SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

Created: 8/5/1964

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Situation and Prospects in Cub

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PHc

THE 1

1

DISCUSSION 4

I.

II. THE ECONOMY

Current 4

Economic Outlook 7

INTERNAL POLITICAL 9

Current 9

Security Machinery II

IS

MILITARY

Current Siruation

The Soviet Military Presence

Chances of Remtroduction of Strategic

17

Cuban-Soviet Relations 17

The Problem of SAMss

Overtures Toveard tbo

Latin American Policies

SITUATION ANDIN CUBA

THE PROBLEM

To assess (he Cuban situation and the outlook over the next year or two.

CONCLUSIONS

the downward* trend of the Cuban economyhave slowed and perhaps levelled off. we believe thewill be stagnant over the next two years. Ineptand low labor morale will persist. Living levels are likelyslightly lower, and shortages of foodstuffs, housing andof consumer goods will continue. Slight gains in industrybut these will probably be offset by some decline in thesector. )

earnings56 are likely to be belowbecause of lower sugar prices and poor prospects forlarger production of sugar and other export commodities.of total trade with the Free World can be expected lothe period. We believe that the Soviets and otherwill provide sufficient credit assistance to prevent adrop in total imports. In these circumstances. Cuba's heavy

)

military disaffectioncale sufficient to Ihreaten Castro. Major deterioration in the internal situation or serious difficulties within the government could alter the picture, bu! would be unlikely toCastro's power position in less than several years. We believe his death would lead, in fairly short order,ower struggle of unpredictable outcome. )

D The Cuban armed forces are much the best-equipped in Latin America and. except for Brazil, the largest. Their capabilities have continued to improve, chieflvesult of the deliverv of additional weapons from the USSR and Cuban acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The compulsory military serviceintroduced last November, will probably cause an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency, but will permit improved selectivity of recruits for the active forces, and will eventuallyuch larger trained reserve. )

are almost certainly no Russian combat units stillUpon completion of currentovietpresence, mostly technical and maintenance personnel, ofwill probably remain so long as the Cuban armed forceson the USSR for technical and materia! support totheir complex Soviet equipment. )

the period of this estimate, the Soviets areto reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba, thoughthe technical capability to do so clandestinely. TheyCuba for support of their submarines, but so long as theythe risk would be high, they would not push such afar. )

C. The Cuban-Soviet relationship rernains intact, althoughhave continued. Castro, though willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviel dispute, has refused to join in any formal condemnation of Peiping. He is concernedurther improvement in US-Soviet relations leave his regime more isolated and exposed. Though the Soviets almost certainly consider Castro to be erratic and undependable. they have little choice but toto support him. )

H. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as well as between Castro and the US. is the continuationverflights. Castro and Khrushchev haverogram of

9*

warnings, threats, and compromise suggestions to induce the US to desist. It is almost certain that Cuba now has full control over the SAMconsequently the capability to shoothus we beliese that the Soviets can onlv give advice. backed up by their political and economic leverage, though we cannot wholly exclude the possibility that they have retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Nevertheless, we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seek UN action. If this fails, there is considerable danger that he wouldhootdown. calculating that the US would notin force or that, if it did. the resulting hue and cry would end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by- Castro or even anshootdown is alwnvs possible. J

I. Castroerious interest in improving relations with the US,eans of reducing the pressures on his regime. Healso considers that his recent gestures are useful toecord of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba'sto the UN" onssue. He will probably make further overtures from time to time, but there is little chance that he will accede at any early date to the conditions the US has stated.)

J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America havesetbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less sanguine about the chances for quick success. Nevertheless, he will almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to potential revolutionaries. He may press for early aggressive action by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chances seem poor, hoping that their repression would eventually produce conditions more favorable for exploitation.

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

l The appeal of Castro'searing thinner, though his own hold On the instruments of power remains firm Dunn" the year since our last general assessment ofhe Castro regime lias had more setbacks than accomplishments, more tribulation than triumph. The economic difficulties have been particularly evident; these haveurther narrowing in popular support and increasing resort to methods of repression and threat. The hope* of the Cuban leaders for rapid gains by sympathetic revolutionary group*in Latin America were dealt serious blows, particularly in Venezuela last Decemher and by the Brazilian revolution in April.

i On the other hand, there have been some important achievements.orces have considerably improved their overall capabilities, largely through the acquisition of more Soviet wcjpons and weapon systems. The regime's large-scale effort in technical, vocational, and general education has moved ahead, though at some expense to the quality of education on the professional level. The program of training and indoctrinating subversives from other countries has continued. On the economic side, substantul Soviet aid is continuing and high world prices permitted good earnings4 sugjr crop, aiding Cuba's effort to expand imports of critically needed equipment from Western suppliers.

II. THE ECONOMY Current Siruotion

', "Siruauon jrxi Prospects inatedeetet.2 cropillion tent, crop) in lie nre-Cutrore typicallyillion torts.

There were contrasting aspects to Cuba's economic performanceegardedhole, it was another bad year: total production was below that2 and Cross National Product (CNP) remained substantially below thathe last prerevolutionary year. On the positive side, however, the rate of economic decline, which has been rapid in recent tears, seems to have slowed or levelled off. Data so far available suggest that stagnationow level will continuelight gains in industrial output are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agriculture sector.

We estimate Cuban sugar output4 at approximately the same level as inmillion metricsmallest crop in IShe regime had hopedarger harvest, and the replanting of cane undertaken23 might have made this possible. However, Hurricane Flora damaged some cane and intensified transport and supply difficulties. The regime's nationalization of middle-sized farms inhe Second Agrarian

lso createdroblems in sugar production. Marcos er. antart at the harvest :he organizing of civilian "volunteer' brigades, and the use of army units, the regime once again failed to lure or drue an adequate labor force into the grueling work of the cine fields Harvesting uas also adversely afiected by military aierts especially the iarse-scale itsobdtza-tton undertaken in May. Increaseda made of cane loading machines, but this seems to line madearginal diRerence. Consequently, some cane remained uncut ts-hen the harvestded in June.

J The regime's general inabilirs to manage jgriculture ts also evident in lower output of most other crops. Hurricane FIom. the nationalization decree, and the diversion of land from food and Industrial crops to cane have been other depressing fact on Tlie regime is trying to institute more intensivemethods and increased application of fertiliser, but it is probable thatin iionsugar agriculture this vtai >vill be even loner than the uninipres-sise level1

6 There has probablylight increase in industrial output sinceesulting largely from an improvement in the Supply of imported fuels and industrial rasv materials and from tlie opening of some nesv plants, most of them budt svith Soviet Bloc aid and under the supervision of Soviet Bloc technicians Nevertheless. Minister of Indnsmes Che Cuevara continues to expresssvith the slow pace of industrial expansion and the lose productivity of industrialone of the longer-range. Soviet-financed mining or power protects have yet come into oe>erabon- Plans for large-scale irsdiistnaliution have been shelved for the indefinite future

T. By and large, the Cuban construction industry is still in the doldrums, its performance3 dipped berosv that of the previous year, and tbe planalls for no increase. Cuban oSaals base publicly admittedumber of plants, some where- the machinery veu delivered long ago. has lagged behind schedule

S. Cuban trade datahow an increaseillion in exportsise attributable to higher prices for sugar. Imports3 rose to their

* tt rs worth Mtsnsj Out Cohan econrarssc piu4 talis forJ3 In the loUl iooujii of food available for consumption including, imports. Even if this goal tsthe Cubans havt seldom met plan goals in thewould noi be enough to keep up with the annual population growth, and per capita eon. suospuoo "oak) decrease

' Cuevan. in February ol tha year, djeussed tha un-mprenm rwrrorrrunor of the economy3 and. in calling, for new rlforts, said,cannot rest on our laurels. Our industrial laurels are so Dny thai thev ara nor0 rest on. not even to rest on* finger oa. W* oust at least crease nor laurels. Thai ti oci"

3 oade firjures are takenecindv acvo jed document Tha sourc* appears accurate in nuns* of its deUili. and we lit disposed to give if moir credence than our earlierhose proiecttoni were, isrver the less, basedonsiderable body ofthey pUcrd Cabin rtpaetswlUn and ussports at *TJC mObon3 Farther lirht will be thrown on the rouetrace sUtistict for dWlie usilabfe but this wUI not beonth ot so.

highest levelhis increase.ilmost entirely in imports trom the Communist countries and much of it was deliveries of machinerv andfinanced by development credits.4 the value of Cuban exports will again increase, largely because of the high sugar prices which prevailed when most of the crop was sold Importshole may go upis* in imports from the Free World ise largely offsetecline ia imports from the Communist countries The level of Soviet assistance4 will probably be appreciably below0 million level

CUBAN FOREIGN

(in million* of 8 1M0 il

(preliminary) (ettiiuated/

. Eiptuti (FOB)

Conwitiniii ecus-

tries

JO

World

: C1 r

couo-

.

World

"

US ransom paymenu of StJ miiboo. inillion

Castro regime has given considerable attention to the problemthe parts and other production requisites needed to maintainplant, largely of US manufacture. The Soviets have not providedin adequate quantity, and Cuba has had to divert scarce skillsinto uneconomic effortsake parts by hand and to use substituteand equipment. Costly improvisation has been necessary toforeign suppliers, who have exacted maximum prices for vitally

In these circumstances, the Castro regime has intensified its efforts to expand trade relations with Western nations. By these means it hopes not only to mitigate the adverse effects of the US economic denial program but also to reduce its own political isolation. Because the Soviets and other Communist countries allowed Castro to reduce his soipenents of sugar to them3e has been able to capitalize on high sugar prices temporarily obtainable in the Free World and to increase his earnings of convertibleConvertible currency reserves now stand at about ST5 million, and prospects for foreign exchange earnings this year arc reasonably good.Castro has been able to secure from the UK and Franceillion of medium term credits for urgently needed transport and construction Some oi this is being deliveredome is to be shipped

The most glaring weakness of the economy has been the regime's own extraordinary mismanagement and ineptitude. After the revolution, the regime

:T

launched progrcrn ofndustrialization and agri-

cultural diversiaeitWn; the most important result of thu was tothe established basis for sugar production. Now rhe regime lias completed (he circle; sugar Is again tlic watchword and the goal0 Isillion tons. Expanded cattle production for food and industrial nipple ii another primarv goal of the administration Following rapid nationaliaution of the great bulk ot che island's economic activity, the regimeoctrinaire Marxist approach toward the managerial function: in its pursuit of centralized control, more and more economic establishmentsm.ide port of large and umvicldv "consolidatedith all major decyioa-making authority concentrated in Havana. But so time-consuming and bureaucratic hai the decision-making process become that Castro himself has damned the system and called for de-centralization and the exercise of much more mponiibdify at local levels.

uban officials have been frank to say tliat their economic statutes ore not accurate enough for soundthey plan and plan and plan The loss, through defection, of skilled labor and managerial talent busumulative adverse effect Not many of the new managers seem to be cost conscious;3 the slate industrial enterprises fell short byillion pesos ofillion pesos that they were supposed to turn over from their incomes to the Cuban budget. Perhaps most serious of all is the regime's continuing failure to provide meaningful material incentives for workers and farmers The imposition of work norms and jfl extended work week haveto the decline in labor morale.

Economic Outlook

The latest in the regime's series of efforts to improve administration of the economy is the assumption byurticos of the roles of Economic Minister and director of planning- But Cuba's problems of inept management and low labor morale are not quickly solvable, theyerv basic limiting factor on the performance of the economy for the short-run future at least. .Also of prime importance in appraising overall prospects for the next two vears is the oudook for Cuban earnings from sugar exports.

Recent sharp declines in sugar futures make prospects muchnd probably6 at well World spot prices, which hadeak ofittleear ago and were soil as high asents last November, are nowents; sugar futures3urther decline. Assuming prices on this general level for sales to non-Communist countries, the Castro regime would have to expand sugar production bv aboutercent to earn as much5 asoreover, it would have to sell the entire uxcreosc to the Bloc at the agreed priceents per pound*

'Duumju* to th* USSR ha* Jaourv. A* So-iets. in effect cneaord to(heir comm.tment alorno per pcund for Cuban Mgar Tit January agmrotnt also colli foe inctcaiint; Sovietillionillionillionillion tun* pel

Such an expansion ofossible but unlikely. Although the regime is moving gradually ahead with its program ot devoting .idditional land to cane production, it probably will not be able to overcome the serious tabor shortage which has characterized the last three harvests. The regime appears now to be convincedolution can be found only through mechanized harvesting techniques. Soviet maehirieTy thus far hasisappointment Cuban use of harvesting equipmenttill at the experimental stage, and we doubt that meo run nation will provide more than marginal relief during the next two years.

During the rest4 and the first porthe Castro government seill almost certainly obtain additional credits from Western European 6rms conoacting to supply equipment to Cuba. Thereafter the availability of such credits will dependonsiderable degree on Cuban earnings from5 sugar crop and on the prospects for exportshe outlook for both is unfavorable, and there wUI probably be some decline in the total value of Cuban exports. In this case, imports would almost certainly decline also, especially from the Free World, as Cuba's suppliers began to have doubts about Cuba's credit worthiness. At leastnd perhaps as earlyuban foreign trade is likely to be below4 level. However, we believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide Cuba sufficient credit assistance toeriously damaging drop in total imports

The outlook for development of the industrial and construction sectors of the economy is closely related to the prospects for on ports. With total imports likely to behere will be little opportunity to increase supplies of budding materials, industrial raw materials, spore parts, and fueb. Any increases in industrial production and construction56 are likely to be small.

IS. The regime's emphasis on technical education in the secondary schools and universities will tend, over the long term, to aid growth, especially in the irsdusoiat sector. This factor is not likely toajor impact during the next two years, however. The program is still relatively new, the shortage of trained teacher) is serious, and the regime has so far succeeded in raxTving Out only part of its planned massive shirt of students to technical training

a sum, we believe, that the Cuban economy wd! operateow level for the next two years. Because of population growth, the individual livm* standard Is likely to become slightly worse. Shortages of foodstuffs, bousing, and many types of consumer goods will persist. The regime's prolonged failure to deliver tbe economic beneEts it promised, together with its probable need to introduce additional belt-tightening measures, will be likely to narrow further its base of popular support.

III. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

Current Situation

Ai the revolution hai lost impetus, tho regime lias been shifting Irscreas-ingly to rnethoris of compulsion and repression in pressing ahead with itsorogroin. The Cuban leaders are apphing some measuret bcxrowed from the Soviet Bloc without successfully adapting them to Cuban characteristics, they are not putting enough Latin flavorislem which the Swissin Havana has referred to as "Marxismhe regime has absorbed small industrial, service, and retail businesses into the massivesector of the economy and hasumber of steps in theprocess. It has proclaimed three new laws in tlie past year; tlte Second Agrarian Reform, the Work Norm and Wage Classification Law, and theMilitary Service Law. If fully implemented, the three taws willrofound effect on practically all Cubans The. stride not only at the interests of those already disenchanted with the regime but also at the peasants nnd students, who make up much of Castro's strongest support.

The Second Agrarian Reform of0 expropriated most farmscres. Somefarms have been affected, and stateof agricultural land has -increased from approximatelyercent toercent. This, in itself,remendous blow to Cuba's conservative rural sector: moreover, many smaller farmers are convinced that their rum will come soon, despite Fidel's repeated assurances to the contrary. The regime has been attempting to force tbe small farmers to sell all their products to the government collection agencies, but black marketing continuesonsiderable scale. Within the lost few weeks, the party newspaper Hoy has warned peasants who work on state farms that they must no longer keep cows or gtow vegetable gardens of their own.

he work norm and wage scale system currently being introducedCuba will apply to agricultural as well as industrial labor. The regime has been moving cautiously in this field, seeking toalance between the political desifabdity of keeping workers reasonably iitisSed and the economic need to increase output and reduce cost through reallocation of workersajor scale, and through improvement of the performance of the individual worker. The regime launched its work norm program on an experimental basis more thanonths ago. and it has been sharply expanded this year. Workers are being fitted into eight salary- dassiScitions. The norms themselves axe not high, but those who fall below them will lose pay and the regime plans gradually to raise norms. Already the traditional Christmas and vacation bonuses have been eliminated, the typical work week has been extended fromoours, and some holidays have been abolished. Regimentation of tlie labor force lias been increased by the issuance of work cards to employed and unemployed.

he Obligatory Military Service Law is designed in part toheap labor force which the regime can use whereverees fit. Popular reaction lias

been so adverse that the regime bas been forcedublic ittlations campaign to assuage angry Cubanumber of prospective draftees hueew have probably joined insurgent groups The penalty for draft-dodging ismuch as six years in prison. The regime has recently announced that students, perhaps the most privileged class in Cuba, will no longer be exempt from theurther souice ol resentment on the part of many young peopleecent decree specifying that students mustregularly in productives well as keep up with their studies.

Antipathy between the 'old" Communists (members of the regular party prior to Castro's revolution) and the "new" Communists (who arc Fidclistas and revolutionaries first and Communists second) has persisted since the days of the revolutionarythe "old" Communists, in Fidel's own words, "hid under thehis behind-the-scenes conflict flared into the open once again Li March of this year in the trial of Marcos Rodriguez; several important "old" Communists were accused of shielding forember of the regular Communist Partv who had betrayed non-Communist revolutionary student leaders to Batista. Castro himself had to intervene directly in the trial; in the name of unity and to preserve some balance between the two groupings, he papered Over the dispute. But the quarrel remains very much alive, and the recent appointment to second-echelon government posts of several loyal Fidclistas who had been consigned to obscurity by "old" Communist leaders suggests that the latter have lost ground.

Infighting of this sort has been one of the reasons tbat Castro's United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) has been so long in the process of formation. He originally said It was to be completed byut by4 it claimed less00 membership, and formation of the first PURS cell in the armed forces did not occur until ISrogress has also been slowed by the difficulty of training prospective members from the poorly-educated classes and by differences of opinion between leading figures in the new party and some governmentabout who is to exercise what powers. But probably the most important impediment has been Fidel's own misgivings about his ability to build the kind of party he could trust. He is acutely aware that the PURS, once fully formed, willotential to challenge his own highly-personalized rule. Thus be is moving slowly and cautiously, holding the partly-formed PURS largely to an advisory role, while he retains the power to make all important decisions.

Castro has also retained close control over the militarv and over the appointment of officers to keyew members of the military have defected and others, among them officers, have almost certainly lost sympathy with certain of the regime's policies, though they are not willing to take the risk of overt opposition at this time. We, nevertheless, doubt that there is military disaffectioncale sufficient to threaten the regime.

Castro has not been able to put an end to insurgent activity. Small guerrilla bands continue to operate from the mountainous areas of Pin or del Rio.

illas. Ca maguey, and Oricntehe regime seemsoncerned lhat an expansion ol guerrilla activities in conjunction with alanding by Cuban exiles could incite elements of the population to revolt. We do not believe that the present capabilities of the exiles justify this fear, butdo dunk the fear is real Indeed, it was almost certainly the primary reason for the extensive Cuban military alert and mobilization that took place in May.

IS. The very fact that the regime is nervous and has moved during recent weeks to arrest and deal ruthlessly with small numbers of suspected agents and other opponents has probably increased its short-termie large and inc.-eaung number of potential opponents of the regime within the country has never had much opportunity to organize for any unified action. Tic elaborate internal security machinerv which now exists makri dissident organizational activity even more difficult and dangerous.

Security Machinery

Castro's Cubaolice state. The principal security andorganization, the Department of State Security, with an estimated personnel strength ofain tarns units throughout the country and apparently has been effective irr infiltrating and exposing counter-revolutionarv groups It works closely with all the Other security agencies and etpeciallv with the huge and ubiquitous organization of volunteerfor the Defense of the Revolution. Throughout the country, in rural areas as well as in almost every city block, these informants report to the local committee the results af spying on their neighbor* Committee membership is claimed to beillionalf. Local committees distribute food rationing cards, band out propaganda, and organize "voluntary'* work groups, committees at higher echelons assist the security agencies in maintaining control of all aspects of private life. Parallel informant roles are played by the Union of Young Communists, the Federation of University Students; and theof Cuban Women.

The policeBureau of Public Oder, the TechnicalDepartment, and che National Identificationcharged with ordinary law enforcement duties: theyotal of at0 personnel, nearly half in the Havana area. The Popular Defense Force comprisesivilian workers, men and women, who serve part time. They come primarily from the old militia reserve. Except in case of emergency, their mission is Co help police and security forces maintain order.

The Cuban foreign intelligence service, the General Directoratetaff of, maintains field stations In every country with which Cuba has diplomatic relations and has representatives distributed throughout Europe and Latin America. In the Western Hemisphere, its mission is "export of theof revolutionary activities,

horn subversionuerrilla warfare, by every poinble technique ot espionage and violence. T've DC! has trained and continues to train guerrilla andagents and support* their activities throughout Central America andost South American countries, as well as assisting leftist political candidates and pcneo-atin- Cuban exile organizations This latter function may deprive exile raiders of the allimportant cement ot surprise.

the past year, the Castro regime ha* coruideraNy expandedbodies, the "Fight Against Bandits' (LCB) and thePirates"hough we still have no acceptable figures onFull-time elite organ nations, they probably engage in morethan any other security force. Units of the LCB. the larger andhave engaged in numerous helicopter-assisted sweeps andculminating in skirmishes with guerrilla bands. The LCP operatespost* and patrol boats, using small stations along Cuba'sto prevent exile InSltrations. as well as ihe escape ofBoth groups work closely with the Department of Statethird organization formed in3 is the National Frontier Guardthe control of the Ministry of Interior; its mission is also coastal defense

Outlook

In view of the extensiveness and pervasiveness of this security apparatus, the chances appear very imall that under present circumstances popularwith the regime will be rrarisfocmed into an effective effort to bring it down. Castro hasemarkable ability toorkable degree of unity among the disparate groups involved in the regime. He has been able to make the great bulk of the populationactivesocialization and regimentation of his resolution.

Tbe ability of the regime to survive may. of course, be lessenedajor deterioration in the basic internal situation Acrimony and disagreement within the government, over such matters as the export of revolution or the advantages and disadvantages of rapprochement with the US. could leadower struggle among regime leaders that would seriously weaken theand reduce the effectiveness of the security organizations. Anotherwhich might change the odds for survival would be measures so oppressive as to precipitate large-scale demonstrations, and so generally unpopular that elements in the security forces and rnilitary forces would refuse to intervene or might even side with the people. However, changes of this nature extensive enough to undermine Castro's power position would be likely to take some years.

astro were to die or be removed from rhe scene during the next vear ot two. the immediate response of the regime, including the mditary, would probablyallying together to try to hold the populace in line and to defendeared US intervention. There is. however, no Cuban on the scene today who appears to have sufficient personal power and popular support to

contain und enntroi the powtrfnl diverse forces within the revolution. Neither Raul Castro, the designated successor, nor Che Cuevara, nor any other member of the 'inner circle" has the personal qualities and following required to control Cuba as Fidel has done. Inpeech. Castro revealed that, if he should tall, he expected the leadership of the PUBS to assume command. He apparently anticipates that his successor wouldommittee, presumably led by the "innerith the PURS National Directorate arrayed behind them.

owever Castro's immediate succession is arranged, we believe that there would be no morerief period of unity after Castro's departureajor power struggle began.cannot predict with any confidence the outcome oftruggle. Certainly the role of the Cuban military will be crucial. Among the many possible resultsower struggle would be the emergenceegime much like Castro's, dominated by men who support him now and supported and accepted by most military elements. Anotherwouldegime ledon-Communist leftist individual or clique that resented Castro's ceenmunizaijon of theh of Juryuch an event would probably 6nd the security forces with divided allegiances and would most likely result irv civil strife or even civil war. Some non-Com-munist group might wish to call for US assistance. In sum. Castro's death would jeopardize the type of political pattern which now exists incouldramatic reversal.

IV. THE MILITARY FORCES Current Siruotion

Castro's armed forces have grownagtag band of guerrillas in the Siena Maestra to much ihe best-equipped military force in Latin America and, except for Brazil, the largest. We estimate the personnel strength of Cuban forces to be moreen on active duty:, Air; ground-based air defense (radar and surface-to-air missile. In addition there are0 in the ready reservean homeguord militia called the Popular Defense Force; the latter, however, hasimited combat capability and is useful primarily for local defense, rear-guard security,anpower pool in time of emergency.

The Soviets have supplied the Castro regime with more than enough modem military equipment for its forces. Its elaborate air defense system uicludesAM sites; an extensive air surveillance radar network;IC fighters, including The Air Force's helicopters ore of par-

on Comrnunnc regime able to conuiund broad support among the Cuban people would probably pursue highly nationalistic poticiet anil maintain many of the toclalutic meuiuiei introduced by GiiUo

titular importance for operations against insurgents and exile landings, and transport aircraft are being used in coastal parrot missions.

ESTIMATED CUBAN HOLDINGS OF MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Tanks and scif-ptopeiled gun*

Other Armored Vehicle*

Field Artillery and Antitank Coni

.vaa

FBOC Rocket Launchers

Military

SAM jwlln enou5|,

equipmentare tire*)

SAMuideline)

Crude-Missile

Cruiae-Missile* .

Air Defense Radars .

Jet Fi-hterv

7 (FACOT/FRESCO,

FARMER)

MIC-21

Helicopters

iuise-Mbsue Boats

Krorutadt and

Motor Torpedo Boars)

Most of the increase in Cuban military capabilities over the past IS months has resulted horn the delivery of additional Soviet weapons and from the acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The Soviets have delivered tanks, patrol craft. MIC 6ghters, and some additional SAM launchers and missiles since2 missile crisis and have transferred to the Cubans the cruise and surface-to-air missiles systems. KOMAR missile, boats.et fighters, and ground forces sveapons. including FROC rockets. Cuban forces are well-equipped to combat internal resistance and to repel invasion short of direct US intervention, but tack experience in the use of some of the newly acquired Soviet weapons. Although Cuban forces are ex-perienced in small unit operations, they still suffer from lack of training in large-scale exercises or in joint operations necessary for more effectivelymaritime raids and internal insurgency. Deficiencies in transportation and logistical support also hinder mditary readiness and operations.

In the event of US invasion. Cuban plans evidentlytrong initial resistance at the point of attack, followedefense of prc-selected key positions and. finally, by guerrilla warfaremall proportion of Cuban forces, however, would be likely to carry on prolonged guerrilla

The Cuban Navy and Air Force are defensively equipped, trained, and oriented. Neither force has moreimited offensive caoabilitv: the Naw

for example, lacks landing craft. Tlie AH Force, while capable of providing some support to guerrillase Caribbean area. lackj the airlift capacity for moreery smai: effort

Outlook

The conscription law went into effect innd the first conscripts were called up at the end of March. The law requires all Cuban males between the ages ofndto register and most to participate In full or part-time military service, and It extendi the active duty service from two to threene effect of the draft it likely to be an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency of the units to which the draftees are assigned. Over time, the most important military results will be touch larger trained reserve and to supply selected personnel for operation and maintenance of the recently acquired advanced weapon systems.

After an initial increase in the sire of the active armed forces, discharges seill probably keep the Cuban military establishment close to its present strength. And following the temporary drop in the level of training and efficiency,will probably become more advanced, to include combined operations and more technical instruction. Military organization may become somewhat more standardized. Nonetheless. Cuban forces"will probably continue to display most of the same shortcomings and vulnerabilities that they have in the past. Lack of combat experience and dependence on the USSR for advanced training and material support will continue to be two nf the most serious.

The Soviet Military Presence

The Soviets have continued to withdraw military personnel34 as they have gradually completed training of Cubans on variousweapon systems and turned these systems oser. one after another, to Cuban control- Soviet withdrawals have been paralleled by deliveries to Cubaariety of items of military equipment and supplies, primarily, it appears, for the purpose of bringing Cuban holdings tn some of the systems up to full strength. Tbe SAM system has been turned over to the Cubans, and theycertainly have full operational control Thus, the Cubans almost certainly have the capability ro shoot

There are almost certainly no Russian combat units sail present on the island. Almost all of the Soviet personnel who manned the SAM and early

law provides the resjlma -ith the means of accomplishing several obtectlses that ara not directly rnditary. Under (he naw law, induttees receive seven pesos per month instead of the oldeso pay. this will probably resultavin; of aboutillion pesos per sear. Technicians much needed by the Cuban economy will Vwuge and cheap labor force will be created for such |obi aa aidin; in sucar harvests. Finally, throughof most adults. Caiuo ha*ew mechanism to aid in esercisine, control over the population.

*Theurface-to-air miasde system has an estimated maximum operational range of aboutautscal milesaximum effective alt rude varubdiry of0 feet

warning radar systemi have returned to the L'SSB. when the rest depart, there will remain an organization of the MAAC type, the majority of whom areand rruinteiiancc personnel.ersonnel of this type will prafa-abiy remain so long as Castro continues to be dependent on the USSR for the technical and material support necessary for maintaining the complexthe Soviets haw supplied,

Chonces of ReintrediKtion of Strategic Weapons

e think it highly unlikely that the USSR will, within tbe period of this estimate, attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles intoven if the Soviets believed that therehance of completing such deploymentsthev would recognize that, to haw the desired political effect, the missiles would subsequently have to be revealed. Thev would be aware,that at somerisis of the 'severest kind would arise in an area where, as provedhe USSR israve disadvantage. The same line ofapplie* to Soviet delivery to the Cubans of other weapons that might be considered "offensive* by the US fe g. light bombers orhough the Soviets might estimate that the risk of US counteraction would not be so great.

he Soviets might see less risk in using Cubj for logistical support of their submarines. This Beet is very large, but regular patrols in tiie Western Atlantic have not been established. Refueling and repair iaaiines in Cuba would go far to overcome difficulties of distance and transit time and thereby would increase Soviet capabilities- The USSR would not expect to keep the US in the dark for long aboutrogram, but it might believe that adevelopment in thisbriefay. by individualconfront the US with difficult problems of response. On the other hand, the Soviets would almost certainly expect sharp reactions from the US. So long as they calculate that the risk would be high they would not pushenture very far.

V. FOREIGN POLICIES

Cuban-Soviet Relations

ha Cuban-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions haveCastro's contact with the Soviet ambassador has become relativelyhe has failed to appear at various social functions of the Soviet Bloc embassies, he continues to treat the Chinese Communists and Albanians as close allies, and the Cuban press frequently runs inASS article and one from the Yw China Scat Agency.

astro has never signed the test-ban treaty. Indeed, lost September he dismissed the relaxation of East-West tensions as much less important than

recojnize that die Soviets have the (ecnnuwl capability of clandestineW reintroducing .tratcglc ueapoiu. butelieve the risk ore corironUlion -Ould beto them.

Cuba's plight asmallattacked, blockaded, againstolicy ofs being" By inference he accused the Soviets of undue friendliness toward the imperialist enemies of Cuba. Castro and Clie Guevara have long expounded the necessity for violentosition much closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet doctrine Tiiev have alsoessentially in competition with most old-line. Soviet backed CommuniU parties in Latin .vmerica. And in Cuba itself. Castro has acted to prevent the Moscow-oriented "old" Communists fromominant role in theor in his United Party of the Socialist Revolution. In short. Castro hasarge measure of independence of action He has shown himself willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Sovict dispute, but he fails in the most important test of loyally: willingness to joinormalof

he Soviets, tor their port, cannot regard Castro as either veryor very consistent. His egotism must tax their patience, the administrative methods of his regime must make them wonderiable Communist slate can realty be molded from Cuban day. Their aid bill for keeping the Cuban economy aSoat is large enough to beertain Soviet officials, as well as some from the Eastern European countries, whichelatively modest part of the whole, have long muttered about pouring funds down the Cubanut the Soviets have not triedrirg Gtstro into line by withholding aid. despite the number of occasions in which he has 2outed their interests. Instead. Khrushchev has catered to his ego and. during his visits to the USSR ui the spring3 and in January ISftl. wooed him for weeks with attention and flattery.

M. Although Castro realizes that he cannot survive without Soviet support and that he must continue to rely on the benefits of Urge-scale Soviet economic and murtarv aid. he will not submit to much Soviet discipline and control. He knows that the Soviets regard their stake inommunist Cubaajor one. Thus he almost certainly believes that hein fact, he probably doesroom for maneuver. Castroontinue to be quite suspicious of any improvement in US-Soviet relations. Apparently his fear is not that the Soviets would sell him out in bilateral negotiations, but that they might stand by while US economic pressures, exile raids, and anof adverse factors gradually eroded ha position beyond recoverv

he Soviets seem to have little choice butontinue theu patientfor Castro. They will almost certainly counsel him to caution in dealing with the US and in fomenting revolution in Latin America; they will not.be able to compel him to followourse. Thev* will try to make Cuba viable as an example to other small nations androject to which So-

By the endor*rm-oiK economic iui.Ur.cc eir-emi.turet lomount io0JiOCL TSne eoendilurrfeen lpcro.jiuceN-ew4 are Iduly io beit0 miU^n.

SEj#*ct'

viet prestige is committed in the face of bo'lind Communist China. For, despite all (heir difficulties with him, Cuba under Castro represent* the beltor the Soviet camp in the last several years and their firsthrough in the Western Hemisphere

Ihe Problem ot* SAMs*

he most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as sselletween Castro and the US. is rise continuation of US reconnaissance overdighti Tlse available evidence points to the conclusion that Cuba new has full control over the SAM system, thus "easing tlie Soviets only the capacity to give advice backed up by their political and economic leverage. On tlie other hand, the evidence is not such as to permit us wholly to exclude the possibility that the USSR lut retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Khrushchev would have an incentive to maintainestraint because the untrammelcdof the SAMs would give the volatile Castro an important influenceital Soviet interest. Khnishchcv must calculate that in the eventhootdovvn the US would retaliate sharply against Cuba. Tha could confront KJuTishchev with tbe unhappv dilemma of facing up to the US ui circumstances even less propitious than those ofr of publicly reneging on his oft'CCpeatcd promises to support Castro.

n the past few months Castro and Khrushchev have publiclyommon position againstights. They havethat the flights will not be tolerated much longer and that, if political persuasion fails to deter the US.ill be shot down. They haveimetable which would bring the issueead after the USCastro has reiterated that he will take his case to the next UN Ceneral Assembly and exhaust the possible political remedies before ordering aKhrushchev has taken pains to stress Castro's right and ability to use the SAM system and has warned that the USSR will tund by Castro in the event of US retaliation.

hough some surprise move in the midst of the US election campaign cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that the USSR and Cuba will continue to use the next few months to agitatessue and sound out the US on possible com promises. Both Ivhnishchev and Castro have let it be known that they would not object to satellite or oblique photography. Thev have also hinted vaguely that some form of inspection on the ground might be arranged in return for inspection of nearby US territory Castro and Khrushchev hope this combination of warnings, threats, and compromise offers will be effective in exerting pressure cn the US. Even if this approach is fruitless, Castro probabl* estimates that in the process he can gain sympathy for his position, begin to mobiliM UN members on his side, and raise the political costs to the US offor the shootdowTi.

n sum. we believe that Castro will think it prudent to wait until after the US elections to force the overflights issue. At the same time, we think he is fully determined toajor effort for formal UN* consideration of the

matter, if he obtains ao satisfaction from the US- If Uiis campaign does not succeed, there is considerable danger that,ast resort, he wouldhootdown. calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did. the resulting hue and cry would being overflights to an end. In the interim there willossibility of an impulsive reaction b> Castro. There is alto the chance of an unauthorized shootdown. but in view of the importance to Castro of this matter, the chances of such an action seem to us to be small

Overtures Toward tho US

Oirushchev, in supporting Cuba's position on overflights, may again have urged Castro to explore the possibilitiesormalization of relations with the US. Castro probably considers such an effort useful toecord of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba's appeal to the UN. In any ease, we believe that Castroerious interest in impi-oving relations with the US. The US economic denial program has hurt Cuba and will continue to do so. Moreover, as parallel revolutions fail to materia lite in Latin America, he is increasingly forced to give up the notion that relations with the UShort-term problem destined to be swept away by the tide of hemispheric revolution. Funhermore. theS-Soviet atmosphere of detente persists, the more he must concern himselfossible lack of support from his patronrisis

His interest in stabdizing relations with the US wars with elements cn Castro's temperament, with his strong revolutionary bent, and with his recurring conviction that the US price for normalization would be nothing less than his own disappearance. He clearly considers US acceptance of his regime toong-range and chancy prospect to which be cannot commit his policies. Nevertheless, he has made various overtures toward the US from time to time. We expect future efforts, perhaps including some moderation of his conduct, intended to soften US resistanceapprochement We think there is virtually-no chance, however, that he will accede at any early date to the cotsditiorts which the US has stated.,!

latin American Policies

is first ofevolutionary and has expended much energyencouraging violent revolutione has providedan assortment of Communist and ooo-Communist revolutionaries.has taken the form of propaganda, limited financial aid, politicaland training in subversive techniques and guerrilla warfare. 3

ulya Staleipoiesnsaji rertaeiicd (he socettandiaf. US poi.cr-that there are two elements in rhe Cuban situation which are nor negotiable: "Caatro'i net ol dependency with rhe USSR which are tantamount to Soviet domination of the regime and rhe cooraDoaara o( Castro's prrtmoooo of subversion elsewhere in rhe bemuphere "

"eausrd. counrry-by-country aaeanatt oaf Comsnurust and Castrout strenrrhi.and opportunities, seedosmurutt Potentialities as Laoncheduled foroosickration In Anr. Secret

atin Americans tr;ueled to Cuba: several hundred cf chem probably received training in trrrorut and guemlb methods whilehe Castro regime has undertaken direct supply or some arms to extremist groups. the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela lost November) but prefers to provide funds for the purrlusc of weapons from other sources.

ISO Although these efforts have helped strengthen extreme leftist dissidentsumber of Latin American countries, there lave been no Costm-stylc revolutions and. except in Venezuela and Cuatemala, very little violentactivity. Indeed. Castro roust view developm-enis over the past year aa disappointing. In Venezuela, long the priority target in Castro's revolutionary plans, the Communist and Costroist groups failed dismally in their terrorist attempts to disrupt the December election and prevent an orderly succession of government. In Panama, the climate of opinion-which came into being with the anti-US riots in January seemed topecial opportunity for aggressive violent action by the Castroistiulnerable, oligarchic regime. Havana immediately urged this course, but the Castrouts in Panama preferredive priority to tactics aimed at gradually increasing their influence within the established political system. In Brazil, the removal of Contort in April dimmed the prospect! of the extreme left tor exerting and expanding political influence; the Castello Bronco government has broken rcbtions with Cuba, leftists have been removed from important Brazilian government jobs, and the various local Communists and Costroist groups ore in disarray In sum, Castro's revolutionirv hopes have suffered notable setbacks during the past year, some of them occurring despite circumstances which he apparently thought propitious for action.

hese developments have also tended to stiffen the inQ-Castro position of most of the member governments of the Organization of American States. The OAS adoption onuly of diplomatic, trade, and shipping sanctions against Cuba is primarily important in its psychological rather than its economic impact. But Castro obviously feels that Cuba's political isolation in the hemisphere is damaging to his cause; he will try to impede implementation of the sanctions as well as other actions which would reinforce this isolation

e believe that Castro and his revolutionary theorist. Che Guevara, have become somewhat less sanguine about their chances for quick revolutionary Success. In their speeches and propaganda on the subject, they will probably wax not or cold at various times as they have in theut they almost certainly will continue to aid and train potential revolutionaries. They mav press for early aggressive action on the part of Castroist groups in some Latin .American countries, even though the immediate chances of these groups seem poor; here, their primary hope would be that the government'swould antagonize larger segments of the population, eventually producing

u|Or rpeecti onaters ooca icaiaenerii ippeaJ for revolution ui Latin America,f encouragement for "trie heroiconaries" of Venezuela andinqeoui eucniilai" of Guatemala.

conditions more favorable for exploitation. Theeauers might, however, have difficulty in persuading even strong sympathizers to undertake the first step of this scenario; there is no plethora of willing martyrs Ul Latinumber of other factors also militate against quick Cajtroist revolution; these range from the dinginess of the Cuban show window to the increased effectiveness of the securitythe increased awareness of the potentialmany Latin American countries.

here is danger, nonetheless, 'hat Castruists may succeed ui triggering or participating in revolutions during the period of this estimate, and this danger mav increaseonger time-span. The basics of the Latin Americanpressures on limited resources, and rates of economic and social development which do not keep pace with the rising expectations of thecontinuing instability and growing popular dissatisfaction with established political parties and institutions. These conditions are readilyby extremists of various shades, sudden change and revolutionary situations must be expected. Depending on the nature ofew hundred Castroist activistsmall number of Cuban-supplied weapons could provide the- initial impetus or even the decisive factor in aa attempt to overthrow an established government But the Castroists would notemerge as the dominant element in the revolutionary movement.

Original document.

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