployment would be'virtually com-plete inowever, an interruption of several months in deployment3 delayed completion of the program.

estimate that byhe soviet mrbm/irbmites, willtrength ofperational bunch ers,of them hard the higher number of mrbm/irbm launchers that werefleccs our conclusion that mrbm hard sites consist of fourirbm hard sites, of three. in. we estimated that mrbmhard sites had two launchers each.

1 Oct lwi

lil'i

operational mrbm/irbm launchers

mrbm (ss-l)

soft

hard

total

irbm (ss-5)

soft

Hard

b. capabilities of ihe force

he bulk of the mrbm/irsm force is deployed in (he western half of european ussr, within range of targets in western europe and parts of north

"forxststmf clue! ofij fooftlwe on pigeo oil ui ion l.

22

zzzin

hi Middle East. Tie remainder of (be force. Lt. toughiy teaoi the launchers,'oyed ta the Caucasian, southern Asiatic, aad Far Eastern regions of the USSR The Soviets MRBM/IRBM force is capable ofevastating first strikeowerful retaliatory attack againsttargets. Some sites can attack important targets outside of Eurasia, such as those in Greenland and Alaska. Some of the MRBM/IRBM launchersaxe intended to support Soviet theater operations.'*

he evidence indicates lhat the production of MRBMs and IRBMsWe estimate that the Soviets have now produced enough missilesail soft MRBM/IRBM launchersetire capability. Wetime for current systems is probablyours. The warheadsby the MRBM force ptobably vary from lolotoo yieldsbelieve that some warheads with yields off* Jsoutd beto IRBMs.

evidence is not adequate toirm judgment as to theMRBM/IRBM launchers or as to the.minner of launch. Le, silo-lift orwe think it likely lhat these launchers were designed for acomparable to that of hard ICBM sites (ice

C. Future Developments

NIEC noted the testingrobable new MRBMYar during the Erst half3 and estimated thai the Sovietsa follow-on MRBM into the force byndewyear after lhat. However/"

"^ji: seems likely that this test program was cancelled. II the Soviets areew missile, it would probably empioy improved storable liquid or solid prooeUants and be deployed in haxd single-silos. On the basis of Soviet technical capabilities, we believe thatystem could become operational ineriod.

that the target system remains essentially unchanged, weSoviets would fee! under oo pressure to expand their totalbeyond that estimated for I! tbey shouldore eEec-

tive follow-on system, they probably would phaseumber of soft launchers.

We have acquired so evidence to Indicate that the Soviets are developing or

intend toobile MRBM/IRBM system during the period of this

estimate, and we consider this unlikely.

SS.s possible that political and military developments in NATO and the Warsaw Pact will at some point lead the Soviets to move some MRBMs into the Satellites, but we believe the Soviets are highly unlikely to turn any nudear

" For pe-ior-aimce cJuracieniBo al MRDMi and irdmi. if* Anaei A, Tibia 2.

23

equipped missiles ovei to Satellite control Further, as was demonstrated in Cubahe Soviets could deploy present mrbm/irbm systems to distant areas.

have also considered the possibility that the Soviets will come toChinesehreat requiring them to target some mrbm/IRBMsThe adventhinese nuclear capability might bring thisgeneral however, we think that worsening Sino-Soviet relations over awould be more likely to inSueace Seviet ground force deploymentnear China, and perhaps to persuade the Soviets to retain moreas Badgers, capable of employing conventional as well as nuclear weapons.

IV. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILE FORCES

Current Soviet missile submarine forces are tbe outgrowth of decisions taken ino develop quickly an extensive but unsophisticated capability, evidently in response to demands from the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Navy modernize. Initially, long-rangewere converted to carry ballistic missiles. This effort washeof two new classes of ballistic missile submarines, the first conventionally-powered and the second nuclear."

The decision to develop cruise missile submarines, probably made. ledimilar pattern. The conversion of conventional submarines by the installation of cruise missile launchers topside was followed by two new classes of submarines, the first nuclear and the second conventionally-powercd. configured to employ the new weapon system. Although the present missile submarine force consists largely of ballistic types, cruise missile types have been entering servicerowing rate during the past two years.

Both public and classified Soviet statements indicate that the original mission of the ballistic missile submarines was to "carry out strikes deep in enemy territory and to support ground forcey thes. Soviet planners probably recognized that this mission could be better performed by ground launched missiles, then entering service in significant numbers. They abo probably concluded that the relatively unsophisticated ballistic missilewere of little value in canying out the Soviet Navy's primary mission of defenseeaborne attack Accordingly, emphasis was placed on cruise missile submarines,rimary mission of countering Western naval nuclear strike forces, particularly carrier task forces. Both ballistic and cruise missile submarinesapability to attack land targets. However,from Soviet classified military writings, as well as die operational practices of the force, indicate that they are not now assigned the mission of participating in initial nuclear attacks on land targets.

" Force chuiccerutici al =LuJc luboinaei, lee.

A. Current Ballistic Missile Submarine Forces

he Soviets now have someoperational ballistic missile submarines, armed withissiles. This force0lass,ocveriioo class units. We believe that almost all of these are equipped withsJlistic missilebe. missile which employs storable liquid propellants and must be elevatedosition above the sail of the surfaced submarine for launching. Soviet ballistie missile submarines canlaunch their Si it missiles within two minutes after surfacing, and the remainderinutes.lass submarines which carry there equipped with three tubes, and thelass with two.

C class submarine was converted to serveest bed forof.ystem, which probably became operationalTheiquid-fueled missile which can be launched fromsubmarine. At leastass subrnarine has probably alsoto employ the new* .

present force of Soviet ballistic mUsilc*su6marines represents apotential threat Mostissiles are probably equiopedicmearhead probablyowever,capability of the force is limitedumber of factors:umber of missiles per submarine: (b) the short range of theand the need for the submarines equipped with this system tolaunching; (c) the operational Limitations of the diesel-poweredcomprise the bulk of the force; (d) the absence of operationalto likely launch areas ofi US coasts.

B. Current Cruise Missile Submarine Forces

addition to ballistic missile submarines, the Sovietsruise missile submarines. Twelve arelassof which half are equipped to carry four missiles each and five tomissiles each; one.rototype, has only one launcher.class submarines, which entered serviceake up morethird of the force. Sit of these are ofype which carriesre of the newerII type, which carries eight missiles. Thethe force is comprised of the newlass, equipped withlaunchers, which was first identified inix units of thisbelieved to bc operational.

cruise missile submarines are equipped with two versions ofmissile system. The first of these,asprimarily as an anti-shipping weapon. For attacking shipthe radar horizon, effectiveness is linitcd by (he requirement for a

"For pcrfor-Bincc chart cUiutici of -vbaariac-liunttci! aiiiJca. ice Aonci A, Table

forward observer to provide target data Soviet documenu indicate (hatand aircraft. will perform this runctioo; the missile itself contains terminal homing guidance for use against ship (argets. We believe that theould also be used against land targets, the low altitude Sight0 feet) of this missile would complicate Western defensive problems.

n improved version of this system,m.B. probably became operationalhis missile cruises at supersonic speed at0 feet and then descends to aneet for the terminal approach to theow-atticude, reduced-speed flight profile, similar to chat of theA. is probably available as an option. TheW class andlass nudear submarines are probably equipped with theystem:I dan and theassprobably carry theN-OB missile. Soviet cruise missile submarines can probably launch the first missile five minutes after surfacing, and the othersew minutes.

ecent developments Lt the cruise missile submarine force indicateSoviets are improving its capabilities to attack land targets. Althoughin this role would be lest than againt( ships, the increased rangeof theissile, its low altitude terminal flight profile, and itscross section would renderifficult target. Its use againstparticularly in conjunctionallistic missile attack, woulddefensive problems. The submarine-launched cruise missilea warheadaximumFor use against ships,

lower yield nuclear or non-nuclear warheads could be employed.

C. Construction ond Conversion Progrcmi

roduction oflass and probably (helass ballistic missile sub-maruies has terminated. We believe that (he Soviets will retroSt all of their present forcelass submarines and at leastass submarines withubmerged-launchallistic missile system. Conversion oflass probably began inand we have recently acquired evidence suggesting that conversion ofass submarines is under way. We believe that conversion programs foraisass submarines could be completed.

onstruction of cruise-missile submarines is continuing. We believe that thelass submarine was deliveredonstruction oflais is probably now under way at two yardsombined delivery rate ofnits per year. Construction ofass diesel-powered. cruise-missile submarine probably began2 at two shipyards. The Sn( unit was sighted in the Baltiche involvement of more than one shipyardonsiderablyass program than previously estimated, and wc believe thatunits per year will be built over the next several years.

c believe that the Soviets alio have underubmarine which we estimate to be the firs:ew, nuclear-powered ballistic missile class. Since we have no evidence that new submarine-launched missiles are under development, we believe that it will employ-e feet sure that the new class will carry more missiles than the three earned bylasses,. The first unit of this new class probably will enter service

e have no evidence of Soviet work on more advanced missile suboiarines,

j Soviet writings show awareness of the advantages of the US Polaris system. There is evidenceizable solid-propellant program in the USSB, but it has no known naval associations. Based solely oo estimated Soviet technical capabilities, we think that during (his decade the USSR could. submarine-launched ballistic missile employing solid or improved liquid propeUants,ollow-oo nuclear submarine capable of carrying considerable numbers ofissile. If developmental work ii already well under way.eapon system could be operatiooal as early

have estimated above that the Soviets are aboutring iotonew nuclear-powered submarine clan carryingissile.ubmarine would go far to meet what we judge (ostrategichis field. We therefore think it unlikelySoviets will bring an entirely new foilo*-on system into service duringof this estimate. Presen( systems wJI continue to be improved,longer range missiles could be developed for employment with them,

D. Estimated Force Levels

will continue to expand and improve its missilebut there is much uncertainty at present as to (he future scopeof Soviet missile submarine programs. Our estimate of theis heavily inSueoced by recent trends in Soviet construction ofwhich has remained relatively constant a; the estimated rate ofper year. We believe lhat construction will continue a: approximatelyduring the period of the estimate, and that it will continue to beballistic missile, cruise missile, and torpedo attack classes.construction of torpedo attack nuclear powered submarines willabout (he current rate of about three per year, although the growingof the Soviet Sect of diesel-powered torpedo attack submarines andrequirement for ASW submarines may bring some increase in thisto missile submarL-.es. our estimate takes account of the cessation of CK class production, retrofitlass submarines withrangeroduction of the probable new class of ballisticand continued production of cruise missile submarines.

27

NSW ,

oav. clui ..

c

total ballisticlu/

ui

E-n

DkMl

.

] eUn

TOTAL CRUISE

9-U iX-Tfl IMl

OS9 6 S9

Operational Capabilities

The failure of the Soviets to conduct nia-oL to poteatialssey limiting factor in tbe development oi operational capabilities. Until very recently. Soviet missile submarines operated almost exclusively within local waters, and we do not believe that they have yet conducted patrols off US coasts However, they haveery limited number of out-of-area patrols sincelow, cautious erpansion of such operations by Soviet Northern and Pacific Fleet submarines can be expected. Byoviet missile submarines will probably be conducting patrols throughout the North Atlantic and Pacific, and possibly into the Mediterranean.

The So<4cu are building up the logistic sauctuie for their missile submarine forces. Several new types of submarine auxiliaries, including one designed Specifically to support missile submarines, have appeared at mafor bases. In addition, the Sovietsproving existing base facilities

he Soviets have been seeking to Lmprove the operational char act ens tics of their submarines, both diesel- and nuclear*powered. Early Soviet nuclear rub-marines experiencedhe operation of their engineering plants, butof these problems have probably been overcome in submarines batikome of the earlier nuclear submarines have probably been modified With cutting hull designs and currently operational engineering plants, Soviet nuclear

2 a

r.

canaximum speed of aboutnow, norma! cruising speeds are probably on the crder ofnots. The maximum speed theoretically attainable with existing Soviet hull designs could be as high asnots. Improvements in engineering plant and hull design coulduclear submarine capable of even greater speeds. Utilizing present steels and technology, new Soviet submarines could achieve maximum operating depthseet in the period of this estimate.

he radiated noise levels of existing Soviet nuclear submarines appear comparable to those of early US nudear submarines. These levels can be reduced, but we have ^sufficient evidence to determine the extent to which noise reduction techniques may have been applied to existing operational SovietIncremental improvements could be made at any time, however, an eficcove noise reduce on program foe existing submarines would probably require extensive mociScation of the engineering plant The Soviets couldelatively quiet new dass of submarine, but we do not bdieve lhat they will have significant numbers ofew type within the period of this estimate.

V. LONG RANGE BOMBER -.

During the past year, we have acquired no evidence of major change in the eapabdities and structure of Soviet Long Range Aviationhe force is being improved through introduction ol new supersonic dash medium bombers and modificauoo of older model aircraft" Use of LRA med.um and heavy bombersaritime reconnaissance role continues. Soviet military writings- during the past year have included some spirited defenses of the utility of manned aircraftide spectrum of military operations; this is in contrast to the denigration of manned bombers whichrevalent Sovietew years ago. We believe that the Soviets will maintain sizable but dedirung bomber forces.

1 he heavy bombe: force stClignificant portion of the current Soviet capability for intecontincntal strategic Ittkfc, but Sovnet LRA. by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is in general much better suited for Eurasian operations. The bulk of the force Is deployed in the Western USSR, the Ukraine, and the loulhern portion of the Soviet Far East. We estimate Chat there are aboutediumeavy bombers in opera, tional units in Long Range Avucion. some of which are utilized as tankers.

A. Recent Developments in Long Rcngc Aviolion

eavy bomber training in (he Arctic has emphasized ertendedflights into the Polar basin. Bison training is oriented towards those activities normally associatedtrike bomber role, and Bear training has the added feature of reconnaissance specifically oriented against surface ships in the Atlantic and Pacific. The Oainii'j; of the medium bomber force has been

prrforaimof Lonem. Table 0

1 !7

TOP SXKX

increasingly oriented to wan! coatirtcfltal or naval rather than intercontinental operation* **

the Bear. Three variants of this aircraft have been identified. Theomber, not equipped for aerial refueling. Thes an air-io-surface mliille carrier. Some Bear Bj have been equipped for aerial refueling, and we believe that this modification program will continue. Theissile carrier which is equipped both for aerial refueling and reconnaissance. We believe that the current operational Bear force consists0i,s.

he provision of an aerial refueling capability fornables the aircraft to reach important targets in the US directly from home bases with heavy loads such as the Kangarooissileand permits extendedmissions. However, this modification of the Bear imposes newfor conversion of Bisons to tanker use. thereby reducing the Bison bomber force. The Kangarooissileange ofl was designed for use against land targets, but it could be used against naval format ions, although it would have limited eSeetivenest because of greatlyaccuracy andifferent guidance System -Ould improve its accuracy against ships.

SS. There is firm evidence that Bear production extendednd Ihere has been considerable activity since then at the Bear production facility. At least part of this activity is accounted for by theodifieationand by production of the Cleat heavy transport, but we cannot exclude

the medium bomberradual reduction in the numberand introduction of the supersonic-dash Blinder have continuedindicates thai fewer Blinders have been delivered to LRAestimated, we believe that there aren operationalLRA. There are two versions of this aircraft; Blinderissile carrier which may be equipped for aerialew ASM (designatedould becomeyc.ir for use with the Blinder B.

B Fufwe Trends in Bomber forces

Soviets would probably plan to employ bomber forces in followafter missile strikes had been delivered. Aircraft equipped with pene-

Aujum Chief[areSjcaoe. USaF. beue-e. (hit ihei;cawi<

- bomber.

" For Kiriccc-irica ot LRAi>Vu.Aami a. Table 4

-T5

(ration aids and nuclear weapons would probably be used for increasinglymissions, such as armed reconnaissance (including maritime) and attacks on selected hard targets ai well as on targets of uncertain location

f the USSR activelyork aod commits funds forand deployment, new types of large military aircraft could be brought to operational use ineriod The Soviets arc technically capable of developing long-endurance subsonic aircraft (for reconnaissance and/or low altitude penetration) aod medium-range high-altitude aircraft with maximum speeds of aboutn this time period.

e have no evidence that the Soviets are developing follow-on bomber aircraft Currentork in large aircraft seems directed primarily toward the development of new transports. Continuation of this work willthe Soviets* state-of-the-art and wuJechnological and production base which they could apply to military purposes. However, considering their likely missile capabilities toward the end of the decade as well as the probable continued availability of existing heavy bomber types, we think it unlikely that the Soviets willollow-on heavy bomber into operational service during the period of thisj they should, US intelligence is likely to obtain indications of its development and production one to three years prior to entry into operational units.

increasing age of the Bison and Bear and continued phase-outwill reduce both the heavy and medium bomber components ofAviation. The output of Blinders will probably continue to beLong Range and Naval Aviation, and we believe thatef these bombers in LRA. On tho basis of pteseotestimate LRA strength as indicated on the following page :1

C. Operotionol Capability t

major restriction on LRA inteicontmental attack capabilities haslimited range of the jet bombers which make up tho bulk of therefueling and Arctic training in the past several years reflect Sovietovercome this limitation. The USSR has rot developed aircrafttanker use. instead. Bisons and Badgers are converted for use aswith aerial refueling, the capabilities of LRA for intcrcontineetal attack

"The Annum Chief of Staff. Ii>ic!!igenee. USAF. coruideri that the Soviet.of the*nI

to. force. He be!that meet of (Ne RiD -ock en larp. urerali*. reeled towardof new Unwporu)c' itratcg.c - Keieelyhe Se-ieuodJct

new heavy bomber by IWJ ind iby lOW

" For ihe. of the AlWlinl Chief of Suit. Iniell-ccnee. L'S.M'.to iSc future itrcnEih of LltA. iee Soo the

" New teeSwilonai deceived ow'i . com bit radauretafi by overercent

75CCCiieT

ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF

IOct Md> Mo

5 0

Heavy Bomber? ud Taoken _

5

5 5

ISO

Medium Bombers and Tanker*

0

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF. INTELLIGENCE. USAF. FOOTNOTE:

The Auiataat Chief of Stair. Intelligence, USAF. eanmales thai the Int-jduerion of aheavy bomber. (he eenu'oued retcat&oa of liable numbers of Badger, ihe' con-tinned production of Blinder, andollow-on meduim bomberill reiult inoviet Loog Range Avlafioo aa fotlewi;

Oct

* *

...

the evidence loot ruSdcnt to enable idcotificaLoo of ihe .pceifie type of fouow-co heavy bomber on which the Soviet* will coocentnle. the AniiUnl Chief of SuS. Intelligence. USaF, considers that the follow-on bomber couldong endurance aircraft with better eapabuiiiei than those of the Bear byuperioiuc-daah bomberuclear powered bomberheseeSecTed ia the rpread of the tabulation above.

remain limited, and wc do not believe that they are likely to improve within the period of this estimate."

n addition to itsermanent home bases. LllA alsoumber of Arctic airfields that could bc used as staging bases for attacksorth America. Arctic training activity has centered around the lour or Svc of thesewhich are capable of supporting bomber operations throughout the year. Toarge bomber force in an initial intercontinental attack, the

" For (he view of the Aasiiuat Chief of SuS. Inteuigeoee. USAF. lee hit footnote on

TO7

32

seaa

would have lo utilise other Arctic au-fields ai welL There axe abouither fields in the Arctic which hive runway! long enough (or LRA bombers Some of these have natural surface runway usable only in winter; some are occupied by otheraval Aviation; some have little POL storage and servicing facilities; and most ire too distant from targets in the continental US to allow for two-way nussioos with rnedrum bombers We believe that the Soviets would have great diEcidty in utilizing these bases effectively toimultaneous initial attack, although they could be used for recovery operations.30

efueled Badgers could reach targets in the extreme north westernof (he ronticentaJ US on two-way missions from Arctic bases in the ChukhoUk Peninsula, but they would have little flexibility of routing and tactics. The Bison would require both Arctic staging and inflight refueling to cover the bulk of US targets on two-way. Unrefueled Bear bombers could reach many US targets directly from home bases, but, when equipped withr bomb loads0 lbs. or more, unrefueled Bears would probably need to stage through the Arctic Refueled Bears carrying theould reach most US targets directly fromome bases. . .

' 9i. Training patterns and range capabilities of Soviet bombers indicate that aircraft attack against the US (except Alaska) would involve heavy bombers almost exclusively. We have previously estimated that the Soviets would commit their enure heavy bomber force to this mission as weapons carriers and tankers. Considering the requirements for Arctic staging, refueling, and noncombatfactors, we estimate lhat at present the Soviets could put somewhateavy bombed over target areas in the US on two-way missions. However, .the use of Soviet heavy bombers in maritime reconnaissance roles leads us to believeew of these aircraft might bc diverted to this mission "

ur evidence leads us to eoneJude that Badgers do not now Sgurein Soviet plans for an initial bomber attack against North America. Nevertheless, considering the requirements for Arctic staging and refueling, as well as noncombat attriDoo factors,elieye thai at present upadgers could arrive over North American target areas on two-way missions. The combat radius ol these bombers would limit such attacks to targets in Greenland, Canada.

-Thebie! of SuJ.e*ee.ecorniaei theof tupag through So.(ei Arcticbut he bei.cea lhat aoJable facJ.uea are suScwnt to enable ihe Sovieu to launch enough bombers and tanlenput atCO bomben over the eon Cinema! US.

"The AiMtaatf SuS.SAF. reWanO7urujtrejtimne the na.ii.ee! aircraft threat lo Ihe continental US to the evenleventuate and the USSR atlaekaUS with nudeare bclie.aa (huan all-out effort aimed a!r ofoo. o- US Ucrcu. Iaauack. hei (bar thet* ICSM facewri etceot combat ator-.n. the So-.cu could, byombers over North Ame.-ea on,nd Hillttack Euraslaa, target. If ihe USillto employ Bad/ena frjce. Cw rwnbe,US could

e! SCO.

Alaska, and the extreme northwestern US. As for Blinders, we hive no evidence lhat they have engaged in Arctic traioJng and. becaute this aircraft, when flying iu designed mission, has eveo leu range than the Badger, wc believe that few if any would be aiiigned to North American targets

he Soviets could further increase the number of bom ben arriving over North America should they resort to one-way unrcfueled attacks with medium bombers. With the growing Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces, this use of the medium bomber force becomes increasingly unlikely.

n view of the limitations of the Soviet Arctic base structure, wc have serious doubt about how efiecbvcly the Soviets could launch large scale bomber operations against North America.

VI. SPACE WEAPONS SYSTEMS

vailable evidence does not of itself indicate whether or not the Soviets now have programs for the military use of space, apart from the miiitaryiupport capability provided by the Cosmos reconnaissanceIn particular, we have ao evidencerogram to establish an orbital bombardmentis seriously contemplated at present by the Soviet leadership. However, the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for use as offensive and defensive weapons and to provide other types of military support.

Since the publication of NIEhe Soviets have launched and de-orbited an increasing number of satellites in00 pound classes, using theooster with suitable upper stages. The Sovietsapability touclear-armed satellite in orbit, but we consider it unlikely that thev will do so.atellite would have limited military effectiveness, and the decision to orbit it would be based primarily on political and psychological coniiderations. The Soviet leadership.probably would recogniie that this would be an act of major international import which would intensify greatly East-West hostility, prejudice the option of detente tactics, andtrong new stimulus to Western militaiy prograjris.

Wc believe that the attainment of reliability and accuracy, particularly for out-of-orbit detonation near the earth's surface, woulderies of tests cstending over atear after an initial launching. After suchthe USSR probably couldmall number of bombardment satellites with CEPi on the order0 nm. against targets located up to several hundred nautical miles from its earth track and withtimcs ranging

to several months. With theooster, the nuclear payload could be Jif there were no requirement that the payload be recoverable.

an orbital bombing system of military significance, there il aof delivery techniques and types oi orbital bombardment forcesbe sought by the Soviets, with considerable differences incosts, and eSectivetiess. Tohreat of retaliation against

population centers,migh:elatively imall force of limitedcomposed ofeapons in orbit For largc-seale use against imaller or harder military targets,uch larger, sophisticated force with short times to target, oear-simulraneity of delivery, and an accuracylhat of ICBMs would be necessary. Even the lesser of these forces would be extremely complex and expensive, and wouldajor Soviet effort to perfect new hardware and to develop advanced techniques. In any case, developmental testing of an orbital bombardment system should beto us atear or two prior to attainment of an accurate, reliable system.

For accomplishing military missions, we think that orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs over the next jU year* in terms of effective, ness. reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. Io view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement o! the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, we believe that the Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system within tbe period of this estimate. -'

Even without any special efforts, however. Soviet technology applicable to this field wdl improve in the normal course of continued development of nuclear technology, ICBMs. and space projects. We recogniac that the Soviets might reach different conclusions as to cos! aod effectiveness, and that altered political eon rider ations in some future phase of East-West relations might lead themifferent decision. Even in these circumstances, wc believe that they would regard space weapons primarily as means ol supplementing existing fotces. of introducing additional complications into US defense planning, and of supporting Soviet claims to strategy parity or even superiority.

VU. COMMAND AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS A. Command and Control

1M. Final authority for the use of strategic strike forces rests firmly with the top political leadership. Such information as we have suggests that steps have been taken in recent years to designatein the Supreme Highand to develop procedures to permit the quick assumption by this body of top level control of military operations should events so dictate. This action together with Khrushchev's assumption of the title of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces provides in peacetime the framework of the command structure which historically has cusicd only in wartime.

he several elements of the Soviet long range ltriking forces areto different major commands Long flange Aviation, the Soviet Navy, and the Strategic Rocket Forces. Coordination of operations among the three long range striking forces is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, whose Ceneral Stair is responsible for planning and probably targeting for the entire military establishment. The Soviets continueorts to improve their

mand and control system for strategic attack forces. The genera! picture remains one of considerably less sophistication and precision than in comparable US command and control systems.

ong Range Aviation has existedeparate command throughout the post-war period, and missile submarines have been assigned to existing fleets. While strategic bombers and missile submarines arc attached to older commands with weD-developed and refined communications and controlthe Strategic Rocket Force* were established0ew component of the Soviet rrulitary establishment. These forces bad new and pressing requirements in the field of command and control, which were revealed in classified Soviet military writingse believe that these earlier shortcomings in communications, control, and data-Drocessing have been largely overcome.

ong Rongc Reconnaissance

c bebevc that.the USSR has devoted considerable effort to puipouiting potential targets for strategic attack in the USlsewhere. High comoe-fence in geodetic mapping prov-des the USSR with an excellent base; 'we currently estimate that the Soviet geodetic enor in location of US missile launch sites is on the orderCO feet. Wehat. by using allmeant, induding reconnaissance satellites, the USSR will be able to reduce geodetic error ioeet by the end of the decade.

ontinuous and up-to-date mfonnation on the location aod movement of key Western forcesigh priority Soviet requirement. In peacetime, this requirement is met ia large part by the extensive Soviet radio dircctioo-fiading effort, which' permits location of Western communications circuits and the units employing them. The Soviet direction-Ending effort couldigh degree of effectiveness under wartime or alert conditions ia the absence of strict Western communications security measures and electronic emission control. The USSR supplements this effort by such means as the exploitation of open sources, dandestioe observation, and signal interceptariety of meanstrawlers.

The Soviet reconnaissance satellite program probably provides support to long-range striking forces. The program uses recoverable vehicles launched from Tyuratam under the mantle of the Cosmo:equirement for precise targeting information on US targets, not obtainable through other col-lection means, seems to be the primary reason for the program.

In conducting any long-range attack, the Soviets would desire to learn as rapidly as possible which targets had survived (heir initial strikes. High-frequency bacx.scattcr antennas in the USSR couid determine general areas and yields of large nudear explosions in the US. but probably not precisely enough for retargeting iCBM'i. These de-ices might assist in programming post-attack reconnaissance

For precise post-attacV. rccooaaiisauce the USSR could useeek out and strike at reviving targets or targets of uncertain location. The Soviets haveigh-altitude, reconnaissance aircraftimilar to. which has an operating radius suitable for use against Eurasian targets. Unmanned reconnaissance of targets in Eurasia might he performed by surface-to-surface aerodynamic vehicles. Such vehicles could become operational within the rteit two years. Damage assessment of US targets could be achieved by employing reconnaissance satellites.

C. Electronic Warfare and Countermecsurcs

he Soviets have considerable capabilities to disrupt or degrade Western strategic and tactical communication! They haveubstantial range of active and passive ECMincluding improved chaff and jammers for use primarily against radar and comrnuoicatioos. The Soviets have the capability to greatly expand the limited use they have made ofdeception techniques. Sov.et eountcrrneasurcs capability preseoilyinto all the significant frequency bands used by the West, from low frequencies0 Mc/s, and probably higher, but the capability is not uniform throughout this range. Existing Soviet countermeasureshowever, are not likely to be effective against some of the less susceptible US communications systems, such as (hose employing ionospheric or rropo-spheric scatter techniques. The Soviets arc continuing to enhance theirwarfare capability, and equipment erpected to become available wUl include such improvements as greater power and more sophistication.

irborne systems. Soviet Long Range Aviation has placed heavyon the role of electronic warfare in its overall mission. All bombers arc probably equipped with basic mechanical and electronic ECM devices, and the Soviets would probably employ sortie bombers primarily in an ECM role They have demonstrated capabilities for employment of ECMide variety of operational conditions. Long Range Aviation aircraft are capable of conducting active aad passive ECM. (jammers and chaff) against enemy air defense electronic systems within mos: of the frequency spectrum00 Mc/s, and ol conducting electionic intercept operations to cover the frequency spectrum from0 Mc/i. Development of electronic warfare capabilities in the frequency spectrum0an be expected. Future improvements could include broader band jammers, higher powered and more automatic equipment, and increased use of deception Although there is no evidence of such systems as air-to-surface missiles designed to home on radar transmitters, air-launched decoys to simulate bomber radar returns, and infrared decoy Sarci to counter heat-seeking air-to-air mis-sdei. these could also be made available provided the Sovietsequirement for them.

IH. Couf.termecrures {or Navel Use. In recent years, the Soviets have given increased emphasisevelopment of shipboard ECM equipment, but such

ANNEX A

TABLES OF WEAPON SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

Tableoviet ICBM System*

Tablooviet MRBM and IRBM Systems

Tableoviet Submarine-Launched Missile System!

Tableoviet Loog Range Aviation Air-to-Surtace Missile Syweras

Tableoviet Missile Submarines

Tableoviet Strategic Bomber Weapoa Systems

ANNfiX A

GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS

'Initial Operational Capabilitythe Em operational unit is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.

Maximum Operational Range

Air-to-Surfoccrange between launching aircraft and target at the instant of missile launch.

Surjace-to-Surjaeerange under opcraQ'oaal conditions with warhead weight indicated. For long-range ballistic missiles, tberange figures disregard the effect of the earth's rotation. La general, ballistic missiles can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-tbird the maximum operational range without serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

Circular Error Probableradiusircle in which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracy specified in the tables, which take into consideration average operational factors. For naval systems firing on coastal targets, an accurate determination of the launching ship's position is necessary to achieve CEFs of the order indicated in the tables.

Re-entrypartissile designed to re-eater the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of its trajectory. Reentry vehicle weight includes that of the warhead, necessary shielding and structure, any penetration aids that may be present and any other necessary or desired components.

Warheadweight of the explosive device and its associated ruling and firing mechanism.

Re'iobilirYes

Ready Missilepercentage of the operational missile force that will be available to immediately initiate bunch preparationormal readiness condition. The Ready Missile Rate may vary with international conditions and will probably be somewhat higher during periods of tension and strategic alert.

Countdown Reliab&ty: The percentage of the missile force that after initiation of launch preparation will be successfully launched with no more thano CO minutes delay in their normal preparation time.

Inflight Reliability: The percentage of the missiles successfully bunched that wtll detonate as planned in the target areaithin three CEP's of the aiming point).

seesef-

* 7 '

arcs:?.

Overall Reliability: The percentage of Ihe operational missile force that will successfully detonate in the target area. (Overall Reliability is the prod-uct of the Ready Missile Rate. Countdown Reliability and Inflight

Rencrionrequired to proceedeadiness condition to launch.

Refirerequired toecond missile from the same pad or launcher.

Readinessfollowing conditions of readiness apply to all ground launched ballistic missiles hawing rnaaamum operational ranges. or greater.

Conditionaunch crewj not on alert. Re-entry vehicle and missile checked but not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted fortarget and missile not erected or fueled.

Cond'-ionaunch crews in launch area and on alert Missile andvehicle mated and checked but in ready building.

Conditionaunch crews at bunch stations. Missile with re-entry vehicle erected oo launch pad. Propellant facilities in position, attached and ready to start propellant loading. Subsystems checkout complete and guidance aligned.

Conditionaunch crews at launch stations. Missile propellant loading completed. All systems ready for Snal checks.

-

41

CBaRaCTERISTICS aSD PERFORMANCE *

oll)

wed)

Raac*

. ' ' -

CEP

(Impfovad

OOf. f

a)

Wartud1 C

Warhead Yield f

Grow

r-

o

Read. Miasile Rate

RcUabitT. Coueidoaro

(laitiaO

(Improved/Year)

RaliabUiir

(Improved/Year)

Overall RebetMbt,

(Icutial)

o vedf Year) Rcaciioo Tiaae from

Rcamsen Cood.tioa a:ra.

caia

Bold Time io Cood. 1 I1 br>.

dayt (hard)

Turin Time atra.

{Soft aim)

idsumu aa

SS-9

Radio letrtial

Tandem

2-ftagc

Storable Liquid

S0%

i%

7

ra.io.mio. hour,ra.

evidence is insufficient to enable us to aikc aa ouo.it of SS-IO characteristics aodIl iiu inocrfcil guidance capabilityCEP

in accuracies auume improvements io missile *ub-ty*lenis. ope.-aiioaal methods, and crew Uaioioj, but not ibe introduction of new guidance es in eiisticg types oJ ICBMs.

jammers, other penetrationad warhead shielding could be incorporated at some sacrifice in nuclear warhead weijht which could be carried within tail tout re-eairy vehicle weight. C

3 To date, no decoy* or penetration aid) bave been identified. Wc feci confident lb*', should auch devices be used, they would be delected.

believe Ibese lo be current aa.imutn yields. Warhead yield olould bo increasednew re-entry vehicle is developed,ut unlikely. Mealrobablyarheads.new ucaecocei ia probably available for missiles enteringU year, and sornc portion of thewill probably be retrofitted with higbcr yield, warheads. We eow.dcr developmente- ooaeeooe -ithwarbead for tbenlikely.

' Toese reliability rales may be Wo high since ibey may not sufficiently sake low account the effect of Soviet opexatiooat celboda aad troop training which are al least aa important as technical cbaracteKslies io determining system reliability. Wc have little best* for estimatingeflecta.

Readinesss believed to be Ibe normal read-ecu condition for ICBMs deployed at soUsika andor bard tiles,

> Aa unfavorable environment could seriously degrade these bold times. Bcausc of tbo protectionissile inhardened sile. il isooser bold lime than lUaoft Mueierpari. We believe Che cryogenic properties of noo-atorable propellanLi probably limit these missilesold lime of about one hour.

' Rcflre cap-bilitiea are applicable to softfy. Estimated refire times are based on tbe assumption Ibat Ibe launch sile was designed apecifioUy for an efficient retire capability snd Ihsl no maior rctUihuhraco! of ground support equipment or launch stand is oecessary.

'Although tbe Director, DIA. and tbe Assistant Chief ofntcliiSeoec. USAF. bel.eve that the -eight of theavailable makes it more likely that tbe1 comparable lo thea payload delivery capability,oeB aolwin iho indicatorseUtl-ely small missile.

They. therefore, cannot exclude Ibe possibility last ibeosceoce could weigh0 pounds or somewhata yield

as probably been phased out or operalioaii! ierv.ee.

'amrocn. other peocireiioa aids aod oaraend laieldice could be iaeorporatcd al sornesacrifice in ouclcar war-bead *eigbt which could be carried within chia cecalcc.elo weight. C

] To date oo decoyi or pcoctratioa aida have beea ideo'.iued. We (eel eootideat toil aboulo auca de-ieea be uicd they would bc detected.

reliability rales may be too high, aiaee they raiy Dot sufficiently takeccount Ihe cfTeel of SovietcoocepU aod troop training, which are at least it liopo'laot aa lechoical chiracicniucs io determining eyalem reliability. We have oo good bails fore ling these effects.

s bclie.ed to be the normal readieeaa eondiiioo for MRDM/tKBMt deployed itaoft aites aodor bard tiles. These times are applicable only to operation! a', pcroaacnl fired aitca aod might be appreciably lougcr when operating from altcroate, Held type site*.

unfavorable environment coulddegrade Ibcae hold timet. Because of tbe protectionoiaaiteardened lite, iliaooker hold time than ita ao'c counterpart. We believe the cryogenic pcuiKrliea of oonalO'ablc pror>;tlanl* probably limit theold lime of about one hour

' Reiirc capabilii.ca iro applicable lo soft liies only. Eatiraated rcare limes arc baaed oo che nsaunipUon thai tbe lauoeawere designed speeifienllv for an efficient refire capability and thai co major rct.irbiihmenc of ground supportor launch aland it lite-ajar;

rcr srcsn

. *

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS AKD PERFORMANCE

S-t

Mai. Rangen.)

Against Lsod350

AgainstAbout160

Preprogrammed auto-pilot leertlal *

with command override

Accuracy (CEP)

Against LandI.

Against*

Warhead

WeightS.OOO

Speedo s!0 or at

so.qoo *'

Reliability -

On

In

CarrierDEARB

Nuaber of

Launch

- Thisge and accuracyan offset bombing technique io -bleb the location of the laod target is precisely known with respecteference point.

h Tbe first figures In these entries areoost-glide vehicle, and the second for a

Wiih this guidance, lie CEP sgsinst ships would. Tte loelusloo ofseekerore effective auli-ship capability is feasible technically. We have no evidence that this haa occurred; sucb readily could be accomplished within tbe period of this estimate.

shown are tnarirautrts. Smaller yields might be employee against ships.

reliability rates may be high because tbe effects of Soviet operational coojepta and uooo training eUedard* are at least as importantechnical characteristics in de-termination of system reliability. We have no reliable basis for estimating these effects.

' The tcrroical phase al theflight profile would be atlupenooie speed.

ta

:

soviet missile submarines characteristics and feriormancu

f>raoi

nii . ,tt inmi Q.

II

O

cnuian mimii.i:

:

(MOD I)

(MOD II)

m<

[i

lie

n

Mii

Mil II 4

Mss il}

Civtssss II i.i

ihimIii -1

43

stzewf

6

soviet stratecic bomber weapon

ESTIMaTEO PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE

'Calculated io aieordenee with USOl IA Spec except that (UCI reserves arc reduced toaximum ofinute* loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)

Boot* Ben* Bu-otti

Crow Weight

Empty Weight0 0

Combat Radius/Range

0 lb

0 lb OO

ooe NA

b

ooc

tb

ooe NA

ASM .

one refuel

' ooe refuel (BLINDER

Speed Altitude (kte/fl)

Speed at Optimum 0 0

Speed/Targe'. i.6C0 0

o. Launch Speed/Lauochtb COO

Combat. CeDiog (fl) 0 0

System Accuracy (CEP)

Accuracy -

ft t

ft l

Accuracy

o.m. va. . ve.

laod target) land targets

Syiiem

Reaebiog Targetaa io North

America-Oexcfueled/refueled

relUbility-Oolauneher/In Aeft and ASM .

foacootM ooo*ic.

TS7

Trie rangedits figures gi-ea ia (hit cable are maximum Ggurea. They are applicable to Ihe moat up-to-date model* of these aircraft, flyiag optimum mission profiles on direct routes. The use nf older mode! aircraft, other mission profiles, indirect routes, low-level penetration or other uettm deaigocd to delay or evade detection and iotereeptioa would reduce tbe effective range. The calculation or degradation io range aod radiua resuliiog from sophisticated penetration tacticsomplex process which can be best accomplished for individual mualooa.thumb for low-level bperatioa* of heavy bombers, the radiua at optimum altitude will be decreasediles for every mile flown at sea level.

as beee equipped to carry one0 nmANGAROO, ratherombload. Theissile ia estimated to weigh0 lbs.as been equipped to carry ooend also to conduct reconnaissanceguc refueling system has been provided. Io addition, oneaa beea observed equipped lor suea refueling.

'omber eot known to be equipped for rcfueliog.ornea ooe KITCHEN ASM which is espected to become operationale believe that BLINDER was designedupcraooic daah minion. Our estimate* of combat radius/raogea.. io. out) at. If BLINDER were flowo subsonic all tbe way, combat radius would be increased by somea.m.

combat load0 lbs. for BISON and BEARbs. forod BLINDER A; ooeor; and one'or BLINDER B.

aecuraeiea iudicated are foe visual bombing or radar bombing against well-defined targets with free-fall boaba. These figures are not applicable to drogue-re Urdcd bombs, which would bo much less accurate.

1 These reliability rates may be high, since the effect! ot Soviet operational concepts aad troop training standards are at least as important aa tecanical ebscaeleriiiica in determination of system reliability, snd we have no reliable baaU for estimating theae effects. '

' (Deludes the following operational at'ritioo rates, excluding combat attrition:f aircraft at home bases would be io commission0 day maintenance ataaddowa prior to initialf aircraft io commission al home bases would be launched from lUgiog bases;f aircraft launched from atagieg bases or directly from home bases od uarefueled missions would arrive in target areas;f aircraft launched oa refueled missions would arrive in target areas. Calculations foe DEaR with ASM arc based oo refueled nights direct from home bases. ALL others assume Arctic staging, and refueling of BADGE Rand BISON aircraft, llaaould bcnoied that without prior maintenance standdown, the In-eommiaaioo rate of heavy bo cabers at home bases would bend for medium bomberi.

ANNEX 8

MAPS Of RANGE CAPABILITIES

Soviet Somber Capabilities against the CoatueaUlof Bison Soviet Bom be Capabilities against the Coo orientalof Bear Soviet Missile Capabilities agaisat toe CootineotilMissiles

Soviet Missile Capabilities against the NortherniodRange Ballistic Missiles Soviet Bomber Capabilities agiinrt (he Northernof Dadger Soviet Bomber Capabilities against toe Northernof Bl-ade:

3CCP.ET:

Soviet Bomber Capabilities against Northern Hemisphere

ranges of badger

ifftteM

I! benbO

>i) itf'Jtud

M bti iso ill

3.K0 It.

Oaiiii

rO.OMIb. iMbMtJMIU

-_. ID. lumiwe ii

, .WMul imnrm.imf

ihiiflmrf.i

i il.

n.hal laii

enii.iil.ik.it.l

ni*. j.ip.it.

"1lm i i- ..

iiiihiia. ih th.mil..

imot* > i* i.

-mttlil tub|o.

uivr.rm-ii.iiiiiiajm

lllk.ir; llll anil.bui iml

ittt

Original document.

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