CHANGING PATTERNS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Created: 7/22/1964

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Patterns in Eastern Europe

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Changing Patterns in Eastern Europe

whim.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

CONCLUSIONS

L THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The USSR and Eastern Europe 3

Factors of Change 0

Internal Devclopmonti 6

II. PROSPECTS 0

Ceneral 8

The OutlookticsJ Stability 9

The Economic Outlook

Relations Among Communist Countries

CHANGING PATTERNS IN EASTERN EUROPE

THE PROBLEM

To assess the situation and outlook in the Eastern European countries and their external relations over ihe next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

Europe has entered upon its thirdere marked by popular upheavals andof disintegration, and the next several years byrelative quiet. The present is marked once more by awith change and we lookeriod of political liveliness

the minds of most Eastern Europeans, however, theof Communist rule is not now tn dispute. It is rather thethe national future, within the frameworkommunistis being subjected to examination and experiment. Theissues are those of liberalization and economic reform.turn arc closely related to the problems of autonomy withincamp and relations with the West. Increasingly,of Eastern Europe are feeling free to approach thesein the light of Soviet wishes or the supposed commonthe Bloc, more in the light of national aspirations and local (Paras.

result of this trend, winch is likely to continue for theyears,rowing diversification in Eastern Europe.including the USSR, will find it increasingly hard to applyanalysiseneral policy to the area. We expectof these countries some movement toward politicala search for better balance and more efficient methods in managing

the economy. Economic progress, while likely to show someover the generally dismal record of the last two years, will not be such as to diminish dissatisfaction and impatience in the near future. Political evolution is not likely to proceedpeed which threatens the Communist regimes.

external relations, weimilar uneven evolutionthe tutelage of Moscow and toward closer contacts withand the US. We believe that the Soviets would considerintervention in Eastern Europe only in emergencywhen they believed vital Soviet interests to bepolitical terms, the irreducible Soviet demand probably is thatshould remain professedly Communist and continue atmembership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as these limitstransgressed wo believe that the USSR is prepared to toleratedivergence in internal policies and even to acquiescein further manifestations of independence in foreigncountries will almost certainly seek to develop theircultural relations with the Westapid rate, though theof Eastern Europe will remain closely lied to that of

wc believe that these trends will unfold graduallymajor upheavals, we are conscious of tho possibility ofand even violent shifts. The chances of change ofdepend to some extent upon each country's success inproblems and party factionalism. Developments inUnion will probably be equally important. If the USSRto falter in its competition with the West, to lose prestigecontest within the Communist movement, or to give anuncertainty in its policy. Eastern European nationalism mayto bolder ventures. These possibilities will alsothe succession period in Soviethich is likely tonervousness, and exaggerated hopes and fears fn )

DISCUSSION

I. THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The USSR and Eastern Europe

1uller eiseiasion of llw impact ol the Slno-Sovlct dispute on EnsK-rn Europe, we, "Prospects tor the International Communis Movement" datedaragraph)

When Stalin diedoviet control over Eastern Europe was strong end the Satellite regimes could not have survived without it. Stalin haddirect political control by installing obsequious leaders such as Rakosi and Bierut and supervising them on the spot through Soviet ambassadors and periodically through official party emissaries. Stalin had also frequentlypurges within the Communist parties to eliminate real or potential dissidents. The secret police were controlled from Moscow by an elaborate system of Soviet "advisers" and by direct penetration at all levels. Sovietcontrolled the Satellite armed forces, with the help of Soviet "advisers' attached to stairs down to Geldgradc level. Political control was augmented by direct control over the economies, which were still being exploited by the USSR. Moscow supervised all planning, trade was largely limited to Bloc partners, and contact of every kind with the outside world was minimal.

Upon coming to power, Khiushchev regarded it as important to correct what he considered to be Stalin's gross errors of policy towards Easternparticular, his blatant exploitation of tlie Satellite economies and his arbitrary, coercive approach. He therefore set Out to establish Sovietwith Uiese countriesewwhich relied less on coercion and more on voluntary cooperation. Klirushchev also consideredajor error tliat Yugoslavia had been excluded from the bloc of Communist states, and he strove to bring Yugoslavia back into it

Khrushchev made some progress5 andut theIn Poland and Hungary later that year sliowed that he had seriously underestimated the problem. Clearly the Communist regimes were not strongly enough established to resist nationalism and pressures forhrushchev moved to reconstitute the fabric of Sovietin Eastern Europe, in the process calling on Chinese assistance and thereby encouraging Petplng's larger ambitions. The Bloc was consolidated at tho Moscow conference that year, but at the price of the continued exclusion of Yugoslavia.

When in later years tlie dispute between the USSR and China became evident, the role of each individual Communist party took on newot onlv was Soviet authority openly challenged, but China's insistenceeneral condemnation of Yugoslavia made that countryentral

loin in Bloc politics, Tho Interaction of these- two developments lederious Soviet defeat in Eastern Europe, when Albania successfully defied the USSR and joined with China against Moscow, The Albanian leaders' hostility-to Khrushchev and to his rapprochement with Tito arose from their acute friarsoscow-Belgrade conspiracy to restore Yugoslav hegemony over Aibania. The Soviets were unable by poutical subversion and pressure or by economic sanctions to bring the Albanians to heel and proved unwilling to resort to military force because of the practical and political difficulties involved.

s the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, Khnisncncv was forced to defend more vigorously his efforts lo re-establish some relationship between Tilo and tho Soviet Bloc- Despite tbe lessonsM. the Imperatives of tbe Sino-Soviet conflict led Khrushchev to urge the other East Europeans to follow the Soviet lead in improsing relations with Yugoslas-ia. In this process,Khrushchev was forced to accept Tito largely on tho lattor't own terms. In fact, Klirushchev recognized Tito's "different road* to socialism, and even publicly ersdorsed certain Yugoslavommunist development. The Yugoslav and Albanian examples thus combined to suggest that the USSR on the one hand favored considerable autonomy, and on the other svas limited in its ability to enforce predetermined liauts.

his Soviet prodicamenl has been dramatically demonstrated more reucntlv by die behavior of Rumania. Rumanian intransigence was the product,of Cheotghiu-Dej'i early opposition to de-Stallnlzation, of ksrigstaisding eco-nomic grievances against tho USSR, and of increased confidenceesult ofsuccesses. Determined lo pursue rapid industrializjition como what may, the Rumanians refused to modify their ocorsornlc deveJopniem program in spite of pressure by the USSR and other Communist countries. An awakeningencouraged2 by Soviet concessions to national sovereignty, has prompted tho Rumanians to act more and more independendy in various aspects of foreign policy. Ttsey have refused to support Soviet actions against China, and have even presumptuously offered to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict. In4 they openly declared their deMrrninatioo to act as an independent Communist counhry.

eanwhile, in thn early sixties, tho pattern of relations in Eastern Europe was also affected by developments outside the Communist world. One factor of major importance was the new view of the world strategic balance whichorldsvidc consequence of the Cuban missile crisisreviously, East European Communists hud been led lo believe that the Soviets possessed an advantage in strategic weapons which would enable them to make major gains against tho West- Tho crisis, however, made it evident that, far from post owing such an advantage, the Soviets were forced to draw back, and to alter their tactics toward the West. Similarly, the evident prosperity and vitality of Western Europe in the sixties cast doubt on Communist con tendons about the direction of history and excited simple envy. Tlie general result

was to reduce Soviet prestige In Eastern Europe and encourage thinking about the future in mora nabcoalolic terms.

Factors of Change

The consequence of this history Is thut, while the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe remnini strong, there is now considerable scope for indigenous factors which are potentially inimicalhai presence. Probably the strongest of these' is nationalism, which has reappeared in dvnamic form, most notably in Rumania and Slovakia. Whatever Us direct targets and its peripheral benefits to certain Soviet policies (as in continuing fears of Westationalism in Eastern Europe is essentially incompatible with Soviet domination. Further, it is, as an emotionalarticularly difficult form of opposition and pressure for the Soviets to combat. This Is especially the cano when it is able toirm hold on the minds of tho Communist leaders themselves, as it did in Hungary and PolandB and seems to be doing in Rumanian any case, few Eastern European Communist leaders remain who are ready to execute Soviet desires without regard to the implications for their own country.

Related to this developmentrend awayoctrinaire approach and toward greater moderation in internal policy. Throughout the area, the men who led in establishing die present regimes are growing old ami are giving way graduallyew generation whose experience with communism is not inevolution but inlate. Whcrooj many of the attitudes and habits of Ihe older leaders were conditioned by early training in the USSR, lry revolutionary fervor, and by close ties with the Soviet party, many of the youngeriving no such bonds, tend to respond more to tbe needs and traditional attitudes of their own countries.

The gradual trend away from doctrinaire policies lias alto been tbe result of economic necessity. Tlie realization is growing, especially in the more industrialized countries, that adequate economic performance depends increasingly on care and sophistication In planning and management. But in spite of much experimentation, thereen no real progress toward devising effective incentives in economies still nin predominantly by command. Already, however, greater restraint is apparent in the adoption of lets ambitious economicact which should ciminidi tlte likelihood of serious mistakes and create more favorable conditions for technical and qualitative improvements.

Finally, tluoughout Eastern Europe the intelligentsia are exerting stronger pressures to end their isolation from the West and toay back to an association with cultural trends in Europe. They have been stimulated by periodic relaxations in Soviet cultural controls and by various official policies, such as in creased encouragement of tourism, exchanges with the West, and discontinued or diminished Jamming of Western broadcasts Some of the leaders, such as Kadar, see beneSti to themselves in accommodating these pressures. Otliers, notably Ulbetcht, continue to try to repress them.

Internal Development!

e believe that, barring external shocks, the Communist regimes are now fairly well established in Eastern Europe. They have developed strong apparatuses of power, and arc able either to anticipate most problems of public order befarc they arise or to suppress them if they do. Moreover, the peoples of these countries far the most part have in the course of someears become resigned to the continued existence of some form of Communist rule. The experience6 in Hungary was especially instructive in bringing home the realization that they could expect little if any help from the West If they tried themselves to overthrow the Communist authorities.

problems continue, nonetheless, as potential threats topopular dissatisfaction with these regimes and their policiesconditionsajor source of discontent, especially in PolandAnodicr problem, intellectufll agitation for greatermore contact with the West, has stimulated both popular disaffectionwithin and among the various parties. Indeed, factionalcontinue to plague the Communist parties, and to weaken tliesome present leaders. Finally, revived nationalism has In somethese differences, and in others has affected tho attitudes andthe Communist leaders themselves.

In contrast to the relatively rosy economic picture In Eastern Europe during the Intoarked decline has occurred during the earlyates of economic growth in the moro industrially developed countries. In Czechoslovakia, industrial production actually fell3 and GNP has scarcely increased at all for two years. Thereumber of reasons for this decline of industrial growth In the northern countries, industry is being operated virtually at full capacity, and especially in East Germany there is nootential for easy growth through the use of existing plant. Except in Poland there is nourplus of agricultural labor for use in industry. Foreign and domestic customers areore rapid improvement of teclinology and quality than tho economies have been able to achieve under an Inflexible system of economic management. Some temporary factors, such as grossly unrealistic planning and unfavorable weather conditions, have also contributed to Ihe slowdown. In most of Eastern Europe agriculturalhas stagnated, and thero has been little improvement in personal consuinpcion.

In Czechoslovakia the serious state of the economy has had important political effects. Dissatisfaction with Novotny's mishaudling of tho economy has toined with resentment against his slowness and clumsiness inon.esult, outspoken criticism of uV leadership occurred and demands were voiced in the press, especially in Slovakia, for Justice to Stalinist purge victims and retribution against the purgers. Those developments considerably sharpened traditional Czech-Slovak antagonism in tho party and population, forcing Novotny to sacrifice some of bis closest associates in the leadership

aod to make important political and economic concessions. Indeed* internal dissension came close last year to unseating Novotny himself. His concessions have by no means mollified the opposition, which continues to agitate for less doctrinaire and less restrictive policies. These developments have been accompanied by on intellectual ferment almost as intense as those in Poland and Hungary, and by the re-emergence of nationalist fervor among Slovaks.

In Poland, Gomulka's popular image has deteriorated greatlynd he has also lost stature in the Communist Party. Though not nearly so intense or clearly defined as, factionalism within tbe party has again become an important problem for Comutka. The conservative or hard-line group, whose main strengthn the internal security apparatus, is manifestly out of sympathy with Gomulka's policies, and for that matter with Khrushchev's, which tliey consider much toolie opposing taction, which has representatives in many ministries and among inlcUcctuals. criticizes Gomulka for failure to get the economy moving and for Imposing too many restrictions on political and social activity. With some Justice, this group charges that the hard-liners are anti-Semitic and desire to restore discredited Stalinist policies. Further, there is widespread popular impatience with die failure of the Corauika regime to achieve the expected Improvement in living conditions, and with increasing restrictions imposed by the regime in daily life, The continuing conflict between Church and State also Imposes strains within the government and upon the populace.

In East Germany, the Ulbricht regime continues to be greatlyof its populace and remains almost completely dependent on Soviet protection. Ulbricht hasoyal instrument of Moscow during the GDR's entire exislence, but his age and health have reached the point where someone else may shortly have to assume the burdens of his post. None of the likely candidates appears to possess his skills and experience, and the Soviets doubtless will be forced to carefully oversee developmentsuccession period. The East German leaders are greatly concerned over the effect among their own intelligentsia of cultural currents and more liberal policies elsewhere in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia. SED leaders several times have been moved to express open disapproval ofin that country. Such cultural currents are making it more and more difflcult for the Ulbricht regime to continue to suppress kindred developments in Ihe GDR.

In Hungary, Kadar appears to have consolidated his leadership over his party. At the same time he has placed his country quietlyradualist and pragmatic course which has Improved the political and economic climate. In this he has developed incentives and has encouraged participation in his internal program on the basis of practical rather than political qualification. He has even used Hungarian national feeling to his own advantaga In the process he hasood deal of his stigmaoviet puppet.

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, Zhivkov seems largely to have failed where Kadar has succeeded. Zhivkov's abilities and his policies are not held in high regard by important elements in the party which would prefer to be led by the ousted Stalinist leader, Chervenkov, or the former premier, Yugov. These elements seize every opportunityhe Gcoigicv spy case last winter) to try to discredit Zhivkov andeturnore conservative line. Nevertheless, Zhivkov's position is greatly fortified by demonstrations of strong Soviet support; his willingness to follow Khnishchev's lead in both foreign and domestic policies has been rewarded by the extension ofO.0GO.OCO in Soviet economic aid during the past several months. In any case, theissues within the Bulgarian party do not now seem to center around the question of Bulgaria's relations with the USSR; thus Zhivkov's removal would probably not lead to any "declaration of Independence" by his successors.

While economic growth was slowing down in the northern countries, Rumania was booming. It achieved an unusually high rate of industrial growthainly because consistently good harvests9 and the availability of Western credits enabled the regime to finance greatly increased imports of industrial malerials, macluhery, and equipment from the West. Rumania's success in Industrialization and its acquisition of modem up-to-date Western equipment increased the confidence of the Communist leaders,them toationalistic position, especially in economic policy.

The Gheorghiu-Dej regime has until recently been reluctant to relax its coercive methods of control. Gheorghiu-Dej has long favored strict, even Stalinist, methods and has opposed the introduction of de-Stahnusation in Rumania, partly because he felt this might undermine his own position. Yet the revival of nationalism in Ihe pasi few years has strengthened the unity of the leadership and has helped the regime to find common ground with therocess which the recently announced wage increases and tax cuts should assist The considerable expansion in contacts and exchanges with tlie West has also had an ameliorative effect. Certain measures taken by thethe extensive release of politicalthat the regime now feels able to relax its coercive policies toward the populace.

II. PROSPECTS General

e believe that the next few years in Eastern Europe will be characterized by continued change and fluidity. In the political sphere, many regimeswill attempt to enlist the supportarger proportion of the populace. This would mean further curbs on the police and security organs, continued sufferance, within limits, of cultural ferment and Ihe exchange of ideas, and greater toleration of non-Communist participation in public life. Createrin internal policy will encourage, and be encouraged by, the development of closer cultia-al and political ties with Western countries. In the economic

sphere, the regimes probably will tend to be more pragmatically mchned in their policies than in the past, and to place more reliance on incentives and less on political exhortation And manipulation. This trend will also be stimulated by the development o( broader economic contacts with tho West.

evertheless, the Communist regimes will still be swayed by tbeof the Communist system and their relations with the USSR. Some of them probably will be forced at times to employ harsh methods of control, and at other times to quicken tbe pace of economic or political concessions to the populace. Much will depend on the course of Soviet policy and the USSR's relations with the West and Communist China.

eneralizations will be more and more difficult to make about Eastern Europe. With the examples of Yugoslavia, Albania, aud now Rumania before them, other Eastern European regimes can increasingly feel free to approach their problems In tho light of national aspirations and tho local politicalsaving their wholehearted endorsements of Soviet policy for those cases In which thoy trulyommon interest with (lie USSR. Traditionalantagonisms probably will again become important in relations between these countries, und between some of them and the USSR. Friction has already been apparent in relations between the Communist regimes of Hungary and Rumania over treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. We think that other differences of this kind will probably appear between some of these countries, and between some of them and Yugoslavia.

The Outlook for Politico! Stability

The Communist regimes arc probably sufficiently strong and experienced to maintain public order. East Germany is the exception; tlie regime isunstable, but tho strong Soviet forces there areosition to crush any disturbances quickly. Since the people are aware of this fact anduch disturbances are not likely under present circumstances.

While svo believe that change in Eastern Europe will bo gradual, we do not exclude the possibility of sudden and even violent shifts, In each country, the chances of change of this sort depend to some extent upon success inpopular dissatisfaction and avoiding gross economic mistakes. Even more important, stability will be endangered if the party proves unable towithin its own upper circles theendemic to Communist politics. The disintegration which threatened the Polish party and overtook thepartyould proceed only because intraparty divisions came to involve the rank-and-file membership and the urban popiilation as weU. The Czechoslovak regime Is currently experiencing difficulty of this nature,uccession problem could intensify this danger in almost any of these countries. But wc believe that, over the next few years, the various regimes will maintain sufficient unity to preserve essential stability.

Equally important will be the Influence of developments in the Soviet Union. If the USSR continues to falter in its miliraiy and economic ccrapetitiou

with the US. loses further prestige in the coolest within the internationalmovement, andontinuing impression of uncertainty In its policy toward Eastern Europe, nationalism will be encouraged to bolderarticular threat to stability lies in the prospectuccession struggle in the USSR; unless this is avoided or quickly ended, factionalism in Moscow will almost certainly breed factionalism, nervousness, and exaggerated hopes and fears In Eastern Europe. This would encourage some Communist leaders to test more vigorously the limits of Soviet permissiveness. Others, particularly those wlwse popular support was narrowest, would try to strengthen domestic discipline andeinforce thislose indontiflcation with the USSR.

he Comulka regime, though still the most permissive in Eastern Europe, has retrogressed considerably from tlie degree of freedom which existed6nd some further encroachments on the freedom of the Poles arehe next few years. The regime will proceed cautiously, however, since it is aware thatourse could bring popular resentmentangerous point. The Novotny regime has had to do much to liberalize its internal policies in the past year or so; svo believe that this trend will continue and that the other regimes will be influenced by it. We also expect the trend towardto continue in Hungnry. Tlie Ulbricht regime Is unlikely to alter its fundamental policies, although it may make some gestures, with Sovietto ease internal pressures.

The Economic Outlook

Tlie more industrialized countries of Eastern Europe arc unlikely touick way out of their difficulties. We expect' In general that grosvth rates of the East European economics will be considerably below the levels achieved in the IWsO's, although above those. Such an economic performance is likely to be disappointing to the regimes In most of Eastern Europe and thus toource of contention over economic policy. Pressure will probablyforigher priority to raising personal consumption andtile economic system. In any event, it will take severaloH living conditions in the industrialized countries can be improved markedly, so that popular Impatience and dissatisfaction will probably remain strong.

Wo believe that many of these countries will continue to experiment svith reforms of the economic system. Increased reliance probably will be placed oo economic rather than ideological factors in planning, and further attempts made to simplify state controls, to increase the authority of enterprises inproduct assortment and methods of production, and to further Improve price systems and incentives. Experiments also probably svill be made toward allowing consumer demand to determine the assortment of consumer goodsand in making production for export more responsive to foreign demand. Changes now under coriraderation la Chechoslovakia, East Cermany, andfor example, are apparently of this nature. Such factors, however, as prudence, vested bureaucratic interests, and ideological conservatism svill limit

the pace of change and piodiice occasional reversals. The basic characteristics of central planning, state ownership, and collective agriculture will persistong time to come.

We believe that these countries will seek to develop closer economicwith the West The mored countries are making serious efforts to produce manufactured goods meeting world standards. Thisong-range effort, but in the taterim tbe developed West is showing an increased wlllingneu to finance East European trade with credits- Rumania's specialsurplus of basic commodittes readily salable outside thewill depend to some extent on future agricultural conditions. As East European industry acquires advanced equipment from the West, this will Increaseon non-Bloc sources for maintenance and new technology.

Closer economic tics with the West will probably be accompanied by im-provod relations in the political and cultural fields, and we expect Western Europe to be increasingly active in the next few years in attempts to exploit the changing situation. There arc very strong traditional cultural bondsmany Eastern European peoples and the West, for example, thoseRumania andarked revival of these ties would tend to lessen internal policy and encourage independence of tlie USSR- The Federalb Improving trade and cultural relations with these countries andmayormula permitting diplomatic relations. This may help to mitigate popular fears in Eastern Europeresurgent" and "revanchist" West Cermany, although tlie critical element here is Bonn's position with regard to frontiers. Tlie prospect of improved relations between West Geimany and East-em Europe tends to undermine tho position of East Germany. This effect is already evident in the "Berlin Clauiii" in recent trade agreements between West Germany and several Eastern European governments.

Relotioni Among Communis! Countries

We thus believe that, over the next few years, the dominint trend inEurope will be toward drvessity. toward autonomy within the framework of loosening Soviet rule. This trend presently benefits from the USSn's detente tactics toward the West and the still evolving Sino-Soviet dispute. Future developments in these spheres may intrude in an Important way to check the processes of cluinge in Eastern Europe. In general, however, we believe that tho factors making for diversity and autonomy have vigorous roots, and that shifts lu Soviet policy arc more likely lo alfect the pace of this process than to leverso it

As one consequence of this trend, we believe that economic cooperation among Ihe CEMA countries will continue to develop primarily along bilateral lines. Rumania's current stand on this issue, which probably evokes considerable sympathy elsewhere, makes it unlikely that the Soviets will press broad schemes of economic integration foe ihe entire area. There is, however, further scope for mutually advantageous specialization, particularly among the more developed

V

countries. La any event, and even though trade with tlie West will almost certainly increase, the economies ot* Eastern Europe will remain closely tied to Out of the USSR.

Rumania'i successful assertion of national interests may stimulate similar moves by other East European states. For the most part, however, these regimes are likely to proceedircumspect fashion. Ratlter than openly differing svith Soviet policy, for example, they will tend to pressreater voice In tlie formulation of general Bloc policy prior to Moscow's officialrather than openly attacking CEMA, they svill bargain for tocrewed Soviet assistance and better terms of trade. Nevertheless, nationalism has on occasion led to bold and injudicious acts in Eastern Europe, and dramaticcan by no moans be ruled out in the futuro.

In such Instances, the reassertion of Soviet authority wouldery difficult matter. Political techniques of control have been much weakened, and we Iwllove that tho Soviet* would consider direct military intervention in Eastern Europe only in emergency circumstances, when they believed vital Soviet interests to be threatened. In political terms, tho irreducible Soviet demand probably is that these regimes should remain professedly Communist and cocMfiuc at least formal membership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as these limits are not transgressed, we behave that the USSR is prepared to tolerate considerable divergence in internal policies and even to acquiesce reluctantly in further manifestations of independence in foreign policy. On other matters than the Warsaw Pact, perhaps Yugoslavia's position suggests the political limits of svhat tho USSR, under sustained pressure, would be svtlling gradually to permit to otlier East European governments.

Tho Soviet strategic stake in Eastern Europe is complex Soviet forces stationed there, particularly in East Germany, play an important rolo In Soviet strategy for general war, in maintaining stability in East Germany, and in deterring Wort Germany from thoughts of reunification by forco. The air defense systems of Eastern Europe are coordinated wilh tho Soviet system and for most practical purposes constitute an extension of that system; tliey provide both additional warning time and active defense against aircraft nttacking the USSR from Western Europe. So long as attack by aircraft from tho west can deliver substantial inegaloooage on the USSR, die air defenses of Eastern Europe svill bo of great importance to the Soviets. All these concerns might be reduced by future developments in the Cerman question and European security arrangements,omplete Soviet vsnrhdrawal from East Germany could only bo undertaken as partundamental change in Soviet policy toward Central Europe.

Within these poutiCal and strategic limits, however, the Soviets probably wiU have to accommodate themselves to an increasing expression of national interests in Eastern Europe. In particsilar. they aro likely to acquiesceonsiderable Increase in Eastern Europe's economic and cultiual relations with tho West, Including the us. In this matter they will find it difficult to press

on theirore restrictive policy than the USSR itself practices. Thus we believe that the concern for self-preservation among the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe will be more important than Soviet misgivings andin limiting their economic and cultural relations with the West

he patterns of change in East Europe are bound to be affected by and In turn to influence the German question. For some time to come the fear of Germany is likely lo be one of Moscow's strongest cards in Prague and War-Saw. All the Eastern Europeau governments are likely to see little to be gained from upsetting the status quo in Central Europe. Nevertheless, these attitudes are not permanently fixed, and they dependreat degree on the situation in East and West Germany. Already, the West Cermans have opened new lines of contacts and exelianges that could affect the attitudes of East Europeans, particularly those less directly concerned with Germany. At the same time,Is doubtful that East Germany can safely afford to follow the trends toward nationalism and liberalization of Internal controls developingin East Europe. It is thus conceivable that the difficulties arising from East Germany's anomalous position in Europe will become increasinglyboth to the USSR and to the other Communist countries. Though other factors will be of great importance, such an evolution of attitudes is one of the developments which might leadoviet re-evaluation of its German policy.

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